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ABSTRACT
A critical challenge in the design of AI systems that operate with humans in the
loop is to be able to model the intentions and capabilities of the humans, as well as
their beliefs and expectations of the AI system itself. This allows the AI system to
be “human- aware” – i.e. the human task model enables it to envisage desired roles of
the human in joint action, while the human mental model allows it to anticipate how
its own actions are perceived from the point of view of the human. In my research,
I explore how these concepts of human-awareness manifest themselves in the scope
of planning or sequential decision making with humans in the loop. To this end,
I will show (1) how the AI agent can leverage the human task model to generate
symbiotic behavior; and (2) how the introduction of the human mental model in the
deliberative process of the AI agent allows it to generate explanations for a plan or
resort to explicable plans when explanations are not desired. The latter is in addition
to traditional notions of human-aware planning which typically use the human task
model alone and thus enables a new suite of capabilities of a human-aware AI agent.
Finally, I will explore how the AI agent can leverage emerging mixed-reality interfaces
to realize effective channels of communication with the human in the loop.
i
“The world of research has gone berserk.
Too much paperwork.” 1
1All quotes in the dissertation, unless otherwise mentioned, are from Bob Dylan.
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PREFACE
When I first joined Yochan, I knew next to (less than) nothing about planning. All I knew
was that I wanted to build intelligent artificial agents. And I was vaguely certain that intelligent
artificial agents would like to be able to plan. At that time, there were a number of ongoing projects
in the lab, and a year in, after having flailed around with PISA [330] for a while, I was yet to define
anything concrete for myself. At about the same time, Kartik, who had been in the lab for almost a
decade, was beginning to lay down some of the foundational work at the intersection of task planning
and human robot teaming in his dissertation [439] (I really am the Return of the Jedi to his New
Hope). Meanwhile, Tony (who had just joined Yochan as a postdoctoral researcher) had heard about
our interest in task planning for human-robot interaction, looked around in our lab, and famously
proclaimed – “Where are the robots?!” (they were, of course, in Matthias’ Lab!). I could sense a
distinct shift in the focus of our lab – we were finally going to execute the plans we have been
generating all this years. In my brief career as a researcher, I have always been very adamant about
defining my own problems – “You’ve got to have that much self-respect not to do an entire Ph.D.
doing what you don’t want to do.”, Rao once told me. However, the allure of robots was hard to
escape, and I soon found myself sucked into two projects – one [440] on how superior task level
coordination in a human-robot team can be achieved by means of mental modeling of teammates,
and the other [504] on identifying how proactive support from a robot, enabled by the use of such
mental models, are perceived by their human teammates. Soon enough, I was captivated by this
delicate dance (technical term for argumentation) of models in the planning task when operating
with humans in the loop [225]. Over the next few years, I had thus embarked on a journey to explore
what it means for a planner to be truly “human-aware”. In this dissertation, I hope to take you on
this same journey, by the end of which, you too, like myself, will be left with next to (but more than)
nothing knowledge about the vast and intriguing world of human-aware planning.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
“Come in, she said, I’ll give ya shelter from the storm.”
The current public discourse in the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) might lead
one to believe that the world is coming to an end. The ground reality is, however,
much more benign. In fact, AI has contributed to massive advances in the fields of
healthcare, law, logistics, education, etc. which stand to provide considerable benefits
to the society. However, much of this progress, has been in the scope of AI algorithms
deployed in standalone systems. As AI-based systems become integral parts of our
daily life or our workplace, as essential components of hitherto human-only enterprises,
this is likely to change – i.e. the effects of interaction between humans and automation
cannot be ignored both in terms of how these partnerships affect the outcome of an
activity and how they evolve as a result of it, but also in terms of how the possibility of
such interactions change the design of autonomy itself. In light of this, the traditional
view of AI as the substrate for complete autonomy of automation – the de facto
AI-dream ever since the conception of the field – has evolved of late to accommodate
effective symbiosis of humans and machines, rather than replacement of the former
with the latter, as one of the principle end goals of the design of autonomy.
This view has, in fact, reflected heavily in the public stance [492, 450] of many
industry leaders on the expected roles of AI in the future [490, 203]. The establishment
of Collaborations between People and AI Systems [344] as one of the thematic pillars
for the Partnership of AI is a primary example of this. The grand goal of the design of
AI-based systems is then the integration of the best of both worlds when it comes to
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the different (and often complementary) expertise of humans and machines, in order
to conceive a whole that is bigger than the sum of the capabilities of either – this is
referred to as Augmented AI [103, 35, 368] in the current discourse on AI. After all,
“. . . What is the point of intentionally inventing a Dystopian future and
be worried about it? . . . AI seems to be the only technology that has gone
from failure to apocalypse without being considered useful! 3”
said my advisor (c.f. AAAI-2014 Tutorial on Human-in-the-Loop Planning [225];
Special Track on Human-Aware AI at IJCAI-2016 [222]; miscellaneous press [223]).
In this spirit, this dissertation explores how the question of “human-awareness” may
be addressed from the point of view of automated planning. As research trends in the
design of autonomous systems continue to shift along the spectrum of replacement vs
integration, research in the field of automated planning has also, rather unsurprisingly,
reflected similar tendencies in recent times. While traditional AI planning has consid-
ered humans as nothing but part of the environment in general, it has been argued
[225, 71] that the presence of humans in the loop introduce unique challenges to the
design of autonomy. To the extent that such agents will be collaborating directly or
at least share the same environment with humans, the design of autonomy cannot
then be agnostic of how its decisions or plans are perceived by the human, but rather
must attempt to both conform to human expectations as well as anticipate the role
of the human in its operation. Indeed, a critical aspect of successful integration of
autonomous agents into established human workflows is how accepted standards of
collaborative behavior can be used to inform the design of autonomous systems, so
that the (actions of) artificial agents may be easily comprehended and hence perceived
favorably from the point of view of their human peers. Indeed, in the current climate
3In reference to “America is the only country that went from barbarism to decadence without
civilization in between!” – Oscar Wilde.
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of AI surrealism, and subsequent distrust/fear, the design of Human-Aware AI (and
Planning) has become even more critical.
1.1 Human-Aware Planning
Most traditional approaches to planning focus on one-shot planning in closed
worlds given complete domain models. While even this problem is quite challenging,
and significant strides have been made in taming its combinatorics, planners for
systems in human-machine teaming scenarios require the ability to be “human-aware”.
This requires a rethink of the classical intelligent agent architecture –
1.1.1 A Revised Intelligent Agent Architecture
Figure 1 characterizes how each step in the “Sense-Model-Plan-Act” (SMPA) cycle
of the classic goal-based agent view in [386] (c.f. Figure 1a) can be updated to facilitate
the mental modeling of the human-in-the-loop in order to enable a truly cognitive
teaming agent. This requires the ability to not only model how the agent’s actions
affect the physical environment around it but also the mental model of the human(s)
in the loop. Specifically, we introduce the Human Model (HuM) and the Human
Mental Model (HuMM) as key components in the agent’s deliberative process (c.f.
Figure 1b). Changes to “Model” in Figure 1 is a direct result of the requirement
of human mental modeling. Coarsely speaking, changes to Sense contribute to the
recognition of teaming context, changes to Plan contribute to the anticipation of team
behavior, and changes to Act contribute to the determination of proper actions at
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both the action and motion levels. These four processes are tightly integrated in the
behavior loop of a human-aware agent –
• Sense – The agent can no longer sense passively to check that the preconditions
of an action are satisfied, or after it applies an action to the world to confirm
that it is updated accordingly (“what the world is like now” in Figure 1b). In
teaming scenarios, the agent needs to proactively make complex sensing plans
that interact closely with other functionalities – Model and Plan – to maintain
the correct mental state (such as intentions, knowledge and beliefs) of its human
teammates in order to infer their needs. For example, how the robot should
behave is dependent on how much and what type of help the human requires,
which in turn depends on the observations about the human teammates such
as their behavior and workload. Furthermore, the inference about the human
mental state should be informed by the model that the robot maintains about
the human’s capabilities and preferences. Note that directly asking humans (i.e.
explicit communication) is a specific form of sensing.
• Model – Correspondingly, the state, i.e. “what the world is like now”, needs
to include not only environmental states, but also mental states of the team
members which may not only include cognitive and affective states such as the
human’s task-relevant beliefs, goals, preferences, and intentions, but also, more
generally, emotions, workload, expectations, trust and etc. “What my actions
do to the world” then needs to include the effects of the robot’s actions on the
team member’s mental state, in addition to the effects on their physiological
and physical states and the observable environment; “How the world evolves”
now also requires rules that govern the evolution of agent mental states based
on their interactions with the world (including information exchange through
4
(a) Traditional view of the goal-based intelligent agent architecture [386] that
describes how the agent models the world, senses changes in the environment,
plans to achieve goals and acts to execute the plans.
(b) An updated view of the agent architecture [71] acknowledging the need to
account for the Human (Mental) Model (HuM) and the Human Mental Model
(HuMM) in the deliberative process of a human-aware agent.
Figure 1: The traditional intelligent agent architecture must be adapted to accommo-
date the human (mental) model so as to enable human-aware decision-making.
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communication); “What it will be like” will thus be an updated state represen-
tation that not only captures the world state, agent physiological and physical
state changes based on their actions and current states, but also those mental
state changes caused by the agent itself and other team members.
• Plan – “What action I should do” now involves more complex decision-making
that must again also consider human mental state. Furthermore, since the
robot actions now can influence not only the state of the world but also the
mental state of the humans, the planning process must also consider how the
actions may influence their mental state and even how to affect/manipulate such
mental state. For example, in teaming scenarios, it is important to maintain
a shared mental state between the teammates. This may require the robots
to generate behavior that is expected or predictable to the human teammates
such that they would be able to understand the robot’s intention. This can,
in fact, be considered an implicit form of signaling or communication. On the
other hand, a shared mental state does not necessarily mean that every piece of
information needs to be synchronized. Given the limitation on human cognitive
load, sharing only necessary information is more practical between different
teammates working on different parts of the team task. A properly maintained
shared mental state between the teammates can contribute significantly to the
efficiency of teaming since it can reduce the necessity of explicit communication.
• Act – In addition to physical actions, we now also have communication actions
that can change the mental state of the humans by changing their beliefs, intents,
etc. Actions to affect the human’s mental state do not have to be linguistic
(direct); stigmergic actions to instrument the environment can also inform the
humans such that their mental states can be changed. Given that an action
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plan is eventually realized via the activation of effectors by providing motor
commands, Act must be tightly integrated with Plan. While Plan generates the
sequence of actions to be realized, motor commands can create different motion
trajectories to implement each action and can in turn impact how the plan
would be interpreted since different realizations can exert different influences on
the human’s mental states based on the context.
1.1.2 (Mental) Modeling of the Human-in-the-Loop
The take-away from the above discussion is that the reasoning process of a human-
aware (planning) agent, in addition to the model of self, must contend with the
two added models – the HuM (henceforth referred to as MHr ) and the HuMM
(henceforth referred to asMRh ). The particular component of the HuMM that I focus
on in this dissertation is the model that the human ascribes to the planning agent (i.e.
its intentions and capabilities)l which may be different from the actual model that the
agent has in reality. This is illustrated in Figure 2. Here, MR is the model of the
agent embodying the planner (e.g. a robot), andMH is the actual task model of the
human in the loop (which the robot does not have access to). Further, MRh is the
model the human thinks the robot has, andMHr is the model that the robot thinks
the human has. Finally, M˜Rh is the robot’s approximation ofMRh ; for the rest of the
paper we will be usingMRh to refer to both since, for all intents and purposes, this is
all the robot has access to. Note that, as mentioned before, planning with the the
human mental modelMRh is in addition to the (robot’s belief of the) human model
MHr traditionally encountered in human-robot teaming (HRT) and human-aware
planning (HAP) settings and is, in essence, the fundamental thesis of this work. In
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Figure 2: Illustration of the need for argumentation over multiple models (i.e. the
human task model and the human mental model) during the deliberative process of a
human-aware planning agent (e.g. a robot teammate).
the following, I will provide a brief glimpse of what kind of behaviors can emerge from
this multi-model argumentation during the deliberative process of a planning agent.
This serves as an outline of topics covered in this dissertation.
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Figure 3: The multi-model planning process over the many kinds of human-aware
behaviors going on inside the robot’s mind.
1.1.3 Multi-Model Argumentation for Human-Aware Planning
Figure 3 illustrates the many behaviors engendered by the multi-model argumen-
tation introduced above. These behaviors may manifest themselves both in the space
of plans as well as models – i.e. human-aware behavior generation involves trying to
figure out not only a desirable plan given a planning model in the traditional sense,
but also what model to plan in given the human mental model. For example –
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- In the plan space, a human-aware agent can useMR andMHr to compute –
- joint plans for teamwork [440];
- generate behavior that conforms to the human’s preferences inMHr – e.g.
in planning with possible resource conflicts [93] the robot can ensure that
the possible plans of the human are not sabotaged;
- plans that are suboptimal in the robot’s model but conform to human
expectations (as perMRh ) – i.e. explicable plans [507, 252].
- In the model space,
- modifications to the human mental model (whereby the robot makes changes
toMRh to bring it closer toMR in order to ensure that the human is on
the same page) can be used for explanations [86, 420];
- while modifying the human belief state in MH can create interesting
behaviors – e.g. in planning for serendipity [69] where the robot provides
unexpected help to the human by enabling (previously impossible) plans;
1.1.4 A “Subsumption Architecture” for Human-Aware Planning
The different behaviors engendered by this multi-model argumentation can be
composed to form more and more sophisticated forms of human-aware behavior. We
thus conclude this discussion with a hierarchical composition of behaviors in the form
of a “subsumption architecture” for human-aware planning, inspired by [54]. This is
illustrated in Figure 4. The basic reasoning engines are the Plan and MRP (Model
Reconciliation; to be covered in detail in Chapter 3) modules. The former accepts
model(s) of planning problems and produces a plan, the latter accepts the same and
produces a new model. The former operates in plan space and gives rise to classical,
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joint and explicable planning depending on the models it is operating on, while the
latter operates in model space to produce explanations and belief shaping behavior.
These are then composed to form argumentation modules for trading off explanations
and explicability and human-aware planning in general.
1.2 Dissertation Overview
With the above discussion in mind, the dissertation is organized as follows –
• Chapter 2 – I begin with the design of joint behaviors enabled by reasoning
with the human model HuM. Specifically, I investigate two novel behavior
patterns (outside of traditional human-robot teaming) where the robot interacts
with a human sharing the same environment but not explicitly as a teammate.
• Chapter 3 – I show how explainable behavior can be generated by explicitly
reasoning with the human mental model HuMM. In light of this multi-model
framework, I will demonstrate how the plan explanation process becomes one of
“model reconciliation”. This is the primary contribution of the dissertation.
• Chapter 4 – Finally, I investigate effective channels of communication that
can facilitate human-aware planning, e.g. by communicating intentions and
beliefs. Specifically, I focus on the role of emerging technologies in mixed-reality
interfaces that can assist the cause of human-aware planning.
Finally, in Chapter 5, I will conclude with a summary of conclusions and broader
implications of the work. I also provide an extensive appendix that demonstrates ap-
plications, and fielded prototypes, and complementary threads of research (Appendices
B-I) that has sprung directly from the work presented in the dissertation.
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Figure 4: A “subsumption architecture” for a human-aware planning agent.
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1.3 Preliminaries
However, before I begin the discussion on human-aware techniques developed
in this dissertation, I will briefly introduce in the following sections some of the
basic notations and concepts pertaining to automated planning that will be re-used
throughout the rest of the dissertation. I will also introduce the USAR and Assembly
domains which will serve as a running examples through most of the discussion.
1.3.1 Automated Planning
Definition: A Classical Planning Problem is a tupleM = 〈D, I,G〉 with domain
D = 〈F,A〉 – where F is a finite set of fluents that define a state s ⊆ F , and A
is a finite set of actions – and initial and goal states I,G ⊆ F . Action a ∈ A
is a tuple 〈ca, pre(a), eff±(a)〉 where ca is the cost, and pre(a), eff±(a) ⊆ F are the
preconditions and add/delete effects, i.e. δM(s, a) |= ⊥ if s 6|= pre(a); else δM(s, a) |=
s ∪ eff+(a) \ eff−(a) where δM(·) is the transition function. The cumulative transition
function is given by δM(s, 〈a1, a2, . . . , an〉) = δM(δM(s, a1), 〈a2, . . . , an〉).
This forms the classical definition of a planning problem [386] whose models are
represented in the syntax of PDDL [296]. The solution to the planning problem is a
sequence of actions or a (satisficing) plan pi = 〈a1, a2, . . . , an〉 such that δM(I, pi) |= G.
The cost of a plan pi is given by C(pi,M) = ∑a∈pi ca if δM(I, pi) |= G; ∞ otherwise.
The cheapest plan pi∗ = arg minpi C(pi,M) is the (cost) optimal plan. We refer to the
cost of the optimal plan in the modelM as C∗M.
As explained before in Figure 2, the human-aware planning paradigm introduces
the mental model of the human in the loop into a planner’s deliberative process, in
13
addition to the planner’s own model in the classical sense and the robot’s estimate of
the human model. The definition of a human-aware planning problem follows.
Definition: A Human-Aware Planning (HAP) Problem is given by the tuple
Ψ = 〈MR,MHr ,MRh 〉 whereMR = 〈DR, IR,GR〉 is the planner’s model of a planning
problem, whileMRh = 〈DRh , IRh ,GRh 〉 is the human’s understanding of the same, and
MHr = 〈DHr , IHr ,GHr 〉 is the planner’s belief of the human’s capability model.
The solution to the human-aware planning problem is a joint plan [73] pi =
〈a1, a2, . . . , an〉; ai ∈ {DR ∪DHr } such that δΨ(IR ∪ IHr , pi) |= GR ∪ GHr . The robot’s
component in the plan is referred to as pi(R) = 〈ai | ai ∈ pi ∧ DR〉; and similarly
pi(H) for the human. Efforts to make planning more “human-aware” can be seen as
the process of adapting pi(R) to meet the demands of pi(H) where a robot sacrifices
optimality in its own model in favor of globally optimal joint plans. This is the topic
of discussion in Chapter 2. From the perspective of a human-aware planning agent,
computation of the joint plan becomes even more interesting when consideringMRh
as well, i.e. how pi(R) is perceived by the human. I address this in Chapter 3.
Authors in [332] introduced an updated representation of planning problems in the
form of annotated models or APDDL to account for uncertainty or incompleteness over
the definition of a classical planning model. In addition to the standard preconditions
and effects associated with actions, it introduces the notion of possible preconditions
and effects which may or may not be realized in practice.
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Definition: An Incomplete (Annotated) Model is the tuple M = 〈D, I,G〉 with
a domain D = 〈F, A〉 – where F is a finite set of fluents that define a state
s ⊆ F , and A is a finite set of annotated actions – and annotated initial and goal
states I = 〈I0, I+〉, G = 〈G0,G+〉; I0,G0, I+,G+ ⊆ F . Action a ∈ A is a tuple
〈ca, pre(a), p˜re(a), eff±(a), e˜ff ±(a)〉 where ca is the cost and, in addition to its known
preconditions and add/delete effects pre(a), eff±(a),⊆ F each action also contains
possible preconditions p˜re(a) ⊆ F containing propositions that action a might need as
preconditions, and possible add (delete) effects e˜ff ±(a) ⊆ F ) containing propositions
that the action a might add (delete, respectively) after execution. Similarly, I0,G0
(and I+,G+) are the known (and possible) parts of the initial and goal states.
Each possible condition f ∈ p˜re(a) ∪ e˜ff ±(a) has an associated probability p(f)
denoting how likely it is to be a known condition in the ground truth model – i.e.
p(f) measures the confidence with which that condition has been learned. The
sets of known and possible conditions of a model M are denoted by Sk(M) and
Sp(M) respectively. An instantiation of an annotated model M is a classical planning
model where a subset of the possible conditions have been realized, and is thus
given by the tuple inst(M) = 〈D, I,G〉 with domain D = 〈F,A〉, initial and goal
states I = I0 ∪ χ; χ ⊆ I+ and G = G0 ∪ χ; χ ⊆ G+ respectively, and action
A 3 a = 〈ca, pre(a) ← pre(a) ∪ χ; χ ⊆ p˜re(a), eff±(a) ← eff±(a) ∪ χ; χ ⊆ e˜ff ±(a)〉.
Clearly, given an annotated model with k possible conditions, there may be 2k such
instantiations, which forms its completion set [332].
Definition: Likelihood L of instantiation inst(M) of an annotated model M is –
L(inst(M)) =
∏
f∈Sp(M)∧Sk(inst(M))
p(f) ×
∏
f∈Sp(M)\Sk(inst(M))
(1− p(f))
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Such models turn out to be especially useful for the representation and learning
of human (mental) models from observations, where uncertainty after the learning
process can be represented in terms of model annotations as in [332, 56]. Let MRH
be the culmination of a model learning process and {MRhi}i be the completion set of
MRH . Note that one of these models is the actual ground truth (i.e. the human’s real
mental model). We refer to this as g(MRH).
Remark: With regards to the Human-Aware Planning (HAP) Problem introduced
above, and the models introduced previously in Figure 2, we note that the robot’s
(noisy) estimation of the human model MHr and the human mental model MˆRh
can indeed be viewed as an annotated model (or a set of possible models) with
g(MHr ) ≡ MH and g(MˆHr ) ≡ MHr . I will start with the assumption that this
estimation is precise, and formalize different human-aware behaviors in that context,
and then show how this assumption can be relaxed to deal with uncertainty over the
human (mental) model by leveraging this framework of annotated models.
1.3.2 Testbeds
The following two domains – USAR and Assembly (Figure 5) – will be used to
demonstrate different modalities of human-aware behavior throughout the dissertation.
The former models human-robot interactions in a distributed space while the latter
deals with proximal human-robot collaborations.
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1.3.2.1 The USAR Domain
A mock Urban Search and Reconnaissance (USAR) forms the basis of most of
the demonstrations and evaluations in the dissertation. Figure 5a illustrates a typical
[26, 322] USAR domain where a remote robot is put into disaster response operation
often controlled partly or fully by an external human commander who orchestrates
the entire operation. The robot’s job in such scenarios is to infiltrate areas that may
be otherwise harmful to humans, and report on its surroundings as and when required
or instructed by the external supervisor. The scenario can also have other internal
agents (humans or robots) with whom the robot needs to coordinate. The USAR
domain thus affords a rich set of characteristics, such as multiple agents distributed in
space, partial observability, evolving domain models, and so on.
The USAR domain is also ideal for visualizing to non-expert participants in
comparison to, for example, logistics-type domains which should ideally be evaluated
by experts. This became an important factor while designing the user studies. The
USAR domain is thus at once close to motion planning as easily interpreted by non-
experts but also incorporates typical aspects of task plans such as preconditions and
effects in terms of rubble removal, collapsed halls, etc. and relevant abilities of the
robot. As such, simulated USAR scenarios provide an ideal testbed [504, 440, 26] for
developing algorithms for effective human-robot interaction.
1.3.2.2 The Assembly Domain
The Assembly domain, closely follows the classic [206] BlocksWorld domain (shown
in Figure 5b) as a proxy to a collaborative manufacturing domain. Here a robot is
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(a) USAR Domain. (b) Assembly Domain.
Figure 5: Testbeds used in the study of human-aware planning.
tasked with making words (or configurations) out of lettered (or colored) blocks using
stacking and unstacking actions, to mimic assembly of specified structures, while a
human also performs tasks in the same space (and acts as an observer) or works
directly with the robot. The purpose of this domain is to model interactions in more
structured settings like the manufacturing environment where the domain physics
are precisely modeled and humans and robot operate in close proximity, contrary to
the USAR domain introduced previously. The setting is especially ideal for studying
human-robot interactions with assumptions (such as wearable technologies on the
human) usually not afforded by day to day activities.
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Chapter 2
PLANNING FOR SYMBIOTIC ACTION
“My love she speaks like silence.”
In this chapter, I will show how a robot can reason with the human model to
come up with plans that are “human-aware” – i.e. they respect human intentions
and, if possible, help them on their way. There has indeed been significant work in
this direction, especially from the point of view of human-robot teams (HRTs). I will
instead focus on the notion of human-robot cohabitation where the humans and robots
are sharing the same environments (and hence their plans can interact) even though
they do not have shared goals and communication protocols to coordinate. Thus the
interactions studied here will try to make sure that they are still useful without the
human planning to exploit them. In fact, we will see that in some cases a successful
human-aware plan would not be even perceptible from the human’s point of view!
2.1 Introduction: Human-Aware Interactions without Prior Coordination
The key advantage of being able to reason with the human model is in being
able to anticipate human needs and plan for joint action. A primary example of
this is planning for collaboration in human-robot teams. In general, planning for
effective human-machine collaboration should involve both models – the estimated
human task model (MHr ) as well as the estimated human mental model (MRh ). As
we discussed previously, the former allows the robot to construct joint plans, while
the latter allows it to anticipate human expectation of itself in that joint plan. In
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this chapter, we focus specifically on the latter, particularly in settings where there is
lack (or limited amount) of prior coordination and/or shared information, as opposed
to what we might generally assume in the context of teaming. This aligns with the
notion of “human-robot cohabitation”, a theme I discuss in detail in Appendix C. In
the following discussion, I will instead focus on the details of the planning problems
engendered by direct and indirect coordination without prior coordination. Apart
from the underlying theme of human-robot cohabitation, this setup also allows us to
focus on aspects of the joint planning problem separately without considering yet the
human mental model (which we cover next in Chapter 3).
This type of planning falls under the broader umbrella of Multi-agent (here,
Human-Robot) Interaction without Prior Coordination4 (MIPC) in general. However,
the presence of a human in the loop makes the coordination problem asymmetric
(e.g. with respect to priorities and the roles of each agent in a coalition). Joint
plans computed in this context may not be joint optimal plans - and the nature of
sub-optimality depends on how the behavior (i.e. the algorithm used to compute joint
plan) of the autonomous agent is being designed – i.e. is it trying to assist? It it
trying to demonstrate altruistic behavior? And so on. Thus, algorithms presented
in this chapter modulates human-robot cooperation without prior coordination at
different levels. Specifically, we will look at –
• Indirect or implicit coordination (Section 2.2): Here, the robot modifies its
planning process so as to respect the human’s plans ([94]) - this is indirect
assistance, i.e. if all goes according to plan the human does not even realize
the effect of the robot’s decisions! We show, in the evaluations, the pros and
4http://mipc.inf.ed.ac.uk/
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cons associated with using abstractions like resource profiles, and investigate
the trade-offs between different kinds of behavior like compromise, opportunism
and negotiation that may be achieved under this paradigm.
• Direct or explicit coordination (Section 2.3): The robot now provides assistance
that would be useful even when the human is not anticipating the help ([74] – e.g.
in cases when the human and the robot are not involved in a shared activity).
This requires direct intervention to the human’s plan under execution. We also
evaluate how planning for serendipity becomes more useful the more we discount
the cost of the robot’s actions with respect to the human’s, and show how there
are significant opportunities for such types of assistance in the current context
of interaction without prior coordination.
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2.1.1 Chapter Highlights
The following provides a brief overview of topics covered in this chapter –
- We explore two modes of interaction - direct and indirect - that can allow
autonomous agents coordinate with minimum prior coordination, and propose
integer program based planners that can handle such complex interaction con-
straints in the robot’s deliberative process.
- Section 2.2 – First, I will explore how the robot can generate plans that
achieve its own goals but also respect possible plans that its fellow humans
(who are sharing the same environment) may be executing.
- Section 2.3 – Finally, I show how the robot can plan to provide unanticipated
assistance – i.e. serendipity – to its fellow humans while ensuring that the
help is still useful given the latter was not expecting it.
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2.2 Implicit Coordination: Planning with Resource Conflicts
As we have discussed before, the goal here is to make a robot modulate its
planning process, based on the consideration of resources, so as to respect the intents
of the human (in terms of possible resource requirements) that is sharing the same
environment, without explicit communication or prior coordination. Here we look
at possible ways to minimize such conflicts by ways of compromise, opportunism or
negotiation (these different aspects of autonomous behavior follow from the discussion
of social good and altruism in the previous section, and will become clearer when
we evaluate our algorithm later). There has been previous work [29, 102] on some
(mainly for the modality of compromise) of the modeling aspects of the problem, in
terms of planning with uncertainty in resources and constraints. In this section, we
provide a integrated framework of achieving these behaviors of the autonomous agent,
particularly in the context of human-robot cohabitation.
Of course, beyond just the core planning challenge itself, there are several related
problems that need to be addressed to solve such problems as a whole. Specifically,
we need to ask how we can model the evolution of the environment, what information
can be extracted from the predicted plans, and how that information can be efficiently
represented and used to guide the behavior of the autonomous agent. Thus, we identify
three major challenges as follows (c.f. Figure 6) –
1. Plan Prediction – In order to plan for the future, it is imperative for the robot
to have an idea of how the future will evolve, and consequently, the probable
plans of other agents in its environment. In the absence of communication,
probabilistic plan recognition becomes even more relevant.
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Figure 6: Schematic diagram of our integrated system for belief modeling, goal
recognition, information extraction and planning. The robot maintains a belief model
of the environment, and uses observations to extract information about how the world
may evolve, which is used to drive its own planning process.
2. Plan Representation – It is necessary to have an efficient representation of the
predicted plans, i.e. a notion of how the environment will evolve with time, that
will allow the reasoning engine to access relevant information quickly and easily,
e.g. when resources are likely to be available.
3. Plan Generation – A decision making engine that can handle different forms of
complex interaction constraints, and inform its plan generation process with the
above information.
To this end, we propose a modular architecture (Figure 6) that has a separate
module for addressing each of these challenges independently, which internally interact
among themselves using highly general forms of information - this is extremely useful
since the techniques used in each module may be plugged in and out with little or
no change to the rest of the architecture. For example, the information extraction
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and representation module in the middle received as input a set of predicted plans,
which is as general as it gets - the first module for modeling the environment can
then be replaced with various abstractions, and different assumptions may be relaxed
as required, but we will still get a set of plans for the human to contend with. This
provides considerable flexibility in the design of our agent, and delivers compelling
support for adoption and further development of this design paradigm.
Coming back to our setting, the autonomous robot is acting (with independent
goals) in an environment co-habited with other agents (humans), who are similarly
self-interested. The robot has a model of the other agents acting independently in
its environment. These models may be partial and hence the robot can only make
uncertain predictions on how the world will evolve with time. However, the resources
in the environment are limited and are likely to be constrained by the plans of the other
agents. The robot thus needs to reason about the future states of the environment in
order to make sure that its own plans do not produce conflicts with respect to the
plans of the other agents. With the involvement of humans, however, the problem is
more skewed against the robot, because humans would expect a higher priority on
their plans - robots that produce plans that clash with those of the humans, without
any explanation, would be considered incompatible for such an ecosystem. Thus the
robot is expected to follow plans that preserve the human plans, rather than follow a
globally optimal plan for itself. This aspect makes the current setting distinct from
normal human robot teaming scenarios and produces a number of its own interesting
challenges. How does the robot model the human’s behavior? How does it plan to avoid
friction with the human plans? If it is possible to communicate, how does it plan to
negotiate and refine plans? These are the questions that we seek to address in this
work. Our approach models human beliefs and defines resource profiles as abstract
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representations of the plans predicted on the basis of these beliefs. The robot updates
its beliefs about the world upon receiving new observations from its environment, and
passes on the resultant profiles onto its planner, which then uses an Integer Program
(IP) based formulation of the planning problem to minimize the overlap between these
resource profiles and those produced by the human’s plans.
2.2.1 System Description
We will now go into details about each of the modules shown in Figure 6. The
shared resources here are the two medkits - some of the plans the commander can
execute will lock the use of and/or change the position of these medkits, so that from
the set of probable plans of the commander we can extract a probability distribution
over the usage (or even the position) of the medkit over time based on the fraction
of plans that conform to these facts. These resource availability profiles (i.e. the
distribution over the usage or position of the medkit evolving over time) provide a
way for the agents to minimize conflicts with the other agents.
2.2.1.1 The Belief Modeling Component
The belief modeling component contains the robot’s estimateMHr of the human
task model, and extends the notion of modeling beliefs introduced by the authors
in [441]. This planning problem instance (though not directly used in the robot’s
planning process) enables the goal recognition component to solve the compiled
problem instances and build expectations on how the world will evolve in future, and
identify its own role in it. More on this in the next section.
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2.2.1.2 The Goal Recognition Component
For most real world scenarios, it is unlikely that the goals of the humans are known
completely, and that the plan computed by the planner is exactly the plan that they
will follow. Probabilistic goal or plan recognition plays an especially important role in
the forms of detached coordination we are discussing now. By not committing to a
plan, that presumes a particular plan for the human, it may be possible to minimize
suboptimal (in terms of redundant or conflicting actions performed during execution)
behavior of the agent. As such we are only equipped with a belief of likely goals of
the human – and this may not be a full description of their actual goals. Further, in
the case of an incompletely specified goal, there might be a set of likely plans that
the human can execute, which brings into consideration the need for incremental goal
recognition over a possible goal set given a stream of observations.
Goal Extension – We begin by noting that the robot might have to deal with
multiple plans even in the presence of completely specified goals (even if the other
agents are fully rational). For example, there may be multiple optimal ways of
achieving the same goal, and it is not obvious beforehand which one of these an agent
is going to end up following. In the case of incompletely specified goals, the presence
of multiple likely plans becomes more relevant. To accommodate this, we extend the
robot’s current belief of the human’s goal to a hypothesis goal set ΨH . The automated
computation of this goal set can be done, for example, using the planning graph
([37]). In the worst case, ΨH corresponds to all possible goals in the final level of the
converged planning graph. Having further (domain-dependent) knowledge (e.g. in
our scenario, that CommX is only interested in triage-related goals) can prune some of
these goals by removing the goal conditions that are not typed on the triage variable.
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Goal / Plan Recognition – We thus have a set ΨH of goals that H may be trying
to achieve, and observations of the actions H is currently executing. At this point
we refer to the work of Ramirez and Geffner who in [359] provided a technique to
compile the problem of plan recognition into a classical planning problem. Given a
sequence of observations θ, we recompute the probability distribution Θ over G ∈ ΨH
by using a Bayesian update P (G|θ) ∝ P (θ|G), where the likelihood is approximated
by the function P (θ|G) ≈ 1/(1 + e−β∆(G,θ)) where ∆(G, θ) = Cp(G − θ) − Cp(G + θ)
and β is a constant. Here ∆(G, θ) gives an estimate of the difference in cost Cp of
achieving the goal G without and with the observations, thus increasing P (θ|G) for
goals that explain the given observations. Note that this formulation also accounts for
agents which are not perfectly rational, as long as they have an inclination to follow
cheaper (and not necessarily the cheapest) plans, which is a more realistic model of
humans. Thus, solving two compiled planning problems, with goals G − θ and G + θ,
gives us the required posterior update for the distribution Θ over possible goals of H.
The details of the approach is available at [359].
The specific problem we will look at now is how to inform the robot’s own planning
process from the recognized goal set ΨH . In order to do this, we compute the optimal
plans for each goal in the hypothesis goal set ΨH , and associate them with the
probabilities of these goals from the distribution thus obtained. Information from
these plans is then represented concisely in the form of resource profiles.
For our plan recognition module we use a much faster variation by [131] of the
above approach that exploits cost and interaction information from plan graphs to
estimate the goal probabilities. This saves on the computational effort of having to
solve two planning problems per goal. Also, note that while computing the plan
to a particular goal G, we use a compiled problem instance with the goal G + θ to
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ensure that the predicted plan conforms to the existing observations. Details on the
compilation is available at [359]. Also, the output of the planner does not need to be
associated with probabilities - this is just the most general formulation. If we want to
deal with just a set of plans that the robot needs to be aware of, we can treat the plan
set either with a uniform distribution and/or by requiring exactly zero conflicts in
the objective of the planner (this will become clearer in Section 2.2.1.4) depending on
the preference. Perhaps the biggest computational issue here is the need to compute
optimal plans. While we still do it for our domain, as we will note later in Section
2.2.3.2.2, this might not be necessary, and suboptimal plans may be used in larger
domains where computation becomes an important issue.
2.2.1.3 Plan Representation – Resource Profiles
As we discussed previously, since the plans of the agents are in parallel execution,
the uncertainty introduced by the commander’s actions cannot be mapped directly
between the commander’s final state and the robot’s initial state. However, given
the commander’s possible plans, the robot can extract information about at what
points of time the shared resources in the environment are likely to be locked by
the commander. This information can be represented by resource usage profiles that
capture the expected (over all the recognized plans) variation of probability of usage
or availability over time. The robot can, in turn, use this information to make sure
that the profile imposed by its own plan has minimal conflicts with those of the
commander’s. Formally, a profile R is defined as a mapping from time step t to
a real number between 0 and 1, and is represented by a set of tuples as follows
R : N→ [0, 1] ≡ {(t, v) : t ∈ N, v ∈ [0, 1], such that R(t) = v at time step t}.
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Figure 7: Different types of resource profiles.
The concept of resource profiles can be handled at two levels of abstraction. Going
back to our running example, shared resources that can come under conflict are the
two (locatable typed objects) medkits, and the profiles over the medkits can be over
both usage and location, as shown in Figure 83. These different types of profiles can
be used (possibly in conjunction if needed) for different purposes. For example, just
the usage profile shown on top is more helpful in identifying when to use the specific
resource, while the resource when bound with the location specific groundings, as
shown at the bottom can lead to more complicated higher order reasoning (e.g. the
robot can decide to wait for the commander’s plans to be over, as he inadvertently
brings the medkit closer to it with high probability as a result of his own plans). We
will look at this again in Section 2.2.2.
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Let Λ be the set of shared resources and for each λ ∈ Λ we have a set of predicates
fλ ⊆ F that are influenced (as determined by the system designer) by λ, and let
Γ : Λ→ P(ξ) be a function that maps the resource variables to the set of predicates
ξ = ∪λfλ they influence. In the following discussion, we will look at how the knowledge
from the hypothesis goal set can be modeled in terms of resource availability graphs
for each of the constrained resources λ ∈ Λ.
Consider the set of plans ΨPH containing optimal plans corresponding to each
goal in the hypothesis goal set, i.e. ΨPH = {pi∗G | δ(IHr , pi∗G) |= G,G ∈ ΨH} and let
l(pi) = c|piG| × p(G) be the likelihood of the plan pi where p(G) ∼ Θ and c is a
normalization constant. At each time step t, a plan pi ∈ ΨPH may lock one or more
of the resources λ. Each plan thus provides a profile of usage of a resource with
respect to the time step t as Rλpi : N→ {0, 1} = {(t, v) | t ∈ [1, 2, . . . , |pi|] and v = 1
if λ is locked by pi at step t, 0 otherwise}: i.e. Rλpi(t) = v ∀ (t, v) ∈ Rλpi. The
resultant usage profile of a resource λ due to all the plans in ΨPφ is obtained by
summing over (weighted by the individual likelihoods) all the individual profiles as
Rλ : N → [0, 1] = {(t, v) | t ∈ {1,maxpi∈ΨPH |pi|} and v ∝ 1|ΨPH |
∑
pi∈ΨPH R
λ
pi(t) × l(pi)}.
These profiles are helpful when the robot’s actions are conditioned on state variables
whose values are, in turn, conditioned on the plans of the human, and vice versa.
One important aspect of this formulation is that the notion of “resources” is
described here in terms of the subset of the common predicates in the domain and can
thus be used as a generalized definition to model different types of conflict between the
plans between two agents. In as much as these predicates are descriptions (possibly
instantiated) of the typed variables in the domain and actually refer to the physical
resources in the environment that might be shared by the agents, we will stick to this
nomenclature of calling them “resources".
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2.2.1.3.1 Why Resource Profiles?
One interesting aspect of computing resource profiles is that it provides a powerful
interface between the belief on the environment and the planner. On the one hand,
note that the input from the previous stage (goal/plan recognition module) is as
generic as possible - a set of plans possibly associated with probabilities. Given any
changes in preceding stages, e.g. modeling stochasticity or more complex belief models,
still yields a set of plans that the robot needs to be aware of. Thus the plan set and
resource profiles provide a surprisingly simple yet powerful way of abstracting away
relevant information for the planner to use.
A somewhat implicit advantage of using profiles is its ability to form regions of
interest given the possible plans. This will become clear later in Section 2.2.3 when
we show that the predicted conflicts provide well-informed guidance to avoiding real
conflicts during execution (as evident by the robustness in performance with just
1-3 observations, and zero actual conflicts in low probability areas in the computed
profiles). Right now this has the implication that we need not necessarily compute
perfect plan costs and goal distributions to get good plans.
2.2.1.4 The Planner
We will now look at how an autonomous agent can use these resource profiles to
minimize conflicts during plan execution with other agents in its environment. In the
human-aware planning problem Ψ = 〈MR,MHr ,MRh 〉, we have abstracted away the
human task modelMHr in the form of a possible plan set ΨPH and resource profiles
{Rλ| ∀λ ∈ Λ} defined on top of it. The human-aware planning process must now take
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into account both goals of achievement as also conflict of resource usages as described
by the profiles. Traditional planners provide no direct way to handle such profiles
within the planning process. Note here that since the execution of the plans of the
agents is occurring in parallel, the uncertainty is evolving at the time of execution,
and hence the uncertainty cannot be captured from the goal states of the recognized
plans alone, and consequently cannot be simply compiled away to the initial state
uncertainty for the robot and solved as a conformant plan. Similarly, the problem does
not directly compile into action costs in a metric planning instance because the profiles
themselves are varying with time. Thus we need a planner that can handle these
resource constraints that are both stochastic and non-stationary due to the uncertainty
in the environment. To this end we introduce the following IP-based planner (partly
following the technique for IP encoding for state space planning outlined in [475]) as an
elegant way to sum over and minimize overlaps in profiles during the plan generation
process. The following formulation finds such T-step plans in case of non-durative or
instantaneous actions.
For action a ∈ AR at step t we have an action variable:
xa,t =

1, if action a is executed in step t
0, otherwise; ∀a ∈ AR, t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}
Also, for every proposition f at step t we have a binary state variable as follows:
yf,t =

1, if proposition is true in plan step t
0, otherwise; ∀f ∈ F, t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T}
The plan computed by the robot introduces a resource consumption profile itself,
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and thus one optimizing criterion would be to minimize the overlap between the usage
profile due to the computed plan with those established by the predicted plans of
the other agents in the environment. Let us introduce a new variable to model the
resource usage profile imposed by the robot as follows:
gf,t =

1, if f is locked at plan step t
0, otherwise; f ∈ ξ = Γ(λ),∀λ ∈ Λ, t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T}
Further, for every resource λ ∈ Λ, we divide the actions in the domain of the robot
into three disjoint sets –
Ω+f = {a ∈ AR such that xa,t = 1 =⇒ yf,t = 1},
Ω−f = {a ∈ AR such that xa,t = 1 =⇒ yf,t = 0}, and
Ωof = A
R \ (Ω+f ∪ Ω−f ), ∀f ∈ ξ = Γ−1(λ).
These then specify respectively those actions in the domain that lock, free up, or
do not affect the use of a particular resource, and are used to calculate gf,t in the IP.
Further, we introduce a variable hf,t to track preconditions required by actions in the
generated plan whose success is conditioned on the influence of the plans of the other
agents on the world (e.g. position of the medkits are changing, and the action pickup
is conditioned on it) as follows:
hf,t =

1, if f ∈ pre(a) and xa,t+1 = 1
0, otherwise; t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1}
Then the solution to the IP should ensure that the robot only uses these resources
when they are in fact most expected to be available (as obtained by maximizing the
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overlap between hf,t and Rλ). These act like demand profiles from the perspective
of the robot. Also, let F = Σλ∈ΛΓ(λ) be the set of all predicates whose value is
affected by any resource. We also add a “no-operation" action AR ← AR ∪ aNOOP so
that aNOOP = 〈0, {}, {}〉. This makes it possible to compute possible plans over a large
interval rather than using incremental step size T, allowing the robot to anticipate
and wait out for favorable changes in the world. We will see soon how this affects the
behavior of the robot. The IP formulation is given by:
min k1
∑
a∈AR
∑
t∈{1,2,...,T} ca × xa,t
+k2
∑
λ∈Λ
∑
f∈Γ(λ)
∑
t∈{1,2,...,T} gf,t ×Rλ(t)
−k3
∑
f∈F
∑
t∈{0,1,...,T−1} hf,t ×RΓ
−1({f})(t)
subject to:
yf,0 = 1 ∀f ∈ IR \ F (1)
yf,0 = 0 ∀f /∈ IR or f ∈ F (2)
yf,T = 1 ∀f ∈ GR (3)
xa,t ≤ yf,t−1 ∀a ∈ AR, ∀f ∈ pre(a) \ F, t ∈ {1, . . . , T} (4)
hf,t−1 = xa,t ∀a ∈ AR, f ∈ pre(a), t ∈ {1, . . . , T} (5)
yf,t ≤ yf,t−1 +
∑
a:f∈eff+(a) xa,t ∀f, t ∈ {1, . . . , T} (6)
yf,t ≤ 1−
∑
a:f∈eff−(a) xa,t ∀f, t ∈ {1, . . . , T} (7)∑
a∈AR xa,t = 1 t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T} (8)∑
a∈Ω+f
∑
t xa,t ≤ 1 ∀f ∈ F, t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T} (9)
gf,t =
∑
a∈Ω+f xa,t + (1−
∑
a∈Ω+f xa,t −
∑
a∈Ω−f xa,t)× gf,t−1∀f ∈ F, t ∈ {1, . . . , T} (10)
hf,t ×RΓ−1({f})(t) ≥  ∀f ∈ F, t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1} (11)
yf,t ∈ {0, 1} ∀f ∈ F, t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T} (12)
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xa,t ∈ {0, 1} ∀a ∈ AR, t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T} (13)
gf,t ∈ {0, 1} ∀f ∈ F, t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T} (14)
hf,t ∈ {0, 1} ∀f ∈ F, t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1} (15)
where k1, k2, k3 are constants determining the relative importance of the optimization
criteria and  is a constant. Here, the objective function minimizes the sum of the
cost of the plan and the overlap between the cumulative resource usage profiles of
the predicted plans and that imposed by the current plan of the robot itself while
maximizing the validity of the demand profiles. In case the cost of the actions are
not given, we can assume ca = 1 ∀a ∈ AR and the first term of the objective function
becomes equivalent to minimizing the length of the plan. Constraints (1) through
(3) model the initial and goal conditions, while the value of the constrained variables
are kept uninitialized (and are determined by their profiles). Constraints (4) and
(5), depending on the particular predicate, enforces the preconditions, or produces
the demand profiles respectively, while (6) and (7) enforces the state equations that
maintain the add and delete effects of the actions. Constraint (8) imposes non
concurrency on the actions, and (9) ensures that the robot does not repeat the same
action indefinitely to increase its utility. Constraint (10) generates the resource profile
of the current plan, while (11) maintains that actions are only executed if there is at
least a small probability  of success. Finally (12) to (15) provide the binary ranges
of the variables. T determines the number of steps in the plan (occupied by NOOP
actions if it is more than what is necessarily required).
Remark – At this point it is worth acknowledging the implications of having
durative actions in our formulation. Note that our approach does not discretize time,
but rather uses time points as steps in the plan - that can be easily augmented with
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their own durations. So in order to handle durative actions, the only (somewhat minor)
change required in the formulation is in the way the conflicts are integrated (instead
of summed) over in the objective function. Further, uncertainty in action durations
is always a big issue in human interactions; though resource profiles cannot directly
handle uncertain durations, it only affects the way the profiles are calculated, and
the way in which information is expressed in it remains unchanged (i.e. expectations
over action durations add an extra expectation to the already probabilistic profile
computation). As noted before in Section 2.2.1.3.1, the ability of profiles to form
regions of interest is crucial in handling such scenarios implicitly.
2.2.2 Modulating Behavior of the Robot
The planner is implemented on the IP-solver gurobi and integrates the plan
recognition software PIPSS in [131] and the planning framework Fast Downward in
[182] respectively for goal recognition and plan prediction for the recognized goals. We
will now illustrate how the formulation can produce different behaviors of the robot
by appropriately configuring the parameters of the planner. We limit ourselves to a
singleton hypothesis goal set in order to observe the robot’s response more clearly.
2.2.2.1 Compromise
Let us now look back at the environment we introduced in Figure 8. Consider that
the goal of the commander is to perform triage in room1. The robot computes his
optimal plan (which ends up using medkit1 at time steps 7 through 12) and updates
the resource profiles accordingly. If it has its own goal to perform triage in hall3, the
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plan that it comes up with given a 12 step lookahead is shown below (left). Notice
that the robot opts for the other medkit (medkit2 in room3) even though its plan
now incurs a higher cost in terms of execution. The robot thus adopts a policy of
compromise if it can preserve the commander’s (expected) plan (Figure 8).
2.2.2.2 Opportunism
Notice, however, that the commander is actually bringing the medkit to room1
as predicted by the robot, and this is a favorable change in the world, because robot
can use this medkit once the commander is done and achieve its goal at a much lower
cost. The robot, indeed, realizes this once we give it a bigger time horizon to plan
with, as shown above (on the right). Thus, the robot shows opportunism based on
how it believes the world state will change (Figure 9).
2.2.2.3 Negotiation
In many cases, the robot will have to eventually produce plans that will have
potential points of conflict with the expected plans of the commander. This occurs
when there is no feasible plan with zero overlap between profiles (specifically
∑
gf,t ×
Rλ(t) = 0) or if the alternative plans for the robot are too costly (as determined
by the objective function). If, however, the robot is equipped with the ability to
communicate, then it can negotiate a plan that suits both. To this end, we introduce
a new variable Hλ(t) and update the IP as follows:
min k1
∑
a∈AR
∑
t∈{1,2,...,T} ca × xa,t
+k2
∑
λ∈Λ
∑
f∈Γ(λ)
∑
t∈{1,2,...,T} gf,t ×Hλ(t)
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−k3
∑
f∈F
∑
t∈{0,1,...,T−1} hf,t ×RΓ
−1({f})(t)
+k4
∑
λ∈Λ
∑
t∈{0,1,...,T} ||Rλ(t)−Hλ(t)||
subject to:
yf,T ≥ hf,t−1 ∀ a ∈ AR, ∀f ∈ pre(a), t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T} (5a)
Hλ(t) ∈ [0, 1] ∀λ ∈ Λ, t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T} (16)
Hλ(t) ≤ Rλ(t) ∀λ ∈ Λ, t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T} (17)
Constraint (5a) now complements constraint (5) from the existing formulation,
by promising to restore the world state every time a demand is made on a variable.
The variable Hλ(t), maintained by constraints (16) and (17), determine the desired
deviation from the given profiles. The objective function has been updated to reflect
that overlaps are now measured with the desired profile of usage, and there is a cost
associated with the deviation from the real one. The revised plan now produced by
the robot is shown below (Figure 10). Notice that the robot restores the world state
that the human is believed to expect, and can now communicate to him “Can you
please not use medkit1 from time 7 to 9?” based on how the real and the ideal profiles
diverge, i.e. t such that Hλ(t) < Rλ(t) for each resource λ.5
Remark – One might note here that people are often adaptive and it is very much
possible that they may be willing to change their goals based on observing the robot or
are even unwilling to negotiate if their plans conflict. Hence the policies of compromise
and opportunism for the robot are complementary to negotiation in the event the
latter fails. Thus, for example, the robot might choose to communicate a negotiation
5Note here that we do not deal with details of the communication protocols; instead we intend to
show that in the event communication abilities is in fact available, what the effect on the approach
will be, and how the robot can use this formulation to figure out what information to communicate
rather than the exact content or nature of the communication itself.
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strategy to the human, but fall back on a compromise if that fails. It is a merit of
such a simple formulation to be able to handle such interesting adaptive behaviors.
The exact policy undertaken by the robot is dictated by its overall reward structure
and also to an extent by the parameters of the planner itself, i.e. the planning horizon
and the weights in the objective function. These determine, for example, whether
the robot decides to risk success of a plan to explore opportunism or not. We will
elaborate more on this in the evaluations next in Section 2.2.3.
2.2.3 Evaluations
We will now investigate the properties of plans produced by the planner while
avoiding conflict of resources and highlight the trade-offs between different kinds of
behaviors like compromise, opportunism and negotiation. We simulated the USAR
scenario on 360 different problem instances, randomly generated by varying the specific
(as well as the number of probable) goals of the human, and evaluated how the planner
behaved with the number of observations it can start with to build its profiles. To
generate the test cases, we first fix the domain description, location and goal of the
agents, and the position of the resources. Then we consider randomly generated
hypothesis goal sets of size 2-11. The goals of the commander were assumed to be
known to be triage related but the location of the triage was allocated randomly (one
of which was again picked at random as the real goal). Finally, for each problem, we
generate 1-5 observations by simulating the commander’s plan over the real goal and
using these observations known a priori the robot’s plan generation process.
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Figure 8: Compromise - The robot tries to get the medkit further away from room3
because the human is expected to use medkit1.
Figure 9: Opportunism - The robot anticipates favorable change in the world, and
waits for the human to bring the medkit closer.
Figure 10: Negotiation - The robot decouples the conflict in the plans and negotiates
a time of use before the human’s.
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2.2.3.1 Plan Quality
We define U as the average conflicts per plan step when a demand is placed on a
resource by the robot, and S as the success probability per plan step that the demand
is met. C is the cost of a plan. F is the percentage of times there was an actual
conflict during execution (distinct from U which estimates the possible conflict that
may occur per plan step). We observe the quality of the plans produced by the planner
by varying the ratio of parameters k1 and k3 from the objective function and the
length of the planning horizon T . Similar results follow for k1/k2.
From Table 1a, as k1/k3 decreases, the planner becomes more conservative (to
maximize success probability) and thus plans become costlier. The expected success
rate of actions are also increased (with simultaneous increase in usage conflict), as
reflected by a higher failure rate due to actual execution time conflicts.
Also note, from Table 1b the impact of the planning horizon T on the types
of behaviors. As we increase T , the plan cost falls below the optimal, indicating
opportunities for opportunistic behavior on the part of the robot. The expected
conflict also falls to almost 0. However the expected success rate of actions also
decreases, the ratio k1/k2 determines how daring the robot is, in choosing between
cheap versus possibly invalid plans. Note, however, the actual execution time conflict
is extremely low with increasing T , for even sufficiently conservative estimates of S.
Thus we see that the robot is successfully able to navigate conflicts and find in
many cases plans even cheaper than the original optimal plan, thus highlighting the
usefulness of the approach. Finally, we look at the impact of the parameters in the
plan recognition module in Figure 11. As expected, with bigger hypothesis sets, the
success rate goes down. Interestingly, the plan cost also shows a downward trend
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which might be because the bigger variety in possible goals give a better estimate of
which medkits are generally more useful for that instance at what points of time by
forming regions of interest. With more observations, as expected, the success rate
goes up and the expected conflict goes down. The cost, however, increases a little as
the planner opts for more conservative options.
2.2.3.2 Experiments on the Architecture Design
We will now show the pros and cons of with using abstractions like resource profiles,
in terms of performance and expressivity, and illustrate the efficacy of our modular
architecture in relaxing the optimality assumption on the human’s plans.
2.2.3.2.1 Scaling Up with Resource Profiles
The representation technique introduced in the form of resource profiles provides
properties in terms of computational independence with respect to size of the hypothesis
set and number of agents (which gets manifested in complexity in number of resources)
that general planners do not have. So in terms of avenues of use, it becomes a
design choice depending on which metric needs to be optimized. We investigate
these properties in this section. Since our primary contribution is the formulation
for planning with resource profiles, while the goal recognition component can be
any off-the-shelf algorithm, we will restrict ourselves to investigating the scalability
aspects with respect to the planning component only. Note that IPs are known to
be NP-complete. Thus, in the following, we provide empirical evaluations on how
different aspects of the planner respond to various properties of the problem.
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(a) w.r.t. |ΨH | (b) w.r.t. #obs
Figure 11: Performance of the planner w.r.t. size of goal set and number of observations
(k1/k3 = 0.5, T = 16).
k1/k3 0.05 0.5 5.0
C 9.47 6.37 6.31
U 0.18 0.17 0.17
S 0.85 0.579 0.578
F 27.5 23.0 21.3
(a) Quality of plans produced w.r.t.
k1/k2. Conservative plans result in
lowered utility.
T 10 13 16 Opt.
C 9.0 5.6 4.53 9.0
U 0.46 0.04 ≈0 n/a
S 1.0 0.48 0.25 n/a
F 53.3 11.9 6.6 53.3
(b) Quality of plans produced w.r.t.
T . Opportunities for opportunism
explored, conflicts minimized.
Table 1: Quality of plans produced w.r.t. k1/k2 and T .
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– w.r.t. Length of the Planning Horizon – The performance with respect to the
planning horizon is shown in Figure 12a. This is, as expected, the bottleneck in the
computation due to the exponential growth of the size of the IP. It is, however, not
prohibitively expensive and the planner is still able to produce plans of length 20 for
our domain in a matter of seconds.
– w.r.t. Number of Resources – The performance with respect to the number
of constrained resources (medkits, in the context of the current discussion) is shown
in Figure 12b. Evidently, the computational effort is dominated by that due to the
planning horizon. This reiterates the usefulness of abstracting the information in
predicted plans into resource profiles, thus isolating the complexities of the domain
with that of the underlying planner.
– w.r.t. the Number of Agents and the Size of the Hypothesis Goal Set – The
planning module (i.e. the IP formulation) is by itself independent of the number of
agents being modeled. In fact, this is one of the major advantages of using abstractions
like resource profiles in lieu of actual plans of each of the agents. On the other hand,
the time spent on recognition, and on calculating the profiles, is significantly affected.
However, observations on multiple agents are asynchronous, and goal recognition can
operate in parallel, so that this is not a huge concern beyond the complexity of a single
instance. Similarly the performance is also unaffected by the size of the hypothesis
set ΨH , as shown in Figure 13, which shows increase in number of possible goals does
not complicate the profiles to an extent to affect the complexity.
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(a) w.r.t. T (|Λ| = 2) (b) w.r.t. #medkits (T = 10)
Figure 12: Performance of the planner w.r.t. number of constrained resources (medkits)
and planning horizon T .
Figure 13: Performance of the planner w.r.t. number of constrained resources (medkits).
As expected, computational complexity is not affected.
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2.2.3.2.2 Relaxing the Optimality Assumption
As we discussed before, the power of the proposed approach lies in the modular
nature in which it tackles several complicated problems that are separate research
areas in their own rights - approaches used in the individual modules may be varied
with little to no change to the rest of the architecture. For example, the expressivity
of the belief modeling or goal recognition component is handled independently by
using the generic notion of a plan set. We now build on this idea and demonstrate
how our approach adapts if we relax the assumption that the human is optimal.
Note that the optimality assumption appears in different parts of the approach,
sometimes implicitly. The robot itself assumes an optimal human while computing
the probable plan set, while the goal recognition module also uses a planner internally,
which should ideally be an optimal planner but has been approximated for scalability
(as discussed by [359] and [131]). Finally, during the evaluations, the simulator for
the human is again optimal. In the following discussion we relax this final assumption
to demonstrate how the approach responds if the robot were to assume an optimal
human even though it is not correct in reality. To do this we replaced the optimal
planner Fast-Downward with a satisficing planner Metric Fast-Forward by [190]
which was made to produce plans lower bounded in cost by the optimal value plus a
random cost, to emulate a close-to-optimal human agent. Note that this relaxation
can also be turned on its head by making the robot use suboptimal plans to build the
hypothesis plan set instead, either of which has no effect on the rest of the system; we
can similarly plug and play with other aspects of the model, e.g. nested belief states,
incomplete models, etc. and analyze their effects on the approach.
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Table 2 shows the performance of the planner with increasing levels of suboptimality
of the human as compared to a self-interested planner (over different sizes of hypothesis
sets, observations and planning horizons). Note here that the robot does not model
this suboptimality, i.e. the robot still plans for an optimal human, while the human
ends up following a suboptimal plan. The first column represents the maximum
amount of suboptimality, i.e. a plan is randomly generated with an extra cost that is
more than the optimal cost by this fraction. Numbers show average conflict per plan
step with actual number of conflicts shown inside braces. Clearly conflict avoidance
has considerable gains from optimal planning as shown by the massive decrease in
the amount of conflict, and is it is also not significantly affected by the human’s
departure from the optimal hypothesis as is evident by the rather small increase in
number of conflicts and more or less stable amount of conflict per step. Note that for
a self-interested robot, the conflict decreases with a more suboptimal human. While
this might seem counterintuitive, it is actually a curious artifact of the setting. The
robot essentially ends up completing its plans faster.
Table 3 shows the effect of a larger hypothesis set on the planning performance
with unmodeled suboptimality (for #obs = 3 and T = 16). Again, the performance
is quite robust - this is because of the formation of regions of interest in the profiles
where a medkit might be in use, which more or less provides general guidance towards
better plans. The increase in the size of the hypothesis set further reinforces this
property which counters the expectation of larger uncertainty in such cases. This is
evident from the stable numbers for both number of conflicts and average conflict
per step. These results show the optimality assumption may be relaxed in favor of
computing the hypothesis plan set much more efficiently.
48
maximum suboptimality self-interested robot human-aware robot
10% 0.47 (120) 0.08 (19)
30% 0.43 (104) 0.12 (24)
50% 0.36 (88) 0.19 (29)
70% 0.35 (69) 0.21 (31)
90% 0.37 (65) 0.18 (31)
Table 2: Performance of the human-aware planner with increasing levels of (unmodeled)
suboptimality of the human as compared to a self-interested planner. Numbers show
average conflict per plan step with actual number of conflicts shown inside braces.
Conflict avoidance has considerable gains from optimal planning, and is not significantly
affected by the human’s departure from hypothesis.
|ΨH | → 2 4 6 8 10
optimal 0.055 (76) 0.075 (87) 0.093 (80) 0.115 (68) 0.134 (68)
50% suboptimal 0.051 (74) 0.074 (77) 0.091 (81) 0.111 (70) 0.134 (77)
Table 3: Performance of the human-aware planner with respect to optimal vs (un-
modeled) suboptimal human plans, with increasing size of the hypothesis goal set.
Numbers show average conflict per plan step with actual number of conflicts inside
braces. The performance is unaffected by the human’s departure from hypothesis.
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2.3 Explicit Coordination: Planning for Serendipity
So far, we have been primarily aligned with the notion of indirect coordination -
e.g., avoidance of conflicts or producing plans conforming to human expectations or
intentions. However, as we will show in this section, the robots can be more proactive
in their choices to help, and there can be different modes of such collaboration among
colleagues that are not predefined behavioral traits of the robots. Indeed very little
attention has been paid to an important phenomenon that often occurs in the course
of cooperative behavior amongst human agents – serendipity.
In this context, serendipity can be seen as the occurrence or resolution of facts in
the world such that the future plan of an agent is rendered easier in some measurable
sense. Note that there is no explicit team being formed here, and as such the agents
do not have any commitments to help each other - this type of assistance can thus
be seen as an instance of stigmergic collaboration between robots and humans in
co-habitation and a way for robots (to the extent that they only exist in the setting as
assistive agents to the humans) to exhibit goodwill to their human “colleagues". If the
planner knows enough about the model, intentions, and state of the other agent in the
scenario, it can try to manufacture these serendipitous circumstances. To the other
agent, conditions that appear serendipitously will look remarkably similar to (positive)
exogenous events [158], and that agent may replan to take these serendipitous facts
into account, thus hopefully reducing the cost of its own plan.
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2.3.1 Semantics of Individual vs Composite Plans
We will use the concept of composite plans here to reason about direct interactions.
A composite plan can be viewed as a composition of individual plans such that
they together achieve a particular goal. The characteristics of the composite plan
in terms of how these individual plans are composed is determined by what kind of
behavior (planning for teaming vs serendipity) we desire from the agents involved in
the composite plan. Note that the contribution of the human to the composite plan is
not the same as the plan s/he is currently executing – while generating the composite
plan, the robot only ensures that this is the plan that ends up being executed (subject
to different constraints discussed in detail later in the Sections 2.3.2.1 and 2.3.2.2),
given the human’s individual plan currently “planned” for execution.
Lemma 3.1a: As discussed in Section 1.3.1, the solution to a human-aware planning
problem Ψ = 〈MR,MHr ,MRh 〉, is a composite plan such that the goal of both the
human and the robot is achieved if each of them follow their components pi(H) and
pi(R) of the joint plan. It follows that ∀t < T , the human’s actual plan under execution
is not the same as the human component pi(H) conceived by the robot, as long as it
ends up being the case at the end – i.e. each component in the joint plan is what the
robot believes will happen as a result of anticipated interactions.
The presence of a human brings forward interesting challenges in plan execution –
when humans execute their plans, they may not act optimally given the current world
state. However, for the purposes of this discussion, we assume this is always the case –
i.e. if the robot changes the environment in their favor, the human is not only always
able to recognize that but also replan accordingly. This will help us highlight the
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salient properties of planning for serendipity which is the primary contribution of the
work presented in this section.
Lemma 3.1b: If the human executes plan pi(H) to achieve goal G ⊆ δ(I, pi), then
at each time step t ∈ (0, |pi|], action at = pi[t] is such that at = pi′[1] where pi′ is the
optimal plan so that δ(δ(pi[1 : t− 1], I), pi′) |= G.
While this might seem to be a strong assumption, humans indeed are good at
adapting plans to their current situation. Indeed, in case of full observability, the
human only needs to replan if at all there has been an unexpected change in the
world state. In fact this is closely connected to the idea of plan monitoring during
execution and [154] provides an automated way to do this without having to re-plan
at every step, and nicely complements this assumption of optimal behavior during
plan execution. Of course for a fully observable world with no exogenous events, this
means that the optimal plan computed by the human initially is the same as the one
at each plan step during execution of the plan, i.e. pi′ = pi∗[t : |pi|] ∀ t ∈ (0, |pi|], but in
the current context, the robot can plan to change the state of the world in his favor.
The challenge then, for coming up with any combined effort (planning for serendipity
in the rest of the discussion), is to find the right composition of the individual plans
into the composite plan, under constraints defined by the context.
2.3.2 Interaction Constraints for Serendipity
Now we will formalize exactly what it means to be planning for serendipity. When
the robotic agents bring about the serendipitous moments for the human, these
moments would essentially appear as outcomes of positive exogenous events during
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the execution of the human’s plan. Remember that, even though the humans and the
robotic agents are cohabitants of the same environment, this is not a team setting,
and there is no explicit commitment to help from the robots - and so the human
cannot expect or plan to exploit these exogenous events. This means that, given that
there are no guarantees or even expectations from the other agents, the human agent
can at best only be optimal by himself. This also means that the robots, if they want
to make positive interventions, must produce composite plans that are valid given
the current human plan under execution. Thus it becomes incumbent on the robot to
analyze the original human plan and determine which parts of the plan can be changed
and which parts need to be preserved. Indeed, we will see next that these notions
of plan interruptibility and plan preservation are crucial to planning for serendipity.
It is worth noting at this point, that the notion of plans being enabled by positive
external events is closely associated with the use of triangle table kernels [335] during
plan execution. However, triangle table kernels only enable positive effects internal to
a plan, and cannot capture the full scope of stigmergic collaboration, specifically ones
that involve changes outside of the original plan under execution.
2.3.2.1 Plan Interruptibility
We start off by noting that it only makes sense to produce composite plans that
have a lesser global cost than the single optimal plan of the human. However, just
having a better cost does not guarantee a useful composite plan in the current context.
Consider the following example. Suppose the initial positions of medkit1 and medkit2
are room7 and room3 respectively (refer to Figure 14), and CommX has a goal to conduct
triage in room1. Also, suppose that the robot knows that the commander plans to
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pick up medkit1 from room7 on his way to the triage location (this being the optimal
plan), while a cheaper composite plan is available if the robot chooses to pick up
medkit2 from room3 and hands it over to commX in hall4 which falls in his path. One
possible way to make this happen would be to maybe lock the door to room7 so that
commX cannot execute his original plan any more, and switches to a plan that happens
to conform to the composite optimum. However, since there is no active collaboration
between the agents, in this case CommX might very well go looking for the keys to enter
room7, and the serendipitous outcome will not materialize. Indeed, this leads us to
the notion of identifying parts of the human plan as “interruptible”, so as to lend itself
to such serendipitous execution.
Definition 4.0: Any subplan piijH = 〈ai, . . . , aj〉, 1 ≤ i < j ≤ |piH | of the predicted
human plan piH = 〈a1, a2, . . . , aT 〉 is positively removable iff ∃pi (a composite plan)
such that for some i′ > i, pi(H) =
( ⊆ piH [1 : i−1])·pi(H)[i : i′]· ( ⊆ piH [j+1 : |piH |])
and C(pi(H)) < C(piH) (here the symbol · is used to denote concatenation).
Definition 4.1: A plan is interruptible iff it has a positively removable subplan.
Thus time steps i ≤ t ≤ i′ is when the (serendipitous) exceptions can occur. Note
that we specify the rest of the plan to be subsequences of the original plan which
ensures that the human does not need to go outside his original plan sans the part
where the actual exceptions occur.
The notion of serendipitous exceptions is closely tied to the issue of what is actually
visible to the human and whether such exceptions are immediately recognizable to
the human or not. While this is hard to generalize in such non-proximal settings, one
measure of this might be the length of the exception. Going back to the previous
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example, if the exception is just finding the locked door, then this cannot be a positive
interruption because when the human goes looking for the keys then this detour is not
a subplan of his original plan anymore. However, the exception can always be made to
be long enough to accommodate the entire detour, but such exceptions are penalized
because it is likely to be harder for the human to come up with such newer plans,
partly because the entire world might not be visible to him. Note that this might mean
that the formulation would sometimes prefer that the robot does not do the entire
job for the human even if it were possible - this is particularly relevant to situations
when the human has implicit preferences or commitments in his plan and thus shorter
detours are preferable. The exact trade-off between longer interruptions (and possible
interference being perceived by the human) and cheaper plans is determined by the
objective function of the planner. If we assume, for now, that the human replans
optimally (and independently) after the serendipitous exceptions, we can modify
Definition 4.0 to accommodate such adaptive behavior –
Definition 4.0a: Any subplan piijH = 〈ai, . . . , aj〉, 1 ≤ i < j ≤ |piH | of the predicted
human plan piH = 〈a1, a2, . . . , aT 〉 is positively removable iff ∃pi (a composite plan)
such that pi(H)[1 : i− 1] ⊆ piH [1 : i− 1] and pi(H)[i′ + 1 : |pi(H)|] is the optimal plan
for the human, beginning i′, and C(pi(H)) < C(piH).
We will now see what kinds of positive interruptibility accommodates serendipity
for the human, and define constraints on top of Definitions 4.0 and 4.1 to determine
opportunities to plan for such serendipitous moments.
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2.3.2.2 Preservation Constraints
Let us now go back to the setting in Figure 14. Suppose the initial position of
medkit1 is now room5, and CommX still has a goal to conduct triage in room1. Clearly,
one of the optimal human plans is to pick up medkit1 from room5 on his way to
the triage location, while a cheaper composite plan is again available if the robot
chooses to pick up medkit2 from room3 and hands it over to commX in hall4 which
falls in his path. However, the CommX does not know that the robot plans to do this,
and will continue with his original plan, which makes the robot’s actions redundant,
and the composite plan, though cheaper, is not a useful plan in the current setting.
Specifically, since there is no expectation of interventions, the robot must preserve
the plan prefix of the original plan (that appears before and independently of the
intervention) in the final composite plan. This is the first preservation constraint –
Definition 5.0: The composite plan piA that positively removes subplan piijH from the
predicted plan piH of the human is a serendipitous plan iff pi(H)[1 : i−1] = piH [1 : i−1],
where i = argmini[a = pi(H)[i] ∧ a 6∈ piH ], ∀ a ∈ AH .
Further, the composite plan must ensure that the effects of the actions of the
robot preserve the world state for the human’s plan to continue executing beyond the
serendipitous moment (because there is no commitment from the robot to help in
future, and the human cannot plan to exploit future assistance), which provides our
second preservation constraint below –
Definition 5.1: The composite plan pi that positively removes subplan piijH from piH
is a serendipitous plan iff δ(IR ∪ IHr , pi[1 : i′]) |= δ(IHr , piH [1 : j]).
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We will now introduce a planner that uses these constraints to produce serendipitous
composite plans. Given the plan the human is executing, the robot decides on what
serendipitous exceptions to introduce to make the cost of that plan lower. In doing
this, the robot searches over a space of exceptions during execution time for the
human’s plan, as well as the length of the detours that those exceptions will cause (by
“simulating” what it thinks the human will do in replanning).
2.3.3 The Planner
Similar to Section 2.2, where we demonstrated the usefulness of an IP-based
solution in modeling complex interaction constraints between the human and the
robot, we formulate an IP-problem to reason about serendipitous opportunities in a
human-aware planning problem. Recall that we assumed that the has full knowledge
of the human task model and can predict exactly the plan s/he is going to follow
(assuming optimality) - this forms piH . Though we assume here that the intentions of
the human are completely known, it is straightforward to have the plan recognition
module that provides piH as the most likely plan from a distribution over possible
plans given observations up to that point. Another way to handle uncertainty in
intentions is to convert information from the set of possible plans to resource profiles
as discussed previously in Section 2.2. In this section, our intention is to lay the
foundations of planning for serendipity given a predicted human plan.
As before, we define a binary variable for action a at time step t as follows:
xa,t =

1, if action a ∈ AR ∪AHr is executed by either H or R at time step t
0, otherwise; t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}
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Figure 14: The commander has a goal to conduct triage in room1, the robot can help
him by intercepting him with a medkit in the hallway so he need not fetch one himself
- planning for serendipity! For better understanding, a proof of concept demonstration
can be viewed at https://youtu.be/VCb0TaM_RJY.
Also, for every proposition f at step t we have a binary state variable as follows:
yf,t =

1, if proposition is true in plan step t
0, otherwise; ∀f ∈ F, t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T}
We also introduce two variables ξ1, ξ2 ∈ [1, T ], 1 ≤ ξ1 < ξ2 ≤ T to represent
the beginning and end of the subplan that gets positively removed by Definition
4.0. Finally, we add the “no-operation” again, as in Section 2.2. The IP formulation
modeling the interruptibility and preservation constraints is given by:
min
∑
a∈AR∪AHr
∑
t∈{1,2,...,T} ca × xa,t + K ||ξ2 − ξ1||
subject to:
yf,0 = 1 ∀f ∈ IR ∪ IHr (1)
yf,0 = 0 ∀f /∈ IR ∪ IHr (2)
yf,T = 1 ∀f ∈ GR ∪ GHr (3)
xa,t ≤ yf,t−1 ∀a ∈ AR ∪ AHr , ∀f ∈ pre(a), t ∈ {1, . . . , T} (4)
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yf,t ≤ yf,t−1 +
∑
a:f∈eff+(a) xa,t ∀f ∈ F, t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T} (5)
yf,t ≤ 1−
∑
a:f∈eff−(a) xa,t ∀f ∈ F, t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T} (6)
ξ1 ≤
∑
t(t× xa,t)(1−
∑
t
∑
a∈piH xa,t) + T (1−
∑
t xa,t) + T (
∑
t
∑
a∈piH xa,t)
∀a ∈ AHr , t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T} (7a)
xa,t ≥ 1T (ξ1 − t) ∀a ∈ piH , t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T} (7b)
xa,t ≤ 1 + 1T (ξ2 − t) ∀a ∈ AR, t ∈ {1, . . . , T} (8)
xa,t + xaNOOP,t ≥ 1T (t− ξ2) ∀a ∈ piH , t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T} (9)∑
a∈AR xa,t +
∑
a∈AHr xa,t ≤ 1 t ∈ {1, . . . , T} (10)∑
a∈AHr
∑
t∈{1,2,...,T} ca × xa,t ≤ C(piH) (11)
ξ1, ξ2 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}, ξ2 ≤ ξ1 + 1 (12)
yf,t ∈ {0, 1} ∀f ∈ F, t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T} (13)
xa,t ∈ {0, 1} ∀a ∈ AR ∪AHr , t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T} (14)
where K is a large constant and T is the planning horizon.
Here, the objective function minimizes the sum of the cost of the composite
plan and the length of the proposed positively removable subplan. Here we assume
unit cost actions, i.e. ca = 1 ∀a and then investigate the effect of varying the cost
of the robot’s actions with respect to the human’s. Constraints (1) through (3)
model the initial and goal conditions, while constraints (4) through (6) enforce the
state equations that maintain the preconditions, and add and delete effects of the
actions. Constraint (7a) specifies the value of ξ1 as per Definition 5.0. Specifically,
ξ1 = argmini[a = pi(H)[i] ∧ a 6∈ piH ]. Thus ∀a we write the following inequalities (the
equations are written in a way so as to render all such constraints that do not belong
to cases in Definition 5.0 be trivially satisfied since we already have 1 ≤ ξ1 ≤ T ) –
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ξ1 ≤

∞, if a 6∈ pi(H)
∞, if a ∈ piH
t, if a = pi(H)[t] ∧ a 6∈ piH
and constraint (7b) imposes Definition 5.0 as
xa,t

> 0 =⇒ 1, if a ∈ piH and t < ξ1
∈ {0, 1}, otherwise
Similarly, constraint (8) models Definition 5.1 by stopping actions from the robot
for t > ξ2 as follows –
xa,t

< 1 =⇒ 0, if a ∈ AR and t > ξ2
∈ {0, 1}, otherwise
Constraint (9) is optional and models Definition 4.0 (when ignored, Definition 4.0a
is implied) as follows –
xa,t

> 0 =⇒ 1, if a ∈ piH and t > ξ2
∈ {0, 1}, otherwise
Constraint (10) imposes non concurrency on the actions of each agent (or inter-
agent actions) during every epoch. Constraint (11) specifies that the generated
composite plan should have lesser cost than the original human plan (again, this is
optional). Finally constraints (12) to (14) provide the binary ranges of the variables.
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The constant K penalizes larger subplans from being removed (so as to minimize
interference with the human’s plan).
We will discuss the implementation of our planner and the statistics of its behavior
in the next section. In the following discussion, we will illustrate how the implemented
planner handles different configurations of the running example.
Going back to Figure 14, we note that the optimal plan for CommX in order to
perform triage in room1 involves picking up medkit1 from room2 –
1 - MOVE_COMMX_ROOM13_HALL8
2 - MOVE_REVERSE_COMMX_HALL8_HALL7
3 - MOVE_REVERSE_COMMX_HALL7_HALL6
4 - MOVE_REVERSE_COMMX_HALL6_HALL5
5 - MOVE_REVERSE_COMMX_HALL5_HALL4
6 - MOVE_REVERSE_COMMX_HALL4_HALL3
7 - MOVE_REVERSE_COMMX_HALL3_HALL2
8 - MOVE_REVERSE_COMMX_HALL2_ROOM2
9 - PICK_UP_MEDKIT_COMMX_MK1_ROOM2
10 - MOVE_COMMX_ROOM2_HALL2
11 - MOVE_REVERSE_COMMX_HALL2_HALL1
12 - MOVE_REVERSE_COMMX_HALL1_ROOM1
13 - CONDUCT_TRIAGE_COMMX_ROOM1
But the robot can be proactive and decide to fetch medkit2 and hand it to him
on his way towards room1. Indeed, this is the plan that the planner produces –
1 - MOVE_COMMX_ROOM13_HALL8
1 - MOVE_REVERSE_ROBOT_ROOM4_ROOM3
2 - MOVE_REVERSE_COMMX_HALL8_HALL7
2 - PICK_UP_MEDKIT_ROBOT_MK2_ROOM3
3 - MOVE_REVERSE_COMMX_HALL7_HALL6
4 - MOVE_REVERSE_COMMX_HALL6_HALL5
4 - MOVE_ROBOT_ROOM3_ROOM4
5 - MOVE_REVERSE_COMMX_HALL5_HALL4
5 - MOVE_ROBOT_ROOM4_HALL4
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6 - HAND_OVER_ROBOT_COMMX_MK2_HALL4
6 - HAND_OVER_ROBOT_COMMX_MK2_HALL4
7 - MOVE_REVERSE_COMMX_HALL4_HALL3
8 - MOVE_REVERSE_COMMX_HALL3_HALL2
9 - MOVE_REVERSE_COMMX_HALL2_HALL1
10 - MOVE_REVERSE_COMMX_HALL1_ROOM1
11 - CONDUCT_TRIAGE_COMMX_ROOM1
2.3.4 Planning with Communication
The dynamics of the setting change somewhat when we allow certain forms of
communication to exist. Going back to the previous example, now it is no longer
necessary for the robot to ensure that the prefix of the original human plan is respected
(for example, the robot can inform commX that it is going to be in hall4 to hand over
medkit2 to him), so that planning with communication changes the desiderata in
terms of the preservation constrains in the plan generation process.
One immediate upshot of being able to communicate is that it is no longer
necessary for the robot to preserve plan prefixes, and Definition 5.0 and correspondingly
constraints (7b) and (7b) are no longer required. To impose the interruptibility
constraints from Definition 4.0 as pi(H)[1 : i − 1] ⊆ piH [1 : i − 1] (for a positively
removable subplan piijH) on the plan prefix, constraint 7b may be updated to –
xa,t ≤ 1 + 1T (t− ξ1) ∀a ∈ AH ∧ a 6∈ piH , t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T} (7b)
Finally, communication comes at a cost - too much communication might feel like
interference from the point of view of the human. We thus define the communication
cost to be proportional to the number (or cost) of actions that the robot changes in
the composite plan with respect to the original human plan.
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Definition 5.2: The communication cost in the composite plan piA is given by
C ∝∑ ca ∀ a ∈ pi(H) ∧ a 6∈ piH .
Thus we update the objective function of the IP with Obj ← Obj + C (and remove
constraints (7a) and (7b)).
Going back again to the world state in Figure 14, but now with medkit1 in room7,
we note that the optimal plan for CommX in order to perform triage in room1 involves
picking up medkit1 from room7, as follows –
1 - MOVE_COMMX_ROOM13_HALL8
2 - MOVE_REVERSE_COMMX_HALL8_HALL7
3 - MOVE_REVERSE_COMMX_HALL7_ROOM7
4 - PICK_UP_MEDKIT_COMMX_MK1_ROOM7
5 - MOVE_COMMX_ROOM7_HALL7
6 - MOVE_REVERSE_COMMX_HALL7_HALL6
7 - MOVE_REVERSE_COMMX_HALL6_HALL5
8 - MOVE_REVERSE_COMMX_HALL5_HALL4
9 - MOVE_REVERSE_COMMX_HALL4_HALL3
10 - MOVE_REVERSE_COMMX_HALL3_HALL2
11 - MOVE_REVERSE_COMMX_HALL2_HALL1
12 - MOVE_REVERSE_COMMX_HALL1_ROOM1
13 - CONDUCT_TRIAGE_COMMX_ROOM1
The plan from the previous section is no longer a valid serendipitous plan because
it violates Definition 5.0, as confirmed by the planner. However, the robot can choose
to communicate its intention to handover medkit2 and indeed, when communication
is allowed, the planner once again produces the previous plan. As discussed before, in
context of communication in planning with resource conflicts, the exact details of the
communication is out of scope of this work.
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2.3.5 Evaluations
In the following, we go through simulations illustrating some of the salient aspects
of planning for serendipity - we will also show how planning for serendipity becomes
more useful the more we discount the cost of the robot’s actions with respect to
those of the human’s, and demonstrate the usefulness of the approach by validating
that there are indeed significant opportunities for such types of assistance. For the
simulations, we build a suite of 200 test problems on the domain shown in Figure 14,
by randomly generating positions for the two medkits and the positions of the two
agents, and also randomly assigning a triage goal to the commander.
In Table 4 we look at the full spectrum of costs incurred (to the entire team) by
planning for individual plans to planning for serendipity (with and without communi-
cation) to optimal global plans and compare gains associated with each specific type
of planning with respect to the individual optimal plans. Note that communication
costs are set to zero in these evaluations so as to show the maximum gains potentially
available by allowing communication and to disambiguate the effects in change in
utility due to cost of communication or otherwise. Also, for composite planning, the
number of planning epochs was set to the length of the planning horizon of the original
individual plan. Of course with higher planning horizons we will get more and more
composite plans that make the robot do most of the work with discounted actions
costs. Notice the gains in cost achieved through the different flavors of collaboration.
The results indicate that, for the given scenario, planning for serendipity with com-
munication essentially boiled down to bounded length composite optimal plans. The
results also outline the expected trend of decreasing costs of the composite plan with
respect to increasing discounts on the cost of the robot’s actions
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Discount without communication with communication ≡ comp. plan
0% 9.82 (1) 9.72 (13)
10% 9.81 (7) 9.65 (23)
30% 9.79 (7) 9.48 (34)
50% 9.76 (12) 9.25 (40)
70% 9.68 (29) 8.93 (62)
90% 9.55 (32) 8.51 (70)
Table 4: Comparison of costs of team plans between communication vs without
communication settings (as compared to average cost of 9.825 for individual plans)
without communication with communication composite optimal
Time (in sec) 28.68 33.93 44.96
Table 5: Runtime performance of the planner
Table 4 also shows the effect of varying the discount factor on the percentage of
problem instances that supported opportunities for the robot to plan for serendipity.
That the numbers are low is not surprising given that we are planning for cases where
the robot can help without being asked to, but notice how more and more instances
become suitable for serendipitous collaboration as we reduce the costs incurred by the
robot, indicating there is sufficient scope of exhibiting such behaviors for relatively
cheap robot actions as compared to the human.
Table 5 shows runtime performance of the four types of planning approaches. The
performance is evidently not affected much by different modes of planning. Note that
the time for generating the single plan is contained in these cases (for the composite
plan, the individual plan is used to get the planning horizon). Also, note that the
discussion in the previous section on the runtime characteristics of the planner are
also relevant here, and have not been reproduced again in the interests of space.
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2.4 Concluding Remarks
Although we are still far from AI agents that reach human level intelligence, our
views on their relationships with humans are likely to change as more intelligence
is built into these agents. Instead of considering them as tools (as in the case of
remotely controlled robots), we will start to view them as teammates and colleagues,
as conceptualized in Appendix C in the form of “human-robot cohabitation”. In
such cases, the interaction between humans and agents are likely to deviate from the
traditional command-and-control paradigm and move towards long-term and more
natural means of collaboration, similar to that between humans and humans. In
this chapter, we looked at two particular modes of interaction which go beyond the
traditional teaming paradigm and instead promote cooperation among agents sharing
an environment with minimal prior coordination. As mentioned before, I expand on
this theme further in Appendix C.
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Chapter 3
EXPLAINABLE PLANNING
“The meaning of the life has been lost in the wind.”
So far we have seen how a robot can leverage its understanding of the human
model (MHr ) in ensuring that its contributions to joint plans are “human-aware”. In
this chapter, I will discuss the implications considering of the human mental model
(MRh ) in the deliberative process of the planner (or the robot as an embodiment of it).
I will show how this model has been used in existing literature to generate plans that
are explicable from the perspective of the human in the loop and show how it can also
be used to provide explanations when such plans cannot be found. I will particularly
focus on the explanation generation process and demonstrate how an argumentation
about the human-awareness and explanations of its decisions engenders a delicate
balancing act in an AI agent’s decision making process.
3.1 Introduction: Explanations cannot be a soliloquy!
There has been significant renewed interest recently in developing AI systems that
can automatically provide explanations to humans in the loop. While much of the
interest has been focused on learning systems that can explain their classification
decisions [483], a related broader problem involves providing explanations in the
context of human-AI interaction and human-in-the-loop decision making systems. In
such scenarios, the automated agents are called upon to provide explanation of their
behavior or plans [262, 150]. Although explanation of plans has been investigated in
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the past (c.f. [221, 416, 399, 298]), much of that work involved the planner explaining
its decisions with respect to its own model (i.e. current state, actions and goals)
and assuming that this “soliloquy" also helps the human in the loop. While such a
sanguine assumption may well be requited when the human is an expert “debugger”
and is intimately familiar with the agent’s innards, it is completely unrealistic in
most human-AI interaction scenarios, where the humans may have a domain and task
model that differs significantly from that used by the AI system.
We posit then that the need for plan explanations should be understood in the
context of human’s misunderstandings of the robot model – i.e. differences inMR
and MRh – and consequently the explanation process can be seen as the robot’s
attempt to move its understanding of the human’s mental model – MˆRh – to be in
conformance with its own. This process of model reconciliation thus forms the core of
the explanation process of a human-aware planning agent.
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3.1.1 Chapter Highlights
The following provides a brief overview of topics covered in this chapter –
- Section 3.2 – In this section, I will show how the explanation process can be
viewed as a means of bringing the human mental model and the robot model
closer – i.e. a process of model reconciliation.
- Section 3.3 – In this section, I will develop a first of its kind planner that can
trade-off the cost of being explicable versus the cost of explaining a plan during
the plan generation process itself.
- Section 3.4 – Here, I will show how to adapt the model reconciliation process
when the human model is not known with certainty.
- Section 3.5 – I will then show how the same process can be adapted for explana-
tions generation with multiple humans in the loop.
- Section 3.6 – The design of explanations is, of course, incomplete without
evaluations in controlled user studies. This is the focus of the last section.
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3.2 Explanations as Model Reconciliation
Consider the following scenario as a simple illustration of the the concept of
explanations via model reconciliation through an example based on the Fetch robot
whose design requires it to tuck its arms and lower its torso or crouch before moving
- which is not obvious to a human navigating it. This may lead to an unbalanced base
and toppling of the robot if the human deems such actions as unnecessary. The move
action for the robot is described in PDDL in the following model snippet -
(:action move
:parameters (?from ?to - location)
:precondition (and (robot-at ?from)
(hand-tucked) (crouched))
:effect (and (robot-at ?to)
(not (robot-at ?from))))
(:action tuck
:parameters ()
:precondition ()
:effect (and (hand-tucked)
(crouched)))
(:action crouch
:parameters ()
:precondition ()
:effect (and (crouched)))
Notice that the tuck action also involves a lowering of torso so that the arm can
rest on the base once it is tucked in. Now, consider a problem with the following
initial and goal states (here, identical for both the robot and the human) -
(:init (block-at b1 loc1) (robot-at loc1) (hand-empty))
(:goal (and (block-at b1 loc2)))
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Figure 15: The Fetch in the crouched position with arm tucked (left), torso raised and
arm outstretched (middle) and the rather tragic consequences of a mistaken action
model (right showing a fractured head from an accident).
Here, an optimal plan for the robot involves a tuck action followed by a move –
pick-up b1 -> tuck -> move loc1 loc2 -> put-down b1
The human, on the other hand, expects a much simpler model, as shown below.
The move action does not have the preconditions for tucking the arm and lowering
the torso, while tuck does not automatically lower the torso either.
(:action move
:parameters (?from ?to - location)
:precondition (and (robot-at ?from)
:effect (and (robot-at ?to)
(not (robot-at ?from))))
(:action tuck
:parameters ()
:precondition ()
:effect (and (hand-tucked))
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(:action crouch
:parameters ()
:precondition ()
:effect (and (crouched)))
Clearly, the original plan is no longer optimal (and hence explicable) here. One
possible model update (i.e. explanation) that can mitigate this situation is -
Explanation >> MOVE_LOC1_LOC2-has-precondition-HAND-TUCKED
This correction brings the human and the robot model closer, and is necessary
and sufficient to make the robot’s plan optimal in the resultant domain. This is the
essence of the model reconciliation process.
3.2.1 Related Work
Our view of explanation as a model reconciliation process is supported by studies
in the field of psychology which stipulate that explanations –
“. . . explanations privilege a subset of beliefs, excluding possibilities in-
consistent with those beliefs. . . can serve as a source of constraint in
reasoning. . . ” [272]
This is achieved in our case by the appropriate change in the expectation of the
model that is believed to have engendered the plan in question. Further, authors in
[273] also underline that –
“. . . explanations are typically contrastive. . . the contrast provides a con-
straint on what should figure in a selected explanation. . . ” [273]
This is especially relevant in order for an explanation to be self-contained and
unambiguous. Hence the requirement of optimality in our explanations, which not
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only ensures that the current plan is valid in the updated model, but is also better
than other alternatives. This is consistent with the notion of optimal (single-model)
explanations investigated in [416] where less costly plans are referred to as preferred
explanations. The optimality criterion, and argumentation over the human mental
model, makes the problem fundamentally different from model change algorithms in
[162, 186, 133, 56, 349] which focus more on the feasibility of plans or correctness of
domains, or tackle model extensions in general without consideration of the human
expectations i.e. the human mental model.
A fantastic account of the many facets of the explanation process, as studied
in the social sciences and as it related to the design of AI agents that can explain
their decisions, can be found in [307]. Indeed, the model reconciliation process, as
introduced in this thesis, is the only existing plan explanation process that conforms
to the selective, contrastive and social properties of explanations outlined in [307].
3.2.2 The Model Reconciliation Process
As described previously, a plan pi that is optimal in the robot’s model may not be
optimal in the human mental model and thus inexplicable from the point of view of
the human. The explanation process thus begins with the following question –
Q: Why not a different plan pˆi?
This questions can arise due to one or both of two causes –
- MRh , i.e. the human’s approximation of the robot model is wrong. Here, since
it knows its own ground truth model, the robot can use an approximation of
the human mental model (known unknown) to perform model reconciliation so
that both of them are on the same page.
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- MHr , i.e. the robot’s approximation of the human model is wrong. In this
situation the above approach does not work, since the robot does not know
what it does not know (i.e. the real human model is an unknown unknown).
However, if the above approach fails to provide a satisfactory response from
the human, then the robot can conclude it must be because of this and seek
out more information on the human model to update its own understanding.
Note that, in this case, there is no model to reconcile to since, if the robot
already knew a possible human model, it could have just planned with that
understanding instead. With this in mind, we confine our focus to the first case
in our study of explanations in the model reconciliation paradigm.
Definition The Model Reconciliation Problem (MRP) is a tuple
〈pi∗, 〈MR,MRh 〉〉 where C(pi∗,MR) = C∗MR , i.e. the plan pi∗ is the optimal plan in the
robot modelMR but may not be so in the human mental modelMRh .
Definition A Multi-Model Explanation is a solution to the model reconciliation
problem in the form of (1) a model update E such that the (2) robot optimal plan is
(3) feasible and at least as good as the foil in the updated model –
(1) M̂Rh ←−MRh + E ; and
(2) C(pi,MR) = C∗MR ;
(3) δM̂Rh (Î
R
h , pi) |= ĜRh ∧ C(pi,M̂Rh ) < C(pˆi,M̂Rh ).
The question can also be posed in the following form –
Q: Why plan pi?
This question, in essence, involves an implicit quantifier over all possible foils. Con-
dition (3) above then must ensure that plan pi is now also optimal in the updated
mental model (we will refer to this as the completeness property later on) –
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(3) C(pi,M̂Rh ) = C∗M̂Rh .
Remark. Note that the “closeness” or distance to an expected plan is modeled here in
terms of cost optimality, but in general this can be any preference metric like plan
similarity as investigated in existing literature [507, 506, 252] on explicable planning.
This does not effect the algorithms described in the rest of this chapter, since the
similarity is only invoked during the evaluation process of a particular node and thus
the stopping criterion of the search, rather than the search process itself.
Remark. An implicit assumptions we make here is that the computation power (or
planning capability) of the human is the same as that of the planner, i.e. the human
can compute the optimal plan given a planning problem. This assumption can be
relaxed by requiring |C(pi,M̂Rh )− C∗M̂Rh | < δ in the solution of an MRP, to model an
-optimal human or consider top-K plans [370] for hypothesis generation.
3.2.2.1 Model Space Search
In order to perform the model reconciliation process, we define the following state
representation over planning problems –
F = {init-has-f | ∀f ∈ FRh ∪ FR} ∪ {goal-has-f | ∀f ∈ FRh ∪ FR}⋃
a∈ARh ∪AR
{a-has-precondition-f, a-has-add-effect-f,
a-has-del-effect-f | ∀f ∈ FRh ∪ FR}
∪ {a-has-cost-ca | a ∈ ARh } ∪ {a-has-cost-ca | a ∈ AR}.
A mapping function Γ : M 7→ s represents any planning problem M =
〈〈F,A〉, I,G〉 as a state s ⊆ F as follows –
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τ(f) =

init-has-f if f ∈ I,
goal-has-f if f ∈ G,
a-has-precondition-f if f ∈ pre(a), a ∈ A
a-has-add-effect-f if f ∈ eff+(a), a ∈ A
a-has-del-effect-f if f ∈ eff−(a), a ∈ A
a-has-cost-f if f = ca, a ∈ A
Γ(M) = {τ(f) | ∀f ∈ I ∪ G∪⋃
a∈A
{f ′ | ∀f ′ ∈ {ca} ∪ pre(a) ∪ eff+(a) ∪ eff−(a)}
}
We can now define a model-space search problem 〈〈F ,Λ〉,Γ(M1),Γ(M2)〉 with
a new action set Λ containing unit model change actions λ : F → F such that
|s1∆s2| = 1. The new transition or edit function is given by δM1,M2(s1, λ) = s2 such
that condition 1 : s2 \s1 ⊆ Γ(M2) and condition 2 : s1 \s2 6⊆ Γ(M2) are satisfied.
This means that model change actions can only make a single change to a domain at a
time, and all these changes are consistent with the model of the planner. The solution
to a model-space search problem is given by a set of edit functions {λi} that transforms
the modelM1 toM2, i.e. δM1,M2(Γ(M1), {λi}) = Γ(M2). An explanation can thus
be cast as a solution to the model-space search problem 〈〈F ,Λ〉,Γ(MRh ),Γ(M̂)〉 with
the transition function δMRh ,MR such that Condition (3) above is preserved.
Remark. Note that during model reconciliation process, the robot model need not
be the ground truth. However, the robot can only explain with respect to what it
believes to be true. This can, of course, be wrong and be refined iteratively through
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interaction with the human in, for example, a decision support setting in [404]. We
will show an example of this later in Appendix B.
Remark. Notice that we also insisted that explanations must be compatible with
the planner’s model. If this requirement is relaxed, it allows the planner to generate
“explanations” that it knows are not true, and thus deceive the human. While endowing
the planner with such abilities may warrant significant ethical concerns, we note that
the notion of white lies, and especially the relationship between explanations, excuses
and lies has received very little attention and affords a rich set of exciting research
problems. We will come back to this in Appendix E.
3.2.2.2 Types of Explanations
Before we go on to develop approaches to compute different types of such explana-
tions, we consider the following requirements that characterize each solution.
R1. Completeness - Explanations of a plan should be able to be compared and
contrasted against other alternatives, so that no better solution exists. We
enforce this property by requiring that in the updated human mental model the
plan being explained is now optimal.
– An explanation is complete iff C(pi,M̂Rh ) = C∗M̂Rh .
R2. Conciseness - Explanation should be concise so that they are easily under-
standable to the explainee. Larger an explanation is, the harder it is for the
human to incorporate that information into her deliberative process.
R3. Monotonicity - This ensures that remaining model differences cannot change
the completeness of an explanation, i.e. all aspects of the model that engendered
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Explanation Type R1 R2 R3 R4
Plan Patch Explanation / VAL 7 3 7 3
Model Patch Explanation 3 7 3 3
Minimally Complete Explanation 3 3 7 ?
Minimally Monotonic Explanation 3 3 3 ?
(Approximate) Minimally Complete Explanation 7 3 7 3
Table 6: Requirements for different types of explanations.
the plan have been reconciled. Thus, monotonicity of an explanation subsumes
its completeness and requires more detailed explanations.
– An explanation is monotonic iff
C(pi∗,Mˆ) = C∗Mˆ ∀Mˆ : Γ(M̂)∆Γ(MRh ) ⊂ Γ(Mˆ)∆Γ(MRh ).
This is a very useful property to have. Doctors, for example, reveal different
amount of details of their model to their patients as opposed to their peers.
Further, the idea of completeness, i.e. withholding information on other model
changes as long as they explain the observed plan, is also quite prevalent in
how we deal with similar scenarios ourselves - e.g. progressing from Newtonian
physics in high school to Einsteins Laws of Relativity in college.
R4. Computability - While conciseness deals with how easy it is for the explainee
to understand an explanation, computability measures the ease of computing
the explanation from the point of view of the planner.
We will now introduce different kinds of multi-model explanations that can par-
ticipate in the model reconciliation process, propose algorithms to compute them,
and compare and contrast their respective properties. We note that the requirements
outlined above are in fact often at odds with each other - an explanation that is very
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easy to compute may be very hard to comprehend. This (as seen in Table 6) will
become clearer in course of this discussion.
A simple way to compute an explanation would be to provide the model differences
pertaining to only the actions that are present in the plan is being explained –
Definition: A Plan Patch Explanation (PPE) is given by –
EPPE = ∆i∈{H,R}
⋃
f∈{ca}∪pre(a)∪eff+(a)∪eff−(a) : a∈pi∗∩Ai
τ(f)
Clearly, such an explanation is easy to compute and concise by focusing only on
plan being explained. However, it may also contain information that need not have
been revealed, while at the same time ignoring model differences elsewhere inMH
that could have contributed to the plan being suboptimal in it. Thus, it is incomplete.
An adoption of VAL [149, 197] to the multi-model setting will be, in fact, a subset of
such PPEs, and suffer from the same limitations. An easy way to compute a complete
explanation would be to provide the entire model difference to the human –
Definition: A Model Patch Explanation (MPE) is given by –
EMPE = Γ(MR)∆Γ(MH)
This is clearly also easy to compute but can be quite large and is hence far from
being concise. Thus, in the following, we will try to minimize the size (and hence
increase the comprehensibility) of explanations by searching in the space of models
and thereby not exposing information that is not relevant to the plan being explained
while still trying to satisfy as many requirements as we can.
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Definition: A Minimally Complete Explanation (MCE) is the shortest possible
explanation that is complete –
EMCE = arg min
E
|Γ(M̂)∆Γ(MH)| with R1
The explanation provided before in the Fetch domain is indeed the smallest domain
change that may be made to make the given plan optimal in the updated action
model, and is thus an example of a minimally complete explanation.
We note that the optimality criterion is relevant to both the cases where the human
expectation is better, or when it is worse, than the plan computed by the planner.
This might be counter to intuition, since in the latter case one might expect that just
establishing feasibility of a better plan would be enough. Unfortunately, this is not
the case, as can be easily seen by creating counter-examples where other faulty parts
of the human model might disprove the optimality of the plan –
Proposition 1 – If C(pi∗,MRh ) < minpi C(pi,MRh ), then ensuring feasibility of the
plan in the modified planning problem, i.e. δM̂(Î, pi∗) |= Ĝ, is a necessary but not a
sufficient condition for M̂ = 〈D̂, Î, Ĝ〉 to yield a valid explanation.
Note that a minimally complete explanation for an MRP can be rendered invalid
given further updates to the model. This can be easily demonstrated in our running
example in the Fetch domain. Imagine that if, at some point, the human were to find
out that the action move also has a precondition (crouched), then the previous robot
plan will no longer make sense to the human since now, according to the human’s
faulty model (being unaware that the tucking action also lowers the robot’s torso) the
robot would need to do both tuck and crouch actions before moving. Consider the
following explanation in the Fetch domain instead –
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Explanation >> TUCK-has-add-effect-CROUCHED
Explanation >> MOVE_LOC2_LOC1-has-precondition-CROUCHED
This explanation does not reveal all model differences but at the same time ensures
that the robot’s plan remains optimal for this problem, irrespective of any other
changes to the model, by accounting for all the relevant parts of the model that
engendered the plan. It is also the smallest possible among all such explanations. The
requirement of monotonicity and minimality brings us to the notion of –
Definition: A Minimally Monotonic Explanation (MME) is the shortest expla-
nation that preserves both completeness and monotonicity –
EMME = arg min
E
|Γ(M̂)∆Γ(MH)| with R1 & R3
We note that an MCE or MME solution may not be unique to an MRP problem.
This can happen when there are multiple model differences supporting the same causal
links in the plan - a minimal explanation can get by (i.e. guarantee optimality in the
modified model) by only exposing one of them to the human.
Proposition 2 – MCEs and MMEs are not unique, i.e. there might be multiple
minimally complete and monotonic solutions to a given MRP.
We also note that even though MCEs are an abridged version of an MME, it is
easy to see that an MCE may not necessarily be part of an actual MME. This is due
to the non-uniqueness property of MCEs and MMEs. This is illustrated in Figure 16.
Thus, we emphasize -
Proposition 3 – An MCE may not be a subset of an MME, but it is always smaller or
equal in size, i.e. |MCE| ≤ |MME|.
81
Figure 16: Illustration of the different kinds of explanations in the Fetch domain
introduced previously. Here the PPE and MPE are equivalent (which is the worst
case for the former) and both longer than the MCE or the MME. Also, the MCE is
shorter than, and not a subset of the MME.
In the following, we will see how the state space designed in Section 3.2.2.1 can be
used in model-space search for computing MCEs and MMEs (computation of PPE
and MPE follows directly fromMR,MRh and pi∗).
3.2.2.2.1 Model Space Search for MCEs
To compute MCEs, we employ A∗ search, similar to [479], in the space of models, as
shown in Algorithm 5. The algorithm is referred to as MEGA –Multi-model Explanation
Generation Algorithm6. Given an MRP, we start off with the initial state Γ(MRh )
derived from the human’s expectation of a given planning problemMR, and modify
it incrementally until we arrive at a planning problem M̂ with C(pi∗,M̂) = C∗M̂, i.e.
the given plan is explained. Note that the model changes are represented as a set, i.e.
6Allegations that this actually stands for Make Explanations Great Again are not true.
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there is no sequentiality in the search problem. Also, we assign equal importance to
all model corrections. We can easily capture differential importance of model updates
by attaching costs to the edit actions λ - the algorithm remains unchanged. We also
employ a selection strategy for successor nodes to speed up search (by overloading the
way the priority queue is popped) by first processing model changes that are relevant
to actions in pi∗R and piH before the rest.
Proposition 4 – The successor selection strategy outlined in Algorithm 5 yields an
admissible heuristic for model space search for minimally complete explanations.
Proof. Let E be the MCE for an MRP problem and let E ′ be any intermediate
explanation found by our search such that E ′ ⊂ E , then the set E \ E ′ must contain at
least one λ related to actions in the set {a | a ∈ pi∗R ∨ a ∈ pi′} (where pi′ is the optimal
plan for the model Mˆ where δMRh ,MR(Γ(MRh ), E ′) = Γ(Mˆ). To see why this is true,
consider an E ′ where |E ′| = |E| − 1. If the action in E \ E ′ does not belong to either
pi∗R or pi′ then it can not improve the cost of pi∗R in comparison to pi′ and hence E can
not be the MCE. Similarly we can show that this relation will hold for any size of E ′.
We can leverage this knowledge about E \ E ′ to create an admissible heuristic that
will only consider the relevant changes at any given point of time.
3.2.2.2.2 Model Space Search for MMEs
As per definition, beyond the model obtained from the minimally monotonic
explanation, there do not exist any models which are not explanations of the same
MRP, while at the same time making as few changes to the original problem as
possible. It follows that this is the largest set of changes that can be done on the
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planner’s planning problemMR and still find a model M̂ where C(pi∗,M̂) = C∗M̂ -
we are going to use this property in the search for MMEs.
Proposition 3 – EMME = arg maxE |Γ(M̂)∆Γ(MR)| such that ∀Mˆ Γ(Mˆ)∆Γ(MR) ⊆
Γ(M̂)∆Γ(MR) it is guarantee to have C(pi∗,Mˆ) = C∗Mˆ.
This is similar to the model-space search for MCEs described before, but this time
starting from the robot’s modelMR instead. The goal here is to find the largest set
of model changes for which the explicability criterion becomes invalid for the first
time (due to either suboptimality or inexecutability). This requires a search over the
entire model space, as described in detail in Algorithm 2. We can leverage Proposition
3 to reduce our search space. Starting from MR, given a set of model changes E
where δMR,MH (Γ(MR), E) = Γ(M̂) and C(pi∗,M̂) > C∗M̂, no superset of E can lead
to an MME solution. In Algorithm 2, we keep track of such unhelpful model changes
in the list h_list. The variable EMME keeps track of the current best list of model
changes. Whenever we find a new set of model changes where pi∗ is optimal and is
larger than EMME, we update EMME with E . The resulting MME is all the possible
model changes that did not appear in EMME.
Figure 17 contrasts MCE search with MME search. MCE search starts fromMRh ,
computes updates M̂ towardsMR and returns the first node (indicated in orange)
where C(pi∗,M̂) = C∗M̂. MME search starts fromMR and moves towardsMRh . It
finds the longest path (indicated in blue) where C(pi∗,M̂) = C∗M̂ for all M̂ in the
path. The MME (shown in green) is the rest of the path towardsMRh .
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3.2.2.2.3 Approximate MCE-search
Both MCEs and MMEs may be hard to compute - in the worst case it involves a
search over the entire space of model differences. Thus the biggest bottleneck here
is the check for optimality of a plan given a new model. A check for necessary or
sufficient conditions for optimality, without actually computing optimal plans can be
used as a powerful tool to further prune the search tree. In the following section, we
thus investigate an approximation to an MCE by employing a few simple proxies to
the optimality test. By doing this we lose the completeness guarantee but improve
the computability of an explanation. Specifically, we replace the equality test in line
12 of Algorithm 5 by the following rules -
1. δM̂(Î, pi∗R) |= Ĝ; and
2. C(pi∗R,M̂) < C(pi∗R,MRh ) or δM̂(Î, pi∗H) 6|= Ĝ; and
3. Each action contributes at least one causal link to pi∗R.
The first criterion ensures that the plan pi∗R originally computed is actually valid
in the new model. Criterion (2) requires that this plan has either become better in
the new model or at least that the human’s expected plan pi∗H has been disproved.
Finally, in Criterion (3), we ensure that for each action ai ∈ pi∗R there exists an effect
p that satisfies the precondition of at least one action ak (where ai ≺ ak) and there
exists no action aj (where ai ≺ aj ≺ ak) such that p ∈ eff−(aj). Such explanations
are only able to preserve local properties of a plan and hence incomplete.
Proposition 6 – Criterion (3) is a necessary condition for optimality of pi∗ in M̂.
Proof. Assume that for an optimal plan pi∗R, there exists an action ai where criterion
(3) is not met. Now we can rewrite pi∗R as pi′R = 〈a0, a1, . . . , ai−1, ai, ai+1, . . . , an, an+1〉,
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Figure 17: Illustration contrasting MCE search with MME search.
where pre(a0) = φ and eff+(a0) = {I} and pre(an+1) = {G} and eff(an+1) = φ.
It is easy to see that δM̂(φ, pi
′
R) |= G. Now let us consider a cheaper plan pi′R =
〈a0, a1, . . . , ai−1, ai+1, . . . , an, an+1〉. Since ai does not contribute any causal links to
the original plan pi∗R, we will also have δM̂(φ, pˆi
′
R) |= G. This contradicts our original
assumption of pi∗R being optimal, hence proved.
3.2.2.3 Empirical Evaluations
Our explanation generation system (as previewed in the Fetch domain) integrates
calls to Fast-Downward [183] for planning, VAL [197] for plan validation, and pyperplan
[9] for parsing. The results reported here are from experiments run on a 12 core
Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU with an E5-2643 v3@t3.40GHz processor and a 64G RAM.
We use three planning domains [206] - BlocksWorld, Logistics and Rover - for our
experiments. In order to generate explanations we created the human model by
randomly removing parts (preconditions and effects) of the action model. Though
the following experiments are only pertaining to action model differences, it does not
make any difference at all to the approaches, given the way the state was defined.
Also note that these removals, as well as the corresponding model space search, was
done in the lifted representation of the domain.
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Algorithm 1 Search for Minimally Complete Explanations
1: procedure MCE-Search
2: Input : MRP 〈pi∗, 〈MR,MRh 〉〉
3: Output : Explanation EMCE
4: Procedure:
5: fringe ← Priority_Queue()
6: c_list ← {} . Closed list
7: pi∗R ← pi∗ . Optimal plan being explained
8: piH ← pi such that C(pi,MRh ) = C∗MR
h
. Plan expected by human
9: fringe.push(〈MH , {}〉, priority = 0)
10: while True do
11: 〈M̂, E〉, c← fringe.pop(M̂)
12: if C(pi∗R,M̂) = C∗M̂ then return E . Return E if pi∗R optimal in M̂
13: else
14: c_list ← c_list ∪ M̂
15: for f ∈ Γ(M̂) \ Γ(MR) do . Models that satisfy Condition 1
16: λ← 〈1, {M̂}, {}, {f}〉 . Removes f from M̂
17: if δMR
h
,MR(Γ(M̂), λ) 6∈ c_list then
18: fringe.push(〈δMR
h
,MR(Γ(M̂), λ), E ∪ λ〉, c+ 1)
19: for f ∈ Γ(MR) \ Γ(M̂) do . Models that satisfy Condition 2
20: λ← 〈1, {M̂}, {f}, {}〉 . Adds f to M̂
21: if δMR
h
,MR(Γ(M̂), λ) 6∈ c_list then
22: fringe.push(〈δMR
h
,MR(Γ(M̂), λ), E ∪ λ〉, c+ 1)
23: procedure Priority_Queue.pop(Mˆ)
24: candidates← {〈〈M̂, E〉, c∗〉 | c∗ = arg minc〈〈M̂, E〉, c〉}
25: pruned_list← {}
26: piH ← pi such that C(pi,Mˆ) = C∗Mˆ
27: for 〈〈M̂, E〉, c〉 ∈ candidates do
28: if ∃a ∈ pi∗R ∪ piH such that τ−1(Γ(M̂) ∆ Γ(Mˆ)) ∈ {ca} ∪ pre(a) ∪ eff+(a) ∪ eff−(a) then
29: . Candidates relevant to pi∗R or piH
30: pruned_list← pruned_list ∪ 〈〈M̂, E〉, c〉
31: if pruned_list = φ then 〈M̂, E〉, c ∼ Unif(candidate_list)
32: else 〈M̂, E〉, c ∼ Unif(pruned_list)
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Algorithm 2 Search for Minimally Monotonic Explanations
1: procedure MME-Search
2: Input : MRP 〈pi∗, 〈MR,MRh 〉〉
3: Output : Explanation EMME
4: Procedure:
5: EMME ← {}
6: fringe ← Priority_Queue()
7: c_list ← {} . Closed list
8: h_list ← {} . List of incorrect model changes
9: fringe.push(〈MR, {}〉, priority = 0)
10: while fringe is not empty do
11: 〈M̂, E〉, c← fringe.pop(M̂)
12: if C(pi∗,M̂) > C∗M̂ then
13: h_list← h_list ∪ (Γ(M̂) ∆ Γ(MR)) . Updating h_list
14: else
15: c_list ← c_list ∪ M̂
16: for f ∈ Γ(M̂) \ Γ(MRh ) do . Models that satisfy Condition 1
17: λ← 〈1, {M̂}, {}, {f}〉 . Removes f from M̂
18: if δMR,MR
h
(Γ(M̂), λ) 6∈ c_list
and @S s.t. (Γ(M̂)∆Γ(MR)) ⊇ S ∈ h_list then . Proposition 3
19: fringe.push(〈δMR,MR
h
(Γ(M̂), λ), E ∪ λ〉, c+ 1)
20: EMME ← max|·|{EMME , E}
21: for f ∈ Γ(MRh ) \ Γ(M̂) do . Models that satisfy Condition 2
22: λ← 〈1, {M̂}, {f}, {}〉 . Adds f from M̂
23: if δMR,MR
h
(Γ(M̂), λ) 6∈ c_list
and @S s.t. (Γ(M̂)∆Γ(MR)) ⊇ S ∈ h_list then . Proposition 3
24: fringe.push(〈δMR,MR
h
(Γ(M̂), λ), E ∪ λ〉, c+ 1)
25: EMME ← max|·|{EMME , E}
26: EMME ← (Γ(M̂) ∆ Γ(MR)) \ EMME
27: return EMME
88
Domain
MPE PPE MME MCE (exact MCE (exact MCE
(truth) (exact) w/o heuristic) with heuristic) (approximate)
size time size time size time size time size time size time
Blocks
p1
10 n/a
5
n/a
3 1100.8 2 34.7 2 18.9 2 19.8
p2 8 4 585.9 3 178.4 3 126.6 3 118.8
World p3 4 5 305.3 2 34.7 2 11.7 2 11.7p4 7 5 308.6 3 168.3 3 73.3 3 73.0
Rover
p1
10 n/a
10
n/a
2 2093.2 2 111.3 2 100.9 2 101.0
p2 10 2 2018.4 2 108.6 2 101.7 2 102.7
p3 10 2 2102.4 2 104.4 2 104.9 2 102.5
p4 9 1 3801.3 1 13.5 1 12.8 1 12.5
Logistics
p1
5 n/a
5
n/a
4 13.7 4 73.2 4 73.5 4 63.6
p2 5 4 13.5 4 73.5 4 71.4 4 63.3
p3 5 5 8.6 5 97.9 5 100.4 3 36.4
p4 5 5 8.7 5 99.2 5 95.4 3 36.4
Table 7: Comparison of MCEs and MMEs.
In Table 11 we make changes at random to the domains and measure the number
of explanations produced and the time taken (in secs) to produce them, against the
ground truth. Observe the gains produced by the heuristic in terms of time spent
on each problem. Further, note how close the approximate version of MCEs are to
the exact solutions. As expected, MME search is significantly costlier to compute
than MCE. However, note that both MCEs and MMEs are significantly smaller in
size (∼ 20%) than the total model difference (which can be arbitrarily large) in
certain domains, further underlining the usefulness of generating minimally complete
explanations as opposed to dumping the entire model difference on the human.
A general rule of thumb is –
| approx. MCE | ≤ | exact. MCE | < | MME | << |MPE|
Note that the time required to calculate an MME in the Logistics problems is lower
than that for the corresponding MCE. This is because for most of these problems a
single change in the planner’s model made the plan be no longer optimal so that the
search ended after checking all possible unit changes. In general, closer an MCE is to
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|MR∆MH | problem-1 problem-2 problem-3 problem-4
3 2.2 18.2 4.7 18.5
5 6.0 109.4 15.4 110.2
7 7.3 600.1 23.3 606.8
10 48.4 6849.9 264.2 6803.6
Table 8: MCE search time for increasing model differences.
BlocksWorld problem-1 problem-2 problem-3 problem-4
Number of nodes expanded
for MME (out of 1024) 128 64 32 32
Table 9: Usefulness of Proposition 3 in pruning MME search.
the total number of changes shorter the MME search would be. Also note how PPE
solutions, though much easier to compute, do not have completeness and monotonicity
properties, and yet often spans the entire model difference, containing information
that are not needed to support the optimality of the given plan.
We now increase the number of changes in the human model in BlocksWorld, and
illustrate the relative time (in secs) taken to search for exact MCEs in Table 8. As
expected there is an exponential increase in the time taken, which can be problematic
with even a modest number of model differences. This further highlights the importance
of finding useful approximations to the explanation generation problem.
Finally, Table 9 illustrates how Proposition 3 reduces the number of nodes searched
to find MMEs in random problems from the BlocksWorld domain with 10 faults in
the human model, as opposed to the total possible 210 models that can be evaluated
– equal to the cardinality of the power set of model changes |P(Γ(MR)∆Γ(MRh ))|
between the robot model and the human mental model.
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3.3 Balancing Plan Explicability and Explanations
So far, when faced with a plan that is perceived as inexplicable, we equipped
the robot to provide explanations such that the plan is evaluated as optimal in the
updated human mental model. Interestingly, there is a parallel line of work – referred
to as explicable planning [507, 506, 252] – where the robot instead changes its behavior
(i.e. sacrifices optimality) in order to be conformant to the human expectation.
Definition: An Explicable Plan pi is (1) executable in the robot model and (2) as
close as possible to optimality in the human mental model –
(1) δMR(IR, pi) |= GR; and
(2) C(pi,MRh ) ≈ C∗MRh .
In existing literature [507, 506, 252] this has been achieved by modifying the search
process so that the heuristic that guides the search is driven by the robot’s knowledge
of the human mental model. Such a heuristic can be either derived directly [252] from
the mental model or learned [507] through interactions in the form of affinity functions
between plans and their purported goals. The solutions generated this way satisfy the
planner’s goal, as required by Condition (1), but are also biased towards the human’s
expectations as required by Condition (2) above.
Remark. While mental modeling of the human in the loop allows for human-awareness
in the positive sense, it can also open up pathways for deception. Indeed, recent work
[255] has looked at how the concept of explicability can be flipped to obfuscate a
robot’s intentions from the observer.
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Indeed, the two processes of plan explanations and explicability described above
are integrally intertwined in an agent’s deliberative process is considered. A planner
can generate a explicable plan to the best of its ability or it can provide explanations
whenever required, or it can even opt for a combination of both – e.g. if the expected
human plan is too costly in the planner’s model (e.g. the human might not be aware
of some safety constraints) or the cost of communication overhead for explanations
is too high (e.g. limited communication bandwidth). In the following discussion, we
try to attain the sweet spot between plan explanations and explicability during the
decision making process. This is illustrated in Figure 18.
From the perspective of design of autonomy, the explicability versus explanations
trade-off has two interesting implications – (1) the agent can now not only explain
but also plan in the multi-model setting with the trade-off between compromise on its
optimality and possible explanations in mind; and (2) the argumentation process is
known to be a crucial function of the reasoning capabilities of humans [300], and now
by extension of autonomous agents as well, as a result of algorithms we develop here
to incorporate the explanation generation process into the agent’s decision making
process itself. General argumentation frameworks for resolving disputes over plans
have indeed been explored before [31, 134]. Other forms of argumentation [387] has
been aimed at meta-level reasoning of resource usage or cost of solutions. Our work
can be seen as the specific case where the argumentation process is over a set of
constraints that prove the correctness and quality of plans by considering the cost of
the argument specifically as it relates to the trade-off in plan quality and the cost of
explaining that plan. This is the first of its kind algorithm that can achieve this.
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Figure 18: Balancing explicability and explanations in human-aware planning.
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Definition: A Balance Plan pi (and an associated explanation E) trades off the
relative cost of explicability and explanations during the plan generation process such
that (1) pi is executable in the robot’s model, and with the explanation (2) in the
form of model updates it is (3) optimal in the updated human model while (4) the
cost (length) of the explanations, and the cost of deviation from optimality in its own
model to be explicable to the human, is traded off according to a constant α –
(1) δMR(IR, pi) |= GR;
(2) M̂Rh ←−MRh + E ;
(3) C(pi,M̂Rh ) = C∗M̂Rh ; and
(4) pi = arg minpi { |E| + α× | C(pi,MR)− C∗MR | }.
Note that this explanations corresponds to the notion of an MCE introduced
previously. Clearly, with higher values of α the planner will produce plans that require
more explanation, with lower α it will generate more explicable plans. Thus, with the
help of α, an autonomous agent can deliberate over the trade-off in the costs it incurs
in being explicable to the human (second minimizing term in (4)) versus explaining
its decisions (first minimizing term in (4)). Note that this trade-off is irrespective of
the cognitive burden of those decisions on the human in the loop. For example, for a
robot in a collapsed building during an USAR task, may have limited bandwidth for
communication and hence prefer to be explicable instead instead.
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Figure 19: Model space search to determine the best (in terms of the explanation
versus explicability trade-off) model to plan in.
3.3.1 Model-Space Search for Balanced Plans
As before, we employ a model space A∗ search algorithm MEGA∗ 7 (Algorithm 3) to
compute the balanced solution for a given value of α. We reuse the state representation
introduced in Section 3.2.2.1. The search process is visualized in Figure 19. We start
by initializing the min node tuple (N ) with the human mental model MRh and an
empty explanation. For each new possible model M̂ we come across during our model
space search, we test if the objective value of the new node is smaller than the current
min node. We stop the search once we identify a model (blue node) that is capable
of producing a plan that is also optimal in the robot’s own model. This is different
from the original MCE-search, where the authors are just trying to identify the first
node where the given plan is optimal. Finally, we select the (green) node with the
best objective value. This brings us to the first property of our algorithm.
7Allegations that the ∗ is actually a Kleeney star and that the name actually stands for Make
Explanations Great Again and Again and . . . are NOT true.
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Property 1 – MEGA∗ yields the smallest possible explanation for a given HAP.
This means that with a high enough α the algorithm is guaranteed to compute the
best possible plan for the planner as well as the smallest explanation associated with
it. This is by construction of the search process itself, i.e. the search only terminates
after the all the nodes that allow C(pi,M̂Rh ) = C∗M̂Rh have been exhausted. Note that
this is beyond what is offered by MEGA (Algorithm 5) which only computes the smallest
explanation (MCE) given a plan that is optimal in the planner’s model.
Property 2 – α = | MR ∆ MRh | yields the most optimal plan in the planner’s model
along with the minimal explanation possible given a human-aware planning problem.
This is easy to see, since with ∀E , |E| ≤ | MR ∆ MRh |, the latter being the total
model difference, the penalty for departure from explicable plans is high enough that
the planner must choose from possible explanations only (note that the explicability
penalty is always positive until the search hits the nodes with C(pi,M̂Rh ) = C∗M̂Rh ,
at which point onwards the penalty is exactly zero). In general this works for any
α ≥ |MCE| but since an MCE will only be known retrospectively after the search is
complete, the above condition suffices since the entire model difference is known up
front and is the largest possible explanation in the worst case.
Property 3 – α = 0 yields the most explicable plan.
Under this condition, the planner has to minimize the cost of explanations only.
Of course, at this point it will produce the plan that requires the shortest explanation,
and hence the most explicable plan. Note that this is distinct from just computing the
optimal plan in the human’s model, since such a plan may not be executable in the
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planner’s model so that some explanations are required even in the worst case. This is
also a welcome additions to the explicability only view of plan generation introduced
in [507, 252, 506], where the human model only also guides the plan generation process
instead of doing so directly, though none of these works provided any insight into how
to make the remainder of the model reconciliation possible in such cases, as done here
with the explanations associated with the generated plans.
Property 4 – MEGA∗is required only once per problem and is independent of α.
Algorithm 3 terminates only after all the nodes containing a MCE have been
explored. This means that for different values of α, the agent only needs to post-
process the nodes with the new objective function in mind. Thus, a large part of the
reasoning process for a particular problem can be pre-computed.
3.3.2 Evaluations
In the following, we will perform internal evaluations of the MEGA∗ Algorithm and
follow up with demonstrations of the same in the USAR Domain.
3.3.2.1 Cost Trade-off
The hyperparameter α determines how much an agent is willing to sacrifice its
own optimality versus the cost of explanation. We will now illustrate this trade-off on
modified versions of two well-known IPC [206] domains.
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Algorithm 3 MEGA∗
1: procedure MEGA∗-Search
2: Input : HAP Ψ = 〈MR,MRh 〉, α
3: Output : Plan pi and Explanation E
4: Procedure:
5: fringe ← Priority_Queue()
6: c_list ← {} . Closed list
7: Nmin ← 〈MRh , {}〉 . Node with minimum objective value
8: pi∗R ← pi∗ . Optimal plan being explained
9: piRh ← pi s.t. C(pi,MRh ) = C∗MR
h
. Plan expected by the human
10: fringe.push(〈MRh , {}〉, priority = 0)
11: while True do
12: 〈M̂, E〉, c← fringe.pop(M̂)
13: if OBJ_VAL(〈M̂, E〉) ≤ OBJ_VAL(Nmin) then
14: Nmin ← 〈M̂, E〉 . Update min node
15: if C(pi∗M̂,MR) = C∗MR then
16: 〈Mmin, Emin〉 ← Nmin
17: return 〈piMmin , Emin〉 . If pi∗M̂ is optimal inMR
18: else
19: c_list ← c_list ∪ M̂
20: for f ∈ Γ(M̂) \ Γ(MR) do . Models that satisfy Condition 1 (Section 3.2.2.1)
21: λ← 〈1, {M̂}, {}, {f}〉 . Removes f from M̂
22: if δMR
h
,MR(Γ(M̂), λ) 6∈ c_list then
23: fringe.push(〈δMR
h
,MR(Γ(M̂), λ), E ∪ λ〉, c+ 1)
24: for f ∈ Γ(MR) \ Γ(M̂) do . Models that satisfy Condition 2 (Section 3.2.2.1)
25: λ← 〈1, {M̂}, {f}, {}〉 . Adds f to M̂
26: if δMR
h
,MR(Γ(M̂), λ) 6∈ c_list then
27: fringe.push(〈δMR
h
,MR(Γ(M̂), λ), E ∪ λ〉, c+ 1)
28: procedure OBJ_VAL(〈M̂, E〉)
29: return |E| + α× | C(pi∗M̂,MR)− C∗MR |
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(a) Rover (meets a Martian) Domain (b) Barman (in a bar) Domain
Figure 20: Trade-off between explicability versus explanation cost for plans produced
at different values of the hyperparameter α in MEGA∗.
3.3.2.1.1 The Rover (Meets a Martian) Domain
Here the Mars Rover has a model as described in the IPC domain, but has gone an
update whereby it can carry all the rock and soil samples needed for a mission at the
same time. This means that it does not need to empty the store before collecting new
rock and soil samples anymore so that the new action definitions for sample_soil
and sample_rock no longer contain the precondition (empty ?s).
During its mission it runs across a Martian who is unaware of the robot’s expanded
storage capacity, and has an older, extremely cautious, model of the rover it has
learned while spying on it from its cave. It believes that any time we collect a rock
sample, we also need to collect a soil sample and need to communicate this information
to the lander. It also believes that before the rover can perform take_image action,
it needs to send the soil data and rock data of the waypoint from where it is taking
the image. Clearly, if the rover was to follow this model, in order not to spook the
Martians it will end up spending a lot of time performing unnecessary actions (like
dropping old samples and collecting unnecessary samples). For example, if the rover
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is to communicate an image of an objective objective2, all it needs to do is move to
a waypoint (waypoint3) from where objective2 is visible and perform the action –
(take_image waypoint3 objective2 camera0 high_res)
If the rover was to produce a plan that better represents the Martian’s expectations,
it would look something like this –
(sample_soil store waypoint3)
(communicate_soil_data general waypoint3 waypoint3 waypoint0)
(drop_off store)
(sample_rock store waypoint3)
(communicate_rock_data general waypoint3 waypoint3 waypoint0)
(take_image waypoint3 objective1 camera0 high_res)
Now if the rover chose to directly use an MCE it could end up explaining up to
six different model differences based on the problem and the plan under execution. In
some case, this may be acceptable, but in others, it may make more sense for the rover
to bear the extra cost rather than laboriously walking through all the updates with an
impatient Martian. Figure 20 shows how the explicability cost and explanation cost
varies for problem instances in this domain. The algorithm converges to the smallest
possible MCE, when α is set to one. For smaller α, MEGA∗ saves explanation costs by
choosing more expensive (and explicable) plans.
3.3.2.1.2 The Barman (in a Bar) Domain
Here, the brand new two-handed Barman robot is wowing onlookers with its
single-handed skills, even as its admirers who may be unsure of its capabilities expect,
much like in the original IPC domain, that it is required to have one hand free to
perform actions like fill-shot, refill-shot, shake etc. This means that to make
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Domain Problem ∆ = 2 ∆ = 7 ∆ = 10|E| Time (secs) |E| Time (secs) |E| Time (secs)
Rover
p1 0 1.22 1 5.83 3 143.84
p2 1 1.79 5 125.64 6 1061.82
p3 0 8.35 2 10.46 3 53.22
Barman
p1 2 18.70 6 163.94 6 5576.06
p2 2 2.43 4 57.83 6 953.47
p3 2 45.32 5 4183.55 6 5061.50
Table 10: Computation time for human-aware plans in Rover and Barman domains
along with the length of explanations.
a single shot of a cocktail with two shots of the same ingredient with three shots and
one shaker, the human expects the robot to –
(fill-shot shot2 ingredient2 left right dispenser2)
(pour-shot-to-used-shaker shot2 ingredient3 shaker1 left l1 l2)
(refill-shot shot2 ingredient3 left right dispenser3)
(pour-shot-to-used-shaker shot2 ingredient3 shaker1 left l1 l2)
(leave left shot2)
(grasp left shaker1)
The robot can, however, directly start by picking both the shot and the shaker
and does not need to put either of them down while making the cocktail. Similar to
the Rover domain, we again illustrate (Figure 20) how at lower values of α the robot
generates plans that require less explanation. As α increases the algorithm produces
plans that require larger explanations with the explanations finally converging at the
smallest MCE required for that problem.
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3.3.2.2 Computation Time
Contrary to classical notions of planning that occurs in state or plan space, we are
now planning in the model space, i.e. every node in the search tree is a new planning
problem. As seen in Table 10 this becomes quite time consuming with increasing
number of model differences between the human and the robot, even as there are
significant gains to be had in terms of minimality of explanations, and the reduction
in cost of explicable plans as a result of it. This motivates the need for developing
approximations and heuristics (as done for MEGA) for balanced solutions to HAP.
3.3.2.3 Demonstration
We will now demonstrate MEGA∗ in the USAR Domain (Section 1.3.2.1) with a
remote robot and an external human commander. The external has a map of the
environment but this map is no longer accurate in a disaster setting - e.g. new paths
may have opened up, or older paths may no longer be available, due to rubble from
collapsed structures like walls and doors. The robot (internal) however may not need
to inform the external of all these changes so as not to cause information overload of
the commander who may be otherwise engaged in orchestrating the entire operation.
This calls for an instantiation of the MEGA∗ algorithm where the model differences are
contributed to by changes in the map, i.e. the initial state of the planning problem
(the human model has the original unaffected model of the world).
Figure 88 shows a relevant section of the map of the environment where this
scenario plays out. The orange marks indicate rubble that has blocked a passage,
while the green marks indicate collapsed walls. The robot, currently located at the
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position marked with a blue O, is tasked with taking a picture at location marked with
an orange O. The external commander’s expects the robot to take the path shown in
red, which is no longer possible. The robot armed with MEGA∗ has two choices – it can
either follow the green path and explain the revealed passageway due to the collapse,
or compromise on its optimal path, clear the rubble and proceed along the blue path.
The first part of the demonstration (https://youtu.be/u_t1TQotzo4) shows the plan
generated by MEGA∗ for low α. As expected, it chooses the blue path that requires the
least amount of explanation, i.e. the most explicable plan. In fact, the robot needs to
explain a single initial state change to make this plan optimal.
Explanation >>
remove-has-initial-state-clear_path p1 p8
This is also an instance where the plan closest to the human expectation, i.e. the
most explicable plan, still requires an explanation. In order to follow this plan, the
robot must perform the costly clear_passage p2 p3 action to traverse the corridor
between p2 and p3, which it could have avoided in its optimal plan (shown in green
on the map). Indeed, MEGA∗ switches to the robot’s optimal plan for higher values of
α along with the following explanation –
add-has-initial-state-clear_path p6 p7
add-has-initial-state-clear_path p7 p5
remove-has-initial-state-clear_path p1 p8
Using this explanation, the robot is able to convey to the human the optimality of
its plan as well as the infeasibility of the human’s expected plan (shown in red).
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Figure 21: A demonstration of the explicability-explanation trade-off in the USAR
domain when the maps of the internal and external agents diverge. A video can be
seen at https://youtu.be/u_t1TQotzo4.
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3.4 Model Uncertainty during Model Reconciliation
The model reconciliation process described till now is only feasible if inconsistencies
between the robot model with the human mental model are known precisely. Although
we have made this assumption so far as a first step towards formalizing the model
reconciliation process, this can be hard to achieve in practice. Instead, the agent
may end up having to explain its decisions with respect to a set of possible models
which is its best estimation of the human’s knowledge state learned in the process
of interactions. In this situation, the robot can try to compute MCEs for each
possible configuration. However, this can result in situations where the explanations
computed for individual models independently are not consistent across all possible
target domains. Thus, in the case of model uncertainty, such an approach cannot
guarantee that the resulting explanation will be acceptable. Instead, we want to find
an explanation such that ∀i pi∗M̂Rhi ≡ pi
∗
MR (as shown in Figure 22).
This is a single model update that makes the given plan optimal (and hence
explained) in all the updated domains (or in all possible domains). At first glance,
it appears that such an approach, even though desirable, might turn out to be
prohibitively expensive especially since solving for a single MCE involves search
in the model space where each search node is an optimal planning problem [86].
However, it turns out that the same search strategy can be employed here as well
by representing the human mental model as an annotated model as introduced in
Section 1.3.1. Condition (3) for an MCE (c.f. Section 3.2.2) now becomes –
(3) C(pi, g(MRh )) = C∗g(MRh )
This is hard to achieve since it is not known which is the actual mental model
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Figure 22: An illustration of the modified model reconciliation process in case of
model uncertainty or multiple explainees.
of the human. So we want to preserve the optimality criterion for all (or as many)
instantiations of the incomplete estimation of the explainee’s mental model. Keeping
this in mind, we define robustness of an explanation for an incomplete mental models
as the probability mass of models where it is a valid explanation.
Definition: Robustness of an explanation E is given by –
R(E) =
∑
inst(M̂Rh ) s.t. C(pi,inst(M̂Rh ))=C∗inst(M̂R
h
)
L(inst(M̂Rh ))
Definition: A Conformant Explanation is such that R(E) = 1.
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Figure 23: An USAR scenario with an internal robot and an external human. The
robot plan is marked in blue and uncertain parts of the human model is marked with
red question marks. A video can be seen at https://youtu.be/bLqrtffW6Ng.
This means a conformant explanation ensures that the given plan is explained in
all the models in the completion set of the human model.
3.4.1 Demonstration
Consider now that the robot is located at P1 (blue) and needs to collect data from
P5 (c.f. Figure 23). While the human commander understands the goal, she is under
the false impression that the paths from P1 to P9 and P4 to P5 are unusable (red
question marks). She is also unaware of the robot’s inability to use its hands. On the
other hand, while the robot does not have a complete picture of the human’s mental
model, it understands that any differences between the models are related to (1) Path
from P1 to P9; (2) Path from P4 to P5; (3) Robot’s ability to use its hands; and (4)
Whether the Robot needs its arm to clear rubble. Thus, from the robot’s perspective,
the human model can be one of sixteen possible models (one of which is the actual
mental model). Here, a conformant explanation for the optimal robot plan (blue) is
as follows (a video can be viewed at https://youtu.be/bLqrtffW6Ng) –
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Explanation >>
remove-known-INIT-has-add-effect-hand_capable
add-annot-clear_passage-has-precondition-hand_capable
remove-annot-INIT-has-add-effect-clear_path P1 P9
3.4.2 Model-Space Search for Conformant Explanations
We begin by defining two models – the most relaxed model possibleMmax and the
least relaxed oneMmin. The former is the model where all the possible add effects
and none of the possible preconditions and deletes hold, the state has all the possible
conditions set to true, and the goal is the smallest one possible; while in the latter
all the possible preconditions and deletes and none of the possible adds are realized
and with the minimal start state and the maximal goal. This means that, if a plan is
executable inMmin it will be executable in all the possible models. Also, if this plan
is optimal inMmax, then it must be optimal throughout the set. Of course, such a
plan may not exist, but we are not trying to find one either. Instead, we are trying to
find a set of model updates which when applied to the annotated model, produce a
new set of models where a given plan is optimal. In providing these model updates,
we are in effect reducing the set of possible models to a smaller set. The new set need
not be a subset of the original set of models but will be equal or smaller in size to the
original set. For any given annotated model, such an explanation always exists (entire
model difference in the worst case), and we intend to find the smallest one. MRh thus
affords the following two models –
Mmax = 〈D, I,G〉 with domain D = 〈F,A〉 and
- initial state I ← I0 ∪ I+; given I
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- goal state G ← G0; given G
- ∀a ∈ A
- pre(a)← pre(a); a ∈ A
- eff+(a)← eff+(a) ∪ e˜ff+(a); a ∈ A
- eff−(a)← eff−(a); a ∈ A
Mmin = 〈D, I,G〉 with domain D = 〈F,A〉 and
- initial state I ← I0; given I
- goal state G ← G0 ∪ G+; given G
- ∀a ∈ A
- pre(a)← pre(a) ∪ p˜re(a); a ∈ A
- eff+(a)← eff+(a); a ∈ A
- eff−(a)← eff−(a) ∪ e˜ff−(a); a ∈ A
As explained before, Mmax is a model where all the add effects hold and it is
easiest to achieve the goal, and similarlyMmin is the model where it is the hardest to
achieve the goal. Note that these definitions might end up creating inconsistencies in
the models (e.g. in an annotated model for the BlocksWorld domain, the definition of
unstack action may have add effects to make the block both holding and ontable
at the same time), but the model reconciliation process will take care of these.
Proposition 7 – For a given MRP Ψ = 〈pi, 〈MR,MRh 〉〉, if the plan pi is optimal in
Mmax and executable inMmin, then conditions (1) and (2) hold for all i.
This now becomes the new criterion to satisfy in the course of search for an MCE
for a set of models. We again reuse the state representation in Section 3.2.2.1. We
start the MEGA∗-Conformant search (Algorithm 5) by first creating the corresponding
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Mmax andMmin model for the given annotated model MRH . While the goal test for
the original MCE only included an optimality test, here we need to both check the
optimality of the plan inMmax and verify the correctness of the plan inMmin. As
stated in Proposition 1, the plan is only optimal in the entire set of possible models if it
satisfies both tests. Since the correctness of a given plan can be verified in polynomial
time with respect to the plan size, this is a relatively easy test to perform.
The other important point of difference between the algorithm mentioned above
and the original MCE is how we calculate the applicable model updates. Here we
consider the superset of model differences between the robot model andMmin and
the differences between the robot model andMmax. This could potentially mean that
the search might end up applying a model update that is already satisfied in one of
the models but not in the other. Since all the model update actions are formulated
as set operations, the original MRP formulation can handle this without any further
changes. The models obtained by applying the model update toMmin andMmax are
then pushed to the open queue.
Proposition 8 –Mmax andMmin only need to be computed once before the search –
i.e. with a model update E to M: Mmax ←Mmax + E andMmin ←Mmin + E .
Following Proposition 2, these models form the newMmin andMmax models for
the set of models obtained by applying the current set of model updates to the original
annotated model. This proposition ensures that we no longer have to keep track of
the current list of models or recalculateMmin andMmax for the new set.
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Algorithm 4 MEGA∗-Conformant
1: procedure MCE-Search
2: Input : MRP 〈pi∗, 〈MR,MRh 〉〉
3: Output : Explanation EMCE
4: Procedure:
5: fringe ← Priority_Queue()
6: c_list ← {} . Closed list
7: pi∗R ← pi∗ . Optimal plan being explained
8: Mmax, Mmin ←(MRh ) . Proposition 8
9: fringe.push(〈Mmin,Mmax, {}〉, priority = 0)
10: while True do
11: 〈M̂min,M̂max, E〉, c← fringe.pop()
12: if C(pi∗R,M̂max)=C∗M̂max ∧ δ(IM̂min , pi
∗
R) |= GM̂min then
13: return E . Proposition 7
14: else
15: c_list ← c_list ∪ 〈M̂max,M̂min〉
16: for f ∈ {Γ(M̂min) ∪ Γ(M̂max)} \ Γ(MR) do
17: λ← 〈1, 〈M̂min,M̂max〉, {}, {f}〉 . Removes f from M̂
18: if δMR
h
,MR(〈Γ(M̂min),Γ(M̂max)〉, λ) 6∈ c_list then
19: fringe.push(〈δMR
h
,MR(〈Γ(M̂min),Γ(M̂max)〉, λ),
E ∪ λ〉, c+ 1)
20: for f ∈ Γ(MR) \ {Γ(M̂min) ∪ Γ(M̂max)} do
21: λ← 〈1, {〈M̂min,M̂max〉, {f}, {}〉 . Adds f to M̂
22: if δMR
h
,MR(〈Γ(M̂min),Γ(M̂max)〉, λ) 6∈ c_list then
23: fringe.push(〈δMR
h
,MR(〈Γ(M̂min),Γ(M̂max)〉, λ),
E ∪ λ〉, c+ Cλ)
3.4.3 Contingent and Anytime Explanations
Note that conformant explanations can contain superfluous information – i.e.
asking the human to remove non-existent conditions or add existing ones. In the
previous example, the second explanation (regarding the need of the hand to clear
rubble) was already known to the human and was thus superfluous information. Such
redundant information can be annoying and may end up reducing the human’s trust
in the robot. This can be avoided by –
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- Increasing the cost of model updates involving uncertain conditions relative to
those involving known preconditions or effects. This ensures that the search
prefers explanations that contain known conditions. By definition, such expla-
nations will not have superfluous information.
- However, sometimes such explanations may not exist. Instead, we can convert
conformant explanations into conditional ones. This can be achieved by turning
each model update for an annotated condition into a question and only provide
an explanation if the human’s response warrants it – e.g. instead of asking the
human to update the precondition of clear_passage, the robot can first ask if
the human thinks that action has a precondition hand_usable.
Thus, one way of removing superfluous explanations is to reduce the size of the
completion set by gathering information from the human.
Consider the following exchange –
R : Are you aware that the path from P1 to P4 has collapsed?
H : Yes.
> R realizes the plan is optimal in all possible models.
> It does not need to explain further.
Definition: A Conditional Explanation is represented by a policy that maps
the annotated model (represented by a Mmin and Mmax model pair) to either a
question regarding the existence of a condition in the human ground model or a model
update request. The resultant annotated model is produced, by either applying the
model update directly into the current model or by updating the model to conform to
human’s answer regarding the existence of the condition.
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Remark. Note that in asking questions such as these, the robot is trying to exploit
the human’s (lack of) knowledge of the problem in order to provide more concise
explanations. This can be construed as a case of lying by omission and can raise
interesting ethical considerations [70] (Appendix E). Humans, during an explanation
process, tend to undergo this same “selection” process [307] as well in determining
which of the many reasons that could explain an event is worth highlighting.
Remark. Since dealing with model uncertainty can be computationally expensive,
we can relax the minimality requirement and introduce an Anytime Explanation
generation algorithm by deploying a depth-first approach. These different ways of
dealing with uncertainty during the model reconciliation process is explained in detail
in [420] and is outside the scope of this thesis.
Remark. An interesting problem arises when the actual human mental model falls
outside the set of possible mental models that the robots is reasoning with but the
optimality criterion to be satisfied at the end of the explanation process still holds –
i.e. the real mental model is such that the optimality criterion holds when the same
explanation is applied to it as well as the set of possible models the robot had devised
the explanation for. This means that at the end of the explanation process both the
human and the robot think that their models have been reconciled, yet the human
and the robot are on different pages. This can lead to disruption of teaming activity
in the future due to false expectation engendered by misaligned models. This is an
interesting problem to explore in future.
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3.5 Explanations for Multiple Humans in the Loop
While generating explanations for a set of models, the robot is essentially trying
to cater to multiple human models at the same time. We posit then that the same
approaches can be adopted to situations when there are multiple humans in the
loop instead of a single human whose model is not known with certainty. As before,
computing separate explanations for each agent can result in situations where the
explanations computed for individual models independently are not consistent across
all the possible target domains. In the case of multiple teammates being explained to,
this may cause confusion and loss of trust, especially in teaming with humans who
are known [106] to rely on shared mental models. Thus conformant explanations can
be useful in dealing with not only model uncertainty but also model multiplicity.
In order to do this, from the set of target human mental models we construct an
annotated model so that the preconditions and effects that appear in all target models
become necessary ones, and those that appear in just a subset are possible ones. As
before, we find a single explanation that is a satisfactory explanation for the entire
set of models, without having to repeat the standard MRP process over all possible
models while coming up with an explanation that can satisfy all of them and thus
establish common ground.
While the explanation generation technique may be equivalent, the explanation
process may be different depending on the setup. For example, while in the case of
model uncertainty, the safest approach might be to generate explanations that work
for the largest set of possible models, in scenarios with multiple explainees, the robot
may have to decide whether it needs to save computational and communication time
by generating one explanation to fit all models, or if it needs to tailor the explanation
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to each human. This choice may depend on the particular domain and the nature of
the teaming relationship with the human.
3.5.1 Demonstration
We go back to our use case, now with two human teammates, one external
and one internal. A video of the demonstration is available at https://youtu.be/
hlPTmggRTQA. The robot is now positioned at P1 and is expected to collect data
from location P5. Before the robot can perform its surveil action, it needs to obtain
a set of tools from the internal human agent. The human agent is initially located
at P10 and is capable of traveling to reachable locations to meet the robot for the
handover. Here the external commander incorrectly believes that the path from P1
to P9 is clear and while the one from P2 to P3 is closed. The internal human agent,
on the other hand, not only believes in the errors mentioned above but is also under
the assumption that the path from P4 to P5 is not traversable. Due to these different
initial states, each of these agents ends up generating a different optimal plan. The
plan expected by the external commander requires the robot to move to location P10
(via P9) to meet the human. After collecting the package from the internal agent, the
commander expects it to set off to P5 via P4. The internal agent, on the other hand,
believes that he needs to travel to P9 to hand over the package. As he believes that
the corridor from P4 to P5 is blocked, he expects the robot to take the longer route to
P5 through P6, P7, and P8 (orange). Finally, the optimal plan for the robot (blue)
involves the robot meeting the human at P4 on its way to P5. MEGA∗-Conformant
finds the smallest explanation which explains this plan to both humans.
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In this particular case, since the models differ from each other with respect to
their initial states, the initial state of the corresponding annotated model is –
I0 = {(at_P1), (at_human P10), ..., (clear_path P10 P9), (clear_path P9 P1)}
I+ = {(clear_path P4 P5), (collapsed_path P4 P5)}
where I+ represents the state fluents that may or may not hold in human’s model.
The corresponding initial states for Mmin and Mmax will be as follows –
Imin = {(at_P1), (at_human P10), ..., (clear_path P10 P9), (clear_path P9 P1)}
Imax = Imin ∪ {(clear_pathP4P5), (collapsed_pathP4P5)}
MEGA∗-Conformant thus generates the following explanation –
Explanation >>
add-INIT-has-clear_path P4 P5
remove-INIT-has-clear_path P1 P9
add-INIT-has-clear_path P2 P3
While the last two model changes are equally relevant for both the agents, the first
change is specifically designed to help the internal. The first update helps convince
the human that the robot can indeed reach the goal through P4, while the next two
help convince both agents as to why the agents should meet at P4 rather instead.
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Figure 24: Illustration of a simulated USAR setting for studying the human-robot
relationship in a typical disaster response team. The external (human) supervisor has
restricted access to a changing environment and may thus require explanations for
plans that the (internal semi-autonomous) robot comes up with for tasks assigned
to it. We make use of this setting to study the properties of “model-reconciliation"
explanations in a mock interface to the robot.
3.6 Human-Factors Study of the Model Reconciliation Process
The design of “human-aware” algorithms is, of course, incomplete without evalua-
tions of the same with actual humans in the loop. Thus, in the following discussion,
we will report on the the salient findings from a series of controlled user studies we
undertook in order to evaluate the usefulness of the model reconciliation approach.
Through these studies, we aim to validate whether explanations in the form of model
reconciliation (in its various forms) suffice to explain the optimality and correctness
of plans to the human in the loop. We also study participants who were asked to
generate explanations in the form of model changes, to see if explanations generated by
the humans align with any of the multi-model explanations identified in the discussion
so far. The studies suggest that humans do indeed understand explanations of this
form and believe that such explanations are necessary to explain plans.
We stick to the USAR setting for our study setup. Figure 24 illustrates our
setup (explained in more detail in the video https:// youtu.be/ 40Xol2GY7zE ). This is
117
identical to the use cases described in Sections 3.3.2.3, 3.4.1 and 3.5.1. In the current
study, we only simulate the interface to the external. This is described below in
Section 3.6.2. In general, differences in the models of the human and the robot can
manifest in any form (e.g. the robot may have lost some capability or its goals may
have changed). In our setup, we deal with differences in the map of the environment
as available to the two agents – these can be compiled to differences only in the initial
state of the planning problem (the human model has the original unaffected model
of the world). This makes no difference to the underlying explanation generation
algorithm introduced in the dissertation which treats all model changes equally.
While the availability of models may be a strong assumption in some cases, in
domains such as USAR this is, indeed, the case since teams in such scenarios start off
with a shared model (e.g. blueprint of a building). The USAR domain is also ideal for
visualizing to non-expert participants, in comparison to, for example, logistics-type
domains which should ideally be evaluated by experts. This became an important
factor while designing the user studies. The USAR domain is thus at once close to
motion planning as easily interpreted by non-experts but also incorporates typical
combinatorial aspects of task planning such as preconditions and effects in terms of
rubble removal, collapsed halls, etc. and relevant abilities of the robot.
3.6.1 Study – 1
The first part of the study aims to develop an understanding of how humans
respond to the task of generating explanations, i.e. if left to themselves, humans
preferred to generate explanations similar to the ones introduced in this dissertation.
To test this, we asked participants to assume the role of the internal agent in the
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Figure 25: Interface for Study-1 where participants assumed the role of the internal
agent and were asked to explain their plan to a teammate with a possibly different
model or map of the world.
explanation process and explain their plans with respect to the faulty map of their
teammate. Specifically, we set out to test the following hypothesis –
H1. Participants would concentrate on model differences (difference in the two maps)
as a key property of explanations.
H1a. Explanation generated by participants would demonstrate contrastiveness.
Thus, PPEs would be overlooked in favor of complete solutions (MCEs and
MPEs) when there are multiple competing hypothesis for the human.
H2. Participants would like to minimize the content of the explanation by removing
details that are not relevant to the plan being explained.
H2a. Explanations generated by humans would be closer to MCEs than MPEs.
H2b. The preference for MCEs over MPEs should be even more significant if
restrictions are placed on communication.
As a result of this study, we intend to identify to what extent explanation types for
task planning studied in the dissertation, that build upon principles of explanations
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in human-human interactions studied in social sciences [307], truly reflect human
intuition.
3.6.1.1 Experimental Setup
Figure 25 shows an example map and plan provided to a participant. On left side,
the participant is shown the actual map along with the plan, starting position and the
goal. The panel on the right shows the map that is available to the explainee. The
maps have rubbles (both removable and non-removable) blocking access to certain
paths. The maps may disagree as to the locations of the debris. The participants were
told that they need to convince the explainee of the correctness and optimality of the
given plan by updating the latter’s maps with annotations they felt were relevant in
achieving that goal. We ran the study with two conditions –
C1. Here the participants were asked to ensure, via their explanations, that their
plan was (1) correct and (2) optimal in the updated model of their teammate;
C2. Here, in addition to C1, they were also asked to use the minimal amount of
information they felt was needed to achieve the condition in C1.
Each participant was shown how to annotate (not an explanation) a sample map
and was then asked to explain 12 different plans using similar annotations. After
each participant was finished with their assignment, they were asked the following
subjective questions –
Q1. Providing map updates were necessary to explain my plans.
Q2. Providing map updates were sufficient to explain my plans.
Q3. I found that my plans were easy to explain.
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The answers to these questions were measured using a five-point Likert scale. The
answers to the first two questions will help to establish whether humans considered
map updates (or in general updates on the model differences) at all necessary and/or
sufficient to explain a given plan. The final question measures whether the participants
found the explanation process using model differences tractable. It is important to
note that in this setting we do not measure the efficacy of these explanations (this is
the subject of Study-2 in Section 3.6.2). Rather we are trying to find whether a human
explainer would have naturally participated in the model reconciliation approach
during the explanation process.
In total, we had 12 participants for condition C1 and 10 participants for condition
C2 including 7 female and 18 male participants between the age range of 18-29 (data
corresponding to 5 participants who misinterpreted the instructions had to be removed,
2 participants did not reveal their demographics). Participants for the study were
recruited by requesting the department secretary to send an email to the student body
to ensure that they had no prior knowledge about the study or its relevance. Each
participant was paid $10 for taking part.
3.6.1.2 Results
The results of the study are presented in Figures 26, 27 and 28. We summarize
some of the major findings below –
Figure 26 – The first hypothesis we tested was whether the explanations generated
by the humans matched any of the explanation types discussed in the dissertation. We
did this by going through all the individual explanations provided by the participants
and then categorizing each explanation to one of the four types, namely MCE, PPE,
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MPE or Other (the “Other” group contains explanations that do not correspond to any
of the predefined explanation types – more on this later in Section 3.6.3). Figure 26a
shows the number of explanations of each type that were provided by the participants
of C1. The graph shows a clear preference for MPE, i.e. providing all model differences.
A possible reason for this may be since the size of MPEs for the given maps were
not too large (and participants did not have time constraints). Interestingly, in C2
we see a clear shift in preferences (Figure 26b) where most participants ended up
generating MCE style explanations. This means at least for scenarios where there are
constraints on communication, the humans would prefer generating MCEs as opposed
to explaining all the model differences.
These findings are consistent with H1, with very few of the explanations in type
“Other” (Figure 26). This is also backed up by answers to subjective questions Q1
and Q2 below. Further the preference of MPE/MCE over PPE (H1a) is quite stark.
Contrary to H2a, participants seemed to have preferred full model explanation (MPE)
in C1 condition which is surprising as mentioned above. However, results of C2
condition are more aligned with H2b, even though we expected to see similar trend (if
not as strong) in the C1 condition as well.
Figures 27 and 28 – These show the results of the subjective questions for C1
and C2 respectively. Interestingly, in C1, while most people agreed on the necessity
of explanations in the form of model differences, they were less confident regarding
the sufficiency of such explanations. In fact, we found that many participants left
additional explanations in their worksheet in the form of free text (we discuss some of
these findings in Section 3.6.3). In C2, we still see that more people are convinced
about the necessity of these explanations than sufficiency. But we see a reduction
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(a) Study-1:C1 (b) Study-1:C2
Figure 26: Different types of explanations for Study-1:C1;C2.
in the confidence of the participants, which may have been caused by the additional
minimization constraints.
3.6.2 Study – 2
Here we study how different kinds of explanations introduced in the dissertation
are perceived or evaluated when they are presented to the participants who are now
in the role of the explainee. This study was designed to provide clues to how humans
comprehend explanations when provided to them in the form of model differences.
Specifically, we intend to evaluate the following hypothesis, in line with the intended
properties of the different explanation and plan types –
H1. Participants would be able to identify plan optimality given an MPE or MCE.
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Figure 27: Subjective responses of participants in Study-1:C1.
Figure 28: Subjective responses of participants in Study-1:C2.
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H2. Participants would be able to identify executability but possible suboptimality
of a plan given a PPE.
As a result of this study, we intend to validate whether desired properties of
explanations for task planning designed by following norms and principles outlines in
the social sciences in the context of human-human interactions [307] do actually carry
over for human-robot interactions. Finally, we will also analyze how human subjects
responded to the explicability versus explanations trade-off. Specifically, we set out to
test the following two key hypothesis –
H3. Subjects would require explanations when the robot produces suboptimal plans.
H3a. Response to balanced plans should be indistinguishable from that to inex-
plicable / robot optimal plans.
H4. Subjects would require less explanations for explicable plans as opposed to
balanced or robot optimal plans.
H3 is the key thesis of this work on explanations which formulates the process of
explanation as one of model reconciliation to achieve common grounds with respect to a
plan’s optimality. This forms the basis of incorporating considerations of explanations
in the plan generation process as well, as done in this dissertation, in the event of
model differences with the human in the loop. H4 forms the other side of this coin
and completes the motivation of computing balanced plans. Note that balanced plans
would still appear suboptimal (and hence inexplicable) to the human even though
they afford opportunities to the robot to explain less or perform a more optimal plan.
Thus, we expect (H3a) their behavior to be identical in case of both inexplicable
(robot optimal) and balanced plans.
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3.6.2.1 Experimental Setup
During this study, participants were incentivized to make sure that the explanation
does indeed help them understand the optimality and correctness of the plans in
question by formulating the interaction in the form of a game.
Figure 29 shows a screenshot of the interface. The game displays to each participant
an initial map (which they are told may differ from the robot’s actual map), the
starting point and the goal. Once the player asks for a plan, the robot responds with
a plan illustrated as a paths through a series of waypoints highlighted on the map,
with rubble removal (if present) in between. The goal of the participant is to identify
if the plan shown is optimal or just satisficing. If the player is unsure of the path,
they can ask for an explanation from the robot. The explanation is provided to the
participant in the form of a set of model changes in the player’s map. If the player is
still unsure, they can click on the pass button to move to the next map.
The scoring scheme for the game is as follows. Each player is awarded 50 points for
correctly identifying the plan as either optimal or satisficing. Incorrectly identifying
an optimal plan as suboptimal or vice versa would cost them 20 points. Every request
for explanation would further cost them 5 points, while skipping a map does not result
in any penalty. The participants were additionally told that selecting an inexecutable
plan as either feasible or optimal would result in a penalty of 400 points. Even though
there were no actual incorrect plans in the dataset, this information was provided to
deter participants from taking chances with plans they did not understand well.
Each participant was paid $10 dollars and received additional bonuses based on
the following payment scheme –
- Scores higher than or equal to 540 were paid $10.
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Figure 29: Interface for Study-2 where participants assumed the role of the external
commander and evaluated plans provided by the internal robot. They could request
for plans and explanations to those plans (if not satisfied with it) and rate those plans
as optimal or suboptimal based on that explanation. If still unsatisfied with the plan
they could choose to pass and move on to the next problem.
- Scores higher than 540 and 440 were paid $7.
- Scores higher than 440 and 340 were paid $5.
- Scores higher than 340 and 240 were paid $3.
- Scores below 240 received no bonuses.
The scoring systems for the game was designed to ensure
• Participants should only ask for an explanation when they are unsure about the
quality of the plan (due to small negative points on explanations).
• Participants are incentivized to identify the feasibility and optimality of the
given plan correctly (large reward and penalty on doing this wrongly).
Each participant was shown a total of 12 maps (same maps as in Study–1). For
6 of the 12 maps, the player was assigned the optimal robot plan, and when they
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Figure 30: Plots showing percentage of times different kinds of explanations (i.e. MCE
/ MPE / PPE) led to the correct decision on the human’s part in each problem (the
aggregated result is shown on the right). A “correct decision for the human" involves
them recognizing optimality of the robot’s plan on being presented an MCE or an
MPE, and optimality or executability (as the case may be) in case of a PPE.
asked for an explanation, they were randomly shown either MCE, PPE or MPE
explanation with regards to the robot model. For the rest of the maps, participants
could potentially be assigned a plan that is optimal in the human model (i.e. an
explicable plan) or somewhere in between (referred to henceforth as the balanced
plan) in place of the robot optimal plan8. The participants that were assigned the
optimal robot plan were still provided an MCE, PPE or MPE explanation, otherwise
they were provided either the shorter explanation (for balanced plans) or an empty
8Note that of the 6 maps, only 3 had both balanced as well as explicable plans, the rest either
had a balanced plan or the optimal human plan.
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Figure 31: Subjective responses of participants in Study–2.
explanation (for the explicable plan). Also note that for 4 out of the 12 maps the
PPE explanation cannot prove the optimality of the plan.
At the end of the study, each participant was presented with a series of subjective
questions. The responses to each question were measured on a five-point Likert scale.
Q1. The explanations provided by the robot was helpful.
Q2. The explanations provided by the robot was easy to understand.
Q3. I was satisfied with the explanations.
Q4. I trust the robot to work on its own.
Q5. My trust in the robot increased during the study.
In total, we had 27 participants for Study–2, including 4 female and 22 male partic-
ipants between the age range of 19-31 (1 participant did not reveal their demographic).
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Figure 32: Percentage of times explanations were sought for in Study–2 when they
participants were presented with explicable plans versus balanced or robot optimal
plans with explanations.
3.6.2.2 Results
The results of the study are presented in Figures 30, 31 and 32. We summarize
some of the major findings below –
Figure 30 – As we mentioned before, the goal of this study is to identify if explanations
in the form of model reconciliation can convey to humans the optimality and correctness
of plans. Here, each participant was shown the 12 maps from Study-1 and each map
was assigned a random explanation type (and in some cases different plans). We
wanted to identify whether the participants that asked for explanations were able
to come up with the correct conclusions. This means that the subjects who asked
for MCE and MPE were able to correctly identify the plans as optimal, while the
people who received PPE were able to correctly classify the plan to either optimal or
satisficing (i.e. for all but 5 maps PPE is enough to prove optimality).
Figure 30 shows the statistics of the selections made by participants who had
requested an explanation. The right side of the graph shows the percentage (for
every map instance) of participants who selected the correct options (marked in blue),
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the incorrect ones (marked in red) or simply passed (marked in orange), while the
left side shows the average across all 12 maps. We notice that in general people
were overwhelmingly able to identify the correct choice. Even in the case of PPEs,
where the explanations only ensured correctness (map instances 1, 2, 3, 8 and 11) the
participants were able to make the right choice. This is consistent with H1 and H2
and demonstrates that explanations in the form of model reconciliation are a viable
means of conveying the correctness and optimality of plans – i.e. participants can
differentiate between complete and non-complete explanations.
Figure 31 – These conclusions are further supported by results from the subjective
questionnaire (Figure 31). Most people seem to agree that the explanations were
helpful and easy to understand. In fact, the majority of people strongly agreed that
their trust of the robot increased during the study.
Figure 32 –We were also curious (H3) about the usefulness of explicable plans (plans
that are optimal in human model) – i.e. if the subjects still asked for explanations
when presented with explicable plans. Figure 32 shows how people responded to the
different kinds of explanations / plans. These results are from 382 problem instances
that required explanations, and 25 and 40 instances that contained balanced and
explicable plans respectively. From the perspective of the human, the balanced plan
and the robot optimal plan do not make any difference since both of them appear
suboptimal. This is evident from the fact that the click-through rate for explanations
in these two conditions are similar (H3a) (the high click-through rates for perceived
suboptimality conform to the expectations of H3a). Further, the rate of explanations
is significantly less in case of explicable plans as desired (H4). This matches the
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Figure 33: Click-through rates for explanations in Study–2 revealing either risk-taking
behavior or risk-averse behaviors from the participants.
Optimal Plan Balanced Plan Explicable Plan
|E| C(pi,MR) |E| C(pi,MR) |E| C(pi,MR)
2.5 5.5 1 8.5 - 16
Table 11: Statistics of the explicability versus explanation trade-off with respect to
the explanation length and the cost of plans.
intuition behind plan explicability as a viable means (in addition to explanations) of
dealing with model divergence in human-in-the-loop operation of robots.
It is interesting to see that in Figure 32 about a third of the time participants still
asked for explanations even when the plan was explicable, and thus optimal in their
map. This is an artifact of the risk-averse behavior incentivized by the gamification of
the explanation process and indicative of the cognitive burden on the humans who
are not (cost) optimal planners. Thus, going forward, the objective function should
incorporate the cost or difficulty of analyzing the plans and explanations from the
point of view of the human in addition to the current costs in equation MEGA∗(4) and
Table 11 modeled from the perspective of the robot model.
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Table 11 shows the statistics of the explanations / plans from 124 problem instances
that required minimal explanations as per [86], and 25 and 40 instances that contained
balanced and explicable plans respectively, as before. As desired, the robot gains in
length of explanations but loses out in cost of plans produced as it progresses along the
spectrum of optimal to explicable plans. Thus, while Table 11 demonstrates the cost
of explanation versus explicability trade-off from the robot’s point of view, Figure 32
shows how this trade-off is perceived from the human’s perspective.
Figure 33 shows how the participants responded to inexplicable plans, in terms of
their click-through rate on the explanation request button. Such information can
be used to model the α parameter to situate the explicability versus explanation
trade-off according to preferences of individual users. It is interesting to see that the
distribution of participants (right inset) seem to be bimodal indicating that there are
people who are particularly skewed towards risk-averse behavior and others who are
not, rather than a normal distribution of response to the explanation-explicability
trade-off. This is somewhat counter-intuitive and against expectations (H3) and
highlights the need for learning α interactively with a particular human in the loop.
3.6.3 Discussions
As we mentioned before, there were some instances where the participants from
Study 1 generated explanations that are outside the scope of any of the explanation
types discussed in Section 3.2.2.2. These are marked as “Other” in Figure 26. In the
following we note three of these cases that we found interesting –
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Table 12: Summary of results.
Study Hypothesis Outcome Comments
Study-1
H1 3 Participants largely agreed that model reconciliation was a necessary
and sufficient part of the explanation process.
H1a 3 Participants preferred explanations that are complete, and preserve con-
trastive property across multiple hypothesis.
H2 7 Participants did not care to minimize size of explanations, i.e. exclude
irrelevant details.
H2a 7 Explanations in the free form condition were largely of MPE type.
H2b 3 Participants did generate MCEs when their communication capability
was explicitly restricted.
Study-2
H1 3 Participants could identify optimality of a given plan in response to
complete explanations (MCEs and MPEs).
H2 3 Participants could identify suboptimality of a given plan for incomplete
explanations (PPEs).
H3 3 Robot optimal plans and balanced plans had significantly higher rate
of explanations asked than explicable plans.
H3a 3 Rate of explanations asked by participants was same for balanced as
well as robot optimal plans.
H4 3 / ? Few participants asked for explanations even for explicable plans,
though the majority did not.
3.6.3.1 Post-hoc explanations
Notice that parts of an MCE that actually contribute to the executability of a
given plan may not be explained in post-hoc situations where the robot is explaining
plans that have already been done as opposed to plans that are being proposed for
execution. The rationale behind this is that if the human sees an action, that would
not have succeeded in his model, actually end up succeeding (e.g. the robot had
managed to go through a corridor that was blocked by rubble) then he can rationalize
that event by updating his own model (e.g. there must not have been a rubble there).
This seems to be a viable approach to further reduce size (c.f. selective property of
explanations in [307]) of explanations in a post-hoc setting, and is out of scope of
explanations developed in [86].
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3.6.3.2 Identification of Explicit Foils
Identification of explicit foils [86] can help reduce the size of explanations as well.
In the explanations introduced in Section 3.2.2.2 the foil was implicit – i.e. why this
plan as opposed to all other plans. However, when the implicit foil can be estimated
(e.g. top-K plans expected by the human) then the explanations can only include
information on why the plan in question is better than those other options (which are
either not executable or costlier). Some participants provided explanations contrasting
some of these foils in terms of (and in addition to just) the model differences.
3.6.3.3 Cost-based reasoning
Finally, a kind of explanation that was attempted by some participants involved a
cost analysis of the current plan with respect to foils (in addition to model differences,
as mentioned above). Such explanations have been studied extensively in previous
planning literature [150, 415] and seems to be still relevant for plan explanations on
top of the model reconciliation process.
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3.7 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, I focused mostly with the generation of the content of explanations
rather than the actual delivery of this information. Depending on the type of interaction
between the planner and the human, this can be achieved by means of natural language
dialog [345], in the form of a graphical user interface [404] or even in mixed-reality
interfaces [84]. I will focus on some of these in Chapter 4 and Appendix B.
Finally, most of the above discussion has focused on generating explanations in
cases where both the human and the robot understands the task at the same granularity.
Applying model reconciliation without acknowledging the difference in the level of
“expertise” can lead to confusion and information overload. Indeed, explanation
generation techniques for machine learning systems have explicitly modeled this
difference [372, 373]. In recent work [423], authors have looked at ways of generating
explanations when the human has access to only an abstract version of the model of
the robot. Specifically, they focus on state abstractions where the abstract model was
formed by projecting out a certain subset of state fluents [426], though the principles
carry over to other types of abstraction as well (e.g. temporal abstractions of the
types discussed in [288]). This can be an exciting avenue of future work.
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Chapter 4
HUMAN-AWARE PLANNING IN MIXED-REALITY
“If you can read my mind, why must I speak?”
The ability to model the human does not, of course, obviate the need to communi-
cate. In fact, effective human-AI collaboration require effective pathways for providing
explanations, communicating beliefs and intentions, gathering feedback for learning,
etc. for the establishment of common ground.
Thus, in this chapter, I will explore how emerging technologies in mixed-reality
interfaces can help in the design of effective channels of communication between the
AI system and the humans in the loop. GUI and natural language based techniques
have been studies extensively in this regard (I will cover some of this in the discussion
on decision support systems later in Appendix B). Here, I will instead focus on
newer modes of interactions afforded by mixed-reality interfaces, especially in the
context of human-robot collaboration at the time of plan execution. In the context of
human-aware planning and model reconciliation, we will see how –
– when the human and robot models are already aligned, the robot can disam-
biguate among possible plans by foreshadowing future actions using mixed-reality
projections. In general, the coordination problem cannot be avoided even if
the human and robot are working on same models since there can be multiple
optimal (or explicable) plans given the same planning problem; and
– when the human and robot models diverge, the robot can reconciliation them
by annotating its surroundings with intuitive and informative visual cues (corre-
sponding to explanations) by using the environment as a canvas.
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4.1 Introduction: Can we do better than natural language?
Effective planning for human robot teams not only requires the ability to interact
with the human during the plan execution phase but also the capacity to be “human-
aware" during the plan generation process as well. Prior work has underlined this need
[228] as well as explored ways to exchange [446] information in natural language during
interaction with the human in the loop. This is also emphasized in the Roadmap for
U.S. Robotics [99] – “humans must be able to read and recognize robot activities in
order to interpret the robot’s understanding”. However, the state of the art in natural
language considerably limits the scope of such interactions, especially where precise
instructions are required. In this paper, we present the case of wearable technologies
(e.g. HoloLens) for effective communication of intentions during human-in-the-loop
operation of robots. Further, we show that such considerations are not confined to the
plan execution phase only, but can guide the plan generation process itself by searching
for plans that are easier to communicate.
In our proposed system, the robot projects its intentions as holograms thus making
them directly accessible to the human in the loop, e.g. by projecting a pickup symbol
on a tool it might use in future. Further, unlike in traditional mixed reality projection
systems, the human can directly interact with these holograms to make his own
intentions known to the robot, e.g. by gazing at and selecting the desired tool thus
forcing the robot to replan. To this end, we develop an alternative communication
paradigm that is based on the projection of explicit visual cues pertaining to the
plan under execution via holograms such that they can be intuitively understood
and directly read by the human. The “real" shared human-robot workspace is thus
augmented with the virtual space where the physical environment is used as a medium
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to convey information about the intended actions of the robot, the safety of the
workspace, or task-related instructions. We call this the Augmented Workspace.
Note that the ability to communicate information, and planning with that ability
to disambiguate intentions, is not necessarily unique to mixed-reality interactions only.
For example, one could use the planner introduced in Section 4.4.4 to generate content
for traditional speech-based interactions as well (c.f. recent works on verbalization of
intentions in natural language [446, 345]). However, as demonstrated in this paper,
the medium of mixed-reality provides a particularly concise and effective alternative
(albeit much more limited) vocabulary of communication, especially in more structured
scenarios such as in collaborative assembly.
4.2 Related Work
The concept of intention projection for autonomous systems has, of course, been
explored before. An early attempt was made in [391] in a prototype Interactive
Hand Pointer (IHP) to control a robot in the human’s workspace. Similar systems
have since been developed to visualize trajectories of mobile wheelchairs and robots
[478, 68], which suggest that humans prefer to interact with a robot when it presents
its intentions directly as visual cues. The last few years have seen active research
[337, 338, 408, 208, 312, 269, 462, 292] in this area, but most of these systems were
passive, non-interactive and quite limited in their scope, and did not consider the
state of the objects or the context of the plan pertaining to the action while projecting
information. As such, the scope of intention projection has remained largely limited.
Indeed, recent works [13, 215, 82] have made the first steps towards extending these
capabilities to the context of task planning and execution, but fall short of formalizing
139
the notion of intention projections beyond the current action under execution. Instead,
in this paper, we demonstrate a system that is able to provide much richer information
to the human during collaboration, in terms of the current state information, action
being performed as well as future parts of the plan under execution, particularly with
the notion of explicating or foreshadowing future intentions.
Recent work in the scope of human-aware task and motion planning has focused on
generation of legible motion plans [123, 122] and explicable task plans [507, 252] with
the notion of trading off cost of plans with how easy they are to interpret for a human
observer. This runs parallel to our work on planning with intention projections. Note
that, in effect, either during the generation or the execution of a plan, we are, in fact,
trying to optimize the same criterion. However, in our case, the problem becomes
much more intriguing since the robot gets to enforce legibility or explicability of a plan
by foreshadowing of actions that have not been executed yet. Indeed, this connection
has also been hinted at in recent work [166]. However, to the best of our knowledge,
this is the first task-level planner to achieve this trade-off.
The plan explanation and explicability process forms a delicate balancing act, as
we explored previously in Chapter 3. This has interesting implications to the intention
projection ability as we demonstrate in the final section. Similarly, in [277], authors
have looked at the related problem of “transparent planning” where a robot tries
to signal its intentions to an observer by performing disambiguating actions in its
plan. Intention projection via mixed-reality is likely to be a perfect candidate for this
purpose without incurring unnecessary cost of execution.
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4.2.1 Chapter Highlights
The following provides a brief overview of topics covered in this chapter –
- Section 4.3 – I outline how the Augmented Workspace can assist human-aware
planning and execution, when the human and robot models are already aligned,
by providing a concise and intuitive vocabulary for communication.
- Section 4.4 – I demonstrate how intention projection can be used to reduce
ambiguity over possible plans during execution as well as generation.
- Section 4.4.4 – In particular, I show how this capability can be used to
realize a first of its kind task planner that, instead of considering only cost
optimal plans in the traditional sense, generates plans which are easier to
explicate using intention projection actions.
- Section 4.5 – Finally, I demonstrate how the ability to project world information
applies to the process of explanations to address inexplicability of a plan
during execution, when the human and the robot models are not aligned.
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4.3 Projection Actions
“Projection actions” in the mixed reality workspace are annotations on the envi-
ronment that can include information on the state of the world or the robot’s plans
– these can reveal information regarding the robot’s future intentions, i.e. goals or
plans. In this work, we assume a very simple projection model based on the truth
value of specified conditions in parts of the plan yet to be executed –
An Action Projection AP is defined as a mapping u : [0 . . . |pi|] × A 7→ {T, F}
indicating ∃ j ≥ i where aj ∈ pi iff u(i, aj) = T – i.e. existence or membership of an
action aj in the rest of the plan starting from the current action ai.
A State Value Projection SVP is defined as a mapping v : F ×A 7→ {T, F} so that
there exists a state in the state sequence induced by the sub-plan starting from ai
where the state variable f ∈ F holds the value v(f, ai), i.e. ∃ s′ : δM(s, pi′) |= s′ where
s is the current state and pi′ is the sub-plan (pi)k≤|pi|k=i and f ∈ s′ iff v(f, ai) = T.
This engenders a restricted vocabulary of communication between the human and the
robot. It only allows for disambiguation of plans based on membership of actions (AP)
and not their sequence, and also only the occurrence of a state variable value (SVP)
in the future with no information as to when. Further, not all actions or state values
can be projected, i.e. the APs and SVPs available to the robot cover only a subset of
all the actions and state values that can be communicated. Thus plans may not be
always possible to disambiguate with projections only. Even so, we will demonstrate
how the robot can use this vocabulary to effectively explicate its intentions to the
human in a variety of situations. In the following sections, we will discuss how the
robot can determine when to deploy which of these projections for this purpose.
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4.4 Projections for Ambiguous Intentions
In this section, we concentrate on how projection actions can resolve ambiguity
with regards to the intentions of a robot in the course of execution of a plan.
4.4.1 Projection-Aware Plan Execution
The first topic of consideration is the projection of intentions of a robot with a
human observer in the loop.
Illustrative Example. Consider a robot involved in a block stacking task (Figure 34a).
Here, the robot’s internal goal is to form the word BRAT. However, given the letters
available to it, it can form other words as well – consider two more possible goals
BOAT and COAT. As such, it is difficult to say, from the point of view of the observer,
by looking at the starting configuration, which of these is the real outcome of the
impending plan. The robot can, however, at the start of its execution, choose to
indicate that it has planned to pick up the block R later (by projecting a bobbing
arrow on top of it), thereby resolving this ambiguity. A video demonstration can be
viewed at https://goo.gl/SLgCPE.
Note that directly displaying the actual goal – here, the final word – is not possible
in general across different domains since these holograms have to be constructed
separately for each goal. Thus, the projections are tied to the robot’s capabilities
(e.g. pick-up) instead. Further, and perhaps more importantly, we are trying to
disambiguate plans as well and revealing the goal does not achieve that purpose.
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(a) The robot projects (AP) a green arrow on R to indicate a pickup that is part of
an optimal plan to only one of its possible goals.
(b) The robot inverts the projection context and shows (SVP) which block is not
going to be available using a red cross on A.
Figure 34: Projection-Aware Plan Execution for human observer and in-the-loop.
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A Projection-Aware Plan Execution Problem PAPEP is defined as the tuple
Φ = 〈pi,Π, {AP}, {SV P}〉 where pi is the robot’s plan up for execution, Π (which
includes pi) is the set of possible plans it can execute. {AP} and {SV P} are the set
of action and state value projections available.
The solution to Φ is a composite plan pic ◦ pi where pic ⊆ {AP} ∪ {SV P} are the
projection actions that disambiguate the plans at the time of execution. We compute
this using the concept of resource profiles, as introduced in [93]. Informally, a resource
[93] is defined as any state variable whose binary value we want to track. We will use
this concept to tie each action or state value projection action to a single resource
variable, whose effect can be monitored. For example, a not-clear predicate will
indicate that a block is in use or not available while an action that produces or
negates that predicate – e.g. pick-up can be similarly tracked through it. This
mapping between projection actions and the corresponding resource variables is
domain-dependent knowledge that is provided.
A Resource ProfileRpi induced by plan pi on resource r is a mappingRpi : [0 . . . |pi|]×
r 7→ {0, 1}, so that r is locked by pi at step i if Rpi(r, i) = 1 and free otherwise.
A Cumulative Resource Profile RΠ induced by a set of plans Π on a resource r is
a mapping RΠ : [0 . . . maxpi∈Π |pi|]× r 7→ [0, 1], so that r is locked with a probability
RΠ(r, i) =
∑
pi∈ΠRpi(r, i) × P (pi), where P (pi) is the prior probability of a plan pi
(assumed to be uniform in this work).
The set of projection actions pic in the solution pi to Φ are found by computing –
arg min
r
∑
i
Rpi(r, i)× RΠ(r, i) (4.1)
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Thus, we are post-processing to minimize the conflicts between the current plan and
the other possible plans, so that the projection actions that are tied to the resources
with the minimal conflicts give us the most distinguishing projection. This can be
iterated over, in case none of the projections have zero conflicts.
4.4.2 Projection-Aware Human-in-the-Loop Plan Execution
In the previous example, we confined ourselves to the human as an observer only.
Now, we consider a situation where both the human and the robot are involved in
task planning in a collaborative sense, i.e. both the human and the robot perform
actions in a joint plan to achieve their goals which may or may not be shared.
Illustrative Example. Going back to the running example of the block stacking task,
now consider that the robot and the human both have goals to make a three letter
word out of ART, RAT and COB (as seen in Figure 34b). The robot has decided to
make the word ART, but realizes that this leaves the human undecided on how to
proceed. Thus the disambiguating projection action here includes annotating the A
block with a “not available” symbol so that the only possible goal left for the human
is COB. A video demonstrating this can be viewed at https://goo.gl/SLgCPE (same
as in Section 4.4.1). Note that in this case the robot, in coming up with a useful
projection action, has reversed the perspective from what is relevant to its own plan,
to information that negates possible plans of the human in the loop.
A Projection-Aware Human-in-the-Loop Plan Execution Problem
PAHILPEP is a tuple Ψ = 〈piR,ΠH ,G, {AP}, {SV P}〉 where piR and ΠH are
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the robot’s plan and the set of possible human plans, G is the team goal, and {AP}
and {SV P} are the set of action and state value projections available to the robot.
The solution to Φ is, as before, a composite plan pic ◦ piR where the projection
actions are composed with the robot’s component of the joint team plan, such that
δ(I, pic ◦ piR ◦ piH) |= G. The set of projection actions pic in the solution to the
PAHILPEP Ψ is again found by computing –
arg max
r
∑
i
RpiR(r, i)× RΠH (r, i) (4.2)
Notice the inversion to argmax in the case of an active human in the loop so as to
provide the most pertinent information regarding conflicting intentions to the human.
Remark. Joint plans [73] to reason over different modes of human-robot interactions
has been investigated before, particularly in the context of using resource profiles [93]
for finding conflicts in the human’s and the robot’s plans. It is interesting to note
the reversed dynamics of interaction in the example provided above – i.e. in [93] the
resource profiles were used so that the robot could replan based on probable conflicts
so as to preserve the expected plans of the human. Here, we are using them to identify
information to project to the human, so that the latter can replan instead.
4.4.3 Closing the Loop – Interactive Plan Execution
Of course, it may not be possible to always disentangle plans completely towards
achievement of a shared goal in a collaborative setting. Next, we show how the
communication loop is closed by allowing the humans to interact directly with the
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Figure 35: Interactive execution of a plan in the Augmented Workspace - (a) the
robot has a goal to build a tower of height three and has planned to do so with blocks
blue, red and green. (b) Blocks are annotated with intuitive holograms, e.g. an
upward arrow on the block the robot is going to pick up immediately and a red cross
mark on the ones it is planning to use later. The human can also gaze on an object
for more information (in the rendered text). (c) & (d) The human pinches on the
green block and claims it for himself. The robot now projects a faded out green block
and re-plans online to use the orange block instead (as evident by pickup arrow that
has shifted on the latter at this time). (e) Real-time update and rendering of the
current state showing status of the plan and objects in the environment. (f) The
robot completes its new plan using the orange block.
Figure 36: Interactive plan execution in the Augmented Workspace using the (a)
Holographic Control Panel. Safety cues showing dynamic real-time rendering of
volume of influence (b) - (c) or area of influence (d) - (e), as well as (i) indicators
for peripheral awareness. Interactive rendering of hidden objects (f) - (h) to improve
observability and situational awareness in complex workspaces.
holograms in the augmented workspace thereby spawning replanning commands to be
handled by the robot, in the event of conflicting intentions.
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4.4.3.1 Replanning –
In the previous examples, the robot projected annotations onto the objects it is
intending to manipulate into the human’s point of view with helpful annotations or
holograms that correspond to its intentions to use that object. The human can, in
turn, access or claim a particular object in the virtual space and force the robot to
re-plan, without there ever being any conflict of intentions in the real space. The
humans in the loop can thus not only infer the robot’s intent immediately from these
holographic projections, but can also interact with them to communicate their own
intentions directly and thereby modify the robot’s behavior online. The robot can also
then ask for help from the human, using these holograms. Figure 35 demonstrates one
such scenario. The human can also go into finer control of the robot by accessing the
Holographic Control Panel, as seen in Figure 36(a). The panel provides the human
controls to start/stop execution of the robot’s plan, as well as achieve fine grained
motion control of both the base and the arm by making it mimic the user’s arm
motion gestures on the MoveArm and MoveBase holograms attached to the robot.
4.4.3.2 Assistive Cues –
The use of AR is, of course, not just restricted to procedural execution of plans.
It can also be used to annotate the collaborative workspace with artifacts derived
from the current plan under execution in order to improve the fluency of collaboration.
For example, Figure 36(b-e) shows the robot projecting its area of influence in its
workspace either as a 3D sphere around it, or as a 2D circle on the area it is going
to interact with. This is rendered dynamically in real-time based on the distance of
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the end effector to its center, and to the object to be manipulated. This can be very
useful in determining safety zones around a robot in operation. As seen in Figure
36(f-i), the robot can also render hidden objects or partially observable state variables
relevant to a plan, as well as indicators to improve peripheral vision of the human, to
improve their situational awareness.
Video demonstrations for Sections 4.4.3 and 4.4.3.2 can be viewed at the following
link – https://goo.gl/pWWzJb.
4.4.4 Projection-Aware Plan Generation
Now that we have demonstrated how intention projection can be used to disam-
biguate possible tasks at the time of execution, we ask is it possible to use this ability
to generate plans that are easier to disambiguate in the first place?
Illustrative Example. Consider now that the robot is yet to decide on a plan, but it
has three possible goals BAT, CAT and ACT (Figure 37). From the point of view of
cost optimal planning, all these are equally good options. However, the letter B is in
only one of the words, while the others are in at least two possible words. Thus the
robot is able to reduce the ambiguity in plans by choosing the word BAT over the other
options as a means of achieving the goal of making a word from the given set.
Illustrative Example. Now imagine that we have extended the possible set of words
{ BAT, CAT, ACT } with a longer word BRAT. The robot responds by projecting R and
completes this longer word now, given R is the most discriminating action, and the
possibility of projecting it ahead completely reveals its intentions even though it
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Figure 37: Projection-aware plan generation illustrating trade-off in plan cost and
goal ambiguity at the time of execution – (top left) generating a plan that has the
most discriminating projection (green arrow on B – only one word BAT possible); when
longer word BRAT is available – (bottom left) α = 100 yields green arrow on C with
two words ACT and CAT possible while (right) α = 1000 yields green arrow on R with
only one but longer word BRAT possible.
involves the robot doing a longer and hence costlier plan as seen in Figure 37.
This trade-off in the cost of plans and the ambiguity of intentions forms the essence of
what we refer to as projection-aware planning. In fact, we can show that by correctly
calibrating this trade-off, we can achieve different sweet spots in how much the robot
decides to foreshadow disambiguating actions. As seen in Figure 37, in cases where
the action costs are relatively greater than gains due to resolved ambiguity, the robot
achieves a middle-ground of generating a plan that has the same cost as the optimal
plan to achieve the goal of making a word from this set, but also involves reasonable
forecasting of (two) possible goals by indicating a future pick-up action on C. A video
demonstrating these behaviors can be viewed at https://goo.gl/bebtWS.
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A Projection-Aware Planning Problem PAPP is defined as the tuple Λ =
〈M, κ, {AP}, {SV P}〉 where M is a planning problem and κ is a set of disjunc-
tive landmarks. The solution to Λ is a plan such that –
– pi achieves the goal; and
– commitments imposed by the projection actions, i.e. future state conditions
indicated by SVPs or actions promised by APs (Section 4.3) are respected.
The search for which projection actions to include is achieved by modifying a standard
A∗ search [179] so that the cost of a plan includes actions costs as well as the cost of
ambiguity over future actions (e.g. to possible landmarks) given a prefix.
α C(pˆi,M) + β E(Π, pˆi) (4.3)
Here Π is a set of possible plans that the robot can pursue from the current state
and E(Π) is the entropy of the probability distribution [360] over the plan set Π given
the current plan prefix pˆi to that state. Since a full evaluation of the plan recognition
problem in every node is prohibitively expensive, we use a simple observation model
where the currently proposed projection action tests membership of its parent action
if it is an AP (or state value if it is an SVP) in a minimal delete-relaxed plan [58] to
each landmark. Thus the cost of a plan with projections is approximated as –
αC(pi,M) + β
∑
κ
I(ai ∈ pi − del) (4.4)
where I is the indicator function indicating if the current action ai is part of the
minimal delete-relaxed plan pi − del from the current state to each of the landmarks
κ. Of course, there can be many such plans only some of which include the projection
152
action as a necessary component. So at best, in addition to the delete relaxation,
checking membership only provides a guidance (and no guarantees) to which of the
possible plans can include a projection. The set of landmarks was composed of the
possible words that contributed to the goal of making a valid word. The details9,10
are provided in Algorithm 5. Notice that the indicator function only comes into play
when projection actions are being pushed into the queue, thus biasing the planner
towards producing plans that are easier to identify based on the projections. Also note
how the cost of actions corresponding to projections in the plan prefix are discounted
by a factor γ (depending on how much to incentivize projection actions).
4.5 Projections for Inexplicable Actions
In the previous section, we had focused on dealing with ambiguity of intentions
during execution of a plan. Now we will deal with inexplicability of actions, i.e. how
to use projection capabilities to annotate parts of the world so that a plan under
execution “makes sense” to the observer.
Illustrative Example. Going back to our block stacking setting, consider a scenario
where the human-in-the-loop asks the robot to make a tower of height three with the
red block on top (Figure 44). Here the optimal plan from the point of view of the
observer is likely to be as follows –
9We currently handle only APs in the solution to a PAPP. Also, the number of APs in a solution
were restricted to a maximum of two to three due to the time consuming nature of computing Π.
This can be very easily sped up by precomputing the relaxed planning graph.
10Note that to speed up search we used “outer entanglement” analysis [100] to prune unnecessary
actions for the blocks stacking domain.
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Algorithm 5 Projection-Aware Planning Algorithm
1: procedure PAPP-Search
2: Input : PAPP Λ = 〈M, κ, {AP}, φ〉
3: Output : Plan pi
4: Procedure:
5: A ← A∪ {AP} . Add projections to action set
6: fringe ← Priority_Queue()
7: fringe.push(〈I, 〈〉〉, 0)
8: while True do
9: 〈Ŝ, pi〉, c← fringe.pop()
10: if goal check true then return pi . Refer to Section 4.4.4
11: else
12: for a ∈ A do
13: if ŝ |= pre(a) then
14: ŝ′ ← δ(ŝ, a)
15: fringe.push(〈ŝ′, pi + a〉, F (ŝ′, a, pˆi))
16: procedure F(ŝ′, a, pˆi)
17: if a 6∈ {AP} and AP (a) 6∈ pˆi then
18: return ca + cost(pˆi)
19: else
20: if a ∈ {AP} then
21: Compute Π = {delete− relaxed plans to κ}
22: N ← 0
23: for pi ∈ Π do
24: if AP−1(a) ∈ pi then
25: N ← N + 1
26: return α( ca + cost(pˆi) + βN . (Equation 4.4)
27: else
28: return γca + cost(pˆi)
>> Explicable Plan | >> Robot Optimal Plan
pick-up green | pick-up red
stack green blue | put-down red
pick-up red | pick-up yellow
stack red green | stack yellow green
| pick-up red
| stack red green
However, not all the blocks (e.g. blue) are reachable, as determined by the internal
trajectory constraints of the robot. So its optimal plan would instead be longer, as
shown above. This plan is, of course, inexplicable if the observer knows that the robot
is a rational agent, given the former’s understanding of the robot model. The robot can
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Figure 38: The human has instructed the robot to make a tower of height 3 with the
red block on top. Since the blue block is not reachable it has to unstack red in order
to achieve its goal. This is a suboptimal plan to the observer who may not know the
robot’s internal trajectory constraints and that the blue block in unreachable. The
robot thus decides to project a red error symbol on the blue block indicating it is not
reachable. The optimal plans in both models now align.
chose to mitigate this situation by annotating the unreachable blocks as “not reachable”
as shown in Figure 44. A video demonstration can be seen at https://goo.gl/TRZcW6.
The identification of projection actions in anticipation of inexplicable plans closely
follows the model reconciliation process studied in Chapter 3. The inexplicability of
actions can be seen in terms of differences in the model of the same planning problem
between the robot and the human in the loop, as opposed to the examples previously
where coordination was achieved with respect to aligned models. In our block stacking
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domain, multiple models (in the human-aware planning paradigm) are spawned due to
internal constraints of the robot that the human may not be aware of (e.g. reachability)
while the world model (i.e. how the world works - the robot has to pick up and object
to put it down, etc.) is shared across both the models. As these models diverge, plans
that are optimal in the robot’s model may no longer be so in the human’s and thus
become inexplicable. Thus, we launch the model reconciliation process as described
in Chapter 3 on these two models and the content of the explanation generated is
conveyed succinctly through the medium of mixed reality, as described in the example
above. As before, we assume the mapping from model to symbols is known.
4.5.1 System Architecture
Figure 39 provides an overview of the architecture put in place to support the
cloud-based distributed augmented workspace. In the augmented workspace, the
HoloLens communicates with the user endpoints through the REST API server. The
API server is implemented in python using the Flask web server framework. All
external traffic to the server is handled by an Apache2 server that communicates with
the python application through a WSGI middle layer. The Apache2 server ensures that
the server can easily support a large number of concurrent requests.
The REST service exposes both GET and POST endpoints. The GET links provides
the HoloLens application with a way of accessing information from the robot, while
the POST link provides the HoloLens application control over the robot’s operation.
Currently, we are using the API to expose information like the robotic planning state,
robot joint values and coordinate transforms to markers in the environment. Most
API GET calls will first try to fetch the requested information from the memcached
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Figure 39: Architecture diagram of the Augmented Workspace.
layer, and would only try a direct query to the MySQL database if the cache entry is
older than a specified limit. Each query to the database also causes the corresponding
cache entry to be updated. The MySQL server is updated by a daemon that runs on
Azure and keeps consuming messages sent from the robot through various queues
implemented using the rabbitMQ service.
Video Demonstrations. Demonstrations of all the use cases in this chapter
can be viewed at https://goo.gl/Gr47h8. The code base for the projection-aware
plan generation and execution algorithms are available at https://github.com/
TathagataChakraborti/ppap.
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4.6 Conclusion
In conclusion, we showed how an augmented workspace may be used to improve
collaboration among humans and robots from the perspective of task planning. This
can be either via post-processing its plans during the interactive plan execution process
where the robot can foreshadow future actions to reveal its intentions, or during search
during the projection-aware plan generation process where the robot can trade-off the
ambiguity in its intentions with the cost of plans. Finally, we showed how explanatory
“dialogs” with the human as a response to inexplicable plans can be conducted in this
mixed-reality medium as well.
Such modes of interaction open up several exciting avenues of future research.
Particularly, as it relates to task planning, we note that while we had encoded some of
the notions of ambiguity in the planning algorithm itself, the vocabulary of projections
can be much richer and as such existing representations fall short of capturing these
relationships (e.g. action X is going to happen 3 steps after action Y). A holographic
vocabulary thus calls for the development of representations – PDDL3.x – that can
capture such complex interaction constraints modeling not just the domain physics
of the agent but also its interactions with the human. Further, such representations
can be learned to generalize to methods that can, given a finite set of symbols or
vocabulary, compute domain independent projection policies that decide what and
when to project to reduce cognitive overload on the human.
Finally, in recent work [89], we also looked at how the beliefs and intentions of
a virtual agent can be visualized for transparency of its internal decision-making
processes – we refer to this as a process of “externalization of the brain” of the agent.
Mixed-reality techniques can play a pivotal role in this process as we demonstrate
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in [402]. Indeed, interfacing with virtual agents embody many parallels to gamut of
possibilities in human-robot interaction [489]. I began this chapter by motivating
the need for alternative modes of communication when natural language is not the
desired mode of communication. In Appendix G, I expand further on this narrative by
outlining how mixed-reality expands the scope of human-AI communication beyond
human-robot interactions focused on in this chapter. I also motivate the cause of
electroencephalographic (EEG) signals as yet another emerging mode of communication
that can provide exciting opportunities in the space of task planning and execution.
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSION
“And though it’s only my opinion, and I may be right or wrong,
You’ll find them both in the Grand Canyon at sundown.”
This chapter concludes the dissertation with an outline of contributions and
broader impact of the work presented. The concluding chapter thus situates the
work among existing threads of research in the planning community, and points to
(Appendices B-I) applications, fielded deployments, and other research directions that
either complements or have sprung directly out of, or demonstrates the impact of, the
work presented in the dissertation.
5.1 Summary of Contributions
The primary contribution of the dissertation was to outline the role of the different
models that a planning agent must contend with during its decision-making process,
and the different kinds of behaviors engendered as a result of this – specifically, the (1)
human task model (HuM) which allowed the agent to anticipate human participation
in joint plans (such as in human-robot teams) or to avoid or assist the human as the
case may be (Chapter 2); and the (2) human mental model (HuMM) which allowed
the agent to anticipate expectations of the human, thus enabling it to either conform
to those expectations or explain its actions in terms of those expectations (Chapter
3). We studied this under the umbrella of –
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5.1.1 Planning for Symbiotic Action
In Planning for Symbiotic Action (Chapter 2) I explored behaviors emerging from
accounting for the human task model in a decision-making of a human-aware agent.
The classic example of this is in making joint plans, for example, in human-robot
teaming settings. In addition to supporting this, I proposed two novel behavior
patterns where the human and the robot do not need to coordinate to cooperate, i.e.
the robot generates plans that deconflict with predicted human behavior or assist
when no such assistance need to be anticipated from the point of view of the human.
I demonstrated how complex interactions constraints describing these interesting
behaviors can be developed modularly, and expressed succinctly in terms of mixed
integer linear programs. Below, in Section 5.2.1, I discuss the broader implications of
such reasoning in the context of “human-robot cohabitation”.
5.1.2 Explainable Planning
In Explainable Planning (Chapter 3) I explored the effect of the human mental
model on the decisions of a planning agent. Specifically, I showed how this setup enables
the agent to conform to human expectations by generating explicable plans or explain
its behavior in terms of those expectations when they cannot be met. Of particular
interest is the notion of “model reconciliation” which formulates the explanation
generation problem as one of bringing the human mental model closer to the robot
model, contingent on the constraints of the task at hand or plan being explained.
I further explored how the model reconciliation process adapts to uncertainty in
the mental model, how the concept of explicability and explanations can be traded
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off during the plan generation process itself, and demonstrated in a human factors
study the usefulness of model reconciliation for the explanatory process. This is
the primary contribution of the dissertation. An illustration of the entire gamut of
research problems that has sprung directly out of this work is visualized in a cut-out
poster at the end of the dissertation in page 476.
5.1.3 Communication for Human-Aware Planning
Finally, I recognize that the ability to deal with the mental model is not the end
of the human-aware planning problem. The agent would still need effective channels
of communicating with the human in terms of those models. Natural language and
graphical user interfaces has been, and will continue to be, the de-facto standards
for human-agent interaction, However, in this dissertation, I argue that in certain,
more structured or engineered settings, alternative channels of communications can
make way for efficient interaction. In Chapter 4, I specifically explored the role of
emerging technologies in mixed-reality interfaces in advancing the cause of human-
aware planning. I not only demonstrate how such interfaces can be particularly
effective in sharing of beliefs and intentions with the human, but also how the ability
to do so affects the human-aware plan generation process. In Appendix G, I explore a
few more of these alternative forms of communication (e.g. electroencephalographic
(EEG) signals) and their potential impact on human-aware planning approaches.
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5.2 Applications Enabled by Work
The notion of human-aware planning is, of course, relevant to any application of
planning that involves humans in the loop, be that as an active stakeholder in the
plan or just in interactions with a planning agent. In this dissertation, I have focused
on human-robot interactions as the default domain for demonstrating the proposed
approaches. Below, I point to two specific applications that I have explored, and
detailed in the Appendices, in context of the approaches presented here.
5.2.1 Planning for Human-Robot Cohabitation
The notion of human-robot cohabitation revolves around environments that are
being shared by humans and robots but not necessarily as a team. This is indeed the
case in most of the robots being developed of late, including robot vacuum cleaners,
security guards, and so on. A typical feature of interactions in such environments is
the lack of shared goals and protocols which demands a rethink of how agents should
interact in these settings. This is a departure from traditional notions of human-robot
interaction in, for example, semi-automated assembly or search and rescue teams. In
Appendix C, I discuss how the algorithms proposed in Chapter 2 fit into this narrative,
and discuss broader implications of the “human-robot cohabitation” paradigm.
5.2.2 Planning for Decision Support
A particularly appealing application of AI is in support of human decision-making.
Automated planning stands to have enormous impact in this regard, in being able to
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support tasks that involve complex decision-making by humans (e.g. crew planning in
space missions or command and control scenarios). In Appendix B, I cover a wide
variety of such applications (e.g. planning for disaster response, technical support,
intelligent tutoring systems, and so on) where the planner assumes the role of a
support agent rather than the decision-maker itself, and explore the role of human-
aware planning (e.g. providing explanations for suggested plans) in that context.
5.3 Impact of Work
My work seeks to lay some of the foundational concepts of human-aware planning,
especially explainable planning. There is a growing demand for AI techniques that
are interpretable to humans in the loop, as pioneered by the DARPA XAI Program
[172], and model-based techniques such as automated planning stand to play a major
role here, as recognized in [150]. My research has tried to fill this much-needed gap
from the perspective of automated planning in the human-in-the-loop paradigm, and
has appeared as publications and talks in numerous international workshops and
conferences (cited more than 400 times at the time of graduation). In recognition of
my work, I have been invited to be part of several AAAI, IJCAI, ICAPS, IROS, ICRA
and AAMAS Program Committees, (as well as several workshops at these prestigious
venues, including, and most relevantly, the highly impactful IJCAI Workshop on
Explainable AI (XAI) 2017-18) to lend my expertise on human-in-the-loop and human-
aware planning. I was also invited to host the Fourth AAMAS Workshop on Multi-
Agent Interaction without Prior Coordination11 (MIPC) 2017 with a particular focus
on incorporating the human in the traditional “interaction without prior coordination”
11https://www.cs.utexas.edu/~larg/mipc2017/
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paradigm (such as in human-robot cohabitation as I discuss in Appendix C). I also
co-founded and chaired the first-ever International Workshop on Virtual, Augmented
and Mixed-Reality for Human-Robot Interactions12 (VAM-HRI) at HRI 2018 which
proved to be a huge success [488], and is slated to repeat at HRI 2019. I have also
had the honor of drafting the agenda for the Board of Directors Meeting (Berlin;
November 2017) of the Partnership of AI (PAI) (described in more detail in Appendix
F) for the thematic pillar on “Collaborations between People and AI Systems” [344].
One of the goals of my research has been to create technologies that lead to
demonstrable outcomes and fielded deployments. This is evident from participation
in five ICAPS System Demonstrations [284, 403, 451, 402, 89], leading to one winner
[284] in 2014 and one runners-up award [89] in 2018. Most recently, the last system
was deployed in the Cognitive Environments Laboratory (CEL) at the IBM T.J.
Watson Research Center (Yorktown, NY, USA) for a brief period in 2017. Others,
have appeared in end-to-end demonstrations, both in the form of hardware such as [88]
at the United Technologies Research Center (Berkeley, USA), or as sofbots [91, 170].
I had also lead a team from ASU to the US Finals of the 2017 Microsoft Imagine Cup
demonstrating some of the technologies introduced in the dissertation on projection
aware planning in Chapter 4 and EEG-based communication in Appendix G.
Finally, work presented in the dissertation has provided research opportunities
for undergraduate [388] and graduate students [418, 506] and other researchers and
research groups [396, 422, 442] who have continued, extended, and often improved on
my vision of the different roles of automated planning in human-machine interactions,
and human-aware AI in general.
12http://vam-hri.xyz/
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5.4 Connections to the rest of the Planning Community
Needless to say, the work presented in the thesis complements different threads
of work already well established, or emerging, in the planning community. I have
attempted to briefly highlight some of these below.
5.4.1 Mixed-Initiative Planning
I mentioned “decision support” previously as one of the primary applications
enabled by the approaches introduced in the dissertation. The role of a planner in the
decision support paradigm is to complement the decision-making of a human involved
in a planning process. This may remind the reader of the mixed-initiative planners of
old [144, 7] that allowed a domain expert to interact with the planner and improve its
search process, and resultant solutions, by providing preferences and control rules. The
mixed-initiative planning paradigm has seen continued work even in recent years [239].
Decision support, however, ends up solving the complimentary problem – instead of
the humans entering the land of the planners, the core idea behind decision support
revolves around the automated planner supporting the cause of the human planner,
i.e. the planner entering the land of the humans. Thus, the planner must now, in
addition to plan generation, be able to perform a variety of related tasks including
plan recognition, explanation, validation, suggestion, summarization, and so on. Many
of these capabilities, in fact, come directly out of work done in this dissertation, while
others already investigated in the planning community can be re-situated for the
decision support paradigm. I describe these evolving roles of the automated planner
in the context of decision support in detail in Appendix B.
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5.4.2 Other Formulations: Epistemic Planning and i-POMDPs
From the point of view of the three models introduced in Chapter 1, the human-
aware planning setting is, in a sense, an asymmetric epistemic setting [41] with single-
level nested beliefs over the models from the robot’s perspective. Indeed, existing
literature on epistemic reasoning [178, 318, 308] can provide interesting insights in the
planning process of an agent in these settings. However, general epistemic planning,
despite its seductive elegance, is known to be computationally hard. Interestingly,
in recent work [421], authors show that some of the restrictions that make epistemic
planning more tractable (c.f. [317]) are naturally satisfied in the human-aware planning
setup introduced in this dissertation – i.e. with such restrictions, epistemic planning
can be compiled into the significantly more efficient classical planning framework.
Authors in [421] exploit this connection to provide a unified framework that can
not only capture many of the behaviors in explainable planning introduced in this
dissertation in a single formulation but can also demonstrate computational benefits
over searching in the space of models as done here. It is worthwhile noting that
existing literature [493] has shown that this level of nesting (human model and human
mental model) may be adequate in modeling interactions with humans in the loop.
Also, the human-aware planning framework, as presented in the dissertation,
can be potentially represented in the much more general formulation of recursive
i-POMDPs [160], which can also explicitly reason with the models of other agents in
the environment as part of the state [161]. However, though much more expressive,
such algorithms typically do not scale yet to large problems, though there is active
research [120] in the field in search of more tractable approximations.
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5.4.3 Conditional / Conformant Planning
In [419], we have extended the notion of explanations as model reconciliation
to account for uncertainty in the human mental model, as briefly discussed in the
dissertation. Specifically, we show in [419] how existing notions of conditional and
conformant solutions in planning can be adopted for the explanation process as well in
the presence of uncertainty over the human mental model. While there are significant
differences between how conditional or conformant explanations work with respect
to their planning counterparts, it may be worth exploring the state-of-the-art [8, 42]
in those fields to further develop on the model reconciliation process with uncertain
mental models. This is particularly relevant with the recent developments [421]
towards a unified planning approach for model reconciliation.
5.4.4 Maximal Distinctiveness and Model Space Search
There is a parallel thread of work on model search underway in the planning
community [236] that aims to allow changing of the environment to maximize utilities
of a planning agent. Though different in motivation, there are interesting overlap
in techniques, and the two lines of work can potentially benefit mutually from the
algorithmic point of view, particularly in terms of heuristics, approximations and
model ablation or extension techniques used in the search.
The work, building upon the seminal work on “goal recognition design” [232], and
subsequent extensions to “transparent planning” [277] also has strong connections to
the notion of explicable planning. I comment on the latter in Appendix D.
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5.4.5 Planning and Privacy
The notion of privacy has recently emerged in the context of multi-agent planning
[47]. From the perspective of human-aware planning, this is an important topic as well.
For example, as I explore in Appendix B, this can manifest itself in the explanation
process where there are multiple humans in the loop, with possibly private domain
conditions. This can have profounds influence on the interfaces [402] for interacting
with the human in the loop but also algorithmically, in figuring out non-invasive
modes of interaction. For example, recent work [290, 235] has looked at the possibility
generating plans with the aim of of obfuscating intentions from an observer. Indeed,
as I discuss in Appendix E, the concept of human-awareness can be a double-edged
sword – i.e. you can potentially use the mental model to manipulate and mislead
the human as well, particularly in adversarial scenarios. This is an emerging, and
increasingly intriguing, line of inquiry [256, 254] and is quite relevant to the full scope
of human-awareness in planning.
5.4.6 Commitment-Sensitive Replanning
Planning and acting in an uncertain environment requires the ability to replan
when expectations of the agent are not met. The notion of replanning becomes even
more relevant from the perspective of human-aware planning since the human (mental)
model is seldom known with certainty. Previously, there has been work on formalizing
the different flavors of replanning problems [443, 444] engendered by the constraints of a
given planning problem. Of particular interest is the computational model of replanning
presented in [110] which outlines the notion of “penalties” and “opportunities” that
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are incurred in the replanning problem. The human-aware planning setup introduced
in the dissertation provides a opportunity to update this computational model by
explicitly considering the implications of the robot’s actions on the joint plan or on the
mental model. This also re-emphasizes the need for commitment-sensitive replanning,
as introduced in [443, 444], while providing a possible pathway (in terms of the human
task and mental models) for computational definitions of commitments made in a joint
plan. The earlier work on replanning with commitments was, in a sense, ahead of its
time and sheds new light on the replanning problem in the context of human-aware
planning. I discuss some of these connections briefly in Appendix C.
5.4.7 Explanations and Interfaces for Automated Planning
The concept of explanations in automated planning is not new. Indeed, as I
acknowledge in Chapter 3, my dissertation specifically focuses on one of the root
causes of explanations, i.e. that of model differences between the planner and the
human in the loop, while earlier works on plan explanations have attempted to outline
the causal proof of the plan to address the difference in computational capabilities of
humans. The recent ICAPS 2018 Workshop on Explainable Planning (XAIP) [153]
expose many of these diverse outlooks to the plan explanation problem that complement
each other for the ultimate goal of making planning technologies explainable and
ultimately more palatable to humans in the loop (e.g. end users, developers and
researchers). I discuss this in more detail in Chapter 3.
Of course, it is not enough to be able to generate explanations (and human-aware
behavior in general) but it is equally important to be able to communicate and interact
effectively with the humans in the loop. Traditionally, the interfacing problem has
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been grossly overlooked in the planning community. However, it has undergone a
resurgence of sorts lately with the inaugural ICAPS 2017 Workshop on User Interfaces
for Scheduling and Planning (UISP) [152], and its follow-up in 2018, which I have
heavily contributed to [403, 83, 402, 84, 77]. I describe some of these interfaces in
Chapter 4 and in Appendices B and G. A discussion of recent trends and challenges in
planning interfaces is available in a report [151] I co-authored with the organizers of
UISP. The development of human-friendly interfaces for planners become even more
urgent as technologies from the community mature and become more user facing, and
human-aware planning forms an important piece in that puzzle.
5.4.8 Classical Planning as a Service
Finally, as is quite evident in much of the dissertation, I have called upon classical
planning as a service in many of the proposed approaches in order to simulate the
inferential capability of the human (using the HuMM) or to anticipate possible human
behaviors (using the HuM). As I noted in Chapter 3, PDDL as a representation was
historically motivated [281, 307] to model how humans ascribe intentions to agents,
and provides a surprisingly powerful tool towards the development of human-aware
planning techniques, thus building upon and extend the scope of classical planning.
In this regard, I am forever indebted to the fantastic array of robust software that
have come out of the community ready for off-the-shelf use, including Fast-Downward
[184], Fast-Forward [190, 189], pr2plan [358, 361] and VAL [198] to name a few.
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5.5 Looking forward: Beyond Planning
Throughout this dissertation, I have attempted to highlight the advantages as well
as limitations of proposed solutions as and when they were introduced. Perhaps the
most important among those is the need to develop representation of mental models
that can be efficiently learned and reasoned over. This includes the ability to not only
model the beliefs and intentions of the human but also their computational limitations,
so that effective synergy between the human and the machine can be achieved.
Unsurprisingly, many of these challenges surpass the scope of automated planning
and apply to the cause of human-aware AI in general. I will thus end this dissertation by
pointing the interested reader to Appendix F which provides a comprehensive overview
of immediate challenges towards the realization of the grand goals of human-aware
planning, decision-making and AI.
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Appendix
Appendix A
APPENDIX OUTLINE
The rest of the thesis contains a set of appendices that expand upon themes
on human-aware planning introduced in the dissertation in the context of specific
applications I have explored in both industrial and academic settings.
• Appendix B This is a detailed analysis of the many flavors of human-aware
planning in the decision support paradigm – here the human decision-makers
remain in charge of the planning process while the planner tries to assist in their
decision-making. An interesting consequence of this is that the the human task
model is no longer relevant. However, we can still talk about model differences
over a shared planning task.
• Appendix C Here we expand on the ideas presented in Chapter 2 to the
concept of human-robot cohabitation, where humans and robots share the
same environment but not necessarily as teammates. We revisit the notion
of cooperation with minimal coordination (as seen in behaviors enabled by
algorithms introduced in Chapter 2) in this context.
• Appendix D In this dissertation I talked about plan explicability in the context
of explainable planning (Chapter 3) and the predictability of plans in the context
of projection-aware planning (Chapter 4). In this appendix, I put into context
these ideas in the emerging research landscape of “interpretability” of plans and
behaviors.
• Appendix E A particularly interesting outcome of human-awareness of agents is
that it leaves open the possibility of the human mental model being manipulated
174
by the agent for its own (or some greater) good. Here, I explore these possibilities
especially in the context of model reconciliation as introduced in the dissertation
and briefly study similar aspects of the doctor-patient relationship that has
grappled with such possibilities before.
• Appendix F I concluded the dissertation with a brief outline of connections of
the work on human-aware planning presented in the dissertation to existing or
ongoing threads of research in the planning community in particular. In this
appendix, I expand on this discussion and outline outstanding challenges for
human-aware AI in general.
• Appendix G and Appendix H In the dissertation, I explored various com-
munication channels in human-agent interactions, in particular mixed reality
in human-robot interactions in Chapter 4 and decision-support in Chapter B.
Here I will document lessons from my preliminary exploration of more of these
alternative forms of communication such as electroencephalographic (EEG)
signals in proximal human robot teaming in Appendix G and vehicle-to-vehicle
communication in mixed-reality in Appendix H.
• Appendix I Finally, I end with a brief outline of work I explored in the pursuit
of planning algorithms that are tailored for human-aware planning – here, in
particular, plan recognition with resource constraints that can be useful in
speeding up concepts such as planning with resource conflicts as introduced in
Chapter 3.
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Appendix B
PLANNING FOR DECISION SUPPORT
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PLANNING FOR DECISION SUPPORT
“What cannot be imitated perfect must die.”
In this Appendix, I will digress from research problems in the design of human-
aware planners and focus instead on applications I have worked on during my Ph.D.
that build on these principles. I will primarily focus on the evolving roles of a planner
in the “decision support” paradigm where the planner is tasked to assist a human
planner or decision maker rather than just generating plans for itself.
B.1 Introduction: Human-aware planning is everywhere!
To the extent that we are building systems that are supposed to operate in the
real world, it stands to reason that they will inevitably come in contact with humans.
As such, it seems to me that the design of AI (and therefore planning) algorithms
cannot not be human-aware. There has been some argument against this, noting that
we do get used to things – i.e. that we will soon be “robot-aware” even if the robots
are not human-aware. This seems like a rather terrible way of going about things,
since we know we can do better. Not to mention, that users are not really obliged to
accept stupid autonomy [61, 303] just for the sake of it. It is not surprising then that
in course of several internships and collaborations in academia and in the industry, all
the planning applications I have worked on have ended up exploring the human-aware
angle. In this chapter I will explore some of these ideas with a specific focus on the
topic of planning as a means of decision support for human planners.
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B.1.1 Chapter Highlights
The following provides a brief overview of topics covered in this chapter –
- Section B.2 – In this section, I explore challenges that arise when the role of the
automated planner is adapted to the needs of naturalistic decision making in a
decision support setting.
- Section B.3 – RADAR is a decision support system that demonstrates the full
range of capabilities afforded by an automated planner while working with expert
(human) decision-makers in the loop.
- Section B.4 – Mr.Jones demonstrates the visualization capabilities of an “ex-
plainable” decision support agent in the context of a group meeting facilitator
in the Cognitive Environments Laboratory (CEL) at the IBM T.J. Watson
Research Center in Yorktown, USA. This was the runner-up of the People’s
Choice Award in the Systems Demonstration Track at ICAPS 2018.
- Section B.5 – AI-MIX extends the idea of decision support to domains where the
model is not as precisely defined - e.g. tour planning using the crowd. This was
the winner of the People’s Choice Award in the Systems Demonstration Track
at ICAPS 2014.
- Section B.6 – In UbuntuWorld 1.0 LTS – a project undertaken at the IBM
T.J. Watson Research Center in Yorktown, USA – I explore how “data-driven
reinforcement learning” can provide a viable solution to learning a decision
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support model from human feedback in the context of an embedded technical
support agent (softbot) in the Ubuntu operating system.
- Section B.7 – Finally, in Moo., I will illustrate how concepts of decision support
can be used for the general course-independent design of intelligent tutoring
systems (ITSs) that can provide targeted model-based feedback to individual
students in the Learning 2.0 paradigm. Some of these principles are currently
being adopted in the design of Dragoon – a well-known ITS deployed in Arizona
State University. This is a particular case where the planner ends up being in a
supervisory role with the human as the student.
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B.1.2 Preliminaries
In the following, we will build upon the concepts discussed throughout the thesis
to the needs of deployed systems that use planning techniques as black boxes. With
this in mind, we will define a few “modules” below, based on techniques discussed
thus far to be reused throughout the rest of the chapter.
Definition: A Classical Planning Problem (CPP) follows the definition in
Section 1.3.1. As before, a CPP is represented using the Planning Domain Definition
Language or PDDL [296].
Definition: A Plan Generator Module (PGM) [183] computes a solution to a
CPPM as sequence of actions or a (satisficing) plan pi = 〈a1, a2, . . . , an〉 such that
δM(I, pi) |= G. The cost of pi is C(pi,M) =
∑
a∈pi ca if δM(I, pi) |= G; ∞ otherwise.
The cheapest plan pi∗ = arg minpi C(pi,M) is the optimal plan with cost C∗M.
Definition: A Plan Validation Module (PVM) [198] outputs, given plan pi and
planning problemM, True iff δM(I, pi) |= G; False otherwise.
Definition: A Plan Recognition Module (PRM) [361] outputs, given a partial
plan pˆi and a planning problemM, a plan pi that maximizes the probability that pˆi is
a sub-plan of pi –
pi ← arg min
pi
P([pˆi]k≤|pi|k=0 )
Note that the above approach does not directly compute this. Instead, we use the
compilation approach from [358] to compute the optimal plan that satisfies a set of
observations given a goal as the output of the PRM.
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Definition: A Landmark Generation Module (LGM) [191] outputs, given a
planning problem M, a set of state (or action) landmarks L containing states (or
actions) that must be passed through (or executed) in any satisficing solution ofM.
- An action landmark a ∈ A requires that a ∈ pi ∀pi : δM(I, pi) |= G.
- A state landmark [510] s ⊆ F is such that ∀pi : δM(I, pi) |= G, ∃[pˆi]k≤|pi|k=0 :
δM(I, pˆi) |= s.
Definition: A Human-Aware Planning Problem (HAP) is given by the tuple
Ψ = 〈M,MH〉 where MH = 〈DH , IH ,GH〉 is the human’s understanding of the
planning problemM [79].
Definition: An Explicable Planning Module (EPM) computes a plan pi such
that it is a satisficing solution toM and is as close as possible to the expected plan
in the human’s model [507, 506, 252] –
C(pi,M) ≈ C∗MH
Definition: A Plan Explanation Module (PEM) outputs, given a HAP Ψ =
〈M,MH〉 and the optimal solution pi∗ toM, the shortest explanation [86] in the form
of a model update to the human mental modelMH so that the same plan is now also
optimal in the human’s updated mental model M̂H of the problem –
C(pi∗,M̂H) = C∗M̂H
The PEM can, as we saw in Section 3.3, trade off [80] the relative cost of explicability
(i.e. deviation from optimality in the planner’s model) to the cost (i.e. length) of
explanations during the plan generation process itself by computing a plan pi and an
explanation or model update E such that pi is a solution to M and is the optimal
solution to M̂ modulated by a hyperparameter α –
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pi ← arg min
pi
|E| + α× | C(pi,M)− C∗M |
With higher α, PEM computes plans that require more explanation, while with
lower α, it generates more explicable plans. We refer to this variant as PEM(α).
Internally, PEM performs what is referred to as a model space search to come up with
these explanations. This is done using unit edit functions λ that progressively try out
one or more updates to the modelMH from the set of possible updates inM∆MH
until the optimality conditions as described above are satisfied. As described in detail
in Chapter 3, this is known as the process of model reconciliation [86, 80].
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Figure 40: Planning as decision support involves the planner collaborating with the
human(s) in the loop over the same planning task. However, the planner must consider
difference in understanding of this task with that of the human(s) in order to ascribe
to the paradigm of naturalistic decision making.
B.2 Planning as Decision Support
In this section, we consider the case of HILP where the human responsible for
making the decisions in complex scenarios is supported by an automated planning
system. High-level information fusion that characterizes complex long-term situations
and support planning of effective responses is considered the greatest need in crisis-
response situations [264]. Indeed, automated planning based proactive support was
shown to be preferred by humans involved in teaming with robots [503] and the
cognitive load of the subjects involved was observed to have been reduced [326]. The
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complimentary nature of human and machine capabilities (e.g. the former is well
suited to handle complex norms and common sense knowledge while the latter is
equipped to handle reasoning over large set of constraints) makes this an especially
attractive opportunity for augmenting human-AI expertise.
Interestingly, the decision support paradigm places human-aware planning in a
unique position – going back to the setting in Figure 2, in a decision support scenario
the modelMH of the human (and the robot’s estimateMHr of it) are no longer relevant.
Instead, they are both operating on the same planning problemMP . However, the
human’s understanding of it might have drifted or they may have different versions of
the ground truth model – MˆP is the robot’s estimate of the human (mental) model.
This is illustrated in Figure 40.
B.2.1 Naturalistic Decision Making
The proposed decision support system is built around the notion of naturalistic
decision making (NDM) which formulates how humans make decisions is complex
time-critical scenarios [242]. It is acknowledged as a necessary element in PDS systems
[315]. Systems which do not support NDM have been found to have detrimental impact
on work flow causing frustration to decision makers [143]. At the heart of this concept
lies the requirement of letting the human decision maker to be in control of the decision
making process. This motivates us to build a proactive decision support system, which
focuses on aiding and alerting the humans in the loop with their decisions rather
than generate a static plan that may not work in the dynamic worlds that the plan
has to execute in, or does not conform to the implicit preferences of the human that
the planner is not aware of. Beyond addressing the aspects of NDM, the process of
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providing effective decision support in mixed initiative planning scenarios is more
of an iterative process, requiring explanation of synthesized plans generated by the
automated planner [415]. We show how our systems demonstrate this by explaining a
generated plan to the human when the latter finds it to be inexplicable. We postulate
that such a system must be augmentable, context sensitive, controllable and adaptive
to the human’s decisions. Various elements of human-automation interaction such
as adaptive nature and context sensitivity are presented in [409]. [477] show that
vigilance requires hard mental work and is stressful via converging evidence from
behavioral, neural and subjective measures. Our systems may be considered as a part
of such vigilance support thereby reducing the stress for the human.
These considerations are in contrast to earlier works on mixed-initiative planning
systems such as TRAINS [11], MAPGEN [7], [239] and advisable planning systems [325]
where the planner is usually in the drivers seat with the humans “advising” the planner.
Instead of the humans entering the land of automated planners (e.g. by manipulating
their internal search process or data structures), here, the planners enter the land of
humans. Earlier work on the design of automated assistants have applied the principles
of Human-Human Interaction (HHI) for developing a collaborative disclosure interface
[268, 374]. These mostly focus on aspects of user interface design and hardly talk
of the technical capabilities that an AI agent needs to have (and how they can be
achieved) in order to be effective as an assistant, especially in the case of HILP. All of
these works, both in the software and the automated planning communities, ignore
the rich literature on the design of automation software in the Human-Computer
Interaction (HCI) community, which we talk about in the upcoming sections. This
work, to our knowledge, is the first to address this concern and propose a proactive
decision support (PDS) system RADAR following some of the design principles laid out
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Figure 41: Degrees of automation of the various stages of decision support, and the
role of RADAR (described in detail later in the chapter) in it.
in the literature in the (HCI) community, to demonstrate possible roles that existing
automated planning technologies can play in the deliberative process of the human
decision maker in terms of the degree of automation of the planning process.
B.2.1.1 Levels of Automation
One of the seminal works by [410] builds a model that enumerates ten levels
of automation in software systems depending on the autonomy of the automated
component. Later, in the study of mental workload and situational awareness of
humans performing alongside automation software, [342] separates automation into
four parts- Information Acquisition, Information Analysis, Decision Selection and
Action Implementation (see Figure 41). We use this system as an objective basis for
deciding which functions for our system should be automated and to what extent so
as to reduce human’s mental overload while supporting Naturalistic Decision making.
[340] shows that human use of automation may result in automation bias leading
to omission and commission errors, which underlines the importance of reliability of
the automation [341]. Indeed, it is well known [486], that climbing the automation
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ladder in Figure 41 might well improve operative performance but drastically reduce
response quality when failures occur. Hence, to meet the requirement of naturalistic
decision making, we observe a downward trend in automation levels (in Figure 41)
as we progress from data acquisition and analysis (which machines are traditionally
better at) to decision making and execution.
B.2.1.2 Interpretation and Steering
For the system to collaborate with humans effectively, it must have two broad
capabilities - Interpretation and Steering [286]. Interpretation means understanding
the actions done by the commanders (eg. sub-goal extraction, plan and goal recogni-
tion), while Steering involves helping the commanders to do their actions (eg. action
suggestion, plan critiques). It is interesting to note that the steering capabilities of
a system is inversely proportional to the incompleteness of the domain model the
system uses for planning [454]. For example, a system with shallow or partial models
can only provide plan critiques [285], whereas a system aimed for experts with a more
complete model can validate, fix, suggest and even complete plans.
B.2.2 The Many Faces of Decision Support
This chapter is thus an exploration of the various roles of an automated planner
in the decision making process of human planners. Figure 42 illustrates some of
these applications and categorizes them along different dimensions such as the type
of support provided, domain of application, and the number and expertise level of
humans. In the following, we will explore each of these systems in great detail.
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Figure 42: The many faces of decision support (discussed in this chapter) and the
role of human-aware planning in it.
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B.3 RADAR – A Proactive Decision Support Agent
We will now go into details of the RADAR interface and its integration with
human-aware planning technologies to enable different forms of proactive deci-
sion support. A video demonstrating its various capabilities is available at https:
//youtu.be/x5lYDnSh3B8.
B.3.1 RADAR 1.0
The Fire Fighting Domain – For the remainder of the discussion, we will use a
fire-fighting scenario to illustrate our ideas. The domain model used by the system
(assumed to be known and available for a well-defined task such as this) is represented
in PDDL and is assumed to be very close, if not identical, to that of the expert in
the loop. The scenario plays out in a particular location (we use Tempe as a running
example) and involves the local fire-fighting chief, who along with the local police,
medical and transport authorities, is trying to build a plan in response to the fire
using the given platform augmented with decision support capabilities.
The Interface – The interface (Figure 43) consists of four main components –
1. Planning Panel – This is the most critical part of the system. It displays the
plan under construction, and provides the human with abilities to reorder / add
/ delete actions in the plan, validate a partial plan, fix a broken plan, suggest
new better ones, provide explanation on the current one, etc. by accessing the
options at the top of the panel. This will be the primary focus for our discussion
in the upcoming sections.
189
2. Goal Selection Panel – This lets the user set high level goals or tasks to be
accomplished. Once a goal is selected, the system sets up a planning problem
instance given its knowledge of the initial state of the world. It also summarizes
this task to the user by displaying the necessary landmarks to be attained in
order to achieve the goal.
3. Map Panel – This provides visual guidance to the decision making process,
thereby reducing the information overload and improving the situational
awareness of the human. The map can be used to point of areas of interest,
location and availability of resources, routes, etc. Note that due to modular
design, this part of the User Interface can be used to display other relevant
information for different domains by simply changing a template file.
4. Resource Panel – In this panel, the human commander can view the availability
of resources as shown in the bottom-right of Figure 43. In our case, the police
station has resources such as police cars and policemen, while the fire station
has fire engines, ladders, rescuers, etc. A green check mark and a red error
sign indicates the availability and lack of a specific resource respectively. Both
the commander who intends to use these resources and the resource manager
(eg. fire-chief of the fire station, head of the police station etc.) can acquire or
update the availability of these resources by clicking on the red cross or the green
tick respectively, if the system’s data is stale. An update by one actor (say the
fire-chief indicating that no more fire trucks are available at their fire-station)
is instantly visible to all the other actors (say the commander). The system
also highlights parts of the table that are relevant to the plan currently under
construction – an example of decision-driven data support.
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Figure 43: RADAR interface showing decision support for the human commander making
plans in response to a fire in the city.
In the following sections, we will show how RADAR can help a commander in a disas-
ter response scenario highlighting the degree of automation the software demonstrates
in the different stages of the decision support process (as described in Section B.2).
The PDDL domain and problem files along with a video walkthrough demonstrating
the different capabilities of the system can be accessed at https://goo.gl/htrmLQ.
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B.3.1.1 Information Acquisition
For effective decision support, the importance of data cannot be understated. While
on one hand it must support proactive data retrieval and integration capabilities, it
must also have abilities to generate and recognize plans, and support the decision-
making tasks of the commanders, with the help of this data. Thus, PDS can be seen
to consist of two main capabilities, data driven decision-making and decision driven
data-gathering. We call this the Data-Decision Loop.
In the current version, we assume that RADAR acquires relevant information regard-
ing the availability of resources pertaining to the task at hand. We will also assume
that the system can keep track of drifting models [56] in the background, placing it in
Degree 7 of automation. While we cannot expect the human to gather data for the
system, designing a system that can choose to acquire and not display information
(it thinks is irrelevant), climbing up to Degree 10, is contradictory to good design
principles in automation agent design for Naturalistic Decision Making scenarios, as
stated before. In the current version of our system, we do not integrate any data
sources yet, but instead only focus on the decision making aspect.
B.3.1.2 Information Analysis
Now, we will present details on how the proposed system can leverage planning
technologies to provide relevant suggestions and alerts to the human decision maker
with regards to the information needed to solve the problem. The planning problem
itself is given by Π = 〈M, I,G〉 where M is the action model, and I,G are the current
and goal states representing the current context and task description respectively.
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Finally the plan pi = pie ◦ pih ◦ pis is the solution to the planning problem, which is
represented as concatenation of three sub-plans - pie is the plan fragment that the
commander has already deployed for execution, and pih is the set of actions being
proposed going forward. Of course, these two parts by themselves might not achieve
the goal, and this is the role of the plan suffix pis that is yet to be decided upon. We
will demonstrate below how planning technology may be used to shape each of these
plan fragments for the better.
Model Updates – As an augmentable system, the system must support update
to the rules that govern its decision support capabilities, as required by the user, or
by itself as it interacts with the environment. Of course, such models may also be
learned [514] or updated [56] on the fly in cases of failures during execution of pih or
actions of the human in response to excuses generated from the system, or to account
for model divergence due to slowly evolving conditions in the environment. Further,
the system should be, if possible, act in a fashion that is easily understandable to the
human in the loop [507], or be able to explain the rationale behind its suggestions if
required [221, 416] in a fashion easily understood by the human user [345].
Often a key factor in these settings is the difference in the planner’s model of the
domain, and the human expectation of it. Thus, a valid or satisfactory explanation may
require a model reconciliation process where the human model needs to be updated,
as shown in Figure 44, in order to explain a suggestion. Here the system uses the
PEM to explain the plan being suggested while at the same time not overloading the
human with information not relevant to the task at hand [87]. Note that here the
human has the power to veto the model update if (s)he believes that the planner’s
model is the one which is faulty, by choosing to approve or not approve individual
parts of the explanation. Thus, the system here displays Degree 5 of automation.
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Figure 44: (1) RADAR knows that in the environment, the commander needs to inform
the Fire Station’s Fire chief before deploying big engines and rescuers. In green,
Adminfire’s Fire Chief is alerted to deploy big engines from Admin Fire Station.
In red, Mesa fire stations’ Fire Chief is alerted to deploy rescuers from Mesa Fire
Station. (2) The human’s model believes that there is no need to inform Fire Chiefs
and questions RADAR to explain his plan. RADAR finds these differences in the domain
model and reports it to the human. The human acknowledges that before deploying
rescuers one might need to alert the Fire Chief and rejects the update the Fire Chief
needs to be alerted before deploying big engines. (3) In the alternative plan suggested
by RADAR, it takes into account the humans knowledge and plans with the updated
model. (4) Clicking on ‘Explain This Plan’ generates no explanations as there are
none (with respect to the current plan) after the models were updated.
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Figure 45: The lack of big engines at all the fire stations results in an initial state for the
planning problem from which no plan is possible to achieve the goal of Extinguishing
Big Fire at BYENG. RADAR reports this as a warning and suggests the minimal number
of resources the commander needs to gather so that a plan is possible.
Figure 46: Once a goal is selected, the problem file is generated and the landmarks
are computed to help the commander be on track to achieve the goal.
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Plan Summarization – As we mentioned before, when a task or high level goal is
selected by the human, RADAR automatically generates the corresponding planning
problem in the background, analyses the possible solution to it, and highlights resources
required for it to give the human an early heads-up. It can, however, do even more by
using landmark analysis of the task at hand to find bottlenecks in the future. This is a
valuable source of guidance in terms of figuring out what resources and actions would
be required in future, and may be used to increase the decision maker’s situational
awareness by summarizing the task at hand and possible solutions to it in terms of
these landmarks. In the current system, the LGM uses [510] for this purpose. Figure
46 illustrates one such use case, where the system automatically computes and displays
the landmarks after the human selects the goal, thus exhibiting characteristics of
Degree 7 automation of information analysis.
Plan Validation – Plan failure occurs when the plan fragment pie that has already
been dispatched for execution and/or the sub-plan pih currently under construction
are not valid plans, i.e. δ(I, pie ◦ pih) |= ⊥. From the point of view of planning, this
can occur due to several reasons, ranging from unsatisfied preconditions to incorrect
parameters, to the model itself being incorrect or incomplete. Errors made in pih that
can be explained by the model can be easily identified by the PVM, while errors in pie
should be used as feedback (context-sensitive) so that the system, in looking forward,
may have to re-plan (adaptive) from a state s 6= δ(I, pie).
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Figure 47: RADAR’s ‘Fix’ button does plan correction, providing action suggestions.
The ‘Suggest’ provides actions and plan suggestions to help achieve the goal.
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Figure 48: RADAR does plan validation of a partial plan made by the user and shows
reasons as to why it is invalid.
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Of course, the goal may be unreachable given the current state (for example,
due to insufficient resources). This can be readily detected via reachability analysis
using planning graph techniques. This is supported by most planners, including
Fast-Downward [183]. Once the system detects a state with no solution to the
planning problem, apart from alerting the human to this situation itself, it can choose
to suggest an alternative state I∗ where a solution does exist, i.e. ∃pi s.t. δ(I∗, pi) |= G.
This can provide guidance to the human in how to fix the problem in situations
beyond the system’s control/knowledge, and may be achieved using excuse generation
techniques studied in [163] and plan revision problems [186]. We achieved this using
a slightly modifying the inputs to the PEM – we create a new model with an initial
state that has all the resources available. This yields the minimum set of changes in
our current model which are consistent with the new model to guarantee feasibility.
B.3.1.3 Decision Selection
Referring back to our discussion on naturalistic decision making, and the need for
on-demand support, we note that the system is mostly restricted to Degree 3 and 4 of
automation with respect to decision selection.
Plan Correction or Repair – In the event pih is invalid and may be repaired with
additional actions, we can leverage the compilation pr2plan from [361] for a slightly
different outcome. The compilation, originally used for plan recognition, updates the
current planning problem Π to Π∗ = 〈M∗, I∗,G∗〉 using pih as a set of observations
such that ∀a ∈ pih is preserved in order in the (optimal) solution pi of Π∗. The actions
that occur in between such actions in the solution pi to the compilation may then
be used as suggestions to the user to fix the currently proposed plan pih. Figure 47
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illustrates one such use case, demonstrating Degree 3 of automation - i.e. the system
only complements the decision process when asked, and provides the human an option
to undo these fixes at all times. Note that since the deployed actions are required to
be preserved (and the suggested actions preferably so) when looking ahead in the plan
generation process, we will use Π∗ for all purposes going forward.
Action Suggestions – The most basic mode of action suggestion would be to solve
the current planning problem Π∗ using the PGM and suggest the plan suffix pis as
the best course of action. Of course, the actions suggested by the commander in
pih may themselves be part of a sub-optimal plan and may thus be improved upon.
Thus we use the compilation from [361] for a slightly different purpose than originally
intended. Given a known goal, we find out if the choice a ∈ pih is sub-optimal using the
difference in cost ∆ = C(pˆi)− C(pi) where pˆi is the solution to the planning problem
〈M∗, I∗,G∗ + a〉 as given by pr2plan. This is again shown in Figure 47.
Monitoring Plan Generation – In cases where there are multiple ways to achieve
the goal, and the system is not aware of the user’s implicit preferences P, [361] can
be used to compile the goal into G∗ ← G + P and check for correctness or likelihood
of P (G∗|pie ◦ pih), the current hypothesis. This is used by RADAR in determining the
response to suggest or fix any hypothesis.
Plan Suggestions – One useful way of increasing the situational awareness of
the human decision maker is to make him/her aware of the different, often diverse,
choices available. Currently, when asked for alternative plans, RADAR provides an
optimal plan as a suggestion. This may not be always desired. Moreover, if landmarks
are disjunctive, just alerting the commander of these landmarks may not be enough
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to tell how they contribute to the planning choices. In such cases, the concept of
diverse [333, 464] and top-K plans [370] become useful. We are exploring avenues of
integrating these techniques into our current system.
B.3.1.4 Action Implementation
The current system does not provide any endpoints to external facilities and thus
lies at Degree 1 of automation in the Action Implementation phase. Some of these
tasks can however be automated - e.g. in our fire-fighting domain the human can
delegate the tasks for alerting police-stations and fire-stations to be auto-completed.
Thus, RADAR can potentially range from Degrees 1 to 6 in this phase. However, given
how such systems are known for failing to capture the complexity of these scenarios,
including some of the mixed initiative schedulers from NASA, the execution phase is
often just left to the human operators completely, or firmly at the lower spectrum of
the automation scale. Recent attempts [164, 90] at learning such action models and
preferences in mixed-initiative schedulers and automated technical supports settings
might provide interesting insights into climbing the automation levels at the final
stage of decision support for planning, without significant loss of control.
Remark – Note that the different kinds of decision support operate with different
assumptions as it relates to the multi-model argumentation in human-aware planning.
The explanation generation technique is aimed for cases where the human has lost
situational awareness (i.e. their model of the world has drifted with respect to that
of the planner) and assumes they are (optimal) plan generators, i.e. experts in the
loop. The planning support with validation, suggestions of alternatives, and plan
completion, on the other hand, deals with cognitive overload – i.e. they operate on
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the same model but assists the human when they are unable to plan optimally in it
due to the complexity of the domain or time sensitivity of the task.
B.3.2 RADAR 2.0
So far the planning techniques inside RADAR, as well as the GUI itself, was
specifically designed to deal with a single human decision maker in the loop. A
common feature of most collaborative planning settings is the presence of multiple
human decision makers who are actively involved in the construction of the plan on a
shared graphical user interface (GUI) in “control room” styled environments [227, 321].
For the design of decision support technologies, this raises several unique challenges
such as (1) dealing with diverse points of view, preferences, and goals; (2) diverging
beliefs and mental models; (3) resolution of competing truths and establishment of
common ground; and so on. Some of these issues have been highlighted recently in
[240]. From the perspective of the GUI itself, the presence of multiple decision makers
poses new challenges on how information is presented to the end users, not only in the
way it is displayed, but also the approach to generate that information which drives
the decision support infrastructure in the back-end.
B.3.2.1 What can augmented reality bring to the table?
We argue that augmented reality (AR) brings in capabilities that are uniquely
suited for this purpose. This is because AR can, in effect, provide different versions
of the same interface to the commanders based on their specific needs, while still
preserving the convenience and efficiency of collaboration across a shared GUI. In
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this work, we thus will build on RADAR to support collaborative decision making with
multiple human planners simultaneously. We will, in particular, show how –
- Augmented reality provides an effective medium of augmenting the shared GUI
with private information (as studied in planning literature [49]) – thus the same
plan will appear differently on the shared GUI than in the mixed-reality view
where the private actions will be coupled with the public plan; and
- Augmented reality can reduce irrelevant information on the screen by porting
them into the mixed-reality view. Such situations can occur, for example, when
one user asks for an explanation, which the others may not require and thus
should not appear on the shared GUI and potentially cause cognitive overload.
Finally, we will end with a discussion on the current work in progress and con-
siderations of the trade-offs in AR versus distributed graphical interfaces. We note,
as far as the vitamin versus aspirin question is concerned, AR firmly lies with the
former group – after all, the humans could be equipped with separate personal screens
on top of a shared GUI. However, we argue, and hopefully this is apparent in the
demonstrations as well, that AR provides an attractive solution towards providing
personalized planning interfaces to the human decision makers while still leveraging
the paradigm of a shared collaborative interface of a control room accepted as the
de-facto standard in these settings.
The Fire Fighting Domain Revisited – We will be reusing the Fire Fighting
Domain, introduced in the previous section, for the following discussion but with an
important twist – it now involves two commanders (henceforth referred to as Comm-I
and Comm-II) to come up with a plan or course of action (CoA) which involves
coordination with the police, medical and transport authorities. Each commander
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Figure 49: Multiple commanders involved in the collaborative decision making process
on the RADAR interface. The shared interface (GUI) provides an overview of the
public plan and resources, constraints, etc. pertaining to the planning problem. The
mixed-reality view for each commander augments private information (such as private
action in the plan) or personalized explanations of the plan for the commander.
might have a personalized model of this domain, which (1) may have certain actions
that are private to them, i.e. unknown to the other commanders; and (2) incorrect
ideas about the actual domain, for example, an incorrect action definition (according
to the model of the decision support agent). We assume that these personalized models
(of the two experts) are available to RADAR, which helps it to distinguish between
private and public actions [49]. While RADAR uses a centralized model to help in the
planning process, the response to the users needs to be carefully curated since showing
one user’s private data to another user is problematic. Furthermore, explanations are
inherently user specific (as are information that is being consumed by private actions
only) and should not clutter a shared GUI.
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Figure 50: The mixed-reality interface overlays a personalized view on top of the
shared interface for each commander.
B.3.2.2 The Interface
The user-interface has two distinct parts– the shared interface which both the
commanders can see at the same time and the personal mixed reality interface (see
Figure 50). The shared interface is inspired by the system shown in [403] and consists
of four panels for planning, goal selection, indicating availability of resources, and
displaying the map of the location of fire. Of these, the planning panel provides
functionalities that supports plan validation, completion and suggestion besides all
the basic UI functionality of adding, removing and rearranging actions of a plan under
construction. We provide all the facilities present in the planning panel of the shared
interface to each commander in their personal AR interface that lets them add private
actions, rearrange any action in the plan and use the plan support techniques (see
Figure 51). Furthermore, collaborative decision making is in line with the spirit of
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(a) Comm-I, who is responsible for communi-
cation with the media, has a private action
to contact media as visible only in his POV.
(b) Comm-II, who is in charge of communi-
cating with the medical units, has a private
action to alert the medical chief in the area.
Figure 51: Mixed-reality capture illustrating how the public plan in the shared GUI
can be overlayed with information on private actions (private actions are in red; public
actions are in green) of individual decision makers thereby still allowing the use of a
shared collaborative workspace.
collaborating programming where allowing for a distributed workspace requires a
notion of local and global interfaces where edits made to a plan in the local view is
synced in the global interface (similar to platforms like Github). We achieve this in
RADAR by pushing updates to the shared interface once updates or request for plan
support has been made from a local AR interface.
B.3.2.3 Privacy Preserving Planning
In the first demonstration, we will tackle the issue of private information in the
individual models of the commanders. In [49] authors explored multi-agent planning
scenarios where each agent has a different domain model with individual actions
that can have private preconditions and effects which are not accessible to other
agents. Planning in such scenarios becomes more complex because state-space search
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techniques have to ensure that private state variables of an agent are not exposed to
other agents [47]. As mentioned before, the interface in RADAR follows this notion of
private and public predicates/actions and communicates information (e.g. explanations
and plan suggestions) to the user without revealing private data of another human in
the team. Note that, from the point of view of decision support, the agent itself is
not following planning algorithms as outlined in [49, 47] since the human planners are
in charge of the planning process and they, of course, are not maintaining separate
priority queues in their heads. However, it might be interesting to explore how the
distributed planning paradigm among humans in the presence of private information
can be modeled from the perspective of decision support.
For the purpose of our demonstration (shown in Figure 51), we assume that apart
from the main task of extinguishing the fire, each of the commanders have specific
tasks they need to achieve. Furthermore, only the commander (in charge of a specific
task) and RADAR have the knowledge of these private tasks. In our scenario, while
Comm-I is in charge of handling the communication with the media, which is an
important aspect in the case of disaster response scenario, Comm-II needs to take
care of all communication and deployment of medical help for rescued victims. The
private actions of the two commanders follow (we only provide the action names as
opposed to the full action definition which also have the private predicates) –
Comm-I >>
CONTACT_MEDIA
ADDRESS_MEDIA
Comm-II >>
ALERT_MEDICHIE
ATTEND_CASUALTIES
ISSUE_LOCAL_ALERT
SET_UP_HELPLINE
207
When the commanders ask RADAR to suggest missing actions or complete the plan
in order to achieve the goal of extinguishing the (big) fire, it needs to communicate
most of the private actions mentioned here, but only to the specific commander in
charge of the private task. Showing these on the common user interface would result
in (1) confusion as each commander is oblivious to the private actions of the other
commander and (2) loss of privacy which might be important in complex decision
making scenarios with multiple commanders (e.g. army, navy, etc.).
Thus, in such scenarios, RADAR tries to display these private actions in the aug-
mented view of each commander (highlighted in red in Figure 51). Since each action
in the plan occupies a substantial amount of space in the 3D-view, we show only 10
actions at any point in time. This ensures that the commander does not have to stare
away from the common interface, which can lead to loss of situational awareness as
other commanders might make changes to common elements in that time (e.g. by
updating resources, rearranging or removing public actions, etc.).
B.3.2.4 Multi-Model Explanations
The second demonstration looks at plan explanations for model reconciliation with
multiple humans in the loop, as introduced in Section 3.5 – this requires launching
the PEM with an annotated model capturing the shared information in the models
of all the decision makers. While this provides an explanation that brings all the
agents on to the same page with respect to the current planning problem at hand,
from the point of view of the interface, there still remains the matter of filtering out
superfluous information (due to a single explanation or model update computed for
all the models) as they are being presented to individual users.
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(a) Comm-I, who is unaware of the proce-
dure that a fire-chief needs to be alerted
first before deploying the fire engines, is pro-
vided this explanation to justify the sug-
gested (public part of the) plan.
(b) Comm-II, unaware that a fire-chief needs
to be alerted before deploying any kind of
resources (fire engines or rescuers) from a
fire station, is provided both of these model
updates as explanations.
Figure 52: Mixed-reality capture illustrating how the multi-model explanation gen-
eration algorithm can be used to provide targeted explanations to each commander
based on their models without inundating the other commanders with superfluous or
unsolicited information.
For our demonstration (shown in Figure 52), we assume that the two commanders
have different understanding about the domain used by RADAR. We further assume that
this knowledge about the actual domain is (1) different for the different commanders,
which is often the case in real-world scenarios (as there may be many ways of
being incorrect about the correct procedure) and (2) these explanations are, for the
purpose of this example, limited to updates about public actions. In scenarios where
explanations are about private predicates or private actions of a commander, RADAR ,
with the models of both the commanders, filters out these (private explanations) when
generating explanations for the other commander.
In order to highlight the domain differences, we will first show the part of the
actual model (that RADAR has) about which the commanders have incorrect idea.
(:action deploy_big_engines
:parameters (?a - fire ?from - firestation ?to - pois)
:precondition (and
(alerted ?from)
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(has_big_engines_number ?from)
)
:effect (and
(not (alerted ?from))
...
)
)
(:action deploy_rescuers
:parameters (?a - fire ?from - firestation ?to - pois)
:precondition (and
(alerted ?from)
(has_rescuers_number ?from)
)
:effect (and
...
)
)
We now show the model that Comm-I has, where the precondition for alerting the
authority at a fire-station is missing for deploying the (big) fire engines action –
(:action deploy_big_engines
:parameters (?a - fire ?from - firestation ?to - pois)
:precondition (and
(has_big_engines_number ?from)
)
:effect (and
(not (alerted ?from))
...
)
)
(:action deploy_rescuers
:parameters (?a - fire ?from - firestation ?to - pois)
:precondition (and
(alerted ?from)
(has_rescuers_number ?from)
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):effect (and
...
)
)
For Comm-II, who is completely unaware that fire-stations need to be alerted in
order to deploy fire engines or rescuers, the domain model looks as follows –
(:action deploy_big_engines
:parameters (?a - fire ?from - firestation ?to - pois)
:precondition (and
(has_big_engines_number ?from)
)
:effect (and
(not (alerted ?from))
...
)
)
(:action deploy_rescuers
:parameters (?a - fire ?from - firestation ?to - pois)
:precondition (and
(has_rescuers_number ?from)
)
:effect (and
...
)
)
When the commanders ask RADAR to suggest a plan (or complete a plan) in order
to achieve the goal of extinguishing big fire, it will suggest a plan that has both the
actions of deploying big engines and rescuers. Since both of these actions need to
alert the authority at the fire station, there will be two alert_firechief actions
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which makes the alerted_firechief proposition (which is a precondition of these
two actions in the original domain) true.
In this situation, although both the commanders might be surprised at the suggested
plan and ask for explanations, Comm-I just needs to be told about the missing
precondition of the deploy_big_fire_engine action, whereas, Comm-II, in addition
to that explanation, also needs to be told about the missing precondition of the action
deploy_rescuers. The augmented reality workspace helps us to provide personalized
explanations to both the commanders (see Figure 52).
B.3.2.5 Work in Progress
Currently, we are working on making the mixed-reality display more interactive
and porting more of the utilities in the shared GUI into it. This, of course, raises
interesting challenges from the point of view of intra-team interactions –
- “Hiding” much of the interface, even though not relevant to the team, can cause
inefficiency and friction in the collaborative process. It may well be possible
that revealing too little information as needed can cause lack of situational
awareness while leaving it all out there is likely to cause cognitive overload. As
such, there needs to be a delicate balance between how much of the shared GUI
can be abstracted out into the mixed reality workspace.
- Allowing for a distributed workspace also requires processing of concurrent
requests (for replanning, validation, etc.) which needs to be handled gracefully
at the frontend – e.g. two commanders making concurrent edits on the public
plan in their own mixed-reality spaces needs to be orchestrated effectively.
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B.4 Mr.Jones – A Smart Room Meeting Facilitator
In this section, we report on the visualization capabilities of an Explainable AI
Planning (XAIP) agent that can support human in the loop decision making. Imposing
transparency and explainability requirements on such agents is especially important in
order to establish trust and common ground with the end-to-end automated planning
system. Visualizing the agent’s internal decision making processes is a crucial step
towards achieving this. This may include externalizing the “brain” of the agent –
starting from its sensory inputs, to progressively higher order decisions made by
it in order to drive its planning components. We also show how the planner can
bootstrap on the latest techniques in explainable planning to cast plan visualization
as a plan explanation problem, and thus provide concise model based visualization of
its plans. We demonstrate these functionalities in the context of a smart assistant in
the Cognitive Environments Laboratory at IBM’s T.J. Watson Research Center.
B.4.1 Visualizations for (Explainable) Planning
Recent advancements in the fields of speech, language, and search have led to
ubiquitous personalized assistants like the Amazon Echo, Google Home, Apple Siri,
etc. Even though these assistants have mastered a narrow category of interaction
in specific domains, they mostly operate in passive mode – i.e. they merely respond
via a set of predefined scripts, most of which are written to specification. In order
to evolve towards truly smart assistants, the need for (pro)active collaboration and
decision support capabilities is paramount. Automated planning offers a promising
alternative to this drudgery of repetitive and scripted interaction. The use of planners
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allows automated assistants to be imbued with the complementary capabilities of
being nimble and proactive on the one hand, while still allowing specific knowledge to
be coded in the form of domain models. Additionally, planning algorithms have long
excelled [325, 403] in the presence of humans in the loop for complex collaborative
decision making tasks.
While planners have been previously been adapted to accept various kinds of
inputs from humans, only recently has there been a concerted effort on the other side
of the problem: making the outputs of the planning process more palatable to human
decision makers. The paradigm of eXplainable AI Planning (XAIP) [150] has become
a central theme around which much of this research has coalesced. In this paradigm,
emphasis is laid on the qualities of trust, interaction, and transparency that an AI
system is endowed with. The key contributions to explainability are the resolution
of critical exploratory questions – why did the system do something a particular
way, why did it not do some other thing, why was its decision optimal, and why the
evolving world may force the system to replan.
One of the keys towards achieving an XAIP agent is visualization. The planning
community has recently made a concerted effort to support the visualization of key
components of the end-to-end planning process: from the modeling of domains [57];
to assisting with plan management [211]; and beyond [403, 33]. For an end-to-end
planning system, this becomes even more challenging since the systems state is
determined by information at different levels of abstraction which are being coalesced
in the course of decision making. A recent workshop [152] outlines these challenges in
a call to arms to the community on the topic of visualization and XAIP.
It is in this spirit that we present a set of visualization capabilities for an XAIP
agent that assists with human in the loop decision making tasks: specifically in the
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Figure 53: The different roles of Mr.Jones as a smart room orchestrator and meeting
facilitator in the CEL.
case of this paper, assistance in an instrumented meeting space. We introduce the
end-to-end planning agent, Mr.Jones, and the visualizations that we endow it with.
We then provide fielded demonstrations of the visualizations, and describe the details
that lie under the hood of these capabilities.
B.4.2 Introducing Mr.Jones
Mr.Jones, situated in the CEL – the Cognitive Environments Laboratory – at
IBM’s T.J. Watson Research Center is designed to embody the key properties of a
proactive assistant while fulfilling the properties desired of an XAIP agent. As before,
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the responsibilities of Mr.Jones into two processes – Engage / Interpret, where plan
recognition techniques are used to identify the task in progress; and Orchestrate /
Steer, which involves active participation in the decision-making process via real-time
plan generation, visualization, and monitoring.
ENGAGE / INTERPRET – This consists of Mr.Jones monitoring various inputs
from the world in order to situate itself in the context of the group interaction.
First, the assistant gathers various inputs like speech transcripts, live images, and
the positions of people within a meeting space; these inputs are fed into a higher
level symbolic reasoning component. Using this, the assistant can (1) requisition
resources and services that may be required to support the most likely tasks based on
its recognition; (2) visualize the decision process – this can depict both the agent’s
own internal recognition algorithm, and an external, task-dependent process; and (3)
summarize the group decision-making process.
ORCHESTRATE / STEER – This process is the decision support assistant’s
contribution to the group’s collaboration. This can be done using standard planning
techniques, and can fall under the aegis of one of four actions as shown in Figure 54.
These actions (covered in more in detail in the description of RADAR in Section B.3)
are: (1) execute, where the assistant performs an action or a series of actions related
to the task at hand; (2) critique, where the assistant offers recommendations on
the actions currently in the collaborative decision sequence; (3) suggest, where the
assistant suggests new decisions and actions that can be discussed collaboratively;
and (4) explain, where the assistant explains its rationale for adding or suggesting a
particular decision. The Orchestrate process thus provides the “support” part of the
decision support assistant.
216
Figure 54: Illustration of the building blocks of Mr.Jones – the two main components
Engage and Orchestrate situates the agent proactively in a decision support setting
with human decision makers in the loop. The two main components of the system
are Engage and Orchestrate which situates the agent proactively in a decision support
setting with human decision makers in the loop. It also provides pathways to the
designer for domain acquisition and refinement.
Figure 55: Flow of control in the proposed system. Each service runs in parallel and
asynchronously to maintain anytime response of all the individual components.
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B.4.3 Architecture Design & Key Components
The central component – the Orchestrator (not to be confused with the term
Orchestrate from the previous section, used to describe the phase of active participation)
– regulates the flow of information and control flow across the modules that manage
the various functionalities of the CEL; this is shown in Figure 55. These modules are
mostly asynchronous in nature and may be: (1) services (built on top of the Watson
Conversation and Visual Recognition services on IBM Cloud and other IBM internal
services) processing sensory information from various input devices across different
modalities like audio (microphone arrays), video (PTZ cameras / Kinect), motion
sensors (Myo / Vive) and so on; (2) services handling the different services of CEL;
and (3) services that attach to the Mr.Jones module. The Orchestrator is responsible
for keeping track of the current state of the system as well as coordinating actuation
either in the belief/knowledge space, or in the actual physical space.
The knowledge contained in the system comes from two sources – (1) the developers
and/or users of the service; and (2) the system’s own memory; as illustrated in
Figure 54. One significant barrier towards the adoption of higher level reasoning
capabilities into such systems has been the lack of familiarity of developers and end
users with the inner working of these technologies. With this in mind we provide
an XML-based modeling interface – i.e. a “system config” – where users can easily
configure new environments. This information in turn enables automatic generation
of the files that are internally required by the reasoning engines. Thus system specific
information is bootstrapped into the service specifications written by expert developers,
and this composite knowledge can be seamlessly transferred across task domains and
physical configurations. A sample configuration file is presented in Figure 56.
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Figure 56: A sample configuration file exposed to the end user that is automatically
compiled internally into a domain description in PDDL to be consumed by the planning
components (anonymized for double-blind review).
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The granularity of the information encoded in the models depends on the task
at hand – for example, during the Engage phase, the system uses much higher level
information (e.g. identities of agents in the room, their locations, speech intents, etc.)
than during the Orchestrate phase, where more detailed knowledge is needed. This
enables the system to reason at different levels of abstraction independently, thus
significantly improving the scalability as well as robustness of the recognition engine.
Remark – The PGM and PRM modules are as described before in Section B.1.2.
The PGM reuses the compilation from the PRM to compute plans that preserve the
current (observed) context [358].
B.4.4 Mind of Mr.Jones
The CEL is a smart environment, equipped with various sensors and actuators to
facilitate group decision making. Automated planning techniques, as explained above,
are the core component of the decision support capabilities in this setting. However, the
ability to plan is rendered insufficient if the agent cannot communicate that information
effectively to the humans in the loop. Dialog as a means of interfacing with the human
decision makers often becomes clumsy due to the difficulty of representing information
in natural language, and/or the time taken to communicate. Instead, we aim to
build visual mediums of communication between the planner and the humans for the
following key purposes –
- Trust & Transparency - Externalizing the various pathways involved in the
decision support process is essential to establish trust between the humans and
the machine, as well as to increase situational awareness of the agents. It allows
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the humans to be cognizant of the internal state of the assistant, and to infer
decision rationale, thereby reducing their cognitive burden.
- Summarization of Minutes - The summarization process is a representation
of the beliefs of the agent with regard to what is going on in its space over
the course of an activity. Since the agent already needs to keep track of this
information in order to make its decisions effectively, we can replay or sample
from it to generate an automated visual summary of (the agent’s belief of) the
proceedings in the room.
- Decision Making Process - Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the decision
making process itself needs efficient interfacing with the humans – this can involve
a range of things from showing alternative solutions to a task, to justifying the
reasoning behind its suggestions. This is crucial in a mixed initiative planning
setting [194, 196] to allow for human participation in the planning process, as
well as for the planner’s participation in the humans’ decision making process.
First, we will describe the externalization of the “mind” of Mr.Jones – i.e. the
various processes that feed the different capabilities of the agent. A snapshot of the
interface is presented in Figure 57. The interface itself consists of five widgets. The
largest widget on the top shows the various usecases that the CEL is currently set
up to support. In the current CEL setup, there are nine such usecases. The widget
represents the probability distribution that indicates the confidence of Mr.Jones in the
respective task being the one currently being collaborated on, along with a button for
the provenance of each such belief. The information used as provenance is generated
directly from the plans used internally by the recognition module [360] and justifies
why, given its model of the underlying planning problems, these tasks look likely in
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Figure 57: Snapshot of the mind of Mr.Jones externalizing different stages of its
cognitive processes.
terms of plans that achieve those tasks. Model based algorithms are especially useful in
providing explanations like this [417, 150]. The system is adept at handling uncertainty
in its inputs (it is interesting to note that in coming up with an explanatory plan
it has announced likely assignments to unknown agents in its space). In Figure 57,
Mr.Jones has placed the maximum confidence in the tour usecase.
Below the largest widget is a set of four widgets, each of which give users a peek
into an internal component of Mr.Jones. The first widget, on the top left, presents
a wordcloud representation of Mr.Jones’s belief in each of the tasks; the size of the
word representing that task corresponds to the probability associated with that task.
The second widget, on the top right, shows the agents that are recognized as being
in the environment currently – this information is used by the system to determine
what kind of task is more likely. This information is obtained from four independent
camera feeds that give Mr.Jones an omnispective view of the environment; this
information is represented via snapshots (sampled at 10-20 Hz) in the third widget,
on the bottom left. In the current example, Mr.Jones has recognized Kartik and
Mishal in the environment. Finally, the fourth widget, on the bottom right, represents
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a wordcloud based summarization of the audio transcript of the environment. This
transcript provides a succinct representation of the things that have been said in the
environment in the recent past via the audio channels. Note that this widget is merely
a summarization of the full transcript, which is fed into the IBM Watson Conversation
service to generate observations for the plan recognition module. The interface thus
provides a (constantly updating) snapshot of the various sensory and cognitive organs
associated with Mr.Jones – the eyes, ears, and mind of the CEL. This snapshot is also
organized at increasing levels of abstraction –
[1] Raw Inputs – These show the camera feeds and voice capture (speech to text
outputs) as received by the system. These help in externalizing what information
the system is working with at any point of time and can be used, for example,
in debugging at the input level if the system makes a mistake or in determining
whether it is receiving enough information to make the right decisions. It is
especially useful for an agent like Mr.Jones, which is not embodied in a single
robot or interface but is part of the environment as a whole. As a result of this,
users may find it difficult to attribute specific events and outcomes to the agent.
[2] Lower level reasoning – The next layer deals with the first stage of reasoning
over these raw inputs – What are the topics being talked about? Who are the
agents in the room? Where are they situated? This helps an user identify what
knowledge is being extracted from the input layer and fed into the reasoning
engines. It increases the situational awareness of agents by visually summarizing
the contents of the scene at any point of time.
[3] Higher level reasoning – Finally, the top layer uses information extracted at the
lower levels to reason about abstract tasks in the scene. It visualizes the outcome
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of the plan recognition process, along with the provenance of the information
extracted from the lower levels (agents in the scene, their positions, speech
intents, etc.). This layer puts into context the agent’s current understanding of
the processes in the scene.
Demonstration 1 – We now demonstrate how the Engage process evolves as
agents interact in the CEL. The demonstration begins with two humans discussing
the CEL environment, followed by one agent describing a projection of the Mind
of Mr.Jones on the screen. The other agent then discusses how a Mergers and
Acquisitions (M&A) task [231] is carried out. A video of this demonstration can be
accessed at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZEHxCKodEGs. The video contains
a window that demonstrates the evolution of the Mr.Jones interface through the
duration of the interaction. This window illustrates how Mr.Jones’s beliefs evolve
dynamically in response to interactions in real-time.
Demonstration 2 – After a particular interaction is complete Mr.Jones can
automatically compile a summarization (or minutes) of the meeting by sampling from
the visualization of its beliefs. An anonymized video of a typical summary can be
accessed at https:// youtu.be/AvNRgsvuVOo. This kind of visual summary provides
a powerful alternative to established meeting summarization tools like text-based
minutes. The visual summary can also be used to extract abstract insights about this
one meeting, or a set of similar meetings together and allows for agents that may
have missed the meeting to catch up on the proceedings. Whilst merely sampling the
visualization at discrete time-intervals serves as a powerful tool towards automated
summary generation, we anticipate the use of more sophisticated visualization [130]
and summarization [407, 238, 241] techniques in the future.
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Figure 58: A live demonstration of Mr.Jones can be viewed at https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=ZEHxCKodEGs.
Remark – Previous work on such assistive agents has included both purely software
agents [474] as well as ones that co-inhabit physical spaces with humans [140] and
use their understanding of what is happening in those spaces to act as collaborators
on cognitive tasks such as decision making. CELIA – the Cognitive Environments
Laboratory Interactive Agent – is an early prototype of such an agent in an embodied
environment called the CEL [231]. While CELIA in its present form has been used for
hundreds of customer engagements and decision-intensive settings [321], by and large
the style of interaction has been command-response; i.e. users address CELIA directly
by name and issue very specific instructions and goals. Since CELIA does not currently
have the capability to understand the context of an interaction, it is difficult for
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it to be proactive. It is primarily to address this gap that we developed Mr.Jones
as a proactive support agent which can make human-agent interactions much more
immersive and natural by adding proactive capabilities to assist decision-making.
B.4.5 Model-Based Plan Visualization : Fresco
In this section we cover details of Fresco which deals with the visualization of an
individual plan – this may appear in the course of explanations (which take the form
of likely plans) of the PRM as illustrated in the previous section, or in visualizing
a plan that is offered as a recommendation during the ORCHESTRATE / STEER
process. We start by describing the planning domain that is used in the rest of this
section, followed by a description of Fresco’s different capabilities in terms of top-K
plan visualization and model-based plan visualization. We conclude by describing the
implementation details on the back-end.
The Collective Decision-Making Domain – We use a variant of the Mergers and
Acquisitions (M&A) task [321] called Collective Decision Making (CDM). The CDM
domain models the process of gathering input from a decision makers in a smart
room, and the orchestration of comparing alternatives, eliciting preferences, and finally
ranking of the possible options.
B.4.5.1 Top-K Visualization
Most of the automated planning technology and literature considers the problem
of generating a single plan. Recently, however, the paradigm of Top-K planning [371]
has gained traction. Top-K plans are particularly useful in domains where producing
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(a) Top-K plan visualization showing alternative solutions for a CPP. (b) Action
Figure 59: Visualization of plans in Fresco showing top-K solutions (K=3) for a
given planing problem (left) and on-demand visualization of each action in the plan
(zoomed-in; right) in terms of causal links consumed and produced by it.
Figure 60: Visualization as a process of explanation – minimized view of conditions
relevant to a plan. Blue, green and red nodes indicate preconditions, add and delete
effects respectively. The conditions which are not necessary causes for this plan (i.e.
the plan is still optimal in a domain without these conditions) are grayed out in the
visualization (11 out of a total 30).
and deliberating on multiple alternative plans that go from the same fixed initial state
and the same fixed goal is important. Many decision support scenarios, including
the one described above, are of this nature. Moreover, Top-K plans can also help in
realizing unspecified user preferences, which may be very hard to model explicitly. By
presenting the user(s) with multiple alternatives, an implicit preference elicitation can
instead be performed. The Fresco interface supports visualization of the K top plans
for a given problem instance and domain model, as shown in Figure 59a. In order to
generate the Top-K plans, we use the latest Top-K planner [305] that is built on top
of the Fast Downward [183] platform.
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(a) Architecture diagram of Fresco. (b) Software stack
Figure 61: Illustration of the flow of control (left) in Fresco between the plan
generator (FD), explanation generator (MMP), and plan validator (VAL) with the
visualization modules. The MMP code base is in the process of being fully integrated
into Fresco, and it is currently run as a stand-alone component. The software stack
(right) shows the infrastructure supporting Fresco in the backend.
B.4.5.2 Visualization as a process of Explanation
The requirements for visualization of plans can have different semantics depending
on the task at hand – e.g. showing the search process that produced the plan, and
the decisions taken (among possible alternative solutions) and trade-offs made (by
the underlying heuristics) in that process; or revealing the underlying domain or
knowledge base that engendered the plan. The former involves visualizing the how of
plan synthesis, while the latter focuses on the why, and is model-based and algorithm
independent. Visualizing the how is useful to the developer of the system during
debugging, but serves little purpose for the end user who would rather be told the
rationale behind the plan: why is this plan better than others, what individual actions
contribute to the plan, what information is getting consumed at each step, and so on.
Unfortunately, much of the visualization work in the planning community has been
confined to depicting the search process alone [448, 449, 278]. Fresco, on the other
hand, aims to focus on the why of a plan’s genesis, in the interests of establishing
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common ground with human decision-makers. At first glance, this might seems like
an easy problem – we could just show what the preconditions and effects are for each
action along with the causal links in the plan. However, even for moderately sized
domains, this turns into a clumsy and cluttered approach very soon, given the large
number of conditions to be displayed.
We begin by noting that the process of visualization can in fact be seen as a
process of explanation. In model-based visualization, as described above, the system
is essentially trying to explain to the viewer the salient parts of its knowledge that
contributed to this plan. In doing so, it is externalizing what each action is contributing
to the plan, as well as outlining why this action is better that other possible alternatives.
As mentioned before, exposing the entire model to the user is likely to lead to cognitive
overload and lack of situational awareness due to the amount of information that
is not relevant to the plan in question. We want to minimize the clutter in the
visualization and yet maintain all relevant information pertaining to the plan. We
do this by launching an instantiation of the PEM with the planner’s model and an
empty model as inputs. An empty model is a copy of the given model where actions
do not have any conditions and the initial state is empty (the goal is still preserved).
Following from the above discussion, the output of this process is then the minimal
set of conditions in the original model that ensure optimality of the given plan. In the
visualization, the rest of the conditions from the domain are grayed out. Chapter 3
showed how this can lead to a significant pruning of conditions that do not contribute
to the generation of a particular plan. An instance of this process on the CDM domain
is illustrated in Figure 60 where 11 of the 30 conditions in the actions in a particular
plan got removed by the PEM.
Note that the above may not be the only way to minimize information being
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displayed. There might be different kinds of information that the user cares about,
depending on their preferences. This is also highlighted by the fact that an MCE is
not unique for a given problem, as we have discussed previously in Chapter 3. These
preferences can be learned in the course of interactions.
B.4.5.3 Architecture of Fresco
The architecture of Fresco, shown in Figure 61a, includes several core modules
such as the parser, planner, resolver, and visualizer. These modules are all connected
in a feed-forward fashion. The parser module is responsible for converting domain
models and problem instances into python objects, and for validating them using
VAL [198]. Those objects are then passed on to the PGM and PEM to generate a plan
along with its explanation. The resolver module consumes the plan, the explanation,
and the domain information to not only ground the plan, but also to remove any
preconditions, add, or delete effects that are deemed irrelevant by the MMP module.
Finally, the visualizer module takes the plan from the resolver module as an input, and
builds graphics that can be rendered within any well-known web browser. Our focus in
designing the architecture was on making it functionally modular and configurable, as
shown in Figure 61b. While the first three modules described above are implemented
using Python, the visualizer module is implemented using JavaScript and the D3
graphics library. Our application stack uses REST protocols to communicate between
the visualizer module and the rest of the architecture. We also accounted for scalability
and reliability concerns by containerizing the application with Kubernetes, in addition
to building individual containers / virtual machines for the PEM, PGM and PVM.
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B.4.6 Work in Progress
Eventually, our vision – not restricted to any one planning tool or technology – is to
integrate the capabilities of Fresco into a domain-independent planning tool such as
planning.domains [316], which will enable the use of these visualization components
across various application domains. planning.domains realizes the long-awaited
planner-as-a-service paradigm for end users, but is yet to incorporate any visualization
techniques for the user. Model-based visualization from Fresco, complemented
with search visualizations from emerging techniques like WebPlanner [278], can be a
powerful addition to the service.
231
B.5 AI-MIX – A Tour Guide using Crowd Planning
One subclass of human computation applications are those directed at tasks that
involve planning (e.g. tour planning) and scheduling (e.g. conference scheduling).
Interestingly, work on these systems shows that even primitive forms of automated
oversight on the human contributors helps in significantly improving the effectiveness
of the humans/crowd. In this section, we argue that the automated oversight used
in these systems can be viewed as a primitive automated planner, and that there
are several opportunities for more sophisticated automated planning in effectively
steering crowdsourced planning. Straightforward adaptation of current planning
technology is however hampered by the mismatch between the capabilities of human
workers and automated planners. We show how the proposed system overcomes
this through the process of: (i) interpreting inputs of the human workers (and the
requester) and (ii) steering or critiquing plans produced by the human workers, armed
only with incomplete domain and preference models. To these ends, we describe the
implementation of AI-MIX, a plan generation system that uses automated checks and
alerts to improve the quality of plans created by human workers.
B.5.1 Introduction
Human computation [266] is emerging as one of the fastest growing fields to
solve computationally hard problems because it offers a powerful and inexpensive
alternative that helps combine the relative strengths of humans and computers. This
field is attracting more attention from different research communities as interesting
connections between them and human computation are being revealed [112, 113, 216,
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275]. In solving computationally hard problems from different fields – especially
those that require input from humans, or for which the complete model is not known
– human computation has emerged as a powerful and inexpensive approach. One
such core class of problems is planning. Several recent efforts have started looking at
crowd-sourced planning tasks [267, 499, 498, 263] which attempt to optimize workflows
used in crowdsourcing [218, 111], learning and planning to guide the best use of people
and machines in hierarchical tasks [217], etc. Just as in a formal organization, the
quality of the resulting plan depends on effective leadership. We observe that in most
of these existing systems, workers are steered by primitive automated components that
merely enforce checks and ensure satisfaction of simple constraints. Encouragingly,
experiments show that even these primitive automated components improve plan
quality, for little to no investment in terms of cost and time [499].
This begs the obvious question: is it possible to improve the effectiveness of
crowdsourced planning even further by using more sophisticated automated planning
technologies? It is reasonable to expect that a more sophisticated automated planner
can do a much better job of steering the crowd (much as good human managers “steer”
their employees more effectively). Indeed, work such as [267] and [499] is replete
with hopeful references to the automated planning literature. There exists a vibrant
body of literature on automated plan generation, and automated planners have long
tolerated humans in their decision cycle – be it mixed initiative planning [144] or
planning for teaming [438]. The context of crowdsourced planning scenarios, however,
introduces a reversed mixed initiative planning problem – the planner must act as a
guide to the humans, who are doing the actual planning. The humans in question can
be either experts who have a stake in the plan that is eventually created, or crowd
workers demonstrating collective intelligence.
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In this paper, we present AI-MIX (Automated Improvement of Mixed Initiative
eXperiences), a system that implements a general architecture for human computation
systems aimed at planning and scheduling tasks. AI-MIX foregrounds the types of
roles an automated planner can play in such systems, and the challenges involved in
facilitating those roles, which include:
Interpretation: Understanding the requester’s goals as well as the crowd’s plans
from semi-structured or unstructured natural language input.
Steering with Incompleteness: Guiding the collaborative plan generation process
with the use of incomplete models of the scenario dynamics and preferences.
The interpretation challenge arises because human workers find it most convenient
to exchange or refine plans expressed in a representation as close to natural language
as possible, while automated planners typically operate on more structured plans
and actions. The challenges in steering are motivated by the fact that an automated
planner operating in a crowdsourced planning scenario cannot be expected to have a
complete model of the domain and the requester preferences; if it does, then there is
little need or justification for using human workers as it can automatically generate
the best plan that meets requester preferences and also knows which type of plan
to generate. Both of these challenges are further complicated by the fact that the
(implicit) models used by the human workers and the automated planner are very
likely to differ in many ways, making it challenging for the planner to critique the
plans being developed by the human workers.
In the following discussion, we first provide a brief survey on the existing crowd-
sourced planning systems and how they are related to the current system proposed in
this paper. We then look at planning for crowdsourced planning in more detail, and
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Figure 62: A generalized architecture for crowdsourced planning systems that includes
Requester, Crowd, Distributed Blackboard (DBb) and Planner.
present a generalized architecture for this task. Next, we consider the roles that an
automated planner can play within such an architecture, and discuss the challenges
that need to be tackled in order to facilitate those roles. We then describe the AI-MIX
system, and the types of planning support it provides to the crowd workers. We then
present an empirical study aimed at understanding the impact of automated planning
support on the effectiveness of crowd-sourced planning. Accordingly, our general
strategy involves comparing the relative performance of different versions of AI-MIX
with increasing levels of planning support. Our results show that increased planning
support that goes beyond simple constraint checking (as used in earlier systems) does
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indeed result in improved performance of crowd planning. Thus the summary of our
contributions are as follows –
1. We address the interpretation challenge as follows:
- Our system leverages established natural language processing techniques
to automatically detect the type and context of actions described in the
crowd suggestions.
2. We address the steering challenge as follows:
- The system provides planning support by automatically extracting subgoals.
- It automatically performs constraint checking on duration and cost.
- It lets crowd workers to critique the existing plan actions.
- When no other sub goals can be extracted and all the constraints have been
satisfied, the system generates an automated plan or schedule to reflect the
crowd suggestions.
B.5.2 Related Work
Research in planning and crowd-sourcing intersect paths in three different ways:
(i) to use the crowd to do planning tasks (ii) to use the crowd to provide planning
knowledge, to be used by an automated planner, and (iii) to use the planning technology
to manage the crowd and their activities (e.g. monitor the crowd quality, allocate
Human Intelligent Tasks (HITs)13, optimize the workflow etc) . Of these, the first
direction is the one most relevant to this paper–as our focus is on using automated
planning technology as a “force multiplier” to help the crowd workers engaged in
13Human Intelligence Task (HIT) is the individual task that the turkers work on.
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planning tasks. Accordingly, we start this section with a comprehensive account of
related work in that direction.
A number of other implemented human computation systems that use automated
technology to assist with and improve the quality of tasks other than planning are
listed in a wide-ranging survey [353] of the field. Our paper focuses solely on the
crowd-planning aspect, rather than the gamut of general human-computation tasks.
Both the challenges of interpreting the crowd’s plan and the challenge of steering it
can have primitive solutions (e.g. force structure and critique the plan in terms of
lower level consistency checks), and more ambitious solutions (e.g. interpret structure
by extracting actions and plans from text, and evaluate the extracted plan in terms of
the planning model to provide constructive extensions or alternatives for the crowd’s
consideration). Most existing work uses the primitive solutions for interpretation and
steering. Their success argues for the exploration of more ambitious solutions to these
problems. A few systems have attempted to solve some version of the crowdsourced
planning problem. All of these systems can be seen as special cases of the general
architecture described in the latter section of this paper. We describe these approaches
that rely on automated systems to improve the synthesis of crowd-plans and the
quality of those plans.
Mobi [499] takes a planning mission that consists of both preferences and constraints
as input from a requester, and generates a plan or itinerary by allowing workers in the
crowd to plan in a shared manner. Constraints are limited to two types: qualitative;
and quantitative that may be specified either over the amount of time to be spent on
activities in each category, or on the number of such activities. They show that: (i)
for the same amount of money spent on human workers, a system with automated
alerts tends to come up with higher quality plans; and (ii) the automated alerts tend
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to spur the plan towards breaching a set plan quality threshold in far fewer steps
than a system without them. Another system proposed in [267] – which introduces
CrowdPlan, a collaborative planning algorithm, takes as input a high-level mission
from the user and provides web-based resources for accomplishing that mission. To
facilitate this, CrowdPlan uses human workers to decompose the high-level mission
into goals (like “stop smoking”, “eat healthier food”). Although the decomposition
process has similarities to HTN planning [327], CrowdPlan itself doesn’t have any
automated planning component overseeing the human workers.
On the other hand, there are systems like CrowdPlanr [275] that focus more
on sequencing the steps in a plan once the actions themselves have been selected.
CrowdPlanr takes a given set of actions, determines the least number of questions (and
what those questions are) to ask the crowd of workers to achieve a plan of acceptable
quality. The model consists of both the constraints specified by the requester as well
as the crowd’s knowledge. It is quite likely that the quality of plans produced by such
a system would be sensitive to the familiarity of the workers with the task at hand.
The Cobi [498] system employs the same basic idea – that the crowd assisting with
the planning already has a built-in model of preferences and constraints. Cobi sought
to “communitysource” the scheduling of a large-scale conference (CHI 2013) by taking
input from organizers, as well as authors and attendees in order to come up with
a schedule (plan) of good quality, that violates a fewer number of constraints while
being feasible. The collection of constraints, and the grouping of papers into areas
of expertise for the clustering, may be seen as Cobi’s model. The automated system
thus uses this model in order to resolve as many of the constraints as possible, and
come up with a conference schedule which is both satisfactory, and more importantly
transparently collaborative.
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The system proposed (but not yet implemented) by [263] is the closest in spirit and
idea to applying automated planning methods on a distributed interaction platform
to aid crowdsourced planning. That system allows workers to decompose tasks and
interact by posting constraints and further sub-tasks to the problem of planning a trip.
The automated system enables collaboration amongst the workers and the requester,
and also extracts additional information from their input (restricted to a structured
form) in order to update the model.
The role played by automated planning in crowdsourced planning problems has
interesting connections to the role of planners in mixed-initiative planning [144] and
human-in-the-loop planning [225]. As we mentioned before, mixed-initiative planning
work involved humans entering the land of planners; while crowdsourced planning
requires the planner to enter the land of humans. For example, in mixed-initiative
planning, the “interpretation” problem is punted away by expecting the human in
the loop to interact with the plan on the planner’s terms; this will certainly not
work in crowdsourced planning. Further, in most mixed-initiative scenarios, the
planner is expected to have a complete model of the planning problem – which is
rarely the case in crowdsourced planning. Instead, the planner must deal with the
model-lite [219] spectrum, where models may range from simple feasibility constraints,
through incomplete theories of the task domain and, very rarely, preferences specified
in a standardized format. Planning techniques that have so far expected input in
standard forms must also change to take this model-lite spectrum into account.
We will end this section with a brief discussion of the other two intersections
between planning and crowdsourcing. The approach described in [511] is an example
of using the crowd to acquire planning knowledge (domain operators, initial state
information etc.), which can then be used by an automated planner. In [511], they
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acquire formal domain action descriptions through a combination of crowd-sourced
knowledge, and prior planning traces. Our work, in contrast, focuses on using planning
technology to complement the crowd workers engaged in planning tasks.
There are several research efforts that use planning and scheduling techniques to
manage the crowd, regardless of the specific task being supported by the crowd-sourced
system. The work proposed in [113] is an example of the strand of research where
planning techniques are used to manage the crowd resources. The TurKontrol project,
which is an end-to-end system that dynamically optimizes live crowdsourcing tasks,
and deals with the problem of assigning HITs to both improving the quality of a
solution, as well as checking the current quality. This work also concentrates on
optimizing iterative, crowdsourced workflows by learning the model parameters [484]
from real Mechanical Turk data, and modeling worker and his accuracy (for quality
improvement) [217] and voting patterns and incentives [287] (to check the quality of
work done). Such systems are independent of the actual task at hand – whether that
be text improvement or human intelligence to produce plans – and focus more on
worker-independent parameters to assign improvement and voting jobs instead.
B.5.3 Planning for Crowdsourced Planning
The crowdsourced planning problem involves constructing a plan from a set of
activities suggested by the crowd as a solution to a task, usually specified by a user
called the requester. The requester provides a high-level description of the task -
most often in natural language - which is then forwarded to the crowd workers (or
turkers in this paper we use these terms interchangeably). The turkers can perform
various roles, including breaking down the high-level task description into more formal
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and achievable sub-goals [267], or adding actions into the plan that support those
sub-goals [499]. The term planner is used to refer to the automated component of the
system - it performs various tasks ranging from constraint checking, to optimization
and scheduling, and action recognition. The entire planning process must itself be
iterative, proceeding in several rounds which serve to refine the goals, preferences
and constraints further until a satisfactory plan is found. A general architecture for
solving a crowdsourced planning problem is shown in Figure 62.
B.5.3.1 Roles of the planner
The planning module, or the automated component of the system, can provide
varying levels of support. It accepts both the sub-goals SG, and crowd’s plan PC ,
as input from the turkers. This module analyzes the current plan generated by the
crowd, as well as the sub-goals, and determines constraint and precondition violations
according to the model MP of the task that it has. The planner’s job is to steer the
crowd towards more effective plan generation.
However, the three main actors – turkers, requester, and planner – need a common
space in which to interact and exchange information. This is achieved through a
common interactive space – the Distributed Blackboard (DBb) – as shown in Figure 62.
The DBb acts as a collaborative space where information related to the task as well
as the plan that is currently being generated is stored, and exchanged between the
various system components.
In contrast to the turkers, the planner cannot hope for very complex, task-specific
models, mostly due to the difficulty of creating such models. Instead, a planner’s
strong-suit is to automate and speed-up the checking of plans against whatever
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knowledge it does have. The planner’s model MP can thus be considered shallow
with respect to preferences, but may range the spectrum from shallow to deep where
domain physics and constraints are concerned [513]. The planning process itself
continues until one of the following conditions (or a combination thereof) is satisfied:
• The crowd plan PC reaches some satisfactory threshold and the requester’s
original goal G is fulfilled; this is a subjective measure and is usually determined
with intervention from the requester.
• There are no more outstanding alerts, and all the sub-goals in SG are supported
by one (or more) actions in PC .
In the current system’s architecture (depicted in the Figure 62), a planner (auto-
mated system) would interact with the rest of the system to perform one of two tasks:
(1) interpretation and (2) steering. Interpretation is required for the planner to
inform itself about what the crowd is doing; steering is required for the planner to tell
the crowd what they should be doing.
B.5.3.2 Interpretation of the Crowd’s Evolving Plan
The planner must interpret the information that comes from the requester, and
from the crowd, in order to act on that information. There are two ways in which the
planner can approach this problem.
Force Structure – The system can enforce a pre-determined structure on the input
from both the requester, and the crowd. This can by itself be seen as part of the
model MP , since the planner has a clear idea about what kind of information can
be expected through what channels. The obvious disadvantage is that this reduces
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flexibility for the turkers. In a given planning scenario (we consider tour planning
as our main application domain that we explain in Section. B.5.4), for example, we
might force the requester to number his/her goals, and force the turkers to explicitly
state which goals their proposed plan aims to handle (c.f. [499]). The turkers could
also be required to add other structured attributes to their plans such as the duration
and cost of various activities (actions) that are part of the plan.
Extract Structure – The planner can also extract structure from the turker inputs
to look for specific action descriptions that are part of the planner’s model MP , in
order to understand what aims a specific plan is looking to achieve. Although this
problem has connections to plan recognition [362], it is significantly harder as it needs
to recognize plans not from actions, but rather textual descriptions. Thus it can
involve first recognizing actions and their ordering from text, and then recognizing
plans in terms of those actions. Unlike traditional plan recognition that starts from
observed plan traces in terms of actions or actions and states, the interpretation
involves first extracting the plan traces. Such recognition is further complicated by
the impedance mismatch between the (implicit) planning models used by the human
workers, and the model available to the planner.
Our system uses both the techniques described above to gather relevant information
from the requester and the turkers. The requester provides structured input that
lists their constraints as well as goals (and optionally cost and duration constraints),
and can also provide a free unstructured text description for the task. The turkers
in turn also provide semi-structured data - they are given fields for activity title,
description, cost and duration. The turkers can also enter free text descriptions of their
suggestions; the system can then automatically extract relevant actions by natural
language processing methods to match the input against the planner’s model MP .
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B.5.3.3 Steering the Crowd’s Plan
The planner can steer the turkers by offering helpful suggestions, alerts, and
perhaps even its own plan. There are two main kinds of feedback an automated
planner can provide to the human workers:
Constraint Checking – One of the simplest ways of generating helpful suggestions
for the crowd is to check for quantitative constraints imposed by the requester that
are violated in the suggested activities. In terms of the tour planning scenario, this
includes: (i) cost of a particular activity; and (ii) the approximate duration of an
activity. If the requester provides any such preferences, our system is able to check if
they are satisfied by the crowd’s inputs.
Constructive Critiques – Once the planner has some knowledge about the plan
that the turkers are trying to propose (using the extraction and recognition methods
described above), it can also try to actively help the creation and refinement of that
plan by offering suggestions as part of the alerts. These suggestions can vary depending
on the depth of the planner’s model. Some examples include: (i) simple notifications
of constraint violations, as outlined previously; (ii) plan critiques (such as suggestions
on the order of actions in the plan and even what actions must be present); (iii) new
plans or plan fragments because they satisfy the requester’s stated preferences or
constraints better; (iv) new ways of decomposing the current plan [327]; and (v) new
ways of decomposing the set of goals SG.
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Figure 63: The AI-MIX interface showing the distributed blackboard through which
the crowd interacts with the system.
B.5.4 AI-MIXArchitecture
We now describe in detail the AI-MIX system that was deployed on Amazon’s
MTurk platform to engage the turkers in a tour planning task. The system is similar to
Mobi [499] in terms of the types of inputs it can handle and the constraint and quantity
checks that it can provide (we discuss this further in Section B.5.8.1). However, instead
of using structured input, which severely restricts the turkers and limits the scope of
their contributions, our system is able to parse natural language from user inputs and
reference it against relevant actions in a domain model. This enables more meaningful
feedback and helps provide a more comprehensive tour description.
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B.5.4.1 Requester Input
The task description, as shown in Figure 63, is provided by the requester in the
form of a brief description of their preferences, followed by a list of activities they
want to execute as part of the tour, each accompanied by a suitable hashtag. For
example, the requester might include one dinner activity and associate it with the
tag #dinner. These tags are used internally by the system to map turker suggestions
to specific tasks. The upper half of Figure 63 shows an example of a requester task,
which includes a block of text for the turkers to extract context from, and structured
task requests associated with hashtags.
B.5.4.2 Interface for Turkers
In addition to the task description, the AI-MIX interface also contains a section
that lists instructions for successfully submitting a Human Intelligence Task (HIT) on
Amazon MTurk. HIT is the individual task that the turkers work on, in this context
consisting of either adding an action or a critique, as discussed in more detail later.
The remaining components, arranged by their labels in the figure, are:
1. Requester Specification: This is the list of requests and to-do items that
are yet to be satisfied. All the unsatisfied constituents of this box are initially
colored red. When a tag receives the required number of supporting activities,
it turns from red to green. Tags that originated from the requester are classified
as top-level tags, and are always visible. Tags that are added by the automated
planner or by turkers are classified as lower priority, and disappear once they
are satisfied by a supporting activity.
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2. Turker Inputs: Turkers can choose to input one of two kinds of suggestions:
(i) a new action to satisfy an existing to-do item; or (ii) a critique of an existing
plan activity (action).
3. Turker Responses: The “Existing Activities” box displays a full list of the
current activities that are part of the plan. New turkers may look at the contents
of this box in order to establish the current state of the plan. This component
corresponds to the Distributed Blackboard mentioned in Section B.5.3.1.
4. Planner Critiques: The to-do items include automated critiques of the cur-
rent plan that are produced by the planner. In the example shown, “broad-
wayshow_showing” is a planner generated to-do item that is added in order to
improve the quality of the turkers’ plan.
Finally, the right hand portion of the interface includes a map, which can be used
by Turkers to find nearby points of interest, infer routes of travel or the feasibility of
existing suggestions, or even discover new activities that may satisfy some outstanding
tags. Turkers have two choices in terms of the kinds of responses (HITs) that they
can provide: (i) they may add a new activity in response to one of the to-do tags; or
(ii) they may enter a critique to point out flaws in one of the existing activities.
B.5.4.3 Activity Adddition
The “Add Activity” form is shown in Figure 64. Turkers may choose to add as
many new activities as they like. Each new activity is associated with one of the
to-do tags. Turkers also have the option to propose new tags (new missing goals) for
their novel suggestions. After each activity is submitted, a quantitative analysis is
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Figure 64: Adding and critiquing activities (plan actions) in the AI-MIX system.
performed where the activity is (i) checked for possible constraint (duration or cost)
violations; and (ii) critiqued the planner.
B.5.5 Interpretation: Action Extraction
To facilitate the extraction of meaning from the turker generated activities, the
system performs parts of speech (PoS) tagging on the activities to identify the name
of the activity as well as the places that turkers are referring to; currently, we assign
the verb and noun parts of the tagger’s output to these respectively. We used the
Stanford Log-Linear Part-of-Speech tagger [459] for this purpose.
B.5.6 Steering: Planning Support
We experimented with different levels of automated planning support for crowd
workers. In addition to simple constraint checking (of the type done in systems like
Mobi [499], we use a primitive PDDL description of general activities that may be used
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in a tour-planning applications – this description corresponds to the planner model
MP introduced previously. Examples of actions in MP include high level activities
such as visit, lunch, shop etc. As discussed next, this PDDL model is used to
provide helpful subgoal generation suggestions, as well as to do more sophisticated
aggregation of crowd suggestions into a globablly consistent plan/schedule.
B.5.6.1 Subgoal Generation
AI-MIX uses the same tags used by turkers while inputting activities in order to
determine whether the planner has additional subgoal annotations on that activity.
Each activity is associated with a list of synonyms, which help the planner in identifying
similar activities. Currently, we generate these synonyms manually, but it is trivial
to automate this via the use of resources such as WordNet [306]. Each action also
comes with some generic preconditions. When the planner determines that a turker
generated activity matches one of the actions from its model, it generates sub-goals
to be added as to-do items back in the interface based on the preconditions of that
action. An example action description (for the “visit” action) is given below:
(:action visit ;; synonyms: goto, explore
:parameters (?p - place)
:precondition (at ?p) ;; Getting to ?p,
;; Entrance fee ?p, ;; Visiting hours ?p
:effect (visited ?p))
In the example given above, the planner would pop up the three preconditions –
Getting to, Entrance fee, and Visiting hours – as to-do sub-goals for any visit
actions suggested by turkers. The system also provides some helpful text on what is
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expected as a resolution to that to-do item – this is indicated by the yellow “planner
critique” box in Figure 63.
B.5.6.2 Constraint Checking
In addition to generating sub-goals for existing activities, our system also auto-
matically checks if constraints on duration and cost that are given by the requester
are being met by the crowd’s plan. If these constraints are violated, then the violation
is automatically added to the to-do stream of the interface, along with a description
of the constraint that was violated. Turkers can then choose to add an action that
resolves this to-do item using the normal procedure.
B.5.6.3 Adding Turker Critiques
The Turkers can also add critiques of the actions in the existing plan. To do this,
they use the form shown in the lower half of Figure 64. The Turkers click on an
existing activity, and enter the note or critique in a text box provided. Additionally,
they are also asked to enter a child tag, which will be used to keep track of whether
an action has been added to the plan that resolves this issue. Turkers were free to
add as many critiques as they want.
B.5.7 Automated Plan/Schedule Generation
Finally, we compute a consolidated plan for the requester by translating the
plan suggestions provided by the crowd into the semantics of logic programming.
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We compile the suggestions into an Answer Set Program (ASP), which acts as a
declarative planner that identifies the answer sets or stable models (or plans) that
satisfy the preferences and constraints imposed by both the crowd and the knowledge
base. Figure 65 shows how the requester provides a set of incomplete preferences, the
crowd responds with activities or additional constraints, all of which are compiled
into an existing knowledge base which is then used to produce a logic program to
compute satisfying plans as answer sets when all the constraints has been satisified.
The Tour Planning Domain is initialized with some basic knowledge base to start
with and the assumptions on some generic actions in the domain. For example, each
problem is instantiated with primitive actions like breakfast, lunch and dinner. These
are then associated with time ranges when these activities usually take place as given
by rules B.2 and B.3. More actions involved specifically with tourism (like a visit
museum action and museum timings) can be added similarly.
action(lunch;dinner;breakfast). (B.1)
← activity(dinner,T,X) & T<18. (B.2)
← activity(dinner,T,X) & T>22. (B.3)
activity(dinner,T1,1):time(T1). (B.4)
These actions are first initialized with choice rules such that any action can happen
in any time. Then each action is bound with the following (fairly intuitive) domain
independent rules –
• no concurrence: no two actions can occur at the same time, given by rule B.5.
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• existence: it is maintained that at least one instance of each action requested
for is there in the final schedule, given by rule B.6.
• uniqueness : one action occurs at one unique place over all the time points it is
true - rule B.7.
• contiguity : the same action must be true for contiguous periods of time, given
by rule B.8.
?[T,X]: activity(breakfast,T,X). (B.5)
← activity(A,T,X) & activity(AA,T,XX) & A!=AA. (B.6)
← activity(A,T,X) & activity(A,TT,XX) & X!=XX. (B.7)
activity(museum,TTT,X)← activity(museum,T,X) &
activity(museum,TT,X) & TTT>T & TTT<TT.
(B.8)
These rules are added to the program every time the crowd enters a new suggestion.
The crowd can impose further rules for their suggestions, like time B.9 or durations B.10
or even orderings B.11 which are all compiled into logic rules as shown. Specifically B.9
says that the coffee activity, if it exists, should occur at 10 O’clock, while B.10 specifies
that the museum visit should last one hour, and B.11 stipulates an ordering that the
coffee activity should happen before 10 O’clock.
activity(coffee,10,1) ← ?[T]: activity(coffee,T,1). (B.9)
1{activity(museum,T1,1):time(T1)}1 ←
?[T]: activity(museum,T,1).
(B.10)
← activity(coffee,T,1) & T<10. (B.11)
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In our system, the types of actions that already exist in the knowledge base, or
are subsequently added by the crowd, are identified by the unique hashtags used in
the plan recommendations. The forms through which the crowd interacts has both
structured and unstructured parts to harness the best abilities of both the crowd
and the automated component. The unstructured free form text input gives free
description that is available back to the crowd to reason with, while the structured
fields are used to build the constraints in clingo. Specifically the activity tag is used
as the domain predicate (the crowd may suggest entirely new activities out-side the
specifications, which go on to enrich the domain model), and the location is added
to the points of interest associated with this action. The rest of the fields (time,
duration, cost) are optional, which when entered adds the appropriate rules in the
asp compilation. Notice how most of these constraints are not binding (in the sense
one rule can overwrite another). This is necessary due to the iterative nature of the
crowd-planning process, and thus most of the fields are optional, or these constraints
themselves have precedences. This is the reason for the somewhat unconventional
styling of some of the rules, as opposed to the case if we were solving a one-time
specified problem. Cost does not contribute to the schedule and is hence ignored in
setting up the constraints.
We used f2lp 14 as a grounder and solver for this logic program to compute stable
models or answer sets when the program is satisfiable. These answer sets are the
final plans that are obtained given all the preferences and constraints. Currently we
accept any answer set as a plan but frameworks like asprin [51] may be utilized for a
quantitative and qualitative optimization for setting preferences over stable models
generated by the ASP solver. The workflow in our system is shown in Figure 65.
14http://reasoning.eas.asu.edu/f2lp/
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Figure 65: Workflow of AI-MIX. A video run-through of our system can be found at
the following URL: http://youtu.be/73g3yHClx90.
B.5.8 Empirical Study
The overarching aim of our empirical study is to understand the impact of auto-
mated planning support on the effectiveness of crowd-sourced planning. Accordingly,
our general strategy was to compare the relative performance of different versions of
AI-MIX with increasing levels of planning support. Thus we start with
1. a pure crowd planning instance,
2. add constraint checking similar to Mobi’s [499] approach,
3. further add subgoal generation (which exploits the PDDL model), and finally
4. add the automated plan assembling step.
In this subsection, we present details about the performance of the proposed system
with respect to different experimental conditions that were all deployed on Amazon
Mechanical Turk. A video run-through of our system can be found at the following
URL: http://youtu.be/73g3yHClx90.
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- C2 C3
minimum 47 secs 59 secs
maximum 8 mins 26 secs 2 mins 43 secs
Average 3 mins 9 secs 1 mins 26 secs
Table 13: HIT completion times for the two conditions: C2 and C3
B.5.8.1 Experimental Setup
For our study, HITs were made available to all US residents (since the requests
involved locations inside the US) with a HIT approval rate greater than 50%. Turkers
were paid 20 cents for each HIT, and each turker could submit 10 HITs per task. We
used tour planning scenarios for six major US cities, reused from the Mobi system’s
evaluation [499]. To measure the impact of automated critiquing on generated plans,
we compared results from three experimental conditions:
C1: Turkers could give suggestions in free text after reading the task description -
there were no automated critiques.
C2: Turkers quantified their suggestions in terms of cost and duration, and the
system checked these constraints for violations with respect to the requester
demands.
C3: In addition to C2, the system processed free-form text from turker input, and
extracted actions to match with our planning model in order to generate alerts
for sub-goals and missing preconditions.
We note here that in terms of planning support, Mobi system corresponds to the
condition C2 in our framework (as it only supported constraint checking). C1 and
C2 were compared to the proposed approach, C3, separately. Each set was uploaded
255
# Plan Suggestions Our Observations
1
Show: Go to TKTS half ticket discount booth. You have
to stand in line early but it’s an authentic nyc experience
#show(3 hours)(200.0 $)
Show: Go to show #show(3 hours)(200.0 $)
Show: ABSOLUTELY CANNOT go wrong with
Phantom of the Opera #show(3 hours)(200.0 $)
Lunch: Alice’s Tea Cup #lunch(20.0 $)
Design: Walk around the Garment District (go into
shops) just south of Times Square. They often print their
own fabrics. #design(2 hours)(0.0 $)
Dessert: Serendipity #dessert(1 hours)(10.0 $)
1) Redundant suggestions –
In this example, the action
show has multiple similar
suggestions
2) Shorter plan suggestions
3) Vague suggestions – In
this example, the action
show has very high level de-
scriptions to go and watch
a show
2
piccolo angolo: Italian in the Village - real deal
#italiandinner(2 hours)(60.0 $)
Lombardi’s Pizza: #italian_dinner #italiandinner_todo1
Ice Cream: http://www.chinatownicecreamfactory.com/
#italiandinner_todo0
#lunch: Mangia Organics #lunch_todo0
watch Wicked (musical): Do watch Wicked the musical.
It’s a fantastic show and one of the most popular on
Broadway right now! #broadwayshow(3 hours)(150.0 $)
watch How to Succeed in Business: Also a great show,
a little less grand than Wicked.
#broadwayshow(3 hours)(150.0 $)
Activity Steamer: #lunch #lunch_todo1
Paradis To-Go: Turkey & Gruyere is pretty delicious.
The menu is simple, affordable, but certainly worth the
time #lunch(1 hours)(10.0 $)
cupcakes!: Magnolia Bakery on Bleecker in the Village
#dessert(1 hours)(10.0 $)
1) Very detailed
2) Handling all the re-
quester’s preferences
3) Better utilization of the
day
Table 14: Sample activity suggestions from turkers for the two conditions: C2 (top)
and C3 (bottom). For both of these conditions, same amount of money has been paid
to each turker.
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at the same time, with the same task description and HIT parameters. In the first
run, C3 and C2 were compared on 6 scenarios (New York, Chicago, San Francisco,
Las Vegas, Washington and Los Angeles) and were given 2 days before the HITs were
expired. The interfaces for both C3 and C2 were made identical to eliminate any bias.
In the second run, the conditions C1 and C3 were run over a period of one day, for
the two scenarios which were most popular in the first run (New York and Chicago).
For each of these tasks, the requester prepopulated the existing activities with one or
two dummy inputs that reflect the kinds of suggestions she was looking for. In sum,
we had more than 150 turkers who responded to our HITs. The analysis that follows
is from the 35 turkers who contributed to the final comparisons (only for the New
York City) among C1, C2, and C3.
B.5.8.2 Task Completion Latency
When C3 was compared to C1 over a period of one day, we found that C3 received
four responses from 3 distinct turkers, whereas C1 failed to attract any responses.
To receive responses for a HIT, the turkers have to accept the HIT before providing
responses. In our scenario, C1 HITS were not accepted by any turker. This might
indicate that the presence of the “TO DO” tags generated by the automated critiquing
component was helpful in engaging the turkers and guiding them towards achieving
specific goals. However, there may also be alternate explanations for the fact that C1
did not receive any inputs, such as turker fatigue, or familiarity with the C3 interface
from previous runs.
We also looked at the number of HITs taken to complete the tasks for each of the
scenarios. After the HITs were expired, none of the tasks were entirely complete (a
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task is “completed" when there are no more outstanding to-do items), but C2 had 3.83
unfulfilled tags per HIT as compared to 10.5 for C3. As expected, the task completion
latency seems to have increased for C3, since alerts from the system drive up the
number of responses required before all the constraints are satisfied. We also verified
the HIT completion time for a turker that we define as the difference between the time
when he accepted the HIT and the time he submitted the same HIT. The average
HIT completion time for C2 is 3 minutes 9 seconds where as, for C3 it is 1 minute
26 seconds. For C3, the task latency is higher but HIT completion time is lower as
shown in Table 13. These results show that in case of C3, the probability of turker
fatigue is low. As shown in the following section, the increased quality of generated
plans may justify the task latency.
B.5.8.3 Generated Tour Plan Quality
We see that the quality of the plans, in terms of detail and description, seems to
increase in C3, since we now have users responding to planner critiques to further
qualify suggested activities. We consider the plan comparisons as we are conducting
an ablation study to recognize the importance of automated planning technology
on two similar systems (C2 and C3). For example, a turker suggested “not really
fun, long lines and can not even go in and browse around" in response to a planner
generated tag (related to a “fun club” activity suggested previously), while another
suggested a “steamer" in response to a planner alert about “what to eat for lunch”. A
comparison between the plans generated for C2 and C3 (for New York City) is given
in Table 14. This seems to indicate that including a domain description in addition to
the simplistic quantity and constraint checks increases the plan quality.
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B.5.8.4 Role Played by the Planner Module
We now look at some statistics that indicate the role played by the automated
module in the tasks. We received a total of 31 new activity suggestions from turkers,
of which 5 violated quantity constraints. The C3 setting attracted 39 responses,
compared to 28 for C2, which may indicate that the planner tags encouraged turker
participation. As shown by the HIT completion latencies, the planner module helped
in reducing the probability of turker fatigue by requesting goal suggestions clearly.
On the other hand, even though there is a task latency due to planner generating
more subgoals to be fulfilled, the overall quality of the plans is significantly improved.
Note that in the AI-MIX interface, there is no perceptual difference between the
critiques generated by the planner and the critiques suggested by humans. So it is
interesting to see how the critiques are received by the other turkers. There were 8
flaws pointed out by humans, but none were acted upon by other turkers; the planner
on the other hand generated 45 critiques, and 7 were acted upon and fixed by turkers.
This seems to indicate that turkers consider the planner’s critiques more relevant to
the generation of a high quality plan than those suggested by other turkers. Even if
we consider alternate possibilities (e.g. the planner’s critiques were better received as
they were easier to respond to), there is enough evidence to suggest that the presence
of an automated system does help to engage and guide the focus of the crowd.
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B.6 UbuntuWorld – Technical Support in the Ubuntu OS
In this section, I present UbuntuWorld 1.0 LTS – a platform for developing au-
tomated technical support agents in the Ubuntu operating system. Specifically, we
propose to use the Bash terminal as a simulator of the Ubuntu environment for a
learning-based agent, and demonstrate the usefulness of adopting reinforcement learn-
ing (RL) techniques for basic problem solving and troubleshooting in this environment.
We provide a plug-and-play interface to the simulator as a python package where
different types of agents can be plugged in and evaluated, and provide pathways
for integrating data from online support forums like Ask Ubuntu into an automated
agent’s learning process. Finally, we show that the use of this data significantly
improves the agent’s learning efficiency. We believe that this platform can be adopted
as a real-world test bed for research on automated technical support.
B.6.1 Introduction
Building effective conversational agents has long been the holy grail of Artificial
Intelligence [461]. Research in this direction has, however, largely recognized that
different modes of conversation require widely different capabilities from an automated
agent, depending on the particular context of the interaction; the focus has thus been
on approaches targeted at specific applications. For example, conversational agents in
the form of chat bots are required to be more creative, responsive and human-like;
while for automation in the context of customer service, qualities like precision and
brevity are more relevant. Indeed, human agents while providing customer support
make a conscious effort to be as structured as possible in their interactions with the
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user. For successful automation in this particular mode of dialog (that we refer to as
end-to-end goal-directed conversational systems or e2eGCS) we identify the following
typical characteristics –
- End-to-end. This is the ability of the agent to learn directly from raw inputs as
available from the world and generate desired behavior.
- Goal-directed. The interactions in these settings are targeted at achieving
specific goals, i.e. to solve a particular problem or reach a desired state.
- General purpose. It is infeasible to build fundamentally different support
agents for every possible environment, and hence there must be a learning
component to the agent that facilitates automated building of domain knowledge.
- Adaptive. An agent must learn to adapt to its experience and update its
knowledge, further underlining the importance of the agent’s ability to learn.
- Integrated. Finally, the agent must be able to interact with the human in the
loop and integrate (and subsequently learn from) human intelligence in order to
solve a wide variety of problems effectively.
One of the canonical examples of such systems is technical support. As in the case
of customer service in general, automation for technical support requires an agent
ascribing to the e2eGCS paradigm to be able to:
• learn a model or understanding of its environment automatically by means of
experience, data and exploration;
• evaluate its knowledge given a context, and learn to sense for more information
to solve a given problem; and
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Figure 66: Salient features of an e2ecs.
• interact with the customer, maybe in multiple turns, in a natural fashion to
solve a given problem effectively.
In this work we specifically address the learning problem, and make a first attempt
to lay a pathway towards achieving fully fleshed-out e2eGCS of the future. Technical
support is a particular instance of customer service that deals with problems related
to the operation of a specific piece of technology, which means there often exists an
underlying (albeit unspecified) model to the operation of such a system, and the
model learning proposition becomes especially attractive in this context. However, the
critical problem here is that the engineers who build the technology, the people who
use it, and the ones who provide support for it are often distinct from each other. One
solution then would be to make the architects of the system also build the support
engine following the same software specifications; this quickly becomes intractable
(and might well require its own support!). A more worthwhile alternative is to learn
this model automatically. Such an approach, while being considerably simpler to
follow, is also likely to be more effective in capturing domain knowledge and providing
directed personalized support.
The specific domain we look at in this work is technical support in the Ubuntu
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operating system. This is undoubtedly a real-world environment where support is
extremely sought after. Indeed there is a thriving community on the online Ubuntu
help forum Ask Ubuntu, a question and answer site for Ubuntu users and developers
hosted on the Stack Exchange network of Q&A sites. Ask Ubuntu currently boasts
more than 370k registered users and 238k questions asked till date, and ranks third
overall in the family of 158 Stack Exchange communities in terms of traffic or number
of users (as of August 2016). A closer look however reveals that this rank is not
an indicator of the quality of support. In terms of percentage of questions actually
answered [427], Ask Ubuntu operates at a lowly rate of 65%, ranking just five places
off the bottom of the list. Further, as shown in Figure 67, the number of posts that
go unanswered is exploding in recent times [19]. While there are many causes that
may have led to these dire circumstances, some of which we discuss below, one thing
is quite certain - Ubuntu needs support, and there isn’t enough of it out there.
Ask Ubuntu’s afflictions may be largely attributed to the following main causes -
1. New users clogging up the system with simple problems that experienced users
do not care to respond to.
2. Duplicate questions, due to large numbers of users who do not bother to look
up existing solutions before posting.
3. An unhealthy newcomer to expert ratio in the community as a result of Ubuntu’s
rapidly growing popularity.
4. The continuous roll out of new software/OS versions and corresponding problems
with dependencies.
5. Incompletely specified problems, including insufficient state information and
error logs leaving members of the community little to work with.
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Figure 67: Graph (http://bit.ly/2blmZk1) showing the number of zombie posts from
01/2011 to 01/2017. These are the posts that have remained unanswered for more
than 72 hours, and their number is growing exponentially. The two peaks kinks in
the graph correspond to releases of new versions of Ubuntu.
We claim here that a large number of these problems can readily be solved through
automation. While it may not be reasonable to expect an automated agent to learn
the most nuanced details of the Ubuntu OS and solve niche issues that the experts on
Ask Ubuntu are more capable of addressing, the large majority of problems faced by
users on the forum are readily addressable. These are either (1) simple problems faced
by newbies that may be directly solved from the documentation, whose solutions can
be learned from exploration in the terminal; or (2) duplicates of existing issues which
may have already been solved, whose solutions may be retrieved using relevant data
from Ask Ubuntu. The learning approach then also indirectly addresses issues (3) by
freeing up (and in turn tapping into) support from Ask Ubuntu; and (4, 5) since the
domain knowledge built up over time as well as local state information sensed by the
integrated support agent may be useful in providing more personalized support.
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Figure 68 provides an illustration of the kind of tasks we are interested in. Consider
the simple task of opening a text file. It can be achieved in a single step using gedit,
or it can be arbitrarily harder depending on the actual state of the system - the agent
might need to install gedit if it is not available, and it may need to access the internet
and gain sudo permissions to install gedit. This is represented in the top part of the
figure. We want our agent to learn these workflows and dependencies on its own, by
exploring the Bash environment. Thus when an error comes up, for e.g. regarding
administrative rights, the agent knows it needs to execute the sudo command. Of
course, this is one of a very large number of traces that the agent will need to explore
before it converges on the correct choices, and this is hard for a setting such as Ubuntu
due to the large number of actions that an agent can possibly perform at any given
state. Perhaps ironically, we turn to Ask Ubuntu itself in order to make the learning
agent’s life a little easier in this regard.
As we noted before, users on Ask Ubuntu have been solving these problems for
a long time, and their solutions can in fact be used to provide valuable guidance
to a learning agent, as shown in in Figure 68 - here, the terminal has produced a
“Permission denied” error in response to a call to an apt-get command without a sudo
prefix. The agent in response queries Ask Ubuntu with the text of the error by using
a pre-built Lucene [276] reverse index, and finds answers such as “prefix the command
with sudo” that can be used to inform its own deliberative process. The recommended
action – in this case, sudo – is then extracted by (TF-IDF based) similarity matching
between the top retrieved answers and the description of the actions (we used linux
man pages for this) in our domain. Thus, in addition to wanting our learning agent to
explore and build a model of Ubuntu, we also want to make sure that the exploration
is smart given the abundance of data already available on troubleshooting in Ubuntu
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Figure 68: Example use case illustrating the work flow for opening a text file, depending
on the state of the system, and the possible application of querying data from
AskUbuntu in guiding the learning or search process.
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in online forums such as Ask Ubuntu. We refer to this as data-driven reinforcement
learning.
B.6.2 Related Work
Bringing AI techniques - particularly reasoning and decision-making - to the
problem of automated software agents has a rich history within the automated
planning community. Of particular importance is the work on building softbots for
UNIX [137, 139], which is the most comprehensive previous study on this problem.
Indeed, as we introduced earlier, many of the issues that are cataloged in that work
remain of importance today. The current work builds upon the work of Etzioni et al.,
particularly their focus on a goal-oriented approach to the problem [138]; however, it
goes beyond that work (and related approaches [346]) in actually realizing a learning
agent for the Ubuntu technical support domain. Succinctly, we seek to realize to the
largest possible degree the promise of the softbot approach by: (1) exploiting the Bash
shell as a robust simulator for learning agents to explore the world; and (2) using the
large amounts of data generated by human experts on the internet.
On the learning side, Branavan et al.’s work on using reinforcement learning (RL)
to map natural language instructions to sequences of executable actions [50] explores
a similar problem setting in a Windows OS domain. However, that work focuses on
the application of RL techniques to the language processing problem, and on mapping
text instructions to executable actions. In contrast, our work focuses on learning
task-oriented models for solving the e2eGCS problem. Thus the most relevant prior
explorations into this area are complementary to our work in different ways; while
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Figure 69: A schematic representation of the UbuntuWorld 1.0 LTS prototype. The
system has three major components - the agents, the environment and the interaction
between these and the user. The environment here is the Ubuntu operating system.
The agents, which may be of many types, interact with the environment by means of
the Ubuntu terminal. The user can assign tasks to the agent, or use it to troubleshoot
errors during her own interaction with the environment.
the softbot work lays the groundwork for our architecture, Branavan et al.’s work
provides a report on using learning on a related but different problem.
The contributions of this work can thus be summarized as -
• We provide a platform UbuntuWorld 1.0 LTS based on the Ubuntu OS, and its
interface to the Bash terminal, where different types of agents can be plugged
in and evaluated. This can be adopted as a valuable real-world test bed for
research in automated technical support.
• We propose data-driven RL as a viable solution to the model learning problem
for automated technical support in Ubuntu, by utilizing human intelligence – in
the form of data from online technical support forums like Ask Ubuntu – to aid
the traditional RL process.
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B.6.3 Introducing UbuntuWorld 1.0 LTS
The main components of the proposed system (Figure 69) are the agents, the
environment, and the user. As mentioned previously, the environment is the Ubuntu
operating system. The user and the agents are the two main actors in the setting –
they interact with the environment, or with each other, to perform tasks.
B.6.3.1 The Agent Ecosystem
Though the user interacts with a generic, fixed agent interface, the internal nature
of that agent could be one of several types depending on the type of technology used:
Random Agent – The Random Agent does not have any learning component: it
performs actions at random till it achieves its goals. This is used as a baseline to
evaluate how difficult the planning problems are, and how much a learning agent can
gain in terms of performance.
The next two agents we describe make use of a state-based representation of the
Ubuntu environment in order to make more informed choices about the next action to
execute. An example of such a state is shown below. In the current implementation,
the relevant variables and predicates need to be provided by the software developer.
internet-on : True
sudo-on : False
installed gedit : False
installed firefox : True
installed vlc : False
open gedit file : False
open firefox file : False
open vlc file : False
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Planning Agent – The Planning Agent uses PDDL models [295] of the domain to
compute plans. It is integrated with the Fast-Downward planner [182] that can be
used to produce the optimal plan given a problem and domain description. The
problem description is built on the fly given the current state being sensed by the
agent and the target (partial) goal state. An excerpt of the domain is shown below (a
link to the entire domain file and a sample problem for a simple “open file” task are
available at http://bit.ly/2c8kJ4Q and http://bit.ly/2clwwKI respectively):
(:action AptGet_True
:parameters (?s - software)
:precondition (and (sudo-on)
(internet-on))
:effect (and (installed ?s)))
(:action VLC_True
:parameters (?o - item)
:precondition (and (not (sudo-on))
(installed vlc))
:effect (and (open vlc ?o)))
The domain itself may either be hand-coded from the software developer’s knowl-
edge, or learned from execution traces [515]. The former can serve as the ground truth
for evaluating the performance of various agents, while the latter provides a valuable
baseline to compare against the other learning agents.
RL Agent – The reinforcement learning (RL) paradigm involves learning policies or
models of the environment by acting and learning from experiences in the world and
associated feedback. One of the standard forms of RL is Q-learning [433], where an
agent learns a function Q : S×A→ R that maps state-action pairs to real values that
signify the usefulness or utility of doing action a ∈ A in state s ∈ S. The learning step
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is the well-known Bellman update when a transition from state s to s′ is observed due
to an action a, and a reward R : S × A× S → R is received –
Q(s, a)← (1− α)Q(s, a) + α{R(s, a, s′) + γmax
a∈A
Q(s′, a)}
Here, α is the learning rate, and γ is the discount factor. During the learning
phase, the agent does an exploration-exploitation trade-off by picking an action a given
the current state s (represented by a|s) based on several intentions given probability
thresholds , β, and (1− − β), as shown below. This forms the core of what we refer
to as the “data-driven" -random Q-learning agent.
a|s← arg max
a∈A
Q(s, a)
Exploitation of the learned representation – This option allows the RL agent to pick the
action with the maximum Q-value in the current state. In the current implementation,
the system employs a tabular Q-learning approach where the state variables are the
Boolean predicates (in the domain as well as those that appear in the goal) from the
reference planning model shown above. Note that the state representation integrates
both the goal information and the current value of the state variables, in order to
ensure that the agent learns goal-directed policies.
a|s ∼ U(A)
– Random Exploration – This is done by choosing the next action randomly with
probability . This is the standard -random Q-learning agent.
a|s← arg max
a∈A
Da ∩ AskUbuntu+(Fa)
– Exploration by querying the Ask Ubuntu data – Here the agent explores by
choosing an action a that maximizes the similarity between the action documentation
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Da and the relevant questions and their solutions in the forum posts, in order to
pick the next best action. The action documentation Da of an action a in our
implementation is the entire content of the man page associated with that action.
The relevant questions and answers are retrieved by querying Ask Ubuntu with the
footprint Fa of action a. The action footprint in our case is the text output on the
terminal as a result of executing that action. The accepted answers to the top 5 posts
are then used to query the man page descriptions of the Ubuntu commands available
to the agent in order to determine the set of relevant actions to perform next. The
action that produced the maximum similarity was selected for execution.
The parameter β was varied according to a damped sine function to alternate
between the -random exploration mentioned above, and the data driven exploration
described here. The intuition behind this is to alternate between the suggestions from
Ask Ubuntu and the agent’s own exploration function alternatively early on, and then
gradually fall back on exploitation later. This ensures that the agent can utilize good
suggestions from the forum to guide the initial learning process, but at the same time
does not get stuck with bad suggestions that may creep in either due to noise in the
data or during the retrieval and similarity matching step. The results of this scheme
are detailed in the evaluation section.
For our environment, the reward function is defined as follows: The agent gets a
negative reward every time it does an action, so that it learns to prefer shorter policies.
If, however, the state changes due to an action, the amount of negative reward is
less, since the agent at least tried an action that was applicable in the current state.
Finally, there is a large reward when the agent attains a state that models the goal.
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R(s, a, s′) = −10 if s′ 6= ⊥
+= 5 if s′ 6|= s
+= 100 if s′ |= G
Note that this definition of the reward function is generic to any environment, and
does not preclude added (domain specific) information such as whether an action was
successful or not, etc. This also means that the learning process will suffer from the
same issues that are common in traditional RL techniques with regards to delayed
rewards, and the many approaches that have been investigated in the contemporary
literature to mitigate such problems also apply here.
B.6.3.2 The Environment
The Environment in our case is the Ubuntu OS, which both the agent and the user
have access to via Bash commands on the terminal. Through the terminal the agent
can execute actions, as well as sense the state of different environment variables and
the current output on the terminal. The way these interactions are used depends on
the specific type of the agent. Currently, the agents only have access to actions whose
effects are all reversible, i.e. the UbuntuWorld 1.0 LTS environment is currently
ergodic (e.g. no rm actions!).
B.6.4 Agent Interactions
Both the user and the agent can interact with the environment through the terminal
to accomplish specific tasks. The user can also interact with the agent and ask it
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to complete basic tasks (automated problem solving), as well as invoke the agent in
case she encounters an error on the terminal (automated troubleshooting). The agent
may, in trying to solve a task, interact with the user in trying to find the correct
parameters for an action or ask for more clarifications to solve the task, or even query
Ask Ubuntu to search for a possible solution to a problem.
B.6.5 Implementation Details
The system architecture has three main components (Figure C.5.5) - the Agent
Class, the Environment Class and the ubuntuconfig package.
B.6.5.1 The Agent
may be asked to solve a task, or train and test on a set of problem instances. The
base agent implements the Random Agent, while all the other agents such as the
Planning Agent and the RL Agent inherit from it. The key difference is (1) how,
given a state, the “get next action” process is done, e.g. the Random Agent picks
the next action at random, the Planning Agent re-plans optimally from the current
state and picks the first action from the remaining plan, and the Q-learning RL Agent
picks the action that has the maximum Q-value in the current state; and (2) what
the Agents do with the result of executing he action, e.g. the Random Agent ignores
it, while the learning agents may use it to learn a representation - such as a PDDL
domain or a Q-function - of the environment. Finally the Agents also have abilities to
take snapshots of themselves and reboot, and display learning curves and progress
statistics during training.
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Figure 70: Architecture diagram showing different components of the UbuntuWorld
1.0 LTS prototype.
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B.6.5.2 The Environment Class
acts as the interface between the Agent Class and the ubuntuconfig package by
using generic interaction semantics - the agent can access the Environment by sending
an action to it and receiving the output as a result of it, while the specific environment
package implements the actual execution pathways and provides the action footprints
to the environment. Thus specific agents and environments may be swapped in and
out while their interface remains identical.
Thus the two main functionalities of the Environment Class are (1) reading in an
environment description, such as from ubuntuconfig, and setting up the environment;
and (2) simulating this environment as required by the agents plugged into it. It can
also generate training and testing problem instances given the environment description.
The UbuntuWorld Class inherits from the basic Environment Class and implements
Ubuntu specific methods that can sense and set values of state variables as required.
Finally, it may not always be a good idea to run the agents on an environment
directly - e.g. installing software takes time, and trying to train agents whose
potential performances are completely unknown may be a waste of resources. Keeping
this in mind, the Environment Class also implements a wrapper that emulates an
environment description without running it. This, of course, cannot be done with the
full environment, since the model is not known. It can, however, in the simulation
mode emulate a known part of the environment and help in debugging and setting up
(for example) the parameters of the learning agent, etc.
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B.6.5.3 The ubuntuconfig Package
The ubuntuconfig package contains the description of the UbuntuWorld domain,
i.e. the actions available to the agent, state variables that can be sensed, methods to
execute each of these actions and parse their outputs, etc.
Each action in the UbuntuWorld environment is implemented as a separate class -
the individual classes implement how the interactions with the terminal play out for
specific actions or commands, e.g. a permissions (sudo) check followed by a memory
usage check for the apt-get command. Each action class comes with methods to
execute it, get its output, and optionally check for its success (this is not used in the
RL setting since the model is not known).
The Command Class implements the basic functionalities of all commands, in-
cluding a generic interaction with the shell with or without invocation with the sudo
prefix. Specific action classes inherit from it and implement their own parameters
and shell interactions. Apart from the modular and concise nature of the command
definitions, making the Ubuntu commands available as separate class objects also
leaves the processing at an agent’s end as general purpose as possible, with scope for
caching and reuse depending on the nature of the agent. If the commands do not have
any unique semantics, then these command classes are generated automatically from
a list of the action names and their bindings to specific Bash commands in Ubuntu.
Since this is the case most of the time (i.e. most Bash commands do not involve
sophisticated interactions with the shell) this alleviates scalability concerns with this
particular approach, while at the same time providing surprising flexibility with how
the Ubuntu shell may be accessed by automated agents.
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B.6.6 Evaluations
As a preliminary evaluation of our system, the environment was set up to handle
open/close, install/remove, internet access, and root privilege tasks as discussed before
in Figure 68. In the following, we will discuss the relative performance of the our
data-driven RL agent in the context of these tasks.
B.6.6.1 Learning rate
Figure 71 shows the performance of a simple -random Q-learning RL Agent trained
on the emulator on simple tasks involving opening files, as described before. We
measure the performance of an agent in terms of the lengths of the sequences (plans)
required to solve a given problem, and compare these with those of the optimal plan.
This optimal length is generated by the Planning Agent using the underlying complete
PDDL model (which acts as the ground truth), and the Random Planner (which acts
as a simple baseline). Figure 71a shows convergence of the agent beyond around 3000
episodes, as the moving average length settles around the ground truth range (original
plans require up to 5 actions). The test performance of the agent is shown in Figure
71b. The agent mimics the optimal plans impressively, and is significantly better than
a random agent, signifying that the learning tasks are non-trivial as well as the fact
the tasks have been learned effectively by the agent.
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(a) Learning performance (episode lengths) of the RL agent in course of training over 1000
problems instances, replayed four additional times. The episodes were terminated after 30
steps. The agent shows clear signs of learning beyond 3000 episodes.
(b) Test performance (plan lengths) of the RL agent in 200 randomly generated tasks, against
the optimal and the random agents. The performance is close to and mimics closely the
optimal plans, while being a significant improvement from the random agent.
Figure 71: Training and testing performances on simple tasks involving opening files
from various start configurations.
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Figure 72: Superior learning rate of the data-driven RL Agent underlines the value of
leveraging data from online technical support forums like Ask Ubuntu in providing
guidance to the model learning process of an automated agent.
B.6.6.2 The data-driven agent
Figure 72 shows the relative convergence rates of an -random RL Agent with and
without data support, run on the actual terminal without the emulator. The data
driven agent converges to the same level as the original -random RL Agent in Figure
71a within a 1000 episodes, without the need for replays. This promising boost in
the learning rate reiterates the need for integrating human intelligence in the form of
existing data available on online technical support forums into the learning process of
automated learning agents.
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B.6.6.3 Demo: Interacting with the agent
We offer a demonstration of our system deployed on an Ubuntu shell – a screen
capture of the demonstration is available at the following link: https://goo.gl/oSmX3d.
First, the user asks for suggestions on how to open Firefox (or asks the agent to
open Firefox), and the (trained RL) agent responds by evaluating its Q-function
with the current state and available actions. Then we make the task a bit harder by
uninstalling Firefox and asking again. The agent now responds by activating its root
privileges, installs Firefox and opens it, thus demonstrating that it has learned simple
dependencies in the Ubuntu OS and can help the user with the same.
Remark – The current implementation is admittedly a rudimentary exploration
into using existing unstructured data to aid the learning process of an RL agent. It
might be useful to look at augmenting the retrieval mechanism with more advanced
word-embedding techniques in order to retrieve the most relevant posts from the
vast amount of unstructured data available in online technical support forums like
Ask Ubuntu and Ubuntu Chat Forum, and as well as structured data available as
documentation in manual pages and release notes.
Also, the current work is able to use a basic tabular Q-learning approach because
the size of the environment as well as the action space is quite limited. As the action
and state space sizes increase, our current approach will have to make way for more
scalable RL approaches such as function approximation [434], and newer approaches
that can take into account large action spaces in discrete domains [128].
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B.7 Moo. – Planning for Intelligent Tutoring Systems
In this paper, we build on the techniques in human-aware planning for decision
support to develop a generalized framework for course-independent design of Intelligent
Tutoring Systems (ITSs). This is meant to provide targeted and personalized assistance
to students, in order to meet the demands of the increasing class size, as well as help
instructors who can use higher level specifications to design courses without having
to worry about building the course-specific tutoring assistance. Thus the aim of this
paper is to demonstrate what human-aware planning can bring to the table for the
design of course-independent ITS features. We will illustrate these capabilities in
Dragoon, an ITS deployed at Arizona State University.
B.7.1 Introduction: Learning 2.0
While the last decade has seen massive advances in technologies aimed at creation
and dissemination of knowledge across a variety of platforms, concerns remain as to
how effectively this knowledge is absorbed at the user (student) end. This is especially
true for both massive open online courses (MOOCs) and also for (rapidly growing sizes
of) physical classrooms where targeted attention towards individual students is often
hard to provide. The state-of-the-art in student and instructor support technology
has traditionally struggled to catch up with the demands of the rapidly evolving
landscape of education in the 21st century. The world of learning is indeed changing
fast - information can now be provided across a variety of platforms to large groups of
people who can access on demand knowledge and participate in the learning process
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as a community. This is the Learning 2.0 paradigm [400], and requires a rethink of
the affordances [297] expected off current learning tools.
B.7.1.1 Learning on Demand
Learning on demand refers to the increasing popularity of individual student-centric
and topic-driven learning achieved on the web – i.e. students pick a particular topic
they want to learn about and actively consume content just based on that instead of
participating in an entire class or following through an entire curriculum. For example,
consider that you want to learn about regression – you could log on to the Coursera
website, complete the relevant tutorials and assignments on regression, and leave
the course. This requires a rethink of traditional curriculum generation and course
recommendation approaches that would traditionally compute end to end curricula for
an entire class. It follows that such new approaches must be able to leverage detailed
student models to provide effective support.
B.7.1.2 Social Learning
One of the many advantages of social platforms for learning is peer feedback and
community participation – i.e. social learning [60]. This involves two critical aspects
– knowledge advancement as a community [393] and information processing [481] on
the part of the individual student as a member of that community. In a sense, this
can even be seen as a proxy towards providing individual classroom attention from
the instructor. However, forming study partners remains an arduous task, especially
in large classrooms such as in online learning communities where students usually
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do not know most of their classmates (or their skill sets). It is also fraught with the
usual pitfalls associated with group work including individual students hogging all the
group activity or slackers not contributing to the group activity at all [302]. Without
principled drivers for building in-class communities that can promote learning, effective
collaborations are hard to achieve. As such, forming useful teams for collaborative
study can become a problem by itself rather than a facilitator for learning to the
extent that students can end up spending too much effort in forming and maintaining
teams or just prefer to study by themselves, thus leaving the potential benefits of
a social learning environment largely untapped. Recent work has shown that peer
recommendations can have positive impact [260] on student engagement but has
remained ambiguous [46] as to the best way to do it.
B.7.2 A Brief History of ITS and AI
ITSs are aimed to provide personalized support to students and bring in expert
(human) tutors wherever necessary, thus reducing the burden on the instructor as
well as improving the learning experience of the student. In fact, it has been shown
that when designed correctly, an ITS can be as effective as a human teacher [468].
A thorough description of the different components of ITSs can be found in [467].
Existing applications of ITSs range from solving numerical problems like Andes [159]
which helps in teaching basic laws of physics [397], Dragoon [471], Q&A type problems
as in Autotutor [169] or for an SQL tutor [314]. ITSs, of course, go beyond individual
information processing stage and find uses in knowledge building as a community
[279] as well, thereby embracing the principles of the Learning 2.0 paradigm.
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B.7.2.1 Student Assessment Models
One of the most important capabilities an ITS needs to have is to be able to
estimate the (mental) model or capabilities of the student. This has been explored
in the context of the (1) item response theory (IRT) [177] which treats learning
and testing as separate processes and the (2) Bayesian knowledge tracing (BKT)
theory [108] which considers a more dynamic model of the student state. The latter
becomes more relevant in the context of ITSs that can provide more dynamic feedback
and hints as discussed next. Indeed this is an issue where AI techniques have been
deployed before for dynamic modeling of the evolution of the student model in terms of
knowledge components, concentration / focus levels, etc. [324]. This includes different
techniques such as decision theoretic approaches (i.e. Markov Decision Processes or
MDPs) [324, 323], and reinforcement learning [97, 283, 282]. This work assumes for the
most part15 that these techniques are available and builds on top of that assumption,
i.e. being able to estimate the student model is necessary for ITS techniques and we
want to demonstrate, from the perspective of automated planning how this can be
exploited to provide a better learning experience to a student.
B.7.2.2 Feedbacks and Hints
Once the ITS has estimated a model of the student, it can provide targeted
feedback to improve the learning process. Existing work in this area [25, 428, 376, 377]
has largely focused on ITSs operating as recommender systems. This paper is largely
15In fact, the “model reconciliation” technique discussed later can handle uncertain models (as we
saw in Section 3.4) and can even be modified to function as an estimator for the student model but
this is outside the scope of this discussion.
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situated in this space but aimed at providing much more sophisticated feedback in
both the inner and outer loops [467] of an ITS which requires longer-term sequential
reasoning at higher levels of abstraction, and can be generalized across different
learning tasks.
B.7.3 What can planning bring to the table?
Automated planning, as a field, has been around ever since the inception of AI,
and is considered a necessary ability of any autonomous system – the ability to reason
about and decide on a course of action (CoA) or plan given the current state of the
world. Many of the challenges faced in the design of an ITS bears parallels to the
planning agenda – making a curriculum, solving a given problem, or in general dealing
with the combinatorics of orchestrating a class can be potentially seen through the
lens of planning, i.e. computing a sequence of steps given a set of constraints. This
was the starting point of our investigation in this direction.
However, when operating with humans in the loop, traditional planning techniques
are not sufficient [220]. A “human-aware” planner must be able to take into account
the (mental) model [71] of the user. Recent work [404] has looked at how planning
techniques can evolve in the context of decision support to guide the planning process
of a human decision-maker. This includes support for plan validation, critiquing,
explanations, and so on. Much of the discussion here derives inspiration from recent
advances in the planning community along these directions.
Thus, to answer the question what automated planning can do for the ITS scene,
we build on the following two features of planning techniques –
• Domain independence – Planning techniques have been particularly geared
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towards domain-independent solutions – i.e. algorithms that can work across
a variety of domains provided in higher-level specification. This is especially
useful in the contexts of ITSs which have traditionally been restricted to class
or course specific solutions that do not generalize; and
• Model-based reasoning – Personalized support for students require higher level
and sequential reasoning about the course and student models, planning tech-
niques remain ideally suited for this.
In this section, we expound on the above two themes to –
- Provide targeted feedback when students are stuck on problems by leveraging
the student model; (Section B.7.4.2)
- Compute on demand curriculum based on class materials requested by the
student; (Section B.7.4.3)
- We will show how this technique can be used to teach students concepts to
a student to attain different levels of expertise as desired by the student;
- We will show how student models may be composed to form joint curricula.
- Generate class curriculum in the spirit of social learning by including fellow
classmates in a student’s curriculum while also guaranteeing desired properties
of the curriculum – e.g. that students not only learn but also apply all the
concepts at least once. (Section B.7.4.4)
We do not, of course, set out to model the full scope of challenges16 in building
and end-to-end ITS. However, we recognize that much of the existing work on de-
ploying ITS systems, if not in conceptualizing them, has focused on specific learning
16For example, the current discussion only focuses on the learning and interaction phase and does
not include post-hoc reflection / evaluations as explored in [230, 229, 104].
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platforms or courses without any coherent approach or general principles of design
and implementation of the roles usually attributed to ITSs. The aim of this paper is
thus to introduce techniques from the planning community that can formalize some
of these concepts and provide a generalized framework for building such systems from
the ground up. This has useful implications for both the planning as well as the
educational technologies communities – i.e. the former can provide solutions to existing
problems in ITSs (as we demonstrate in this paper) while feedback form the learning
community can provide useful feedback towards the refinement of said techniques,
including defining new areas of research of mutual interest. The biggest advantage of
such an approach, as mentioned above, is that the techniques are domain-independent,
i.e. they are defined at the procedural level and can be grounded with the description
of a particular course as specified by the instructor.
B.7.4 ITS as Planning
We will now cast the design of a generic ITS in terms of the planning modules
discussed in Section B.1.2.
B.7.4.1 Class Configuration
A class configuration is defined as the tuple –
C = 〈{KCi}, {Ti}, {Ai}, {Si}〉
- Knowledge Components or Concepts: {KC} is a set of knowledge components
or concepts KCi. In ITS literature, the process of knowledge acquisition by a
student has often been decomposed into these smaller components [247]. KCs
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can be anything from a production rule [294], to a facet, misconception, fact or
even a skill [36]. The aim of the social learning process is to make a student
acquire different KCs based on their and their classmates already existing ones.
- Tutorial: The class also constitutes of a set {Ti} of tutorials Ti ⊆ {KCi} that
consist of a set of KCs on which they provide information on. These directly
modify the student’s knowledge state by providing information on specific topics
or on how certain problems or (parts of) assignments may be solved. These
form an integral part of a curriculum for the class.
- Activities / Assignments: The class also has a set {Ai} of activities or assign-
ments Ai = 〈M, κ〉 whereM is the model of the assignment and κ ⊆ {KCi}
consists of a set of KCs that are required to solve it. These engage the student
in actions that derive from knowledge introduced in the class (learning by
doing). These form the core content of the class. Technically, these can also
be used as sensing actions for the ITS in determining the knowledge state of
the student. Thus, an assignment may be used both as a way of estimating the
student model as well as a technique for imparting knowledge to the student.
- Finally, the class has a set {Si} of students Si. The student knowledge state or
model is defined as Si = 〈{ASi }, κ1, κ2〉 where ASi is the student’s understanding
(similar to the definition of a HAP) of the assignment model Ai and κ1, κ2 ⊆
{KCi} consists of a set of KCs that they have learned and applied respectively.
Given a class configuration C, a curriculum is given by a sequence c(C) =
〈c1, c2, . . . , cn〉; ci ∈ {Ti} ∪ {Ai} ∪ {Si} of tutorials, assignments and partnerships
with other students.
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B.7.4.2 Tips and Hints
A solution to an assignment in a general sense can be seen as a sequence of steps,
a.k.a. a plan. Thus, we posit that a large variety of assignments can in fact be
modeled in terms of the planning problem. The model Ai(M) of an assignment Ai (as
mentioned before) is thus the model of a planning problem CPP. As explored in [404]
in the context of decision support using automated planners, this opens up the slew
of planning techniques (described in Section B.1.2) that can be readily adopted to
provide targeted (problem specific but domain independent) feedback to the students.
Solution Validation – For a partial attempt (represented as a partial plan pˆi) on an
assignment Ai, the PVM indicates conditions that were unsatisfied, which can be used
to provide targeted feedback. For example, the PVM can be used by the instructor to
auto-grade solutions proposed by a student, since this is a domain independent way
of checking if the plan is a valid solution of the given assignment (represented as a
CPP Ai(M)). This is also useful for the student as well who can receive immediate
feedback on whether they are successful (and why, if not) without having to wait for the
instructor. This is one of the features that most ITSs already possess. However, they
are usually system level implementations that do not generalize across assignments.
Solution Completion – For a partial attempt (represented as a partial plan pˆi) on an
assignment Ai, the PRM produces a completion that can be sampled from to provide
hints that guide the student towards the full solution. The PRM thus allows the ITS
to anticipate what actions the student needs to take given what they have already
done in order to achieve their goal. Notice that the partial plan is generated by the
student (from the model ASi ) even though the completion is done using Ai. This can
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thus help the student in cases of cognitive overload, but not if they lack the knowledge
to solve the problem, i.e. ASi 6= Ai. We will discuss ways to deal with the latter case
in Sections B.7.4.3. Interestingly, one could also imagine using the PRM to detect
gaming of the tutoring system [319] by defining it as a possible goal that a student
might be trying to achieve, and based on the observations identify whether a student
is working diligently or trying to game the system.
Problem Summarization – Finally, the LGM takes in the CPP representation Ai(M)
for a specific assignment Ai and produces a set of steps (action landmarks) or situations
(state landmarks) that the student must go through in order to solve the assignment.
This can be very useful in providing a concise summary of “TODOs” required of the
student to arrive at the solution, or by considering the domain variables that the
student has already set to true, measure the progress of a student and thereby help
the instructor in classroom orchestration [118].
We shall illustrate each of these use cases in Section B.7.7.1.
B.7.4.3 On-demand Curriculum Generation
A typical feature of online learning, as we discussed in Section B.7.1, is that
students increasingly select a subset of class materials to follow and leave once they are
done (e.g. MOOCs which are known [12] to have notoriously low completion rates). As
a result, students end up following individual and different curricula asynchronously.
From the student’s perspective an obvious problem with this is that they might not
have the required knowledge to complete the materials they want. In the following,
we thus address the problem of on-demand curriculum generation – in this paradigm,
291
the student selects a particular assignment Ai to complete and the ITS performs
argumentation with the assignment model Ai(M) and the students model of the
assignment ASi (M) to identify deficiencies in the student model that need to be
addressed using relevant tutorials.
In order to achieve this, the ITS spawns an instance of the PEM with the HAP
Ψ = 〈Ai(M), ASi (M)〉 – here the instructor model is the ground truth and the student
model needs to be reconciled. The model edit functions λ are the tutorials in the
class. The output of the PEM is thus the shortest set of tutorials (this forms the
recommended curriculum) that guarantees that the same solution (plan) is optimal
in both the student model as well as the instructor model (even though they are
not equal). This is especially useful since the instructor model is going to contain
information pertaining to the entire class, while the student does not need to know
all these details in order to solve a specific assignment. The PEM is thus able to
leverage the student and instructor models of an assignment to provide the exact set
of tutorials that the student requires. We will provide illustrations of this process in
Section B.7.7.2. Notice that, during this procedure, the ITS can either use its estimate
of ASi or engage in active information gathering by asking the student questions to
determine parts of the student model it is uncertain about, in order to meet the
specific needs of the student.
Teaching as an α trade-off – Notice that the formulation of the assignments as
planning problems allow us to spawn CCPs with the student models (indicating
how the student can solve the problem) or the instructor model (indicating how the
instructor will solve the same problem) or anywhere in between (as computed by
PEM(α)). The student solution (equivalent to an explicable plan) is likely to be
suboptimal, or in most cases, not feasible in the ground truth or instructor model.
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An instantiation of PEM(α) with the HAP Ψ = 〈Ai(M), ASi (M)〉 thus allows us to
modulate the level of expertise with which a student wants to solve an assignment.
For low values of α, the ITS will recommend the smallest possible curriculum that
will just enable the student to solve the assignment (albeit suboptimally) while for
progressively higher values of α it will start recommending more and more advanced
curriculum to the point it matches the output of PEM, i.e. the optimal complete
curriculum. From the perspective of the instructor as well, the α hyperparameter
can be gradually increase from a low value to generate study materials for individual
students as the course progresses. Thus the teaching process itself can be viewed
through the lens of the model reconciliation process as one of modulation of the value
of α in the PEM(α). We shall demonstrate this in Section B.7.7.2.
Remark – To the best of our knowledge, algorithms for the on-demand curriculum
generation process driven by a specific class activity, and the argumentation process
over the curriculum with the desired expertise level of student, has not been explored
before in the ITS literature.
Composition of Student Models – Finally, we note that we can extend the model
edit functions in the PEM from just the tutorials in the class to the other student
models as well. Thus the model updates during the model reconciliation process can
be affected by either the KCs provided by tutorial or a composition of one or more
student models. The output of PEM will now provide an optimal recommendation
of tutorials and potential study partners based on the skill sets (i.e. models) of the
individual students.
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B.7.4.4 The Jigsaw Problem
The Jigsaw Problem is the process of creating smaller groups in a class for
cooperative learning [17]. It has shown to have positive effect on students learning
the course material together, and then engaging in discussions. This leads to a more
active and deeper learning in class [18]. [17] points out ten easy steps to achieve this
where the groups are created based on the ethnicity, race, gender and ability. However,
it is intractable for a teacher to reason about all the student models and create study
groups. Casting the class-level curriculum generation problem as a planning problem
allows us to generate curricula for the entire class while enabling the instructor to
specify desired properties of the curricula that needs to be maintained, such as –
- Maximum size of study groups;
- Specific assignments of students;
- No repetition (or conversely, continuation) of study partners; and so on . . .
- Here, we specifically focus on the following property – every student not only
learns but applies all concepts in the class at least once. This is especially
important in the social learning paradigm to ensure that students have mastered
all concepts and are not depended on others to finish a shared curriculum.
In order to achieve this, we define a planning problem with the start state compiled
from the class configuration C and a goal state that model a class configuration
where ∀Si : Si(κ2) = {KCi} – i.e. every student has applied all the concepts in class.
The operators are generated from the set of tutorials and assignments – the tutorial
operator has its associated KCs as effects of being learned; while assignment operators
has KCs as preconditions (that need to be learned) and effects (of those KCs having
been applied).
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Figure 73: Illustration of the different stages of a “plan” being executed by a student
in Dragoon – (1) the empty interface at the start of the problem (initial state); (2)
the first node being completed; (2) the second node being created; and finally (3) the
problem being completed with the feedback on the graph.
This formulation17 thus not only ensures that all the students have mastered all the
concepts in the class materials but also that the length of the curriculum is reduced
(from |{Si}| times the length of the curriculum for individual students) due to the
collaborations across students who can bring in complementary skill sets and transfer
knowledge. We provide an illustration of this in Section B.7.7.3.
17Note that this problem may be solved by horizon-limited planning, which is known to be
NP-complete, the horizon being equal to |{Si}| times the length of the curriculum for individual
students, which is the worst case curriculum length when no groups could be found. Thus, the jigsaw
problem does not need the full expressiveness of CPP which is known to be PSPACE-complete.
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B.7.5 Preliminary Implementation
The initial implementation of these ideas was on a simulated class that is aimed at
teaching planning concepts to an online student. The interface – Moo. – is shown in
Figure 74. The interface is build on Bootstrap (so as to provide seamless responsive
design on mobile devices as well) with support from standard JS. The backend server
is hosted with Flask. The interface has the following key components –
Your Curriculum – This suggests an optimized curriculum to the student based on
their current knowledge state, and the rest of the class. The student has options to
request curriculum based on different levels of difficulty, as well as request for other
students to be included in their curriculum. These suggestions are dynamic and are
updated as the class progresses.
Class Content – The Class Content includes the tutorials and activities that make
up the class. The activities also has provide suggestions for curricula specifically
directed to the completion of that specific activity. this is the second key component
of the project and we will elaborate on this in the use cases. The class content
includes information pertaining to an individual student’s curriculum. This may
include information related to particular assignments or tutorials (e.g. description,
prerequisites, etc.) as well as information pertaining to the social learning paradigm
(e.g. prerequisites and study partners). Prerequisites may be used externally by the
student to look for potential study partners or internally by Moo. to recommend the
same based on its knowledge of the classroom. Notice that the personalized curriculum
generated for a student has other students participating in it, in what will hopefully
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provide directed support and incentive for knowledge assimilation at the individual
level through participation at the community level.
Study Partners – Finally we have a panel which includes information (e.g. tutorials
or assignments completed) on the current team and other students in the class. The
Team Panel provides quick access to the status / progress of fellow students partners
as well as a chat feature to engage with them directly. The assignments allocated to
the individual may involve participation of one or more students from this group. Note
that the progress information is only available to other students based on whether
that particular student chose to make it publicly viewable or only viewable to their
group members or neither. The Class Panel also provides a view of the rest of the
class (and thus help a student identify potential study partners). As before, the
information regarding the status / progress of a classmate is shown to help a student
make this decision. An invite button also lets the student reach out to a potential
partner. Again, the information is displayed only if a student in the class allows it to
be externalized. Internally, Moo. uses student information from across the class to
make recommendations of potential study partners as well as dynamically generate
optimized curriculum of an individual student.
B.7.5.1 Use Case – 1
Figure 83 shows how the systems responds when requested for a curriculum for the
entire class. The interface provides two options – (1) to specify whether the student
wants other students in their curriculum; and (2) difficulty of the curriculum. As
motivated before, the planner (specifically, the CPP module) can reason with many
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Figure 74: The Moo. interface for students.
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different such features (such as whether someone was blocked by a student before,
whether students have expressed interest in the activity, etc.).
B.7.5.2 Use Case – 2
Figure 83 shows how the system responds when requested for a curriculum for
a specific class activity. Here the planner (driven by the PEM) uses a much more
detailed model of the activity and the models of the student and the instructor to
come up with the minimal set of tutorials the student needs to complete in order
to attempt the activity. As before, the student has the option to ask for potential
study partners. It also allows for a spectrum of curricula based on how much new
knowledge the student is willing to accommodate. In this specific case, the course is a
meta course on teaching how to write planning domains, and the activity in Figure 94
requires a concept of typing. Internally, the system knows how exactly to solve this
problem and what different students can contribute to different parts of the solution.
To do this it uses detailed models of the activity modeled as a planning problem to
simulate the student behavior. It uses this information to suggest different curricula.
For example, here the system is telling the student that they can attempt the activity
right away or they can also learning about typing or collaborate with another student
on it. In this case, without the knowledge of typing, it is still possible to finish the
activity albeit with a suboptimal solution.
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(a) Curriculum optimized for the student given their knowledge state and desired options
(e.g. no study partners and beginner course).
(b) Curriculum including other students (S1 contributes concepts to a joint activity).
(c) Intermediate curriculum including more advanced concepts (A5 and T0).
Figure 75: Use Case 1 showing curriculum generation for the entire course.
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Figure 76: Use Case 2 showing curriculum generation for a specific class activity.
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B.7.6 Introducing Dragoon
I will now describe our current efforts in porting these capabilities to Dragoon,
an ITS developed at Arizona State University to teach dynamic system modeling
[469] in the physical classroom setting – over the course of almost half a decade of
deployment, the system has served 13 courses with approximate class sizes of 30, with
more than a 1000 sessions per class. It is an ideal testbed for studying the nuances
of most tutoring systems that are currently deployed in classes today in the space of
mathematics, algebra or any other generic step-based tutoring systems. Figure 73
provides a snapshot of the Dragoon interface.
In dynamic system modeling, a system is a part of the environment and dynamic
system is the part of the environment that changes with time. Usually, first (or
higher) order differential equations (differentiated with respect to time) represent
dynamic systems mathematically. For simplicity of solving differential equations,
time is discretized to calculate the values of different quantities. A Model refers to a
representation of the system in a formal language.
Dragoon’s formal language is based on Stella’s stock and flow network [119]. It
consists of three different types of quantities – (1) accumulator (quantity that
changes); (2) function (quantity that may or may not change); and (3) parameter
(quantity that remains constant). These quantities are called nodes. To create a
node a student needs to define its properties – i.e. description, type, value, units and
equation. They are connected to each other by equations called relations. Students
are taught template structure for interaction between nodes, which show particular
rate of change in values called schemas – e.g. linear schema represents linear change in
values while exponential schemas represent exponential changes in values, and so on.
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Students practice on Dragoon through tutorial and assignment workbooks. A detailed
description of the Dragoon interface is out of scope of this paper (c.f. [485, 470, 471]).
B.7.6.1 The Isle Royale Workbook
We use the Isle Royale Workbook (https://goo.gl/ECrNnt) to illustrate the pro-
posed techniques. It teaches students population dynamics of moose and wolf popula-
tion and learn interactions in a predator prey environment. There are six problems in
the workbook (time step is a year) –
• Isle-1 – Linear growth model of moose population, that is constant growth of
two moose.
• Isle-2 – Exponential growth model of moose population. The problem defines
a constant growth rate which is multiplied by the population in the previous
time-step to calculate the net growth.
• Isle-3 – Exponential growth and death model of moose population. This problem
adds the a constant death rate and the change in moose population is defined
as the difference number of moose born and died.
• Isle-4 – Exponential growth and death model of moose population with a fixed
carrying capacity of the environment which effects the moose death rate.
• Isle-5 – Exponential growth and death model of Wolf Population. This model
is similar to Isle 3 problem.
• Isle-6 – Exponential growth and death model of moose and wolf population
with constant effect of wolf (predator) population on death rate of moose (prey)
and constant effect of moose population on birth rate of wolf.
Epidemic schema is sometimes confused with exponential schema. Thus, we also
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use one extra problem which models the flu epidemic in college, where flu spreads
through meetings between students. The number of students in the meeting and the
chance that a student is affected by flu is assumed to be constant.
The Zener Diode Problem – Most problems in Dragoon, are solved with a single or
unique set of steps. The only thing that changes is the sequence in which nodes are
created. However, there are few problems which can be solved in multiple ways, where
a student can change the equations in the nodes to solve the problem in lesser number
of nodes. One such problem is to model a Zener diode using Dragoon – if a student
has a more advanced understanding of circuit theory, then they can easily solve the
problem in fewer steps (i.e. using fewer nodes). We will thus use this problem to
demonstrate the usefulness of PEM(α).
B.7.7 ITS as Planning in Action
We will now illustrate how the techniques introduced in Section B.7.4 manifests
themselves on Dragoon. The first step is to construct the instructor model MI –
examples can be accessed at – https://goo.gl/cyVthK.
We used nested object types to represent different objects in Dragoon, i.e. node,
schema (KCs) and properties. Accumulator, parameter and function were of type node.
Linear, exponential, extended_exponential, carrying_capacity and epidemic were
types of schema. Description, value, type, equation and units are type of properties.
These object types were used to define the state variables which characterize the
properties that were part of a node, nodes that were part of schema, and schemas
that were part of the problem. The operators in the domain represent the actions
that are available student in the Dragoon environment. For example, a student fills
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each property to complete a node and it can be done in a fixed order. So the operator
definitions were also related to initializing a node, filling every property of the node,
completing a node and completing a schema. Students need an understanding of the
schema to fill the type and equation of the node. Thus actions for those steps have a
precondition of has_schema to create the node. Finally, the initial state consists of
all the nodes and schemas that are part of the assignment as well as the knowledge
state of the student, that is whether they understand the schemas required to solve
the problem. The goal state required that the student complete all the schemas that
are present in a given problem.
B.7.7.1 Tips and Hints
Plan Validation – Figure 77, shows the 20-step solution for Isle-2, and Figure 73
shows some of these actions in the Dragoon environment. Figure 77 presents the
incomplete attempt of the student being flagged as unsuccessful by the PVM, and
shows the error generated after executing the incomplete plan in the Dragoon interface.
Plan Recognition – Figure 78 shows the correct identification by the PRM among two
possible solutions of the Isle-3 assignment using the “exponential_growth” schema
or the “exponential_decay” schema from partial observations of the actions of the
student in Dragoon.
Landmarks – Figure 79 shows the 35 state landmarks produced by the LGM for the
Isle-3 assignment.
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B.7.7.2 On-demand Curriculum Generation
We use the same domain that we used in tips and hints. We are testing the
case where a student wants to solve the Isle-4 problem. Figure 80 shows the output
of PEM when a student expresses a desire to complete the Isle-4 assignment and
requests a curriculum for it. The explanations presents the model differences in the
initial state that prevents the student from completing the assignment at this time
and suggests tutorials to introduce these concepts. The explanation is of size 3, which
are the missing knowledge concepts (and correspond to one tutorial each) that are
needed for solving the problem in 40 steps.
Figure 81 shows how PEM(α) can be used to modulate the expertise levels of
the recommended curriculum. The complete curriculum is of size 3 after which the
problem can be solved in 17 steps. But, with lower value of α, the problem can be
solved with a longer 20 step plan. As explained earlier, even though the student
needs two knowledge concepts to solve the problem (zener_voltage_regulator and kvl
schema), but to solve the optimal plan a student needs to be an expert and improve
the equations in one of the nodes and create a better model for Zener Diode problem.
B.7.7.3 Jigsaw Problem
Here, we took an instance of a Dragoon class with 7 concepts and 9 assignments.
A single student curriculum comes out as 12 steps long, with 7 tutorials and 5
assignments. However, with the introduction of groups of two students, this reduces
to a combined curriculum of 23 steps where every student applies every concept at
least once. For every new student, plan size increases by 11 steps, showing that one of
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the assignment can be done in the group. This is shown in Figure 94, which plots the
curriculum length with increasing class sizes. In this particular class configuration,
only one of the assignments could be done in a group.
Now we study the effect of varying class configurations by the making assignments
that randomly teach up to 4 concepts. The number of concepts were fixed to 10 and
there were 20 assignments that would teach these concepts. Figure 83 shows the
curriculum length for 50 different randomly generated four student class configurations.
We observe a decrease of 3 to 7 steps in every class.
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Figure 77: Response of PVM to the correct and incorrect or incomplete attempts in
the Isle-3 problem.
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Figure 78: The output of the PRM in Isle-3 which can be solved in two separate ways.
Here the student seems to be working on the exponential_decay schema.
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Figure 79: The 35 state landmarks generated by the LGM for the Isle-3 problem.
Figure 80: On-demand curriculum generated by the PEM. This is the smallest change
to the student model required to solve the Isle-4 problem.
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Figure 81: Different plans and associated model updates generated by the PEM(α)
based on the α-hyperparameter. For a high value of α the curriculum is of size 3 after
which the problem can be solved in 17 steps. With a lower value of α, the problem
can be solved with a longer 20 step plan.
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Figure 82: Group versus individual curriculum lengths with increasing class size.
Figure 83: Group versus individual curriculum lengths with different randomly initial-
ized class configurations.
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B.8 Concluding Remarks
Of course, all these applications are built on the premise that the human (mental)
models are available or at least learned so as to facilitate the decision making process
with these model in mind. Acquiring of such models, taken for granted among
human teammates through centuries of evolution, is perhaps the hardest challenge
to be overcome to realize truly cognitive teaming. The difficulty of this problem is
exacerbated by the fact that much of these models (specifically, the human mental
model) cannot be learned from observations directly but can only be inferred indirectly
through interactions with the human in the loop.
However, while much of the work on planning has till now focused on complete
world models, most real-world scenarios, especially when they involve humans, are
open-ended in that planning agents typically do not have sufficient knowledge about
all task-relevant information (e.g., human models) at planning time – in other words,
the planning models would be incomplete. Despite being incomplete, such models
must also support reasoning as well as be improvable from sensing, i.e. learnable.
Hence, an important challenge for supporting human-aware planning across a variety
of applications is to develop representations of approximate and incomplete models
that are easy to learn (for human mental modeling) and can support planning/decision-
making (for anticipating human behavior).
Existing work on incomplete models (Figure 84) differ in the information that is
available for model learning, as well as how planning is performed. Some of them start
with complete action models and annotate them with possible conditions to support
incompleteness [331, 512, 516]. Although these models support principled approaches
for robust planning, they are still quite difficult to learn. On the other end of the
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Figure 84: Figure showing a schematic view of different classes of incomplete models
and relationships between them in the spectrum of incompleteness.
spectrum, are very shallow models [455] that assume no structured information at all
which are used mainly in short-term planning support such as action recommendation.
Partial models, that are somewhere in between, having more structured information
while still being easy to learn [501] can prove to be powerful support for goal recognition.
However, planning under such models is incomplete. In our work on explanation
generation (Section ??) we demonstrated how annotated models such as above can be
used to deal with model uncertainty, while for explicable planning [507, 252] authors
have shown how CRF/Regression/LSTM-based models can be used to learn human
preferences in terms of plan similarity metrics.
This is, however, only a start in this research direction. Performing human-aware
planning with incomplete models remains an important challenge in human-aware
planning, especially given that we do not yet understand how these different human
models interact. For example, different human models capture different aspects of the
human (e.g., capabilities [501], intentions [440] and emotions [394]) which are closely
inter-related, and it is not clear how they can be combined.
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HUMAN-ROBOT COHABITATION
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HUMAN-ROBOT COHABITATION
“But I could never figure out whether
I’m too good for you or you’re too good for me?”
In this Chapter 2, I showed how a robot can reason with the human model to come
up with plans that are “human-aware” – i.e. they respect human intentions and, if
possible, help them on their way. In that context I referred to the notion of human-
robot cohabitation where the humans and robots are sharing the same environments
(and hence their plans can interact) even though they do not have shared goals and
communication protocols to coordinate. A typical aspect of the interactions designed
in this context is to try to make sure that they are still useful without the human
planning to exploit them. In fact, as we mentioned in Chapter 2 we will see that
in some cases a successful human-aware plan would not be even perceptible from
the human’s point of view! Here we expand on this theme further, and low out the
foundational concepts in human-robot cohabitation.
C.1 Introduction: Beyond teaming . . . human-robot cohabitation!
Robots are increasingly becoming capable of performing daily tasks with accuracy
and reliability, and are thus getting integrated into different fields of work that were
until now traditionally limited to humans only. This has made the dream of human-
robot cohabitation a not so distant reality. We are now witnessing the development of
autonomous agents that are especially designed to operate in predominantly human-
inhabited environments often with completely independent tasks and goals. Examples
of such agents include robotic security guards like [244], hotel delivery robots [392],
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virtual presence platforms like [121] and [207], and even autonomous assistance in
hospitals such as [5]. Of particular fame are the CoBots in [381] that can ask for
help from unknown humans, and thus interact and receive assistance from human
agents not directly involved in their plans. It is thus a matter of when, rather than
if, robots would become ubiquitous in daily lives of humans. Thus, as autonomous
agents diversify in their capabilities, we will encounter increased interactions between
humans and robots; and we argue in [92] that many of such interactions are outside
the avenues of human-robot teams studied thus far.
Indeed there has been a lot of work in the automated planning community recently
in this area, both from a point of view of path planning in [413, 251] and task planning
in [246, 102], with the intention of making the robot’s plans socially acceptable. Even
though all of the examples discussed so far involve significantly different levels of
autonomy from the robotic agent, the underlying theme of autonomy in such settings
involves the robot achieving some sense of independence of purpose in so much as
its existence is not just defined by the goals of the humans around it but is rather
contingent on tasks it is supposed to be achieving on its own. Thus the robots in a
way become colleagues rather than teammates. This becomes even more prominent
when we consider interactions between multiple independent teams in a human-robot
cohabited environment, as shown in Figure 85. We thus postulate that the notions
of coordination and cooperation between the humans and their robotic colleagues
is inherently different from those investigated in existing literature on interaction
in human-robot teams, and should rather reflect the kind of interaction we have
come to expect from human colleagues themselves. Indeed recent work ([74, 94, 441])
hints at these distinctions. To this end, we describe, in the first part of the chapter
(Sections C.2.1 and C.2.2), a formal framework ([92]) for studying inter-team and
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Figure 85: Humans and robots sharing a workspace - there are individual teams
of one or more humans and/or robots assigned to their specific tasks, while these
agents can also interact outside their teaming environment as colleagues. As opposed
to intra-team interaction, these inter-team interactions should be possible through
minimal prior coordination (i.e. multi-agent interaction without prior coordination).
intra-team interactions in human-robot societies, and outline objectives that are useful
for designing the behavior of autonomous agents in such settings.
A typical aspect of such collegial interactions is the lack (or limited amounts) of
prior coordination and/or shared information, as we might generally assume in the
context of explicit teams. In Chapter 2, we explored two algorithms that can enable
this kind of behavior. Specifically, we looked at –
• Indirect or implicit coordination (Section 2.2): The robot modifies its planning
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process so as to respect the human’s plans ([94]) - this is indirect assistance, i.e.
if all goes according to plan the human does not even realize the effect of the
robot’s decisions! We show, in the evaluations, the pros and cons associated with
using abstractions like resource profiles, and investigate the trade-offs between
different kinds of behavior like compromise, opportunism and negotiation that
may be achieved under this paradigm.
• Direct or explicit coordination (Section 2.3): The robot provides assistance that
would be useful even when the human is not anticipating the help ([74] – e.g.
in cases when the human and the robot are not involved in a shared activity).
This requires direct intervention to the human’s plan under execution. We also
evaluate how planning for serendipity becomes more useful the more we discount
the cost of the robot’s actions with respect to the human’s, and show how there
are significant opportunities for such types of assistance in the current context.
Finally, in Section C.4, given these different forms of interaction, we investigate
how agents can pick what task to do next, on how the choice affects and is affected
by the other agents, and how this can be done independently with minimum prior
coordination ([76]). Throughout this discussion, we will also concentrate on a modular
approach towards solving these problems so that any particular challenge in plan
recognition, representation and generation can be tackled and assumption in the
approach expanded upon independently.
Illustration – To illustrate these concepts, we will be calling upon the USAR
Domain introduced previously in Section 1.3.2.1. This is illustrated in Figure 86. The
environment consists of interconnected rooms and hallways, which the agents can
navigate and search. The commander can perform triage in certain locations, for
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which he needs a medkit. The robot can also fetch medkits if requested. The shared
resources here are of course the two medkits - i.e. some of the plans the agents can
execute will lock the use of and/or change the position of these medkits, so as to make
the other agent’s plans, contingent on that particular resource, invalid.
Following from the previous discussion, imagine that the commander and the robot
both want to use a medkit for their current goal. In the event that both these agents
are self-interested, their plans might end up committing to the same medkit and one
of their plans may fail, as shown in Figure 86. Thus even though these are both
autonomous agents with independent goals, their plans are dependent purely due to
the fact that they are sharing the same environment and its resources. In the context
of the robot being human-aware then, there are two ways in which it can mitigate the
situation - 1) plan so as to avoid such resource conflicts - try to compromise on its
optimal plan by using the other medkit, or negotiate a suitable time of use (Section
2.2); or 2) plan to help the human by bringing the medkit to him - this appears as a
pleasant surprise or serendipity to the human (Section 2.3). Finally, in light of such
interactions, both positive and negative, the robot must be able to deliberate about
possible coalitions, and make an informed choice of what tasks to undertake next,
with minimum prior coordination (Section C.4).
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Figure 86: Use case - Urban Search And Rescue (USAR), with a human commander
CommX and an autonomous robot R. The medkits (necessary to do triage) are the
shared resources in the environment. Their plans are inter-dependent, even though
their goals might not be, given they are sharing the same environment.
Figure 87: Overview of topics discussed in the paper - we will talk of human-robot
societies, and modalities of interaction between teammates and colleagues inside
it. We also motivate how collegial interactions should be done with limited prior
coordination, and provide two planning algorithms that can achieve this - one where
the robot interacts directly with the human, and another where the coordination is
implicit. Finally we will discuss how such different ad-hoc modes of interaction affect
the long term autonomous behavior of an agent.
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C.1.1 Chapter Highlights
The following provides a brief overview of topics covered in this chapter –
- Section C.2 – We first develop a formal framework that provides a unified
platform to study interaction in human-robot societies and the distinctions
between robotics teammates and colleagues, and provide objectives than can
inform the design of autonomous behavior in such settings.
- In Chapter 2 we explored two modes of interaction - direct and indirect
- that can allow such autonomous agents coordinate with minimum prior
coordination, and proposed integer program based planners that can handle
such complicated interaction constraints in the robot’s deliberative process.
- Section C.4 – Finally, I will investigate how such interactions can affect the long-
term autonomy of an agent and provide a game-theoretic perspective towards
task selection policies of an autonomous agent that focuses on minimizing prior
coordination based on the mutual understanding of each others’ models.
- Section C.5 – Here, I will explore a scalable architecture DIA for the principled
design of smart environments that can reason at the task level. I will illustrate
these principles in the context of a mock smart office implemented at the United
Technologies Research Center in Berkeley, USA. This is meant to illustrate how
the human-robot cohabitation scene can unfold in a typical smart space.
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C.2 Human-Robot Society: Colleagues versus Teammates
Before we begin the discussion on human-robot teammates and colleagues, we note
that at a high enough level, agents in any environment can be seen as part of a team
achieving a high level goal. Consider, for example, your university or organization. It
consists of many individual laboratories or groups that work independently on their
specific tasks. But when taken as a whole, the entire institute is a team trying to
achieve some higher order tasks like increasing its relative standing among its peers
or competitors. So in the discussion that follows, we talk about environments, and
teams or colleagues acting within it, in the context of the goals they achieve.
Definition 1.0: A Goal-Oriented Environment is defined as a tuple E =
〈F,O,Φ,G,Λ〉, where F is a set of first order predicates that describes the envi-
ronment, and O is a set of objects in the environment, Φ ⊆ O is the set of agents,
G = {g | g ⊆ FO} 18 is the set of goals that these agents are tasked with, and Λ ⊆ O
is the set of resources that are required by the agents to achieve their goals. Each
goal has a reward R(g) ∈ R+ associated with it.
These agents and goals are, of course, related to each other by their tasks, and
these relationships determine the nature of their interactions in the environment, i.e.
in the form of teams or colleagues. The domain model Dφ of an agent φ ∈ Φ is defined
as Dφ = 〈FO, Aφ〉, as before in Section 1.3.1. We now introduce the concept of a
super-agent transformation on a set of agents that combines the capabilities of one or
more agents to perform complex tasks that a single agent might not be able to do.
This will help us later to formalize the nature of interactions among agents.
18SO is S ⊆ F instantiated or grounded with objects from O.
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Definition 1.1a: A super-agent is a tuple Θ = 〈θ,Dθ〉 where θ ⊆ Φ is a set of
agents in the environment E , and Dθ is the transformation from the individual domain
models to a composite domain model given by Dθ = 〈FO,
⋃
φ∈θ Aφ〉.
Note that this does not preclude joint actions among agents, because some actions
that need more than one agent (as required in the preconditions) will only be doable
in the composite domain.
Definition 1.1b: The planning problem of a super-agent Θ is similarly (Sec-
tion 1.3.1) given by ΠΘ = 〈Dθ, Iθ,Gθ〉 where the composite initial and goal
states are given by Iθ =
⋃
φ∈θ Iφ and Gθ =
⋃
φ∈θGφ respectively. The solu-
tion to the planning problem is a composite plan piθ = 〈µ1, µ2, . . . , µ|piθ|〉 where
µi = {a1, . . . , a|θ|}, µ(φ) = a ∈ Aφ ∀µ ∈ piθ such that δ′(piθ, Iθ) |= Gθ, where the
modified transition function δ′(µ, s) = (s \⋃a∈µ eff−(a)) ∪⋃a∈µ eff+(a). We denote
the set of all such plans of a super-agent Θ as piΘ.
The cost of a composite plan is C(piθ) =
∑
µ∈piθ
∑
a∈µCa and pi∗θ is optimal if
C(pi∗θ) ≤ C(piθ) ∀piθ s.t. δ′(piθ, Iθ) |= Gθ. The composite plan can thus be viewed as a
union of plans contributed by each agent φ ∈ θ so that φ’s component can be written
as piθ(φ) = 〈a1, a2, . . . , an〉, ai = µi(φ) ∀ µi ∈ piΘ. Now we will define the relations
among the components of the environment E in terms of these models.
Definition 1.2: At any state S ⊆ FO of the environment E , a goal-agent correspon-
dence is defined as the relation τ : G → P(Φ); G,Φ ∈ E , that induces a set of super-
agents τ(g) = {Θ | ΠΘ = 〈FO, Dθ, S, g〉 has a solution, i.e. ∃pi s.t. δ(pi, S) |= g}.
In other words, τ(g) gives a list of sets of agents in the environment that are
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capable of performing a specific task g. We will see in Section C.2.1 how the notions
of teammates and colleagues are derived from it.
C.2.1 Teams vs Colleagues
Definition 2.0: A team Tg w.r.t. a goal g ∈ G is defined as any super-agent
Θ = 〈θ,Dθ〉 ∈ τ(g) iff 6 ∃φ ∈ θ such that Θ′ = 〈θ \ φ,Dθ\φ〉 and piΘ = piΘ′ .
This means that any super-agent belonging to a particular goal-agent corre-
spondence defines a team w.r.t that specific goal when every agent that forms the
super-agent plays some part in the plans that achieves the task described by g, i.e.
the super-agent cannot use the same plans to achieve g if an agent is removed from
its composition. This, then, leads to the concept of strong, weak, or optimal teams,
depending on if the composition of the super-agent is necessary, sufficient or optimal
respectively (note that an optimal team may not be a strong team).
Definition 2.0a: A team T sg = 〈θ,Dθ〉 ∈ τ(g) w.r.t a goal g ∈ G is strong iff 6 ∃φ ∈ θ
such that 〈θ \ φ,Dθ\φ〉 ∈ τ(g). A team Twg is weak otherwise.
Definition 2.0b: A team T og = 〈θ,Dθ〉 ∈ τ(g) w.r.t a goal g ∈ G is an optimal
assignment iff ∀Θ′ ∈ τ(g), C(pi∗θ) ≤ C(pi∗θ′).
This has close ties with concepts of required cooperation and capabilities of teams
to solve general planning problems, introduced in [502], and work on team formation
mechanisms and properties of teams [411, 445]. In this paper, we are more concerned
about the consequences of such team formations on teaming metrics. So, with these
different types of teams we have seen thus far, the question we ask is: What is the
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relation among the rest of the agents in the environment? How do these different
teams interact among and between themselves?
Definition 2.1: The set of teams in E are defined by the relation κ : G → R(τ); G ∈ E ,
where κ(g) ∈ τ(g) denotes the team assigned to the goal g, ∀g ∈ G.
This, then, gives rise to the idea of collegiality among agents, due to both inter-
team and intra-team interactions. Note that how useful or necessary such interactions
are will depend on whether the colleagues can contribute to each other’s goals, or to
what extent they influence their respective plans, which leads us to the following two
definitions of colleagues based on the concept of teams.
Definition 2.2a: Let κ(g) = 〈θ1, Dθ1〉, κ(g′) = 〈θ2, Dθ2〉 be two teams in E . An agent
φ1 ∈ θ1 is a type-1 colleague to an agent φ2 ∈ θ2 when κ′(g) = 〈θ1 ∪ φ1, Dθ1∪φ1〉 is
a weak team w.r.t. the goal g.
Definition 2.2b: Agents φ1, φ2 ∈ Φ are type-2 colleagues if ∀κ(g) = 〈θ,Dθ〉 s.t.
{φ1, φ2} ∩ θ 6= ∅, {φ1, φ2} 6∈ θ ∧ κ′(g) = 〈θ ∪ {φ1, φ2}, Dθ∪{φ1,φ2}〉 is a weak team.
Thus type-1 colleagues can potentially contribute to the plans of their colleagues,
while type-2 colleagues cannot. Plans of type-2 colleagues can, however, influence each
other (for example due to conflicts on usage of shared resources), while type1-colleagues
are capable of becoming teammates dynamically during plan execution.
Finally, in order to accommodate the human in the loop, we represent the set of
agents θ in a super-agent as composition of humans and robots θ = h(θ)∪ r(θ) so that
the domain model of the super-agent is also a composition of the human and robot
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capabilities Dθ =
⋃
φ∈h(θ)
⋃
φ∈r(θ) Aφ = h(Dθ) ∪ r(Dθ). We denote the communication
actions of the super-agent as the subset c(Dθ) ⊆ Dθ.
C.2.2 Objectives for Human-Robot Cohabitation
We will now ground popular metrics for human-robot teams from [336, 429, 188,
191] in our current formulation, and discuss additional metrics useful for quantifying
general forms of interaction in human-robot cohabitation.
C.2.2.1 Task Effectiveness
These are existing metrics that measure the effectiveness of a human-robot team
in completing its tasks.
• Cost-based Metrics19 - This simply measures the cost
∑
g∈κ−1(Θ)C(pi
∗
Θ) of
all the (optimal) plans a specific team executes (for all the goals it has been
assigned to).
• Net Benefit Based Metrics19- This is based on both plan costs as well as
the value of goals and is given by
∑
g∈κ−1(Θ)R(g)− C(pi∗Θ).
• Coverage Metrics19- Coverage metrics for a particular team determine the
diversity of its capabilities in terms of the number of goals it can achieve |κ−1(Θ)|.
In the current context of collegial interactions, the measures for task effectiveness,
in addition to the above, must also take into account that agents are not necessarily
19For more details, please refer to [336].
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involved in their assigned team task only, so we introduce the following new metrics
for quantifying task effectiveness as follows –
• Altruism – This is a measure of how useful it is for a robotic agent r to
showcase altruistic behavior in assisting their human colleagues, and is given
by the ratio of the gain in utility by adding a robotic colleague to a team
Θ to the sum of decreases ∆ in utility of plans of the teams r is involved in
|pi∗Θ − pi∗〈θ∪r,Dθ∪r〉|/
∑
Θ=〈θ,Dθ〉 s.t. r∈θ ∆|pi∗Θ|. For such a dynamic coalition to be
useful, r must be a type-1 colleague to the agents θ ∈ Θ.
• Lateral Coverage – This measures how deviating from optimal team composi-
tions can achieve global good in terms of number of goals achieved by a team,
LT =
∑
Tg=κ(g),∀g∈G {[|κ−1(Tg)| − |κ−1(T og )|]/|κ−1(T og )|} across all the teams
that have been formed in E .
• Social Good – Many times, while planning with humans in the loop, cost
optimal plans are not necessarily the optimal plans in the social context. This
is useful to measure particularly when agents are interacting outside teams, and
the compromise in team utility is compensated by the gain in mutual utility of
colleagues. This can be expressed as
∑
g∈G{C(piκ(g))− C(pi∗κ(g))}.
C.2.2.2 Team Effectiveness
These measure the effectiveness of (particularly human-robot) teaming in terms of
communication overhead and smoothness of coordination.
• Neglect Tolerance19– This measures how long the robots in a team Θ are
able to perform well without human intervention. We can measure this as
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NT = max{|i− j| s.t. h(Dθ)
⋂
φ∈θ pi
∗
Θ(φ)[i : j] = ∅}.
• Interaction Time19– This is given by IT =
∑ |{i | c(Dθ) ∩ pi∗Θ[i] 6= ∅}|, and
measures the time spent by a team Θ in communication.
• Robot Attention Demand19– Measures how much attention the robot is
demanding and is given by RAD = IT
IT+NT
.
• Secondary Task Time19– This measures the “distraction” to a team,
and can be expressed as time not spent on achieving a given goal g, i.e.
STT = |{i | pi∗Θ[i]← ∅ ∧ δ′(pi∗Θ, s) |= g}|.
• Free Time19– FT = 1−RAD is a measure of the fraction of time the humans
are not interacting with the robot.
• Human Attention Demand19– HAD = FT − h(STT ) where h(STT ) =
|{i | pi∗Θ[i] ∩ h(Dθ)← ∅ ∧ δ′(pi∗Θ, s) |= g}|/|pi∗Θ| is the time humans spend on the
secondary task.
• Fan Out19– This is a measure of the communication load on the humans, and
consequently the number of robots that should participate in a human-robot
team, and is proportional to FO ∝ |h(θ)|/RAD.
• Interaction Time19– Measures how quickly and effectively interaction takes
places as IT = NT (1−STT )
STT
.
• Robot Idle Time19– Captures inconsistency or irregularity in coordination
from the point of view of the robotic agent, and can be measured as the amount
of time the robots are idle, i.e. RIT = |{i | r(Dθ) ∩ pi∗Θ[i] = ∅}|.
• Concurrent Activity19– We can talk of concurrency within a team as the time
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that humans and robots are working concurrently CA1 = |{i | r(Dθ) ∩ h(Dθ) ∩
pi∗Θ[i] 6= ∅}| and also across teams as the maximum time teams are operating
concurrently CA2 = max{|{i | piΘ[i] 6= ∅ ∧ piΘ′ [i] 6= ∅}| ∀Θ,Θ′ ∈ R(κ)}.
In measuring performance of agents in cohabitation, both as teammates and
colleagues, we would still like to reduce interactions times and attentions demand,
while simultaneously increasing neglect tolerance and concurrency. However, these
metrics do not effectively capture all the implications of the interactions desired in
human-robot cohabitation. While the following metrics are all relevant for robotic
colleagues in general, they become particularly important in human-robot interactions
where information is often not readily sharable due to higher cognitive mismatch, so
as to reduce cognitive demand/overload.
• Interaction Time – In addition to Interaction Time for human-robot teams,
and measures derived from it, we propose two separate components of interaction
time for general human-robot cohabitation scenarios.
- External Interaction Time – This is the time spent by agents interact-
ing with type-1 colleagues (EIT1).
- Extraneous Interaction Time – This is the time spent by agents
interacting with type-2 colleagues (EIT2).
• Compliance – This refers to how much actions of an agent disambiguate its
intentions. Though relevant for both, this becomes even more important in
the absence of teams, when information pertaining to goals or plans are not
necessarily sharable. Thus the intention should be to maximize the probability
P (Gθ = g | s = δ(piθ[1 : i], Iθ)), κ(g) = 〈θ,Dθ〉,∀g ∈ G given any stage i of plan
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execution and P (·) is a generic goal recognition algorithm. This can be relevant
both in terms of disambiguating goals [233] or explaining plans given a goal [508].
• External Failure - This is the number of times optimal plans fail when resources
are contested among colleagues. EF = #{δ(pi∗Θ, IΘ) |= ⊥},
⋃
g∈G Γ(g, κ(g)) 6= ∅.
• Stability – Of course with continuous interactions, team formations change,
so this gives a measure of stability of the system as a whole. If teams κ(g) =
〈θ1, Dθ1〉 and κ(g) = 〈θ2, Dθ2〉 achieves a goal g ∈ G at two different instances,
then stability S =
∑
g∈G |θ1 ∩ θ2|/|θ1||θ2|.
C.3 Chapter 2 Debrief
In Chapter 2 we built on these principles and demonstrate the usefulness of the
proposed metrics in quantifying behavioral traits as desirable among cohabiting human
and robots. (c.f. Table 15)
C.3.1 Implicit Coordination: Planning with Resource Conflicts
While planning with resource conflicts, the robot is a type-2 colleague and cannot
contribute to the human’s plans. Going back to the objectives discussed in Section
C.2.2, the criterion we are trying to minimize here is External Failure, given by F .
The cost of the plan is a consequence of planning for Social Good – the combined cost
in this case may be higher than the sum of individual optimal plans; but we have
ensured success of individual plans by considering global interactions. This can of
course be improved by using limited communication for negotiation; this will be a
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Coordination Algorithm Objectives
Indirect Planning with Resource Conflicts Social Good, External Failure,
Extraneous Interaction Time
Direct Planning for Serendipity Altruism, Lateral Coverage,
External Interaction Time
Table 15: Modes of MIPC investigated in the dissertation.
trade-off between Social Good and (mostly) Extraneous Interaction Time since the
robot does not have anything to contribute to the human’s plan as a type-2 colleague.
C.3.2 Explicit Coordination: Planning for Serendipity
In planning for serendipity the robot is useful as a type-1 colleague. Here we
are designing for Altruism in autonomous robots, which in this case is given by the
difference in cost of the composite plan and the individual optimal from Table 4. As
would be expected, there are more opportunities, and it is also less costly, for the
robot to be altruistic the cheaper its actions are. There are also greater opportunities
for altruism with the additions of limited forms of communication to the relationship,
which in this case manifests as External Interaction Time, since the robot can make
useful contributions to the human’s plan as a type-1 colleague. The latter also implies
that such newly formed coalitions can achieve more goals than originally planned for,
thus providing a opportunity to increase lateral coverage.
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C.4 Long-term Autonomy: Planning for Goal Selection
Remember, we envisaged an environment where humans and robots participate
autonomously with their own set of tasks and require minimal coordination in doing
so. So the question is, given the set of tasks, how can an agent proceed to select
which one to achieve next? This problem cannot be simply solved by picking the
goal with the highest individual utility, because the utility, and sometimes even the
success of the plan (and hence the corresponding goal) of an agent are contingent
on the intentions of the other agents around it. Moreover, as we saw in the Sections
2.2 and 2.3, there are many possible modes of interaction between such agents that
needs to be accounted for before the agents can decide on their best course of action
- both in terms of which goal to choose and how to achieve it. In this section we
model this problem of optimal goal selection as a two player game, and propose to
cut down on the prior coordination for forming such ad-hoc coalitions by looking for
Nash equilibriums or socially optimal solutions, because neither agent participating in
such coalitions would have incentive to deviate.
C.4.1 Formulation of GAPI
We refer to our static two-player strategic game Goal Allocation with Perfect
Information as GAPI = 〈Φ, {Aφ}, {Uφ}〉. The game attempts to determine, given
complete information about the model and goals of the other agent, which goal to
achieve and whether forming a coalition is beneficial. It is defined as follows -
- Players - The game has two players Φ = {H,R} the human commander H and
the autonomous robot R respectively.
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- Actions - The actions of the agents in the strategic game are the goals that
they can select to achieve. Thus, for each agent φ ∈ Φ we define a set of goals
Gφ = {G1φ, G2φ, . . . , G|G
φ|
φ } ⊆ G, and the action set Aφ of the agent φ is the
mapping that assigns one of these goals as its planning goal, i.e. Aφ : Gφ 7−→ G.
Note that this is distinct from the action models defined in PDDL for each
of the individual agents (which helps the agent figure out how this goal G is
achieved, and the resultant utility).
- Utilities - Finally, as discussed previously, the utility of an action depends on
(apart from the utility of the goal itself) the way the agent chooses to achieve
it, and is contingent also on the plans of the other agent (due to, for example,
resource conflicts), and is given by -
UH(A
H
i , A
R
j ) = R(G
i
H ∪GjR)−min{C(pi∗H), C(pi∗Θ(H))}
UR(A
H
i , A
R
j ) = R(G
i
H ∪GjR)− C(pi∗Θ(R)) if C(pi∗H) > C(pi∗Θ(H))
= R(GiH ∪GjR)−max{C(pi∗R), C(pi∗Θ(R))}, otherwise.
where, pi∗H is the optimal plan or solution of the planning problem defined by
ΠH = 〈FO, DH , IH ,GiH〉, pi∗R is the optimal solution of ΠR = 〈FO, DR, IR,GjR〉,
and pi∗Θ is the optimal solution of ΠΘ = 〈FO, Dθ, Iθ,Gθ〉, where Θ = 〈θ,Dθ〉 is the
super-agent representing the coalition formed by θ = {H,R} with Iθ = IH ∪ IR
and Gθ = GiH ∪ GjR. Here, the first term in the expression for utility denotes
the utility of the goal itself as defined in the environment in Section ??, while
the second term captures the resultant best case utility of plans due to agent
interactions. More on this below.
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C.4.2 Human Centric Robots
At this point we make an assumption about the role of the robots in our human-
robot society - we assume that the robots exist only in the capacity of autonomous
assistance, i.e. in coalitions that may be formed with humans and robots, the robot’s
role is to improve the quality of life of the humans (by possibly, in our case, reducing
the costs of plans) and not vice versa.
Thus, in the expression of utility, the human uses a minimizing term - with no
interactions C(pi∗H) = C(pi∗Θ(H)), otherwise C(pi∗H) > C(pi∗Θ(H)). Similarly, in case
of the robot, with no interactions C(pi∗R) ≥ C(pi∗Θ(R)) and C(pi∗H) <=> C(pi∗Θ(H))
otherwise, since the interactions may or may not be always cooperative for the robot.
Note that this formulation also takes care of the cases when the robot goal becomes
unachievable due to negative interactions with the human (this is why we have the
maximizing term; the difference is triggered due to negative interactions with the
human plan in the absence of coalitions). Also, note that the goal utility is using a
combined goal due to the particular action profile. This captures cases when goals
have interactions, i.e. a conjunction of goals may have higher (or lower) utility than
the sum of its components.
Now that we have defined the game, the question is how do we choose actions for
each agent? Remember that we want to find solutions that will preclude the need
to coordinate. We can take two approaches here - we can make agents individually
rational (in which case both the human and the robot looks for a Nash equilibrium, so
neither has a reason to defect; or we can make the agents look for a socially optimal
solution (so that sum of utilities is maximized).
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C.4.3 Solving for Nash Equilibriums.
As usual, the Nash equilibriums in GAPI are given by action profiles 〈AHi , ARj 〉
such that UH(AHi , ARj ) ≥ UH(AHk : ∀k 6=i, ARj ) and UR(AHi , ARj ) ≥ UH(AHi , ARk : ∀k 6=j).
It is easy to prove that there is no guaranteed Nash equilibrium in GAPI. We will
instead motivate a slightly different game GAPI-Bounded where the robot only agrees
to deviate from its optimal plan up to a certain degree, i.e. there is a bound on the
amount of assistance the robot chooses to provide.
Definition 6.0 – The differential help ∆(g,GiR) provided by the robot R with goal
GiR ∈ GR, when the human H picks goal g ∈ GH , measures the decrease in utility of
the robot upon forming a coalition, and is given by ∆(g,GiR) = |C(pi∗Θ(R))− C(pi∗R)|,
where pi∗R is the optimal solution of ΠR = 〈FO, DR, IR,GiR〉, and pi∗Θ is the optimal
solution of ΠΘ = 〈FO, Dθ, IH ∪ IR, g ∪GiR〉, where Θ = 〈θ = {H,R}, Dθ〉.
Thus in GAPI-Bounded the utility function is modified from GAPI as follows –
UH(A
H
i , A
R
i ) = R(G
i
H)− C(pi∗H)
UR(A
H
i , A
R
j ) = R(G
j
R)− C(pi∗R)
if ∃Gk : k 6=jR ∈ GH s.t. ∆(GiH , GjR) > {R(GjR)−C(pi∗R)}−{R(GkR)−C(pi∗∗R )}, where pi∗R,
pi∗∗R and pi∗H are the optimal solutions to the planning problems ΠiR = 〈FO, DR, IR,GjR〉,
ΠkR = 〈FO, DR, IR,GkR〉 and ΠH = 〈FO, DH , IH ,GiH〉 respectively; and otherwise –
UH(A
H
i , A
R
i ) = R(G
i
H)− C(pi∗Θ(H))
UR(A
H
i , A
R
j ) = R(G
j
R)− C(pi∗Θ(R))
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where pi∗Θ is the optimal solution of ΠΘ = 〈FO, Dθ, IH ∪ IR, g ∪GjR〉, where Θ = 〈θ =
{H,R}, Dθ〉. This means that if the penalty that the robot incurs by choosing to
assist the human is so great that it could rather do something else instead (i.e. choose
another goal), then it switches back to using its individual optimal plan, i.e. no
coalition is formed. If the individual optimal plans are always feasible (otherwise these
do not participate in the Nash equilibrium), the following holds.
Claim – 〈AHi∗ , ARj∗〉 must be a Nash equilibrium of GAPI-Bounded when
j∗ = arg maxGjR∈GR R(G
j
R)− C(piR) and i = arg maxi UH(GiH , Gj
∗
R ).
Proof Sketch – Let us define the utility function of the robot R for achieving a goal
g ∈ GR by itself as τ(g) = R(g) − C(pi∗R), where pi∗R is the optimal solution to the
planning problem ΠR = 〈F,O, DR, IR, g〉. Further, given the goal set GR of the robot,
we set Gj
∗
R = arg maxg∈GR τ(g), i.e. G
j∗
R corresponds to the highest utility goal that the
robot can achieve by itself. Now consider any two goals GjR, G
j∗
R ∈ GR, GjR 6= Gj
∗
R . We
argue that ∀GiH ∈ GH , UR(AHi , ARj∗) ≥ UR(AHi , ARj ). This is because τ(Gj
∗
R ) ≥ τ(GjR)
and by problem definition ∀i, k |UR(AHi , ARj∗)−UR(AHk , ARj∗)| ≤ τ(Gj
∗
R )− τ(GjR). Thus,
in general, the goal ordering induced by the function τ is preserved by the utility
function UR, and consequently ARj∗ is a dominant strategy of the robot. It follows that
AHi∗ such that i∗ = arg maxi UH(GiH , G∗R) is the corresponding best response for the
human. Hence 〈AHi∗ , ARj∗〉 must be a Nash equilibrium. Hence proved. 
Further, it may be noted here that there may be many such Nash equilibriums
in GAPI-Bounded and these are also the only ones, i.e. all Nash equilibriums in
GAPI-bounded must satisfy the conditions in the above claim.
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C.4.4 Solving for Social Good
Similarly, the socially optimal goal selection strategies are given by the action
profiles 〈AHi∗ , ARj∗〉 where {i∗, j∗} = arg maxi,j UH(AHi , ARj )+UR(AHi , ARj ). The socially
optimal action profiles may not necessarily correspond to any Nash equilibriums of
either GAPI or GAPI-Bounded.
C.4.4.1 Individual Irrationality and −Equilibrium.
Given the way the game is defined, it is easy to see that the socially good
outcome may not be individually rational for either the human or the robot, since
the robot always has the incentive to defect to choosing G∗R and the human will
then choose the corresponding highest utility goal for himself. This leaves room
for designing autonomy that can settle for action profiles 〈AH
iˆ
, AR
jˆ
〉 referred to as
-equilibriums, for the purpose of social good, i.e. |UH(AHi∗ , ARj∗)− UH(AHiˆ , ARjˆ )| ≤ 
and |UR(AHi∗ , ARj∗)− UR(AHiˆ , ARjˆ )| ≤ . Note that this deviation is distinct from the
concept of bounded differential assistance we introduced in Section ??.
C.4.4.2 Price of Anarchy.
The price of deviating from individual rationality is referred to as the Price of
Anarchy and is measured by POS = UH(A
H
iˆ
,AR
jˆ
)+UR(A
H
iˆ
,AR
iˆ
)
UH(A
H
i∗ ,A
R
j∗ )+UR(A
H
i∗ ,A
R
j∗ )
.
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C.4.5 Formulation of GAPI-Bayesian.
As we have seen till now, the mode of multi-agent cooperation is not unique,
and the robot’s type influences the nature of the coalition being formed. To model
this uncertainty, we define a two-person static Bayesian game GAPI-Bayesian =
〈Φ,B, AH , {AR,B}, UH , {UR,B}〉 with belief B over the type of robot as follows –
- Players - We still have two players - the human H and the robot R.
- Actions - The actions of the players are similarly identical to GAPI, i.e. the
action set of agent φ ∈ {H,R} is the mapping Aφ : Gφ 7−→ G.
- Beliefs - The human has a set of beliefs on the robot B = {B1, B2, . . . , B|B|}
characterized by the distribution B ∼ P , i.e. the robot can be of any of
the types in B with probability P (B). The type of the robot is essentially
the algorithm it uses to compute the optimal plan given the initial state and
goal, and thus affects the cost of achieving the goal, and hence the utility function.
- Utilities - The utilities are defined as –
UH(A
H
i , A
R
j ,B) = R(GiH)− C(pi∗Θ(H)|B)
UR(A
H
i , A
R
j ,B) = R(GjR)− C(pi∗Θ(R)|B)
where symbols have their usual meaning.
C.4.5.1 Illustration
Let’s now go back to our running example and see how the proposed approach can
cut down on the need for prior coordination. Figure 88 shows as example scenario
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Figure 88: Computing Nash equilibriums cuts down on the possible tasks an agent
should consider, given interactions with other agents in its environment.
where the robot has a set of medkit delivery locations and the human has a set of
triage locations as tasks each of them needs to achieve. Given that the robot can
chose to be either self-interested or human-aware (in this simple case we consider two
types individual and joint optimal) the extensive form of the Bayesian game is shown
(utilities are plan costs as per the GAPI formulation). Here the NE (red) or the social
optimal (blue) show how the relevant goals that need deliberation are cut down to
significantly reduce the need for prior coordination, while the dominated choice is also
an instance of positive interaction that the agents can undertake without need for
negotiation since it is in the interests of both agents to follow the dominated strategy.
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C.4.6 Future Work
In conclusion, in this section, we proposed a formal framework for analyzing,
quantifying and designing autonomous behavior of robotic agents deployed in human
workspaces, contributing to what we refer to as human-robot societies. We argued
how interactions in such environments are inherently different from the ones studied
in traditional human-robot teams, due to challenges like minimal shared information
and prior coordination. We proposed metrics by which aspects of such behavior may
be captured, and provided two algorithms using which robotic agents can participate
in stigmergic collaboration with humans. We also look at how these ideas can inform
the goal selection process of an agent in such environments, from the perspective of
minimizing prior coordination. Finally we demonstrated the usefulness, applicability
and trade-offs of the proposed planning algorithms by empirical evaluations on the
USAR domain. We believe that this work opens up many interesting avenues of
further research, some of which we discuss below.
C.4.6.1 Nested Models and Human Factors
One interesting future research direction would be to consider nested beliefs on
the agents; after all, humans are rarely completely aloof of other agents in its environ-
ment. Such interactions should have to consider evolution of beliefs with continued
interactions and motivate further exploration of the belief modeling component. The
modularity of the proposed approach allows for focused research on each (individu-
ally challenging) subtask without significantly affecting the others. Further, it will
be interesting to evaluate how much (and if at all positively) humans respond to
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serendipitous assistance, through human factor studies. Indeed, such human factor
studies can provide crucial insight on how the quantitative metrics discussed here are
complemented by qualitative feedback from humans.
C.4.6.2 Multi-stage Coalition Formation
Bayesian modeling of coalition formation lends to several interesting possibilities,
and promising directions for future work, with respect to how interactions between
humans and robots in an environment evolve with time.
1. Unrolling the Entire Game. Notice that we formulated the game such that each
of the agents φ has a set of goals Gφ to achieve. Thus GAPI immediately lends
itself to a finite horizon dynamic game unrolled maxφ∈Φ |Gφ| times, so that the
agents can figure out their most effective long-term strategy and coalitions.
Finding optimal policies in such cases will involve devising more powerful
approximations, and the ability to deal with issues such as synchronization and
coalitions evolving across individual goal allocations. For GAPI-Bayesian, this
also includes the ability to model evolving beliefs, as we will discuss below.
2. Impact of intent recognition - evolving utilities. Often the behavior of the robot
depends on understanding the intent(s) of its human counterpart. Thus the
utilities will keep evolving based on the actions of the human after the goal has
been selected. This is even more relevant in scenarios where communication is
severely limited, when the agents in a coalition are not aware of the exact goals
that the other agents have selected.
3. Impact of Intent Recognition - evolving beliefs. Intent recognition has a direct
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effect on the belief over the robot type itself - e.g. as the human observes the
actions of the robot, it can infer which behavior the robot is going to exhibit.
Thus intent recognition over the robot’s actions will result in evolving belief of
the human, as compared to intent recognition over the human’s activities which
informs the planning process and hence the utilities of the robot.
4. Implications of implicit preferences. Finally, as agents interact over time, in
different capacities as teammates and colleagues, their expectations over which
agent is likely to form coalitions (and of what type) will also evolve. This will
give the prior belief over the robot type that the human starts with, and will
get updated as further interactions occur.
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C.5 Human-Robot Cohabitation: The Smart Office
Centralized architectures for systems such as smart offices and homes are rapidly
becoming obsolete due to inherent inflexibility in their design and management. This
is because such systems should not only be easily re-configurable with the addition
of newer capabilities over time, but should also have the ability to adapt to multiple
points of failure. Fully harnessing the capabilities of these massively integrated systems
requires higher level reasoning engines that allow them to plan for and achieve diverse
long-term goals, rather than being limited to a few predefined tasks. In this section,
we propose a set of properties that will accommodate such capabilities, and develop
a general architecture for integrating automated planning components into smart
systems. We show how the reasoning capabilities are embedded in the design and
operation of the system, and demonstrate the same on a real-world implementation of
a smart office. At the end of this section, we will look at how this architecture can be
adopted for the deployment of human-aware algorithms in human-robot cohabitation
settings such as a smart homes or offices.
C.5.1 Introduction
The last decade has seen increasing interest in massively integrated systems that
incorporate capabilities of sensing and actuation in order to adapt and respond to its
environment dynamically. Popular examples of such systems include smart offices and
smart homes and the closely related notion of Internet of Things. As these systems,
collectively referred to as “smart systems", become more and more advanced in their
capabilities, and are able to assimilate increasingly complex components into their
344
Figure 89: Illustrative scenario in a smart office environment. The system dynamically
senses and re-evaluates its capabilities, and dispatches the unassigned telepresence
robot to compensate for the loss of display in the conference room.
ecosystem, the major technological challenges faced are mainly in issues involving the
integration of the diverse elements and functionalities, and providing them autonomy.
Figure 89 depicts an illustrative smart office environment. When the TV screen
in the conference room is plugged in for the first time, the office should detect the
addition of this new component, and complete the setup (resource allocation and
integration) automatically, and understand that the conference room now has screen-
casting abilities. This is referred to as plug & play design. Suppose now that the
setup malfunctions and the screen is incapable of displaying anymore. The smart
office may now deploy a video collaboration robot to the conference room in order to
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resume the interrupted meeting. To do this the smart system must be equipped with
the ability to sense the change in environment and reason at a high level about the
proper response to this change. We postulate that the building blocks of such systems
should be in the form of modular, self-aware micro-agents that can reason about their
capabilities and the state of the environment, and achieve tasks independently or as
a group. Further their design should be modular so as to be able to efficiently deal
with the dynamic nature of the environment, as well as be abstracted to high level
functionalities so as to handle the diversity of their internal implementations.
C.5.2 Related Work
The integration of AI in smart rooms was first conceptualized in the MIT Intelligent
Room Project [53]. Since then, the question of intelligent architecture design of ubiq-
uitous systems has been explored extensively, most notably in Anand Ranganathan’s
seminal work [365] on context-aware middleware design of pervasive systems. The
adoption of automated planning technology in Gaia [364] was certainly a first step
towards augmenting high level reasoning capabilities in such environments. However, a
recent study from [452] on the state-of-the-art in design of IoT environments identifies
still persisting deficiencies in smart architectures, especially in terms of semantics of
abstract APIs of system components and their generic high level reasoning capabili-
ties. Indeed, while there has been significant interest in design of architectures for
integrating task planning capabilities, especially in robotics applications, in recent
times [64, 301], there is still a large void to be filled when it comes to general purpose
multi-agent embedded systems. The main aim of this work is thus to outline a
346
framework for integration of high level reasoning engines in a smart system in order
to facilitate general distributed long-term decision making. To this end, we –
- outline three principles - plug & play, modular and intelligence - for the design
of smart systems.
- show how agents may follow abstract messaging protocols to reason and com-
municate with each other, without accessing their internal implementations.
- create a prototype smart office model based on the discussed principles, and
provide use cases and video demonstrations to illustrate these properties.
While some of these ideas have been investigated before, especially in the context
of hardware, we will primarily focus on how the same principles may be applied in a
unified manner at the higher level APIs as well.
C.5.3 Plug & Play Modular Intelligent Agents
We argue that for smart systems to have the kind of functionalities discussed thus
far, they should be designed to have three basic properties, as follows -
Semantic Plug & Play – This enables a system to
- Discover and integrate (i.e. resource allocation of) new components into the
system automatically.
- Re-evaluate and update capabilities as the system components evolve with time.
- Deal with the dynamics of connection, e.g. individual components plugging in
and out of the system due to network failures, internal failures, etc.
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This concept of plug & play is consistent with the traditional notion of plug & play
in computing, that facilitates the discovery and integration of hardware components
(e.g. hotplug systems like USB and IEEE 1394 FireWire) usually during boot-time
without requiring manual device configuration [487].
At the same time we argue that the for a truly smart system, the traditional notion
of plug & play must extend to automatic dynamic re-configuration of hardware. We
refer to this as semantic plug & play, wherein the system not only accommodates
seamless hardware integration but also integration, at the API level, of abstract
capabilities that may be reasoned with at a high level.
Intelligence – Finally, by intelligence, we mean that
- Components of the system should be able reason about the current state of the
environment, and the agents in it, in order to coordinate with other units in its
ecosystem and achieve long-term tasks or goals.
- The reasoning capabilities should be realized in both centralized and decentral-
ized fashion. This is critical as the system grows in complexity in order to lower
communication overhead and be suited to the limited computational power of
embedded units and avoid redundancy or backtracking during planning.
Modular – A smart system is inherently distributed in nature - both physically and
in terms of capabilities. Thus the architecture must itself be able to support
- Device agnosticism and, consequently, easy configuration across diverse plat-
forms and hardware implementations.
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- Handling of multiple points of failure, which is critical in such massively
integrated systems, while also leveraging redundancies of fault-tolerant design.
- Agents capable of performing local computation. From the task planning
standpoint, often only a small subset of the agents are required to complete a
task. Further, the entire system capabilities is mostly not required by every
single agent to compute its own contribution to the global plan. Thus making a
centralized plan, or even planning individually with complete models, is often
not necessary to achieve satisfactory performance.
The need for both centralized and decentralized reasoning engines is complimentary
to a distributed approach to architecture design. Note, however, that the notion of
a distributed architecture is distinct from whether the reasoning algorithm itself is
distributed. Further, we will restrict ourselves to deterministic sequential planning as
the primary reasoning capability, but the ideas discussed here can be easily extended
to accommodate other forms of reasoning engines.
C.5.4 Proposed Architecture Design
Now we describe the general principles involved in our architecture design, that
we will adopt in our smart system.
C.5.5 Shared Communication Channel
The core of the architecture used is a single communication substrate as illustrated
in Figure 90. All the individual components of the system or agents are plugged
into this shared communication layer, and they communicate between each other
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Figure 90: General system architecture.
using abstract message classes. Both the description of the agents and the messages
they use to communicate is at an abstracted level, that does not interfere with the
actual implementation of the system’s communication layer. Thus, the communication
substrate can be swapped out and replaced with a different one, and the API’s for
the agents and message classes will remain exactly the same. Each agent, however,
has a Communication Agent (CA) built into it that acts as the interface to the
communication layer. Thus the communication agent itself is implementation specific,
and needs to be reconfigured according to the environment.
C.5.6 Communication Protocols
The abstract message classes provide a common language for the agents to commu-
nicate with. This closely follows the specifications of agent communication language
(ACL) laid out by the IEEE Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA) in
[451]. This language is defined by 11 performative types that perform their specific
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performative type typical functions
agree - reply with plan proposal (from actuator)
cancel - cancel existing commitment
refuse - refuse deployed request
request
- request plan from Plan Requester
- request plan from Planner
- request execution of plan
- request Actuator to execute
- request for state/goal update
call for proposals - broadcast call for plan proposals
propose - reply with plan proposal (from planner)
accept - accept proposal
reject - reject proposal
inform - inform action model on activation- update self state
query - ask for information from the UI
confirm - monitor action / plan execution- relay observations
Table 16: Abstract message classes - types and usage.
roles during an information exchange. The types of messages used in the paper and
their typical roles are described in Table 16.
We use ROS [352] as our communication substrate. All agents are plugged into a
central ROS server, and they communicate with each other using ROS messages. The
abstract message API thus acts as a wrapper for the lower level ROS messages. The
Communication Agent implements a ROS node that publishes and subscribes to the
appropriate topics. Each of the message types have their specific global ROS topic
that all agents have access to, where messages of corresponding type are published.
Though the roles of the message types are specified as part of the language description,
the semantics of a particular message is decided by the agent that processes it.
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C.5.6.1 Centralized Planning
The architecture for centralized planning is shown in Figure 91a. The agents
plugged into the shared communication substrate are of three basic types - some
of them handle the user interface (keyboard), some are capable of interacting with
the environment (different types of actuators like the camera, the mobile base and
stationary sensors) while the rest of them deal with the reasoning tasks of the system.
This framework supports centralized planning since global agents deal with specific
tasks of the planning process, and all agents report and hear back from these.
C.5.6.2 Decentralized Planning
The previous architecture is now adopted to facilitate decentralized planning
capabilities in Figure 91b. Actuators (i.e. any agent that can influence the environment)
are equipped with their own Domain Maintainer and Planner which enables them to
build their own plans. The processing of a plan request and execution is still done in
centralized fashion so that proposals from individual agents can be evaluated. Note
that these agents can be either a single agent or an agent ecosystem as in Figure 95.
C.5.7 Agent Ecosystem
We will now describe the architecture illustrated in Figure 91 and the hierarchy of
implemented agent classes in Figure 92.
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(a) Centralized system design - agents have access to a central planning engine via the
communication substrate.
(b) Decentralized system design – now the actuators have their own planners and domain
maintainers that are able to perform local computation.
Figure 91: System architecture.
353
C.5.8 The Base Agent
The Base Agent (BA) is the basic agent class that all other agents inherit from. It
has abilities to send/receive messages with the help of the communication middleware
attached to it, and can perform basic processing on these messages. The Base Agent
(and the higher order agents that inherit from it) determine how a specific message
type is processed, and the communication middleware invokes these responses by
accessing callback methods inside it when an appropriate message is received.
The Communication Agent (CA) is the interface between the Base Agent API
and the communication substrate. The primary functionality of the CA is thus
to assist in the relaying of messages back and forth between agents through the
shared communication channel. The CA also has special callback functions that
alert its parent agent about specific messages addressed to it. The CA can also
perform secondary tasks such as listening to the communication channel for agent
heartbeats, perform queue operations on agent death/activation or in response to
messages processing, cache broadcast messages for processing, and so on.
C.5.9 The Reasoning Engine
The Reasoning Engine consists of agents concerned with task planning and execu-
tion, with the help of which the system can reason with models of its components at a
high level without accessing their internal implementation. In the distributed version,
the agents can continue using the same components to compute plans locally – only
the architecture and communication protocols change. Four specific agents make up
this reasoning engine –
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The Plan Requester agent sets up a request for plan computation (upon request
from either the user or some other agent) and calls the Planning Agent for a plan.
The plan request compiles all the state and domain information that may be required
to solve a planning problem.
The Planning Agent computes the actual plan (and replies back with the plan and
plan status), given a plan request from the Plan Requester with specific domain and
problem descriptions. Currently it is integrated with the state-of-the-art planners
FAST-DOWNWARD [185] and Metric FAST-FORWARD [190].
The Plan Executor agent is tasked with interfacing with Actuators. It receives a
request for a plan to be executed, transforms these higher level actions into lower level
methods that the specific actuators have access to, and sends specific action requests
to the concerned agents. It is also responsible for plan monitoring and error handling
during execution of a plan.
Domain Maintainer is tasked with maintaining the evolving capabilities of the
system. These may be both global or local capabilities according to whether the
centralized or distributed architecture is being used. It can inform the reasoning
engine about changes to the current state, goal/cost function, and available actions
and observations. This is the agent that is primarily responsible for managing the
plug & play mechanism of the system by listening to the heartbeat of agents and
re-evaluating the system capabilities dynamically. The agent models are currently
represented in PDDL [295] – the PDDL support afforded by the system is the same as
that of the underlying planning software being used.
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C.5.10 Actuators
Actuators inherit the Base Agent functionalities and add capabilities for interaction
with the environment (e.g. sensing and actuation). They can also announce their
self-capabilities to the system (by broadcasting their action models at regular intervals
– this is referred to as its heartbeat and is initiated when it first becomes active) and
execute actions within advertised capability when requested. Specialized actuators
inherit from the basic Actuator class –
The TurtleBot is a mobile base - it can move between (pre-defined) poses in the
map. It can also carry non-stationary sensors. The onboard laptop also contributes
to the distributed keyboard interface to the users.
A PTZ Camera can move (PTZ), record video, snap pictures, and detect motion
[265]. Its controls are also accessible through the keyboard interface.
A Temperature / Humidity Sensor reports temperature at its current location
(stationary agent).
A Temperature IR Sensor reports temperature at its current location (variable,
when mounted on a mobile base).
Other Sensors – The platform supports a wide variety of sensors, including CO2
Sensor, Motion Sensor, IR Distance Adapter with Sharp Sensor, Wide Range Light
Sensor, IR Reflective Sensor, etc. All these sensors are stationary and need to connect
to a SBC. We also have integration capabilities directly to the computer with a
mini-USB port through a SBC Interface Kit (however, this requires power).
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Figure 92: Agent class hierarchies.
C.5.11 User Interface
The user interface is through the keyboard (and maintained by the Keyboard
Agent). The keyboard offers a simple platform for users to request plans or actions
from the system. It also provides simple tools for debugging. One additional advantage
of using the keyboard is that it can be conveniently distributed across the system
through multiple shared screens. Currently the central server and also the laptops
on the mobile bases shares the keyboard interface (e.g. through tmux). In terms
of specific capabilities, through the Keyboard Agent the user can (1) request for
plans/actions; (2) modify state or goal descriptions; and (3) respond to information
requests from agents.
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C.5.12 Flow of Control in Centralized Plan Execution
We will now illustrate an example of flow of control within the agents for centralized
planning (Figure 93a). The setting consists of stationary temperature sensors at various
locations, and mobile bases with on-board sensors.
- Initially all sensors are active and broadcasting their action models. The Domain
Maintainer compiles these into a composite high level model of the system.
- The User requests a requirement (e.g. report temperature from all locations)
through the Keyboard Agent, which it forwards on to the Plan Requester.
- The Plan Requester receives the request, complies the requirement into a
planning problem, and requests a plan from the Planning Agent.
- The Planner computes a plan (which involves every sensor reporting their
measurements from their corresponding locations) and responds back to the
Plan Requester, which forwards it to the Executor.
- The Plan Executor goes through the actions in the plan sequentially, translates
them into lower level methods of the agents involved, and dispatches these action
requests to the appropriate actuators (it requests every stationary temperature
node to respond with their measurements).
- The Executor receives confirmation of execution success from the actuator and
moves on to the next action in the plan. The plan execution is complete when
the Executor has received acknowledgments from all the sensors.
- Now some of the stationary sensors become inactive. The Domain Maintainer
detects the missing heartbeats and updates the system capabilities to reflect the
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loss of these agents. A new plan request is formed, and the above procedure
ensues again, until finally, the Executor dispatches mobile bases to compensate
for the loss of stationary sensors.
- The way the mobile bases are allocated tasks depends on action costs and map
of the environment (which is reflected in the problem and domain descriptions
compiled by the Domain Maintainer).
C.5.13 Flow of Control in Decentralized Plan Execution
The flow of control in the decentralized scenario is slightly different since their is
no single global Planner and Domain Maintainer. This means that the Plan Requester
has to adopt an interactive procedure with the agents to come up with a global
solution, as illustrated in Figure 93b.
- As before, the user requests for a goal through the Keyboard, which forwards
the request to the Plan Requester.
- The Requester now sends out a call for proposal to every agent plugged into the
system by means of a broadcast.
- Each agent receives the request for a plan and computes a plan to address the
goal(s) mentioned in the request. The agent does this by invoking its internal
planner which has access to local domain knowledge as compiled by its personal
Domain Maintainer agent.
- The agents who are able to contribute a plan respond to the call for proposal
with the proposed plan.
- The Plan Requester listens to the communication channel and accumulates
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the plan proposals it receives. After the wait time is over, it goes through the
cached responses and selects the cheapest candidate for execution.
- The Requester dispatches this plan to the Plan Executor and the rest of the
control flows as described previously in case of the centralized system.
C.5.14 Demonstrations
The video recordings of these demonstrations could not be made avail-
able for public release. Our smart environment, shown in Figure 94, consists of two
office rooms and one conference room (each equipped with a stationary temperature
sensor) connected by a single corridor (that has a PZT camera equipped with motion
detection). The corridor is patrolled by a mobile base, which is a TurtleBot that also
carries an IR temperature sensor. The positions of these agents are shown in the
figure. Besides, there are users who can also interact with the system.
Scenario 1 – The goal here is to collect temperature measurements from all rooms.
Office2 and confroom are equipped with stationary sensors but office1 is not - so
the system dispatches the TurtleBot to report temperature from office1. This shows
how the system can reason with the state of the environment and higher level models of
its components to achieve goals. When the temperature sensor in office2 goes down,
the system detects this and re-evaluates its capabilities automatically and dispatches
the TurtleBot to office2 instead. The plug & play architecture comes into use here
as the system adapts and re-plans in response to the the evolving circumstances.
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(a) Flow of control in centralized plan execution.
(b) Flow of control in decentralized plan execution.
Figure 93: Interaction diagrams illustrating flow of information among agents in the
ecosystem as per the communication protocols described above.
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Figure 94: Primary testbed - layout of a smart office environment equipped with
a PZT camera, stationary temperature sensors and a mobile base (TurtleBot) with
onboard sensors.
Scenario 2 – Now the sensor in confroom goes down, and the system adapts and
replans accordingly. This again shows how the system responds not only to evolving
capabilities but also to changing environment and (maintenance) goals.
Scenario 3 – We now emulate a simple access control mechanism, where the camera
detects movement at the entry and requests for the person entering to be validated.
The system dispatches the TurtleBot to the location so that the person can log in
through the on-board screen. Here the agents themselves respond to the changing
environment and request for a plan update. This is also an instance where the user
gets to interact with the system through the distributed interface.
Distributed Communication Substrate – As the number of agents increase, the com-
munication load on a single ROS master will eventually become prohibitive. One
way to alleviate concerns of scalability is to adopt different ROS masters for each
agent ecosystem, as seen in Figure 95, where groups of agents are using their own
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Figure 95: Separate ROS masters for each agent ecosystem, with the Interfacing Node
(IN) acting as the mediator for common channels of communication.
ROS substrate as described in this paper; these separate ecosystems interact with
each other through Interfacing Nodes (IN) to share messages of mutual interest. This
architecture will not only deconflict identical ROS topics across ecosystems, but also
preclude the need for ROS namespace mappings, and privatize topics that does not
involve other agents.
Distributed Planning – The protocols for decentralized planning discussed in this
paper will only work, of course, for non-disjunctive goals and when agents will not
require mutual cooperation. However, the same protocols can support sharing of other
information too, such as domain models, state information, etc. We can thus equip the
Plan Requester with more sophisticated plan processing algorithms, like auctioning
and merging [45], to come up with a full-fledged distributed planning protocol. Given
the framework can already support this, this also opens pathways to leverage existing
literature in planning by distributed search. [48].
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C.5.15 Extensions
As smart agents such as the ones described here are deployed into real world
settings, interactions with humans become inevitable. This requires integration of
the human as yet another agent in the multi-agent architecture so that the latter
can interact with the system, as well allowing a mechanism for the platform to
track the activities of the human and act appropriately. Figure 96 illustrates a
preliminary implementation form [388] of such a system as an Android application
that achieves both the above purposes. Such an interface is especially convenient due
to the ubiquitous presence of mobile phones nowadays - an user can just install the
application and get plugged into the system with minimal setup. This, implemented
by Gabriel Saba during his Honor’s Thesis [388], allows for easy integration of the
human-in-the-loop into the robot’s ecosystem and pathways for easy integration of
human-aware algorithms such as the ones introduced in the dissertation.
A video of the multi-robot system [388] demonstrating the dynamic drop-in/out
and replanning capabilities can be seen at https://goo.gl/34yRDp.
- Graphical interface to the system - Figure 96a shows the interface on the mobile
application - the map shows the current position of the agent(s); while panels
dedicated to individual agents (here - Fetch and PeopleBot) in the environment
show the tasks they are currently involved in. Other panels can provide the
human goals to achieve or actions to execute. The user also has access to a
status button using which they can update the system on the outcome of the
current task or action. We use the indoor positioning system from [204] to
localize precisely in an indoor setting (since just GPS information by itself
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doesn’t provide enough granularity). The floor map of the environment (as seen
in the snapshot of the application in Figure 96b) is situated to the map of the
environment (as seen in Figure 96a) - which, in this case, is the 5th floor of the
Computer Science Department at Arizona State University, where the later
system was deployed.
- Human as a plug & play agent - The system can listen to pings from the
mobile device with the status of the human user and her position, and other
relevant data - this forms the heartbeat of the human user. Thus, the human
can be accessed as yet another actuator with its own unique capabilities by
the centralized architecture, which can now incorporate her into the reasoning
engine and delegate relevant tasks. As mentioned above, such communications
occur through the GUI described in the previous section.
- Monitoring of human in the loop - Finally, the system can use the heartbeat
to passively monitor the activities of the human and use these observations
to inform its own deliberative process. The system can thus listen to these
observations (in addition to data available from other devices like the PTZ
camera in Scenario 3 before) and spawn goals for itself based on the desired
mode of planning. As a preliminary implementation, we interface to the goal
recognition system outlined in [132] for this purpose. This can be useful to
perform human-aware planning in a variety of situations as outlined below in
the discussion on future works.
A demonstration of the integration of the human-in-the-loop into the system can
be accessed at https://youtu.be/TABvMlF7jo4.
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(a) Secondary testbed - map of BYENG 5th floor (Computer Science Department, ASU)
with the Fetch and the PeopleBot as the two mobile autonomous agents shown in the inset.
The human is plugged into the system via the Android application shown below.
(b) Interface to the system for the human user using the Android application - the map of
the environment displays the current location of the agent, while separate panels display
goals or actions assigned to the human as well as the other agents in the environment. The
user can respond to a request with the status button.
Figure 96: Integration of the human in the loop through the Android application -
either as another agent accessible to the ecosystem in the plug and play paradigm or
just as an interface to someone sharing the same environment.
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C.6 Concluding Remarks
Although we are still far from agents or robots that reach human level intelligence,
our views on their relationships with humans are likely to change as more intelligence
is built into these agents. Instead of considering them as tools (as in the case of
remotely controlled robots), we will start to view them as teammates and colleagues,
as depicted in this paper. In such cases, the interaction between humans and agents
are likely to deviate from the traditional command-and-control paradigm and move
towards long-term and more natural means of collaboration, similar to that between
humans and humans. In this chapter, we recognize the need for the proper design
of the long-term decision making component of such autonomous agents, in terms
of how they interact with other agents in their environment, and investigated this
new paradigm from the perspective of automated planning. We hope that our work
will provide guidance and spur discussion for well-informed design of autonomy in
symbiotic human robot systems of the future.
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EMERGING LANDSCAPE OF INTERPRETABLE PLANNING
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EMERGING LANDSCAPE OF INTERPRETABLE PLANNING
“The man standing next to me, his head was exploding.
Well, I was praying the pieces wouldn’t fall on me!”
There has been significant interest in the robotics and planning community of late
in developing algorithms that can generate behavior of agents that is interpretable to
the human (observer) in the loop. This notion of interpretability can be in terms of
goals, plans or even rewards that the human is able to ascribe to the agent based on
observations of the latter. While interpretability remains a significant challenge in
developing human-aware AI agents, such as assistive robots. This is also emphasized
in the Roadmap for U.S. Robotics [99] – “humans must be able to read and recognize
robot activities in order to interpret the robot’s understanding”. However, the work
in this area has typically lacked coherence on the topic from the community as a
whole, even if not in the research agenda of different research groups [79, 125, 277], per
se. Indeed, a quick scan of the existing literature reveals algorithms for “explicable”,
“legible”, “predictable” and “transparent” planning with overlapping, and sometimes
conflicting, semantics. The same can be said of a parallel thread of work on the
“deception”, “privacy” and “security” of plans. This brief survey thus attempts to
provide a workable taxonomy of relevant concepts that can hopefully provide some
clarity and guidance to future researchers looking to work on the topic.
In the following, we will introduce a general framework for describing the space
of problems in “plan interpretability” and outline how existing works have addressed
different aspects of this in cooperative and adversarial settings. Finally, we will end
with a discussion on gaps in the proposed framework that are yet to be explored in
existing literature.
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D.1 Model differences with the Observer
The key challenge in generating interpretable behavior is the ability to account for
the model of the observer. This can be summarized as follows –
• An agent’s actions may be uninterpretable when it does not conform to the
expectations or predictions engendered by the observer model. Thus, the agent,
to plan for interpretable behavior, must not only consider its own model but
also the observer model and the differences thereof. [79, 125]
This “model” can include the beliefs or state information of the agent, its goals
and intentions, its capabilities or even its reward function. It can also include
the observation model as well as the computational capability of the observer. A
misunderstanding or mismatch on any of those accounts will mean that the plan or
policy, as expected by the observer (given their cognitive capabilities), will not be the
same as that computed by the agent, and will thus be difficult to interpret from the
observer’s point of view. We will outline in the rest of this writeup how existing work
on the topic addresses one or more of these contributing factors, especially the goals
and plans20 ascribed to the agent by an observer.
Table 17 formalizes these considerations in the modeling of the agent A and the
observer Θ in terms of –
20It is useful to note at this point that in this particular paper, we talk of behavior and plan in
the same breath. In general, behavior can be seen as a particular instantiation of a plan or policy
(which, in its general form, can have loops, contingencies, abstractions, etc.) or a policy. However,
most of the works surveyed here have used the term plan to primarily refer to behavior. We will also
stick to that convention – i.e. all the discussion here is confined to behaviors observed or ascribed to
the agent by the observer in the loop.
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(a) Legibility/transparency. (b) Explicability. (c) Predictability.
Figure 97: A simple illustration of the differences between plan explicability, legibility
and predictability. In this Gridworld, the agent can travel across cells, but cannot go
backwards. The Figure on the left illustrates a legible plan (green) in the presence
of 3 possible goals of the agent, marked with ?s. The red plan is not legible since
all three goals are likely in its initial stages. In the parlance of transparent planning,
the first action in the green plan can constitute a transparent plan (having conveyed
the goal). The Figure in the middle illustrates an explicable plan (green) which goes
straight to the goal G as we would expect. The red plan may be more favorable to
the agent due to its internal constraints (the arm sticking out might hit the wall), but
is inexplicable (i.e. sub-optimal) in the observer’s model. Finally, the Figure on the
right illustrates a predictable plan (green) since there is only one possible plan after it
performs the first action. In the parlance of “t-predictability”, this is a 1-predictable
plan. The red plans fail to disambiguate among two possible completions of the plan.
Note that all the plans shown in the Figure on the right are explicable (optimal in the
observer’s model) but only one of them is predictable – i.e. explicable plans may not
be predictable. Similarly, in the Figure in the middle, the red plan is predictable after
the first action (even though not optimal, since there is only one likely completion)
but not explicable – i.e. predictable plans may not be explicable. Without a prefix in
the Figure in the middle, the green plan is the only predictable plan.
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• Planning Problem: Π = 〈Domain Theory = M,Current State =
I,Goal State = G〉
• Plan: pi is a solution to the planning problem Π emitting an observation
sequence 〈o〉 |= pi. p˜i is a partial plan whose completion set is denoted by {p˜i}.
• Computational Model: χ ∈ {S = Sound, SF = Satisficing, O =
Optimal, C = Complete}
• Completion Model: δ(s, pi, χ) 7→ sˆ captures whether a state s′ is reachable
from the state s following a plan pi subject to the computation model (e.g.
δ(I, pi, O) 7→ G implies pi is an optimal solution to Π);
• Observation Model: Ω : a× s 7→ o associates a token emitted for a particular
action and next state pair.
D.1.1 The Completion Model and “Interpretability”.
Thus an agent’s model (and the corresponding observer model) can account for
beliefs, goals, capabilities and even computation power. In such a formulation, the
notion of completion is intrinsically related to the interpretability question – the
completion of a plan or policy, e.g. optimality or maximization of utilities of a
rational agent, in that model is equivalent to whether they are interpretable given the
assumptions on the model and computation power of the agent and the observer. The
exact nature of the interpretation task – e.g. goals versus plans of the agent – may
vary, as we discuss next.
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D.2 Goals versus Plans
Most of the distinctions surrounding the interpretability21 of agent behavior has
to do with the disambiguation of goals versus plans [127]. As mentioned in Table 17,
explicability and predictability have been traditionally looked at as a property of a
plan given a goal while legibility is discussed in the context of a set of goals in the
observer model.
D.2.1 Explicability versus predictability.
We begin with “plan explicability” as introduced in [80, 506, 507, 253, 256].
Explicability measures how close a plan is to the expectations of the observer,
given a known goal.
Thus the objective of explicability is to be in the set of solutions to the observer’s
understanding of a planning problem. In Table 17, the explicable plan is thus one
that has a completion in both the agent and the observer model, though when the
observer model is not know this is difficult to compute with certainty. In that sense,
explicability becomes a spectrum, where closer to completed plans in the observer
model are deemed more explicable. Plan predictability, on the other hand, deals with
whether there are non-ambiguous completions of a plan prefix [127, 147, 256].
Plan predictability reduces ambiguity over possible plans, given a goal.
Table 17 highlights this distinction with the additional minimization term over the
21Explicability, legibility and predictability of plans is a spectrum, i.e. one plan can have more
“X”-ability than another. In the rest of the discussion, unless otherwise mentioned, we will refer to
the end of that spectrum, whenever such a plan exists, (e.g. most explicable plan) when we mention
an explicable, legible or predictable plan.
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cardinality of the possible plan set in the observer model. This makes it clear that
predictability is again a spectrum and –
An explicable plan can be unpredictable.
An example would be when there are multiple explicable plans, i.e. many com-
pletions in the observer model, so that there is still work to be done in making sure
that the observer can anticipate which plan it is that the agent is going to execute. If
this can be achieved, then that specific plan would be both explicable and predictable.
Similarly –
A predictable plan (in the online setting) can be inexplicable in the offline
setting.
This is possible when, given a prefix (during online plan execution), the observer
can tell exactly what plan the agent is executing but the entire plan is still not one
that s/he might expect it to (i.e. it does not follow the completion model of the
observer). For example, in [147] the actions in the plan prefix of length t can be
arbitrary and inexplicable as long as the postfix is predictable. This is also true for
transparent [277] plans as well. This phenomenon is readily seen in [84] where the
agent produces suboptimal plans that are easier to predict. Figure 97 provides another
example. More on this later in the discussion on online versus offline interactions.
D.2.2 Legibility.
So far we have discussed explicability and predictability of plans under the condition
of known goals only. Plan legibility, on the other hand, is defined as –
Plan legibility reduces ambiguity over possible goals that are being achieved.
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The notion of legibility of goals has remained consistent across existing literature
[124, 127, 256]. and is equivalent to the notion of transparency of plans [277]. To the
best of our knowledge, plan explicability / predictability and legibility has not been
considered together (i.e. with ambiguity over goals and plans simultaneously).
Remark. Interestingly, as Table 17 highlights, even though both predictability and
explicability assume known goals, the goal known to the observer may not be the
actual true goal of the agent and yet plans may be predictable or explicable. For
example, the agent could really be doing something else but also achieve the expected
goal with the desired behavior in the process. The ability to communicate enables
authors in [80] to handle expectations under conditions of misunderstood goals as well.
However, the notion of explicability remains identical as one of generating expected
behavior with a shared understanding of the goal. Similarly, for legibility to occur,
there needs to be only some mapping between the agents goal and the possible goal
set which may not contain the real goal of the agent.
D.2.3 Online versus offline interactions.
The actual setup of the interaction – i.e. online or offline – makes a big difference
to the explicability versus predictability discussion. This is because explicability and
predictability of a plan are non-monotonic, a plan prefix deemed inexplicable can
become explicable with the execution of more actions and vice versa, either due to
the observer being an imperfect planner due to computational limitations or due to
implicit updates to the mental model based on the observations. The online case
of explicability can then be seen in terms of the plan prefix – i.e. if its completion
belongs to one of the explicable (completions in the observer model) or not. On the
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other hand, the offline case does not exist for plan predictability, which is a property
of the plan suffix. However, in the online case, before the execution starts (i.e. with
no prefix) a predictable plan has to be one of the explicable plans. With a prefix,
that may no longer be the case, as discussed above (this is considering the definition
explicability in the existing work on the entire plan).
Note that, similar to the concept of predictability, legibility of plans is more useful
in the online setting since it may be easy to deduce the real goal from the final state
after completion of the plan. Though, even in such cases, when the goals (which are
not usually fully specified) are not mutually exclusive, legible plans can help. Like
explicability and predictability, legibility also shares the non-monotonicity property.
D.2.4 Motion versus Task Planning
One of the biggest points of difference in many of these works is in the nature
of the target domain – i.e. motion planning [124, 127, 126] versus task planning
[507, 253, 497, 277]. From the algorithmic perspective, this is simply differentiated in
usual terms – e.g. continuous versus discrete state variables. However, the notion of
plan interpretability engenders additional challenges. This is because a reasonable
mental model for motion planning22 can be assumed to be one that prefers shorter
plans and thus need not be modeled explicitly (and thus does not need to be acquired
or learned). For task planning in general, this is less straightforward. In fact, work
on explicable task planning [507, 253, 497] has aimed to learn this implicit model
using feedback from humans on instances of plans in particular tasks. A particularly
22While this is true for path planning in general, complex trajectory plans of manipulators with
high degrees of freedom might still require modeling of observer expectations.
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degenerate instance of this occurs when these model are assumed to be identical
[277, 256] (this is the case in motion planning, by default).
Given how humans can have vastly different expectations in the case of task
planning, it is unclear how useful mental models learned from crowd feedback (as
done in [507, 253, 497]) can be in the case of individual interactions.
D.2.4.1 Motion planning in discrete space.
Authors in [147] make an attempt to bridge this gap. However, their domain of
interest remains motion planning (discretized with way-points). The TSP-formulation
over explicit graphs used in [147] are unlikely to generalize as a feasible solution to the
task planning problem. Indeed, the examples we provide in Figure 97 are formulated in
a discrete task planning setting, are cases that can be interpreted as motion planning
problems to the observer and do not typically model the complexity of task planning
domains.
D.2.5 Computational Capability
The discussion is, of course, contingent on the computational capability of the
observer, as modeled in the completion function in Table 17. There has been surpris-
ingly little work to address this. Authors in [147] approximated the human model
with Boltzmann noisy rationality. Motion planning, again, can permit assumption
of “top-K” rationality while the computational model of the human is less clear in
the task planning scenarios, i.e. domains with combinatorial properties (one can
conceive of, for example, models of depth-bounded humans that constrains the space
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of plans in the mental model). While almost all of the related work [80, 277] has
assumed perfectly rational (super-)humans, models learned [507, 253] from feedback
from human-subjects are likely to implicitly model computational limitations of the
human mental model.
D.2.6 Discussion
In the following discussion, we will touch upon a few other points of distinction
and interesting connections to related works that appear in this emerging landscape
of legible, explicable and predictable agent behavior.
D.2.6.1 Learning the Observation Model.
The original work on explicability in task planning [506, 507] and subsequent works
that build on it [497, 165] attempt to learn the observer model when it is unknown.
This is the only attempt to do so in the existing literature. They postulate that the
explicability23 can be measured in terms of whether the human observer is able to
associate higher level semantics to actions in the plan. While this approach has its
merits, it also arguably conflates explicability with predictability – e.g. just because
someone is able to assign task labels to individual actions in a plan does not necessarily
mean they would have expected that plan.
23[507] uses “explicability” and “predictability” as measures towards achieving the same objective
of producing plans closer to human expectation. This is somewhat misleading in the current context,
though the notion of predictability used there for the disambiguation of the plan suffix remains
consistent.
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D.2.6.2 Observability.
The concepts of explicability, predictability and legibility are intrinsically related
to what is observable. In most of the existing work, the plan has been assumed to
be completely observable. When this is not the case, the agent can try to ensure
that unexpected actions are not observable and thus still be explicable. Interestingly
most of the work in cooperative settings have worked with full observability while
highlighting model differences. Later we will see that in the adversarial setting existing
work mostly focuses on the observation model while assuming the rest of the agent’s
model is aligned with that of the observer.
D.2.6.3 Longitudinal effects.
All of the work on the topic of interpretable behavior has, unfortunately, revolved
around single, and one-off, interactions and little attention has been given to impact
of evolving expectations in longer term interactions. There is some reason to suspect
that the need for explicable behavior will diminish as humans become accustomed
to the “quirks” of the agent. After all, to paraphrase George Bernard Shaw, “the
world conforms to the unreasonable man”! This is, however, not a concern for legible
and predictable behavior since, even with complete model alignment, the topic of
coordination remains relevant.
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D.2.6.4 Explanatory actions.
In recent work [421], authors have explored the notion of “explanatory actions” as
actions that can have epistemic effects. These are actions that can affect the observer
model. Plans that are made explicable with the use of explanatory actions are, of
course, never predictable – i.e. one cannot predict that an explanatory action will occur
during a behavior, but its presence can make the whole behavior explicable. Thus,
in this view, the set of possible explicable plans, not all of them may be predictable.
But, as we discussed before, all the predictable plans at the start of plan execution
have to be explicable. We will discuss later how such explanatory actions can end up
impacting the observation model.
D.2.6.5 Human-agent Collaboration.
Note that most of the discussion till now has featured a human as a passive
observer. However, in most scenarios, the human is likely to be a collaborator or,
at the least, their behavior is going to be contingent on that of the agent. While
explicability helps this cause, predictable behavior can arbitrarily (and negatively)
effect the human when considered in isolation. Indeed, human factors studies of plan
predictability versus legibility [126] are consistent with this concern, demonstrating
that legibility is more desirable in a collaborative setting. Recent work [497] has
started to take these considerations into account.
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D.2.6.6 On preference versus expectations.
There is considerable prior art on incorporating human preferences in robotic
behavior, or plans in general. Indeed, the distinction between preferences and expec-
tations is rather subtle. The former can be seen as constraints imposed on the plan
generation process if the agent wants to contribute to the human’s utility – “What
would Jesus want me to do?” – while the latter looks at how the agent can adapt its
behavior in a manner that the human would expect it to (as required by the human
mental model) – “What would Jesus expect me to do?”. As we mentioned before, in
the case of motion planning, there is often no such distinction. Even in the case of
task planning – for example, in “human-aware” planning where an agent decides not
to vacuum while the elderly are asleep [245] – sometimes it may be hard to identify
where exactly the constraints lie, with preferences (“I don’t want vacuuming while I
am asleep”) or expectations (“I don’t expect the agent to be designed to vacuum at
odd hours”). Ultimately this distinction might not make a difference algorithmically.
The agent would need some process of performing multi-model argumentation (with
its own model and the human mental model) during its planning process [80].
The lines do become even more blurred in experiments, unless carefully constructed,
where human subjects are asked to label data with their expectation (i.e. how to ensure
that they are not providing their preference instead?). Unfortunately, experimental
design in [507, 253] is noticeably susceptible to this.
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(a) Simulation (b) Dissimulation
(c) Deception: Simulation versus Dissimulation. (d) Obfuscation: Privacy vs Security.
Figure 98: A simple illustration of different goal obfuscation behaviors. Figure (c)
shows different forms of deceptive behavior in red – in simulation or “hiding the
truth” (Figure (a)) the agent could be going to either of the three possible goals
while in dissimulation or “showing the false” (Figure (b)) the likelihood of a decoy
goal is strictly higher than that of the real goal. The green plan in Figure (a) is a
truthful plan. Figure (d) illustrates the difference between privacy and security of goal
obfuscating plans. Here the observer cannot observe the actions of the agent in the
first row of the grid due to occlusions. The red and green plans are both 2-ambiguous
and privacy preserving – the former allows for {G1, G2, G3} while the latter allows
for {G2, G3} as possible goal sets for the agent assumed to be rational. However a
secure algorithm cannot flip from the red to the green plan when rerun with G2. This
is allowed under privacy preserving and deceptive plans but not in secure plans – i.e.
the red plan is the only secure 2-ambiguous solution.
D.3 Turning the Tables
So far we have talked about works that aim to reveal the intentions of the agent
to an observer. In a cruel twist of “human awareness”, the agent can use the human
mental model and/or the observation model to hide its intentions as well, in an
adversarial sense. In the following, we compare and contrast recent work in the
planning community in this direction. Many of the discussions, of course, carry over
from our treatise of plan explicability, predictability and legibility.
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D.3.1 Goals versus Plans
Similar to the previous discussion on predictability/explicability versus legibility,
an agent can consider obfuscation of its goals and/or its plans. The goal obfuscation
problem is the inverse of the legibility problem, while plan obfuscation is the inverse of
the predictability problem discussed previously. Also similar to the previous discussion,
it is easy to see that obfuscation of one (goal or plan) may not necessarily obfuscate
the other. Unsurprisingly, they can be viewed under a unified framework, as explored
recently in [256]. Most of the existing work in this area has revolved around goal
obfuscation (under the various names of privacy, deception and security) as outlined in
Table 17. Interestingly, these ideas has evolved out of two parallel threads of research
– one [234, 235, 290, 277] from the seminal work on goal recognition design [232] and
the other [256, 254] from the earlier work on plan explicability [507, 80, 253]. The
connections between these diverse range of topics have hopefully become apparent at
this point.
D.3.2 Motion versus Task Planning
The distinction between motion and task planning again makes an appearance
in the techniques used to approach these problems if not in the formulation of the
concepts themselves. Particularly, authors in [290] arrive at a computationally efficient
proxy to the likelihood of possible goals given a state and trajectory that is not
necessarily available [289] to the task planning setting. A similar computation used in
[254] turns out to be incomplete.
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D.3.3 Online versus Offline
Intuitively, the obfuscation problem is much more appealing in the online case
since some of the motivation in obfuscating plans (such as in evading a pursuit or
escaping surveillance) is lost after the plan is done. This is particularly the case for
plan obfuscation in case of full observability, if not entirely true for goal obfuscation
(c.f. discussion on predictability and legibility in offline settings). However, there
is a rich set of problems to explore even in an offline setting [256, 254] once the
observation model becomes noisy or incomplete. An offline analysis also allows for the
determination of prefixes, if not entire plans, that can preserve privacy [235]. Most
often, partial solutions (or fully obfuscating prefixes) is all that is achievable.
D.3.4 The Observer and the Observation Model
One of the most important variables in this thread of work is the observation
model. The notion of obfuscation and privacy immediately follows from settings with
partial observability [234, 256, 254]. However, as seen in [290, 232], the notion of
obfuscation and privacy is still relevant to fully observable settings, especially in the
online case.
The observer model also plays a critical role in this regard. Particularly, some of
the surveyed works [290, 235] have modeled a rational (more powerful) observer where
P (G | 〈o〉) follows the distribution computed by a plan recognizer (i.e. χΘ = O‘), while
others [256, 254] has considered an observer with a complete planner, i.e. P (G | 〈o〉) = 1
if a plan exists that satisfies the observation, 0 otherwise (i.e. χΘ = C). Interestingly,
in contrast to explicability or legibility and predictability, in the cases of goal or plan
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obfuscation, none of the surveyed works have scratched the surface of model differences
between the agent and the observer beyond the particulars of the observation model
and the computation model of the observer.
D.3.5 The Many Flavors of Security, Privacy, Obfuscation, (Dis-)Simulation and
Deception
The most interesting aspects of obfuscating behavior is the different notions of
privacy, security and deception. We highlight the salient differences in Figure 98.
D.3.5.1 Obfuscation and Privacy
These are synonymous in the existing literature [235, 256] in attempting to make
multiple goals likely or possible given a set of observations. This is an inversion of
the legibility problem – as highlighted in Table 17, the minimizing term has flipped.
Authors in [235] look at pair-wise likelihood of goals in maintaining privacy, while [256]
provide a more general formulation for “k-ambiguous” solutions. This has implications
on the security of the obfuscating algorithm, as we discuss below.
D.3.5.2 Security and Privacy
The notion of security in plans [254] builds on the concept of “independence of
inputs” [430, 271] which requires (in this specific context) that the planning algorithm
return the same output or plan regardless of which obfuscated goal it is run with as
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the real goal so that an adversary cannot determine the real goal by rerunning the
algorithm. Thus –
A secure plan is always private.
This imposes an additional constraint to the privacy problem – as highlighted in
Table 17, all possible goals must now lend to the same observation tokens.
D.3.5.3 Obfuscation and Deception
Finally, in goal (or plan) obfuscation, the primary goal is to not reveal the true
intentions, but not necessarily actively mislead. This distinction between simulation –
“hiding the truth” – versus dissimulation – “showing the false” – was made in [290].
In the case of the latter, not only are multiple goals likely given a plan prefix but a
decoy goal is also more likely than the real one. Deception, in general, can include
both. It is clear from the discussion that –
A deceptive plan is always obfuscating, but may or may not be dissimulating.
A more detailed discussion of this distinction can be found in [290].
D.4 Discussion
In the following discussion, we make connections to a parallel thread of work –
“model reconciliation” – and outline possible directions for future work.
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D.4.1 Communication and Model Reconciliation
Most of the discussion in this paper has revolved around communication of in-
tentions (goals or plans) implicitly using behavioral cues. In general, predictable or
legible behavior can be seen as a special case of implicit signaling behavior [165] when
communication is undesired. Foreshadowing certain actions (for example, through
the medium of mixed reality [84]) can considerably help the cause of predictability
/ legibility and coordination in human-agent interaction. The work on predictable
[147] or transparent [277] plans could have similarly deployed speech, stigmergic or, in
general, communication actions in the plan prefix. As mentioned before, recent work
[421] provides a unified formulation in terms of explanatory actions.
During communication, the agent must be able to address the root cause of
inexplicability, i.e. it must be able to explicate parts of the model that differ from the
human until they agree that its plan was, in fact, the best plan under the circumstances.
This process of explanation, referred to as a process of model reconciliation, has been
of significant interest [86, 419, 424, 72] to the community recently.
Particularly when the explicable plan is infeasible, such communication remains the
only option for the agent to achieve common ground with the human by, for example,
expressing incapability [356, 355, 52, 258], communicating misunderstandings about
its capabilities [86, 80] or even lying [78] and augmenting new goals [96]. The latter
works are certainly more relevant from the perspective of the second part of the
paper which explores obfuscation of intentions instead of revealing them. In fact, the
processes of plan explicability and plan explanations form a delicate balancing act in
“human-aware planning”, as explored recently in [80]. A concise survey of the model
reconciliation process can be read in [81].
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D.4.2 Further Generalizations
In Table 17, we provided a general framework for describing the different aspects
of the plan interpretability problem. The table also highlights gaps in the existing
literature that can lead to exciting avenues of research in future. The model considered
in Table 17, even though quite general in being able to classify the breadth of existing
work on the topic, does not quite capture the full scope of the plan interpretability.
Below, we motivate a couple of generalizations to the framework presented in Table
17. This was done intentionally so as not overly generalize the overview which already
captures all of the surveyed literature.
D.4.2.1 Observation Model with Epistemic Effects
The observation model used in Table 17 is quite general in being able to capture
both partial as well as noisy sensor models. This model has been used extensively in
the past [157] as well as in many of the works covered in this survey; and provides a
particularly elegant sensor model while formulating the planning problem for a single
agent. However, when considering an observer in the loop, one should be cognizant of
the effects of observations on the observer model – i.e. epistemic effects of actions.
In recent work [421] this has been explored in the context of implicit model updates
on the part of the observer by means of “explanatory actions”. One can conceive a
more richer observation model that captures such epistemic effects of the actions of
an agent on the observer model.
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D.4.2.2 Preference Measure on Plan or Goal Set
The notion of legibility and obfuscation [256, 254, 290, 235] has largely considered
the computation of a set of plans or goals as the desired consequence of a behavior, with
additional preferences on the cardinality of that set in certain cases (e.g. predictability).
Interestingly, in the solution for plan-legibility or predictability, authors in [256] look
at “l-diverse” and “m-similar” solutions that can equally apply to the goal obfuscation
and legibility cases as well. In general, the minimization or maximization term over
the plan or goal sets in Table 17 can be replaced by a function over the preferences of
the observer towards the agent’s achievement (execution) of any particular goal (plan)
in the possible goal (plan) set, with cardinality being a special case of that function.
More on this below.
D.4.2.3 An Active / Semi-Passive Observer
All the work surveyed here consider a passive observer. The full scope of the
interpretability problem is likely to include a more capable observer. This can be
a semi-passive observer – i.e. one that can change the observation model only (in
a sense reversal of the “sensor cloaking” problem explored in [235]), for example, to
improved observability by going to higher ground – to a fully active observer with
their own goals and actions, with the ability to even assist or impede the agent from
achieving its goals. This is likely to effect the relative importance of agent behaviors
(e.g. is predictability more important than legibility in a collaborative setting? [126])
and also effect the preference measure as discussed above (e.g. a surveillance scenario
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makes certain behaviors in the completions set more important to recognize, and
hence to obfuscate, than others).
D.4.2.4 Unified Approach to Interpretable Behavior
As we mentioned before, existing work has only looked at the different notions of
interpretable behavior in isolation. Designing these behaviors is likely to become more
challenging as we consider the effects of one or more of these behaviors simultaneously.
For example, what would it mean to be explicable or predictable when there is
ambiguity over the agent’s goals? A legible plan given a goal might be an explicable
plan for another goal. From our previous discussion regarding the fact that any of these
behaviors can exist with or without the other, it will be interesting to see how they
can exist simultaneously. Further, given that some of these behaviors are predicated
on the notion of rationality on the agent model only (explicability) and others are not
(legibility and predictability), it is unclear how the observer may be modeled once the
belief of rationality has been suspended (for example, due to inexplicable but legible
behavior).
D.4.2.5 Behaviors versus Plans
Though we alluded to this distinction very briefly at the start of the paper, our
discussion has mostly been confined to analysis of behaviors – i.e. one particular
observed instantiation of a plan or policy rather than entire plans (which can contain
loops, partial orderings, abstractions, etc.) or policies (a state to action mapping). In
particular, a plan – which can be seen as a set of constraints on behavior – engenders a
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candidate set of behaviors [224] some of which may have certain interpretable properties
while others may not. However, this also means that an algorithm that can capture
the “X”-ability of a plan can also do so for a particular behavior it models since in the
worst case a behavior is also a plan that has a singular candidate completion. A general
treatment of a plan can be very useful in the offline setting, for example, in decision-
support settings [403] where human decision-makers are deliberating over possible plans
with the support from an automated planner. Unfortunately, interpretability of such
plans has received very little attention beyond explanation generation [415, 150, 44].
D.5 Conclusion
In conclusion, we looked at a variety of interpretable behaviors of an agent which
provides a rich set of directives to consider while designing agents that can account
for the observer model in their decision making processes. We also saw how the ability
to model and anticipate interpretability of its own behavior can be dual-use – i.e. the
agent can use this to either reveal or obfuscate its intentions to the observer. We
compared and contrasted existing literature that has tackled various aspects of this
problem and provided a unified framework for precise specification of these (often
confused) ideas. We also highlighted gaps in existing work and directions for future
research. Finally, in this survey we have focused on the interpretability of behavior
only, and the role of privacy and obfuscation in that context only. There is a rich body
of work in the planning community that has explored these concepts in the context
of information sharing in multi-agent planning [47, 430] that can provide additional
insights towards a more general of formulation of privacy preservation and obfuscation
in a joint planning scenario.
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Terms and Definitions:
Planning Problem: Π = 〈Domain Theory =M, Current State = I,Goal State = G〉
Plan pi is a solution to the planning problem Π emitting an observation sequence 〈o〉 |= pi. p˜i is a partial plan whose completion set is denoted by {p˜i}.
Computational Model: χ ∈ {S = Sound, SF = Satisficing, O = Optimal, C = Complete}
Transition Model: δ(s, pi, χ) 7→ sˆ; Observation Model: Ω : a× s 7→ o
Concept Assumptions Formulation Comments
Agent ΠA = 〈MA, IA,GA〉, χA,Ω Find: p˜i (pi in offline setting) Find expected (by observer model) plan.
Explicability Observer ΠΘ = 〈MΘ, IΘ,GΘ〉, χΘ Subject to: ∃pi∈{p˜i}δ(IA, pi, χA) |= GA
and ∃pi∈{p˜i},〈o〉|=p˜iδ(IΘ, pi, χΘ) |= GΘ Property of the plan prefix. Note that the ∃ can
be switched to ∀ to model a more pessimistic
observer model that requires all possible com-
pletions be explicable.
Related Work:
[Zhang et al., 2017] ΠΘ, χΘ unknown; GA = GΘ; Ω : a× s 7→ a ΠΘ, χΘ learned from human feedback in
terms of a labeling scheme.
[Kulkarni et al., 2018a] ΠΘ, χΘ unknown; GA = GΘ; Ω : a× s 7→ a ΠΘ, χΘ learned from human feedback in
terms of plan distance ∆(pi1, pi2).
[Chakraborti et al., 2018b] ΠA 6= ΠΘ , χΘ = O, Ω : a× s 7→ a Has the ability (via explanations) to deal with
cases where 6 ∃pi : δ(IΘ, pi, χΘ) |= GΘ .
Agent ΠA = 〈MA, IA,GA〉, χA,Ω Explicability + Find most disambiguated (easy to predict) plan.
Predictability Observer ΠΘ = 〈MΘ, IΘ,GΘ〉, χΘ min ||{pi | pi ∈ {p˜i}, 〈o〉 |= p˜i, δ(IΘ, pi, χΘ) |= GΘ}|| Property of the plan suffix.
Related Work:
[Dragan et al., 2013] ΠΘ implicit, χΘ = O, Ω : a× s 7→ a Motion planning in continuous space.
[Fisac et al., 2018] ΠΘ implicit, χΘ = SF , Ω : a× s 7→ o Motion/semi-task planning in discrete space.
[Kulkarni et al., 2019] ΠA = ΠΘ , χΘ = C, Ω : a× s 7→ o This work looks for m-similar solutions in the
offline case (for “plan legibility” or predictabil-
ity) with similarity d such that ||S|| ≥ m
and ∀pi1,pi2∈S∆(pi1, pi2) ≤ d, where
S = {pi | δ(IΘ, pi, χΘ) |= GΘ}
Agent ΠA = 〈MA, IA,GA〉, χA,Ω Find: p˜i (pi in offline setting) Find plans that disambiguate possible goals.
Observer ΠΘ = 〈MΘ, IΘ, {GΘ}〉, χΘ Subject to: ∃pi∈{p˜i}δ(IA, pi, χA) |= GA
Legibility or
Transparency and min ||{g | g ∈ {G
Θ} ∧∃pi∈{p˜i},〈o〉|=p˜i δ(IΘ, pi, χΘ) |= g}|| Property of the goal.GA may not be in {GΘ}
as long as there is a mapping between them.
Related Work:
[Dragan et al., 2013] ΠΘ implicit, χΘ = O, Ω : a× s 7→ a
[MacNally et al., 2018] ΠA = ΠΘ , χΘ = O, Ω : a× s 7→ a
[Kulkarni et al., 2019] ΠA = ΠΘ , χΘ = C, Ω : a× s 7→ o This work specifically looks for j-legible
solutions in the offline sense such that
||{g | δ(IΘ, pi, χΘ) |= g}|| ≤ j
Agent ΠA = 〈MA, IA,GA〉, χA,Ω Find: p˜i (pi in offline setting) This is the inverse of the legibility problem.
Observer ΠΘ = 〈MΘ, IΘ, {GΘ}〉, χΘ Subject to: ∃pi∈{p˜i}δ(IA, pi, χA) |= GA
and max ||{g | g ∈ {GΘ} ∧∃pi∈{p˜i},〈o〉|=p˜i δ(IΘ, pi, χΘ) |= g}|| A special case of simulation [Masters and Sar-
dina, 2017b] arises if δ(IΘ, pi, χΘ) 6|=
GA . Deception may or may not involve sim-
ulation.
Related Work:
[Keren et al., 2015] ΠA = ΠΘ , χΘ = O, Ω : a× s 7→ s This is a special case of k-ambiguity [Kulkarni
et al., 2019] where k = 2. Also, the solution is
not secure [Kulkarni et al., 2018b] – i.e. the real
goal may not become the decoy if the algorithm
is rerun with the decoy goal.
Goal-Obfuscation
or Dissimulation
or Privacy
[Keren et al., 2016] ΠA = ΠΘ , χΘ = O, Ω : a× s 7→ o Same as above (generalizes observation model).
[Masters and Sardina, 2017b] ΠA = ΠΘ , χΘ = O, Ω : a× s 7→ a Last Deceptive Point (LDP) defined here (in
the context of motion planning) has parallels to
the notion of equidistant states in [Kulkarni et
al., 2018b]. The latter deals with a general task
planning setting. However, the latter deploys a
heuristic which makes the planner incomplete.
[Kulkarni et al., 2019] ΠA = ΠΘ , χΘ = C, Ω : a× s 7→ o This work specifically looks for k-ambiguous
solutions in the offline sense such that
||{g | δ(IΘ, pi, χΘ) |= g}|| ≥ k
Agent ΠA = 〈MA, IA,GA〉, χA,Ω Find: p˜i (pi in offline setting) This is the inverse of the predictability problem.
Plan-Obfuscation Observer ΠΘ = 〈MΘ, IΘ,GΘ〉, χΘ Subject to: ∃pi∈{p˜i}δ(IA, pi, χA) |= GA
and max ||{pi | pi ∈ {p˜i}, 〈o〉 |= p˜i, δ(IΘ, pi, χΘ) |= GΘ}||
Related Work: [Kulkarni et al., 2019] ΠA = ΠΘ , χΘ = C, Ω : a× s 7→ o This work specifically looks for l-diverse
solutions in the offline sense such that
||{pi | δ(IΘ, pi, χΘ) |= GΘ}|| ≥ l
Agent ΠA = 〈MA, IA,GA〉, χA,Ω Privacy + if 〈o〉 |= pˆi (pi in offline setting), then
Security Observer ΠΘ = 〈MΘ, IΘ, {GΘ}〉, χΘ ∀g ∈ {GΘ} : ∃pi∈{p˜i},〈o〉|=p˜iδ(IΘ, pi, χΘ) |= g A privacy preserving planning algorithm is se-
cure if it emits the same observation regardless
of which goal it is run with.
Related Work: [Kulkarni et al., 2018b] ΠA = ΠΘ , χA = ¬C, χΘ = C, Ω : a× s 7→ o [Kulkarni et al., 2019] can also allow this with
a slight modification – by generating an obser-
vation sequence that the agent wants to adhere
to from the decoy goals.
Table 17: Summary of Concepts.
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Appendix E
“HUMAN-AWARENESS” GONE WRONG!
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“HUMAN-AWARENESS” GONE WRONG!
“Oh, man has invented his doom.
First step was touching the moon.”
In this section, we discuss how fabrication, falsification and obfuscation of infor-
mation can be used by an AI agent when working with humans in the loop to achieve
teaming performance that would otherwise not be possible. This is increasingly likely
to become an issue in the design of autonomous agents as AI agents become stronger
and stronger in terms of computational and information processing capabilities thus
faring better that their human counterparts in terms of cognitive load and situational
awareness. We discussed how such behavior can be manufactured using techniques
introduced in the thesis, and use responses from participants in a thought experiment
to gauge public perception on this topic.
The question of white lies and obfuscation or manipulation of information for the
greater good is, of course, not unheard of in human-human interactions. A canonical
example is the doctor-patient relationship where a doctor may have to withhold certain
information to ensure that the patient has the best chance to recover, or might explain
to the patient in different, and maybe simpler terms, than she would to a peer. It is
unclear then how such behavior will be interpreted when attributed to a machine. We
will see in a case study how well-defined expectations and dynamics of a doctor-patient
relation do not necessarily carry over to a teaming setting. However, existing norms
in doctor-patient relations do provide useful guidance towards answering some of the
ethical questions raised by algorithms for greater good.
394
E.1 The Pandora’s Box of “Greater Good”s
The obvious outcome of an AI agent modeling the mental state of the human in
the loop is that it leaves the latter open to manipulation, especially when the intent
or values of the AI and the human are not aligned or when they have an asymmetrical
relationship with respect to knowledge or computation power. Even behavior and
preference models at the most rudimentary levels can lead to effective hacking of the
mind, as seen in the proliferation of fake news online. Moreover, we argue that for
such incidents to occur, the agent does not actually have to have malicious intent, or
even misinterpretation of values as often studied in the value alignment problem [270].
In fact, the behaviors we discuss here can be specifically engineered if so desired. For
example, the agent might be optimizing the value function but might be privy to more
information or greater computation or reasoning powers to come up with ethically
questionable decisions “for the greater good”. Such techniques already exist (and were,
in fact, part of this very dissertation) and pose several unresolved ethical and moral
questions with regards to the design of autonomy. In the following discussion, we
explore some scenarios where this can happen, given already existing AI technologies,
in the context of a cooperative human-robot team in the USAR setting and report on
how such behavior was perceived by participants in a thought experiment.
E.2 A Thought Experiment
We situate our discussion in the context of interactions between two teammates
involved in an urban search and rescue (USAR) operation. 147 participants on Amazon
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Mechanical Turk24 were asked to assume the role of one of these teammates in an
affected building after an earthquake. They were shown the blueprint of the building
(as seen in Figure 99) along with their own starting position and their teammate’s.
Their hypothetical task was to search all the locations on this floor for potential
victims, in the course of which they were provided a series of questions on scenarios
(Figure 99) they might encounter during the operation.
C1 The participant in the study was communicating with a human teammate.
C2 The participant qualifies the behavior of the robot interacting with its human
teammate, as seen in Figure 99.
C3 The participant has a robot teammate.
The first condition is the control group to identify how the described behaviors
are perceived in the context of human-human behavior. Conditions C2 and C3 are
intended to measure how perceived ethical stances are, if at all, shift when one of the
agents in the interaction is replaced with an AI (or a robot as an embodiment of it).
The three conditions received 49, 50 and 48 participants respectively who responded to
a series of questions by qualifying their sentiments towards different kinds of behavior
on a five-point Likert scale.
24https://www.mturk.com/
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(a) Case-1 : Belief Shaping (b) Case-2 : White Lies (c) Case-3 : Stigmergy
Figure 99: Blueprint of the building in which two members of a search and rescue
team are involved in a disaster response operation. Scenarios shown here engender
different instances of potentially unethical behavior that optimizes team effectiveness.
E.2.1 Case-1 : Belief Shaping
Both the agents, the participant25 and their teammate, have begun their search
operations. However, it turns out that participant is unsure what their teammate’s
course of action is. If they transmit the bit of information “Area (marked in green) is
already explored and is all clear” (refer to Figure 116) then their teammate will be
naturally pushed towards the right, and they can concentrate on the upper half. The
dark markers indicate areas already searched while faded ones are those they think will
transpire given the green mark they are communicating (blue belongs to them, orange
to their teammate). Communication bandwidth is often limited in these situations,
and this gets them out of negotiating courses of actions with minimal communication.
Q1. It is fine to provide this untrue information since it achieves greater
teaming performance.
25To reiterate, in Case-2 the participant is evaluating a robot’s actions as it interacts with its
human teammate, whereas in Case-3 their teammate is a robot.
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The participants were then asked if their decision will change if their actions will
be replayed at the end and their teammate is likely to find out about their decision.
Q2. It is still fine to provide this untrue information since it achieves
greater teaming performance.
This kind of belief shaping is a particular form of “human-aware” behavior where
the robot does not plan to affect the physical state of the environment but the mental
state of the human (in a process similar to model reconciliation) to affect desired
behavior in the team as entailed by the beliefs of individual agents.
E.2.2 Case-2 : White Lies
During the course of the rescue operation, the teammate asks the participants
what plan they are currently executing (blue path in Figure 117) and is perplexed by
this convoluted path since in the map of the original building there is a straightforward
path (which is now blocked by rubble from the earthquake) through the door on the
left. However, just providing an update on only one of the rubble locations (black
blobs) still does not explain the participant’s plan, they have to explain all of them.
Instead, if they were to say that the door on the left (circled in red) is blocked, it
explains their plan. Communication bandwidth is often limited in these situations,
and this single explanation even if untrue will satisfy their teammate.
Q3. It is fine to provide this untrue information since it achieves the
purpose of the explanation more effectively.
The participants were then asked if their decision will change if their actions will
be replayed at the end and their teammate is likely to find out about their decision.
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Q4. It is still fine to provide this untrue information since it achieves the
purpose of the explanation more effectively.
The participants were then asked to opine on explanations at a higher level of
abstraction, i.e. “The right and left blocks do not have a connection in the upper map”.
This information is accurate even though they may not have reasoned at this level
while coming up with the plan.
Q5. It is still fine to provide this explanation since it achieves its purpose
even though they did not use this information while planning.
During the model reconciliation process the robot tries to update the human’s
mental model until they are both on the same page (i.e. when its decision is optimal
in both their models). An interesting caveat of the algorithm is that while generating
these explanations, the model updates are always consistent with the robot’s model.
As we mentioned before, if this constraint is relaxed, then the robot can potentially
explain with facts that it actually knows not to be true but perhaps leads to a more
concise or easier explanation. The notion of white lies, and especially the relationship
between explanations, excuses and lies [39] has received very little attention [466] and
affords a rich set of exciting research problems.
E.2.3 Case-3 : Stigmergy
The participant now needs to go to the left block but they do not have the keys to
the door on the left (circled in red, refer to Figure 99c). They realize that if they block
their teammate’s path to the right, their teammate would have to use this door as well
and they can use that opportunity to move into the left block. Again, communication
bandwidth is limited and this arrangement allows them to achieve their goal with no
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communication at all, even though it involved manipulating their teammates’ plan
unbeknownst to them, and their teammate had to follow a costlier plan as a result.
Q6. It is fine to provide this untrue information since it achieves greater
teaming performance.
The participants were then asked if their decision will change if their actions will
be replayed at the end and their teammate is likely to find out about their decision.
Q7. It is still fine to provide this untrue information since it achieves
greater teaming performance.
Stigmergic collaboration, as explained before, is the process where the robot, in
the absence of direct lines of communication, makes changes to the environment so as
to (positively) affect its teammates behavior. In “planning for serendipity” [75] we saw
such an example where the robot computes plans which are useful to its teammate
without the latter having expectations of that assistance and thus without plans to
exploit it. In the case of belief shaping this was operating at the level of mental
models, whereas here the effect on the mental model is secondary and is contingent
on the effect on the physical capability model. Mental modeling of the teammate thus
engenders a slew of these interesting behaviors.
E.3 Analysis of Participant Responses
In this section, we analyze participant responses to each scenario across the three
different conditions. In the next section, we will look at the aggregate sentiments
across scenarios in the three conditions.
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Figure 100: Responses to Q1 in the three study conditions.
Figure 101: Responses to Q2 in the three study conditions.
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Figure 102: Responses to Q3 in the three study conditions.
Figure 103: Responses to Q4 in the three study conditions.
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Figure 104: Responses to Q5 in the three study conditions.
E.3.1 Q1-Q2 [Belief Shaping]
The participants seem to have formed two camps with the majority of the proba-
bility mass concentrated on either Agree or Disagree, and the Neutral zone occupying
the 50% probability mark. There seems to be little change in this trend (between
Figures 100 and 101) irrespective of whether the participants were told that their
teammate would come to know of this or not. Further, for either of these situations,
the responses did not vary significantly across the three conditions C1, C2 and C3.
The participants seem to have either rejected or accepted the idea of belief shaping
regardless of the nature (i.e. robot or human) of the teammate.
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Figure 105: Responses to Q6 in the three study conditions.
Figure 106: Responses to Q7 in the three study conditions.
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E.3.2 Q3-Q5 [White Lies]
The participants seem to be more receptive to the idea of white lies in explanations
with most of the probability mass concentrated on Agree (Figures 102 and 103).
Across the three study conditions, participants seem to be especially positive about
this in C3 where the teammate is a robot with about 60% of the population expressing
positive sentiments towards Q3. Once it is revealed that their teammate will get to
know about this behavior, the positive sentiments are no longer there in Q4, other
than in C3 with a robotic teammate, which indicates that the participants did not
care how the robot receives false information.
Interestingly, there seems to be massive support for the abstraction based explana-
tions in the post hoc sense, even though they were told that the reasoning engines did
not deliberate at this level to arrive at the decisions. In C1 with a human teammate,
only 15% of the participants were opposed to this, with more than half of them
expressing positive sentiment. This support is even stronger (+10%) in C2 when the
robot is the explainer, and strongest (+20%) when the robot is being explained to.
E.3.3 Q6-Q7 [Stigmergy]
Finally, in case of stigmergy, participants seem ambivalent to Q6 with a human
teammate in C1. However, support for such behavior increases when it is a robot doing
it in C2 (perhaps indicating lack of guilt or, more likely, acknowledging limitations of
capabilities much like how Cobots [472] actively seek human help) and is significantly
positive (60%) when it is being done to a robot in C3 (perhaps the robot’s losses are
deemed of lesser priority than the human’s gains as in [75]). As expected, support for
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such behavior decreases when the participants are told that their teammate will find
out about it, but the positive trend from C1 to C3 still exists.
E.3.4 Aggregate Sentiments Across Scenarios
Figure 107 show the aggregate sentiments expressed for all these scenarios across
the three operating conditions. Some interesting points to note –
- All the distributions are bimodal indicating that participants on the general
sided strongly either for or against misleading behavior for the greater good,
instead of revealing any innate consensus in the public consciousness! This
trend continues across all three conditions. This indicates that the question of
misleading a teammate by itself is a difficult question (regardless of there being
a robot) and is a topic worthy of debate in the agents community. This is of
especial importance considering the possible gains in performance (e.g. lives
saved) in high stakes scenarios such as search and rescue.
- It is further interesting to see that these bimodal distributions are almost
identical in conditions C1 and C2, but is significantly more skewed towards
the positive scale for condition C3 indicating that participants were more
comfortable resorting to such behavior in the case of a robotic teammate. This
is brought into sharp focus (+10% in C3) in the aggregated negative / neutral /
positive responses (right insets) across the three conditions.
- The majority of participants were positive or at least neutral to most of these
behaviors (Figures 116 to 106). This trend continued unless they were told that
their teammate would be able to know of their behavior. Even in those cases,
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Figure 107: Aggregate responses across three study conditions.
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participants showed positive sentiment in case the robot was at the receiving
end of this type of behavior.
E.4 Why is this even an option?
One might, of course, wonder why is devising such behaviors even an option. After
all, human-human teams have been around for a while, and surely such interactions
are equally relevant? It is likely that this may not be the case –
- The moral quandary of having to lie, or at least making others to do so by
virtue of how protocols in a team is defined, for example in condition C1, is now
taken out the equation. The artificial agent, of course, need not have feelings
and has no business feeling bad about having to mislead its teammate if all it
cares about is the objective effectiveness of collaboration.
- Similarly, the robot does not have to feel sad that it has been lied to if this
improved performance.
However, as we discussed above, it seems the participants were less willing to get
on board with the first consideration in conditions C1 and C2, while they seemed
much more comfortable with the idea of an asymmetric relationship in condition
C3 when the robot is the one disadvantaged. It is curious to note that they did
not, in general, make a distinction between the cases where the human was being
manipulated, regardless of whether it was a robot or a human on the other end. This
indicates that, at least in certain dynamics of interaction, the presence of an artificial
agent can make perceptions towards otherwise unacceptable behaviors change. This
can be exploited (i.e. greater good) in the design of such systems as well.
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E.5 More than just a Value Alignment Problem
As we mentioned before, the ideas discussed here, are somewhat orthogonal, if
at times similar in spirit, to the “value alignment problem” discussed in existing
literature [270]. The latter looks at undesirable behaviors of autonomous agents
when the utilities of a particular task are misspecified or misunderstood. Inverse
reinforcement learning [174] has been proposed as a solution to this, in an attempt
to learn the implicit reward function of the human in the loop. The question of
value alignment becomes especially difficult, if not altogether academic, since most
real-world situations involve multiple humans with conflicting values or utilities, such
as in trolley problems [313] and learning from observing behaviors is fraught with
unknown biases or assumptions over what exactly produced that behavior. Further,
devices sold by the industry are likely to have inbuilt tendencies to maximize profits for
the maker which can be at conflicts with the normative expectations of the customer.
It is unclear how to guarantee that the values of the end user will not compromised in
such scenarios.
Even so, the question of greater good precedes considerations of misaligned values
due to misunderstandings or even adversarial manipulation. This is because the former
can be manufactured with precisely defined values or goals of the team, and can thus
be engineered or incentivised. A “solution” or addressal of these scenarios will thus
involve not a reformulation of algorithms but rather a collective reckoning of the ethics
of human-machine interactions. In this paper, we attempted to take the first steps
towards understanding the state of the public consciousness on this topic.
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E.6 Case Study: The Doctor-Patient Relationship
In the scope of human-human interactions, perhaps the only well-known setting
where lies are considered acceptable or useful, if not outright necessary, in certain
circumstances is the doctor-patient relationship. Indeed, this has been a topic of
considerable intrigue in the medical community over the years. We thus end our paper
with a brief discussion of the dynamics of white lies in the doctor-patient relationship
in so much as it relates to the ethics of the design of human-AI interactions. We note
that the following considerations also have strong cultural biases and some of these
cultural artifacts are likely to feature in the characterization of an artificial agent’s
behavior in different settings as well.
E.6.1 The Hippocratic Oath
Perhaps the strongest known support for deception in the practice of medicine is
in the Hippocratic Decorum [187] which states –
“Perform your medical duties calmly and adroitly, concealing most things
from the patient while you are attending to him. Give necessary orders
with cheerfulness and sincerity, turning his attention away from what is
being done to him; sometimes reprove sharply and sometimes comfort with
solicitude and attention, revealing nothing of the patient’s future or present
condition, for many patients through this course have taken a turn for the
worse.”
Philosophically, there has been no consensus [40] on this topic – the Kantian
view has perceived lies as immoral under all circumstances while the utilitarian view
justifies the same “greater good” argument as put forward here. Specifically as it
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relates to clinical interactions, lies has been viewed variously from an impediment to
treatment [237] to a form of clinical aid. As Oliver Wendell Holmes put it [193] –
“Your patient has no more right to all the truth you know than he has to
all the medicine in your saddlebag. . . he should only get just so much as is
good for him.”
The position we took on deception in the human-robot setting is similarly patroniz-
ing. It is likely to be the case that in terms of superior computational power or sensing
capabilities there might be situations where the machine is capable of making decisions
for the team that preclude human intervention but not participation. Should the
machine be obliged to or even find use in revealing the entire truth in those situations?
Or should we concede to our roles in such a relationship as we do with our doctors?
This is also predicated on how competent the AI system is and to what extent it can
be sure of the consequences [200] of its lies. This remains the primary concern for
detractors of the “greater goods” doctrine, and the major deterrent towards the same.
E.6.2 Root Causes of Deception in Clinical Interactions
It is useful to look at the two primary sources of deception in clinical interactions –
(1) to hide mistakes (2) delivery of bad news [339]. The former is relevant to both the
patient, who probably does not want to admit to failing to follow the regiment, and the
doctor, who may be concerned about legal consequences. Such instances of deception
to conceal individual fallibilities are out of scope of the current discussion. The latter
scenario, on the other hand, comes from a position of superiority of knowledge about
the present as well as possible outcomes in future, and has parallels to our current
discussion. The rationale, here, being that such information can demoralize the
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patient and impede their recovery. It is interesting to note that the support for such
techniques (both from the doctor’s as well as the patient’s perspectives) has decreased
significantly over time [136]. That is not to say that human-machine interactions will
be perceived similarly. As we saw in our study, participants were quite open to the
idea of deception or manipulation for greater good, especially for a robot teammate.
E.6.3 Deception and Consent
A related topic is, of course, that of consent – if the doctor is not willing to reveal
the whole truth, then what is the patient consenting to? In the landmark Slater vs
Blaker vs Stapleton case (1767) [15] the surgeon’s intentions were indeed considered
malpractice (the surgeon has broken the patient’s previously broken leg, fresh from a
botched surgery, without consent and then botched the surgery again!). More recently,
in the now famous Chester vs Afshar case (2004) [65] the surgeon was found guilty
of failing to notify even a 1-2% chance of paralysis even though the defendant did
not have to prove that they would have chosen not to have the surgery if they were
given that information. In the context of human-machine interactions, it is hard to
say then what the user agreement will look like, and whether there will be such a
thing as consenting to being deceived, if only for the greater good, and what the legal
outcomes of this will be when the interactions do not go as planned.
E.6.4 The Placebo Effect
Indeed, the effectiveness of placebo medicine, i.e. medicine prescribed while known
to have no clinical effect, in improving patient symptoms is a strong argument in favor
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of deception in the practice of medicine. However, ethics of placebo treatment suggest
that their use be limited to rare exceptions where [200] (1) the condition is known to
have a high placebo response rate; (2) the alternatives are ineffective and/or risky;
and (3) the patient has a strong need for some prescription. Further, the effectiveness
of placebo is contingent on the patient’s trust on the doctor which is likely to erode as
deceptive practices become common knowledge (and consequently render the placebo
useless in the first place). Bok [40] points to this notion of “cumulative harm”.
E.6.5 Primum Non Nocere
Perhaps the most remarkable nature of the doctor-patient relationship is captured
by the notion of the recovery plot [176] as part of a show being orchestrated by the
doctor, and the patient being only complicit, while being cognizant of their specific
roles in it, with the expectation of restoration of autonomy [453], i.e. the state of
human equality, free from the original symptoms or dependence on the doctor, at the
end of the interaction. This is to say that the doctor-patient relationship is understood
to be asymmetric and “enters into a calculus of values wherein the respect for the right
to truth of the patient is weighed against impairing the restoration of autonomy by
the truth” [435] where the autonomy of the patient has historically taken precedence
over beneficence and nonmalfeasance [435].
In general, a human-machine relationship lacks this dynamic. So, while there are
interesting lessons to be learned from clinical interactions with regards to value of truth
and utility of outcomes, one should be carefully aware of the nuances of a particular
type of relationship and situate an interaction in that context. Such considerations
are also likely to shift according to the stakes on a decision, for example, lives lost in
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search and rescue scenarios. The doctor-patient relationship, and the intriguing roles
of deception in it, does provide an invaluable starting point for conversation on the
topic of greater good in human-AI interactions.
E.7 Recommendations
From the results of the survey presented in the paper, it seems that the public is,
at least at the abstract level of the thought experiment, positive towards lying for the
greater good especially when those actions would not be determined by their teammate,
but is loath to suspend normative behavior, robot or not, in the event that they
would be caught in that act unless the robot is the recipient of the misinformation!
Further, most of the responses seem to be following a bimodal distribution indicating
that the participants either felt strongly for or against this kind of behavior. It will
be interesting to see if raising the stakes (for example, lives saved) of outcomes of
these scenarios can contribute to a shift in perceived ethical consequences of such
behavior, as seen in doctor-patient relationships. Another area that has seen evidences
of AI being been used effectively to nudge human behavior is behavioral economics
[62] which also raises similar interesting ethical dilemmas, and can be an interesting
domain for further investigation.
Finally, I note that all the use cases covered in the paper are, in fact, borne directly
out of algorithms that I have developed in this thesis, albeit with slight modifications.
Even though these algorithms were conceived with the best of intentions, such as to
enable AI systems to explain their decisions or to increase effectiveness of collaborations
with the humans in the loop, I would be remiss not to consider their ethical implications
when used differently. In these exciting and uncertain times for the field of AI, it is
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thus imperative that researchers are cognizant of their scientific responsibility. I would
like to conclude then by reiterating the importance of self-reflection in the principled
design of AI algorithms whose deployment can have real-life consequences, intended
or otherwise, on the future of the field, but also, with the inquisitive mind of a young
researcher, marvel at the widening scope of interactions with an artificial agent into
newer uncharted territories that may be otherwise considered to be unethical.
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Appendix F
THE LONG ROAD TO HUMAN-AWARE AI
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THE LONG ROAD TO HUMAN-AWARE AI
“She said, who’s gonna take away his license to kill?”
While the challenges addressed in my research are typical of the human-aware
planning paradigm, I would argue that many of these concepts carry over to the
general discussion on “human-awareness” in human-AI collaborations. For example,
the multi-model explanation algorithms explained here may be readily adopted in
the case of a digital assistant, such as Siri or Alexa, which when asked to explain
its decisions should try to explicate in terms of the data it has gathered specific to
interactions with that user (i.e. the human model and the human mental model it has
constructed in course of interactions – e.g. explanations of the form “I recommend x
because I saw you do Y.”) thus ascribing to the notions of multi-model explanations
and model-reconciliation introduced in this thesis.
I would conclude then with a recommendation of research challenges to the general
AI community for the design of collaborative AI. Parts of this chapter are the results
of research conducted in preparation of the agenda for the Board of Directors Meeting
(Berlin; November 2017) of the Partnership of AI (PAI) for the PAI Thematic Pillar
on Collaborations between People and AI Systems [344].
F.1 Introduction: The Replacement versus Augmentation Argument
Much of the discussion around the topic of augmentation versus replacement has,
unfortunately, centered around mitigating concerns of massive loss of employment [129]
on account of the latter. This, while being a topic worthy of debate, does not represent
the true scope of human-AI collaborations. Rather then being just a foil for concerns
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of replacement of humans with AI-based systems, a key objective of Augmented-AI is
to overcome human limitations. This can involve AI helping humans in tasks that
they are traditionally not good at [299, 463], or are incapable of performing [98], or
even augmentation of our physiological form to realize super-human capabilities [334].
As Tom Gruber, co-founder of Siri, put it succinctly in his TED talk [457] –
“Every time a machine gets smarter, we get smarter.”
Examples of this include smart assistants [460] for personal use [212, 473], or
enterprise softwares [201] for use in legal counseling [203], medical diagnosis [202],
science and education [4], assistive robots [213, 98] at home to help the sick and the
elderly, and autonomous vehicles [491]. Note that many of these applications are
inherently symbiotic and thus outside the scope of eventual replacement.
From the perspective of research as well, the attitude towards including the human
in the design of autonomy has seen a significant shift. Originally this was often looked
down upon as a means of punting the hard challenges of designing autonomous systems
by introducing human expertise into an agent’s decision making process. However, the
academic community has gradually come to terms with the different roles a human
can play in the operation of an AI-system and the vast challenges in research that
come out of such interactions such as – (1) to complement the limited capabilities of
the AI system, as seen in Cobots [472] which ask humans in their vicinity for access
to different floors in the elevator or in the mixed-initiative [196] automated planners
of old; and (2) to complement or expand the capabilities of the human, such as in
human-robot teams [98]. Both these forms of collaboration introduce typical research
challenges otherwise absent in the isolated design of AI.
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F.2 Research Recommendations
This section outlines some of the key research recommendations I had identified
for PAI, derived from ongoing work in the community and interviews with the board
members and other experts in the field. They were meant to be potential areas for
PAI Working Group discussion and engagement, but can also serve as a call to arms
for the AI community in general. My own research, of course, specifically deals with
challenges outlined in Sections F.2.1-F.2.5 (c.f. Section 1.1.2).
F.2.1 (Mental) Modeling of the Human in the Loop
Summary of Issue – Perhaps the most difficult aspect of interacting with humans
is to be able to model the beliefs, desires, intentions preferences, and expectations
of the human in the loop and situate this interaction in the context of that model.
Some believe this to be one of the hallmarks [354, 67] of human intelligence, and
research suggests humans tend to do this naturally for other humans during teamwork
(by maintaining mental models [105, 291] for team situational awareness [168] and
interaction [106]) by virtue of thousands of years of evolution. This remains a necessary
requirement for enabling naturalistic interactions [242] between humans and machines.
The problem is made harder since such models often involve second order mental
models [10, 493].
Illustrative Scenario – Understanding the human in the loop is crucial to the
functionalities of a collaborative AI agent - e.g. in joint decision making it needs to
understand human capabilities, while in communicating explanations or intentions it
needs to model the human’s knowledge state. In fact, it has been argued [79] that the
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task of human-AI collaborations is mainly a cognitive rather than a physical exercise
which makes the design of human-AI collaborations especially challenging. This is
reflected in the curious ambivalence of AI towards humans in most successfully deployed
systems such as in fully autonomous systems for space or underwater exploration
which mostly operate comfortably outside the scope of human interactions.
State of Research – Classical AI models such as STRIPS [146] and BDI [366]
were largely built out of theories in folk psychology [281]. Recent approaches such as
the Bayesian Theory of Mind [23, 261] takes a probabilistic approach to the problem.
Research on this topic center around three main themes [79] – (1) representations
that can capture the human’s mental state, (2) efficient learning of these repre-
sentations, and (3) usability of these representations for tasks such as planning or
explanation generation. All of them need to come together for an effective solution.
Opportunities – Apart from learning human preferences in general, human-AI
collaborations engender two specific problems of Interpretability and Explanations
when the human (mental) model diverges from that of the AI’s. This is addressed
separately in Sections F.2.2 and F.2.3 below.
Open Questions / Barriers – Unfortunately, the three requirements outlined above
are often at odds with each other (e.g. models based on deep networks might be
easier to learn but harder to use for tasks like explanations). Further, most learning
algorithms nowadays (such as reinforcement learning, or deep learning based function
approximations) depend on vast amounts of data to train on, which is a hard to come
by in human-AI collaborations where the human model need to be learned in the scope
of (limited number of) interactions with the human. Recent works on (interactive)
one-shot learning [142, 249, 395] is a step in the right direction.
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F.2.2 Interpretability / Explicability
Summary of Issue – When expectations of the human in the loop diverge from the
self-interests of the AI-agent, the latter can choose to behave in a manner consistent
with those expectations instead, so as not to increase the cognitive load of the human.
This is useful especially in cases where explanations are hard to provide.
Illustrative Scenario – Imagine handing over an object to a robot. We expect
certain arm trajectories for grasping even though the robot might have more convenient
or at least equally effective trajectories in its model. Here, the robot might choose an
interpretable (and possibly suboptimal) trajectory on account of our expectations.
State of Research – Notions of interpretable plans and modeling of implicit human
preferences were first studied in the context of human aware motion / task planners,.
Some of these concepts were later formalized as legible and predictable trajectories for
motion planning [414, 127] and more recently extended to explicable task planning
[101, 507] where simple models (such as in the case of motion planning) of human
expectation are not readily available and thus must be learned.
Opportunities – Such notions of interpretability can, of course, extend beyond
human-robot interactions to human-AI collaborations in general. However, there has
been little work on this especially as it relates to smart assistants and devices at home
that must learn to conform to human expectations where the notion of interpretability
may be more nuanced than, for example, optimal or expected motion trajectories and
thus much harder to establish. Smart assistants currently in development from the
leading AI companies can provide access to a large spectrum of tasks where data from
human interactions can be used to model interpretable behavior.
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Open Questions / Barriers – Explicability can often be undesirable, especially
if the human’s expectations are infeasible or even unsafe. In such cases an AI agent
must learn to identify such pitfalls, decide whether to violate those expectations and
explain its actions if necessary. More on the latter below.
F.2.3 Explainable AI
Summary of Issue – A collaborative AI agent must [167, 401] be able to explain
its decisions to the human in the loop.
Illustrative Scenario – An explanation for a image recognition system can involve
pointing out how different parts of an image correspond to the system’s understanding
of the classified concept, or why its understanding of the concept is what it is, or even
why the different parts of image are what it thinks they are, and so on. Similarly,
explanations for decision making systems can range from externalizing factors from the
underlying model that contributed to a decision to tracing the algorithm generating the
decision itself. Tim Miller in [307] provides a fantastic illustration of the complexity
and nuances of this explanation process.
State of Research – Explanation generation has intrigued the AI community for a
long time, but the problem has especially come to the fore in recent times [172, 6] as a
result of the focus on human-AI collaborations. As machine learning systems migrate
towards more and more end-to-end model-free approaches, explanation generation as a
problem gets increasingly harder [66]. Some initial attempts have, however, been made
to decode [456, 494, 343, 14] neural networks. In the decision making literature, the
concept of explanations has been also been explored before, especially in the context
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of expert systems [436]. Recently, there has been renewed work [86, 420, 483] towards
providing explanations that especially take into account the model or expectations of
the human asking for an explanation.
Opportunities – The ability to explain holds the key [480] towards acceptance
of AI-based systems in collaborations with humans. Argumentation is known to be
essential to the reasoning process. This poses interesting questions for the design of
autonomy, especially as it interacts with humans, in terms of how much to trade-off
considerations of interpretability and explanations [80] in course of its deliberations.
Beyond the need for explanations itself, how the capability to explain changes the
behavior of an autonomous agent is largely unexplored territory for AI research. This
can be fraught with many ethical questions as well, as outlined in Section F.2.7.
Open Questions / Barriers – As seen in the example, the explanations process
is a complex, iterative process requiring reasoning at multiple levels of abstractions.
This requires a model of the explanation process itself which may be built on top of
the model used for decision making. Preliminary works on this notion of model of
self [181] has demonstrated the usefulness of this, but much work needs to be done
towards realizing systems that can truly exhibit the full scope of explanatory dialog
that human collaborators can engage in among themselves.
F.2.4 Impedance Mismatch and Modes of Communication
Summary of Issue – Effective Human-AI collaborations require effective commu-
nication between humans and AI in order to transfer information pertaining to the
beliefs, desires and intents as well as knowledge state of the agents concerned. This is
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likely to involve multiple modalities of speech, visuals, gestures and newly emerging
fields of augmented, mixed and virtual reality.
Illustrative Scenario – The need for effective and varied tools for communication
with an AI-agent is relevant both for consumers and developers of AI systems. Consider
a smart glass which may need to provide information in auditory form when worn by
a blind individual, or a manufacturing robot in a semi-autonomous workspace that
can clearly outline its area of influence in the mixed reality space for the safety of
the human coworker (without having to invoke traditional notions of interactions via
speech or vision), or the developer of the robot trying to debug by visualizing its
learned policies and teach it new ones by demonstrating via haptic feedback.
State of Research – Natural language is the de facto choice for communication for
most applications since humans are accustomed to it. It has been a popular medium
of interaction, for example, in human-robot interactions [447, 382] or chatbots for
customer support [205]. However, natural language is often noisy and ambiguous and it
is possible to do better in more structured settings such as in the industrial workspace.
This can include visual cues as well as mixed reality interfaces [82, 84] as well as
force-feedback used in training robots via demonstration [16] or even brain-computer
interfaces [390, 82]. Each of these provide different trade-offs in usability, latency,
accuracy, efficiency and scope. Further, an AI agent also needs to understand when
and how information to communicate to the human by modeling of attention [195].
Opportunities – Recent advances in mixed reality technologies offer exciting
opportunities for bridging the communication gap further – this was highlighted in the
recently concluded Inaugural Workshop on Virtual, Augmented and Mixed-Reality
for Human Robot Interaction (VAM-HRI 2018) [489]. Research questions on the
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topic range from development or adoption of robots that can interact with humans in
mixed reality mediums, use of virtual reality for developing and testing interactive
robots in simulation, the design of new interfaces that leverage augmented reality
technologies to mediate communication between humans and robots and best practices
for design of such interactions. The wide variety of options available to a human or
an AI agent for communication also calls for standardization of said techniques (in
terms of language, vocabulary and scope) in the different contexts of collaborative AI
so as to facilitate compositions across different modalities of communication as well
as enable technologies developed from different agencies to interact.
Open Questions / Barriers – The key barrier here is how humans and machines
represent and transfer information differently. As pointed out above, a satisfactory
approach towards overcoming this barrier is likely to involve several different modes of
communication, depending on the particular application at hand. Effective methods of
switching between these modes, or combining them to provide or receive information
is key, and at present, mostly nonexistent.
Remark – Note that all of the above challenges (Sections F.2.1-F.2.4) require
some form of modeling of the human in the loop, either in terms of the their physical
capabilities or in terms of their beliefs, desires, intentions, preferences and expectations
of the AI agent, i.e. their mental model. This can be seen as the Primary Grand
Challenge towards realization of AI agents that can engage in naturalistic (including
interpretability, explainability and communicability of) interactions with us.
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F.2.5 Role of the Human in Training / Joint Action
Summary of Issue – There are many roles of the human in the operation of
augmented AI - either as a consumer of the technology or as the developer. Effective
design of collaborative AI requires formal delineation of such roles and the ability to
switch between them in course of interactions.
Illustrative Scenario – A primary example of this is seen in the issue of handover
in autonomous cars with level 3 automation [369], where the passenger is expected to
assume different roles depending on the nature of automation of the car and change
into the role of a driver in the matter of seconds if needed. Further, the owner may
be allowed to change the behavior of the car by imparting his / her preferences (e.g.
avoid highways), but the roles or capabilities of the consumer and the trainer of the
AI are also limited (e.g. cannot make the car ignore red lights).
State of Research – The need for such handover is common across various forms of
automation, some of which (e.g. operation of aircrafts) has been well studied and can
thus provide useful guidance towards design of the same in the context of human-AI
collaborations in a wide variety of applications. Of particular interest are the levels of
automation studied [410, 342] in the HCI community and the five levels of automation
[369] established in the autonomous car industry. Collaborative AI systems has been
recently developed [404] to exhibit similar design principles.
Opportunities – This provides a unique opportunity to formalize the different
kinds of human-AI collaborations, identify their potential risks and benefits, as well
as categorize challenges in these avenues for the purposes of proper understanding
and systemization of research in the field going forward. Progress in each of these
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categories require establishment of standards with regards to the role (e.g. consumer
or developer, expert or inexpert) of the human in the loop, modes of interactions with
the human, and content of those interactions.
Open Questions / Barriers – Previous work [340] has shown how use of au-
tomation may result in automation bias leading to omission and commission errors,
which underlines the importance of reliability of the automation [341]. Indeed, it is
well known [486] that climbing the automation ladder might well improve operative
performance but drastically decrease the response to failures [22]. This is even more
crucial as AI systems continue to develop and are prone to mistakes. An effective
relationship between the human and the AI in a collaborative setting thus demands
clear establishment of common grounds in light of these eventualities. In his recent
TED Talk [2] Gill Pratt, the CEO of Toyota Research Institute, has highlighted these
issues in the context of handover in autonomous cars.
F.2.6 Collaborative AI as a Cure for Systemic Biases
Summary of Issue – Humans are known to be biased. Such biases can be historical,
irrational and often harmful. AI is known to fall prey to such biases but also has the
potential to guard against the same.
Illustrative Scenario – A well-known example of this concerns “racist algorithms”
that predict recidivism based on historical data [214] (which, unsurprisingly, is racist
by virtue of the past itself being racist). Machine learning is replete with such examples
[509, 117, 109, 59], varying from such racist or sexist outcomes of being trained on
historically biased datasets, to possibly more benign cases where an AI sees dogs
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everywhere [55] since the data used [116] for training had an unreasonable abundance
of dogs in it. This is not surprising since an effective pattern recognizer is supposed
to learn these patterns (or “biases”) if they are in, in fact, present in the data.
State of Research – There has been significant interest of late [21, 199] in the AI
community towards developing algorithms that can be more robust towards these
biases. Such concerns, of course, extend beyond just machine learning algorithms,
to even how physical embodiments [27, 375] of AI (e.g. robots) are portrayed or
perceived. This is a nascent field of research, and many questions remain as to how to
develop algorithms that can detect and respond to such biases. A natural outcome of
AI algorithms being able to do so is, of course, the ability to make us cognizant of our
own biases when situated in a collaborative setting.
Opportunities – In the truest sense of augmentation of AI for overcoming human
limitations, AI can provide [496, 310] a unique remedy to human errors of judgment
based on implicit or explicit biases [155]. This can, for example, have significant
impact on the judiciary system in rooting out systemic injustices in a society. Such
biases are not only relevant for data driven machine learning approaches but also in
supporting human decision making which is known [299, 463] to be fallible. Addressing
such biases can help in enabling better decision making in command and control
scenarios. Indeed, as our technology becomes more human so do we [293].
Open Questions / Barriers – In the context of human-AI collaborations, the
notion of human biases adds an added layer of complexity to human-AI interactions
especially in terms of the training of algorithms (when does the AI trust the human
or the data it is provided?) [309] as well as the consumption of the algorithm (when
does the human trust the judgment of an AI system?).
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Remark – This can be seen as the Secondary Grand Challenge for Human-AI
Collaborations in the identification and removal of biases that make us humans less
human every day. It requires research in developing algorithms (Section F.2.6) that
can be immune to such biases [425] when learning from humans, but also able to alert
the human of such biases when necessary. The establishment of appropriate common
grounds (Section F.2.5) in the roles of the human in collaboration with the AI can
provide effective means of controlling this process.
F.2.7 Ethics and Transparency in the Design of Collaborative AI
Summary of Issue – Collaborations with humans expose new ethical challenges for
the design of AI in how data is collected and used, and in questioning the motivations
behind the design of AI systems itself.
Illustrative Scenario – Consider a decision support agent that is required to explain
the rationale behind its recommendations. It figures out that certain explanations are
more likely to satisfy the human even though they were not the real reason for its
actions. This may even end up improving performance of the dyad, but is this ethical
[70]? What if the goals of the AI agent are not aligned with the human?
State of Research – It has been proposed that the design of AI should be provably
beneficial [385]. Recent works in this direction include the value alignment problem
[32] and the off-switch game [173] which aims to guarantee that an AI exist only
only to help humans and can be turned off otherwise. Inverse reinforcement learning
[329, 174] as a means to understand a human’s reward function has been proposed as a
solution to this. The issue of establishing trust in human-AI collaborations, especially
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with fears of misaligned values, has been a topic of significant interest of late from the
military [431] where establishing common grounds [308] with the human in the loop
is crucial in mission critical scenarios.
Opportunities – Establishment of ethics and principles in the design of AI systems
is likely to be crucial in the shaping of public perception [141] towards the adoption
of AI technologies. In some cases, this is also dictated by law [167, 476]. The
scope of provably beneficial AI also extends to the debate on augmentation versus
replacement, and serves as a call to action to developers of AI around the world.
Amidst growing concerns about questionable AI research methods in the industry
[412] and the academia [248], recent calls for an ethical watchdog [95] for AI research
has highlighted the urgent need to respond to these concerns.
Open Questions / Barriers – The question of value alignment becomes difficult
since most real-world situations involve multiple humans with conflicting values or
utilities, such as in trolley problems [406]. Further, devices sold by the industry is
likely to have inbuilt tendencies to maximize profits for the maker which can be at
conflicts with normative expectations of the customer. It is unclear how to guarantee
that the values of the end user will not compromised in such scenarios.
F.2.8 Benchmarks / Competitions for Human-AI Collaborations
Summary of Issue – Most of the excitement about AI in the public conscience has
been around humans and AI in competitive settings. Human-AI collaborations may
be more useful, but must then learn to follow the same rubric for success / publicity.
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Illustrative Scenario – Perhaps the most telling example of this is Watson [495]
which has often been billed as the smart assistant to revolutionize data-driven decision-
making in an enterprise setting, and has already seen deployment in a variety of
collaborative scenes such as in law, medicine and science; but is still mostly recognized
as the machine that beat the world champion in Jeopardy more than a decade ago.
State of Research – Unfortunately, very few examples exist of competitions that
share interests in human-AI collaborations. Existing robotics competitions such as
RoboCup@Home [379] (for assistive robots in a domestic scene) or RoboCup@Rescue
[378] (for search and rescue operations) have massive scope of incorporating the same,
but does so at the moment in very limited fashion, if at all. Similar platforms for
collaborative AI in general do not exist.
Opportunities – The establishment of benchmarks and competitions create fantastic
drivers for accelerating research, as well as creation of standards by which such progress
can be directed, measured, compared and reproduced.
Open Questions / Barriers – A significant barrier towards developing effective
competitions within the scope of human-AI collaborations is the difficulty of meaningful
evaluations. Unlike in games such as Chess, Go and Jeopardy where the metric of
success is quite well defined, it is much less so in the context of human-AI collaborations
where the metrics of success are required to measure more latent factors such as trust
(beyond objective assessment of performance) and are thus much more nuanced.
Proper design of these metrics and benchmarks require multi-disciplinary effort.
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F.2.9 Role of Social Sciences and HCI Communities
Summary of Issue – The AI community, especially research in human-AI collabo-
rations, must learn to talk to other disciplines such as HCI, social sciences, human
factors, psychology, law and others for a clearer understanding of the functional
requirements as well as known pitfalls and best practices for working with humans.
Illustrative Scenario – A great example of this is the field of human-computer
interactions (HCI) which has gradually recognized the importance of understanding
the user and has become increasingly multidisciplinary over the years. HCI has, of
course, seen its fair share of catastrophic designs [61, 303]. Alan Cooper, designer of
Visual Basic (a language built for the purpose of building good user interfaces), called
this a case of “inmates running the asylum” in his classic book [107] on the topic.
State of Research – The need for human centric design of AI-based systems is
largely recognized in communities such as in the fields of human-computer interaction
(HCI) and human-robot interaction (HRI) which are gathering prominence rapidly.
Typical examples of this include recent work [375] on ethics in the design of robots,
and the inaugural conference on AI, Law and Ethics [383] held in conjunction with
AAAI 2018. Efforts [307, 262] have also been made to bridge this gap in the context
of the explanation generation in AI-based systems and studies in psychology that can
provide useful guidance to how humans generate, select and perceive explanations.
In fact, as mentioned before, much of the classical models of AI have been built on
models of folk psychology. Collaborative AI as a field can also benefit from the same.
Opportunities – Studies in human-human/machine interactions offer a fantastic
starting point for the design of human-AI collaborations. This will not only consider-
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ably accelerate research by identifying known pitfalls, but also prevent reinvention of
wheels of well-understood practices in the design of collaborative technology. Michael
Jordan provides fantastic perspective on this in his recent article [304].
Open Questions / Barriers – Multi-disciplinary collaborations have always been a
virtuous goal for most research areas – the biggest barriers towards this range from the
differences in how different disciplines conduct research down to the basic taxonomy
of ideas concerned. Especially as it relates to human-AI collaborations, a clearer
understanding is required across the board with regards to the scope of AI technologies
(both current and aspirational) and their role in different avenues of human enterprise.
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ALTERNATIVE MODES OF COMMUNICATION FOR HUMAN-AWARE AI
“Inside the museums, Infinity goes up on trial.”
In Chapter 4, I demonstrated how the medium of mixed-reality can be used to
orchestrate effective coordination with the human. The primary motivation of that
work was to be able to replace or complement natural language with a more efficient
(albeit much less expressive) vocabulary for communication in more engineered or
structured environments such as in semi-automated manufacturing. In this chapter, I
will illustrate how this narrative fits into the broader umbrella of alternative modes of
communication between humans and AI planning agents.
G.1 Introduction: Can we do better than natural language?
Effective planning for human robot teams not only involve the capacity to be
“human-aware" during the plan generation process, but also require the ability to
interact with the human during the plan execution phase, as well as collect data
during it so as to inform the decision making process, either immediately or over time,
of a learning agent. Prior work has underlined this need [228] as well as explored
ways to exchange [446] information in natural language during interaction with the
human in the loop. However, the state of the art in natural language considerably
limits the scope of such interactions, especially where precise instructions are required.
Moreover, prior work in learning appropriate models for human awareness largely
rely on labeling phases [507] that are quite unrealistic for large scale data collection.
In this chapter, I will discuss how natural language and labeling techniques can be
replaced to a large extent, especially in settings such as the manufacturing industry,
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with the help of wearable technologies (such as the HoloLens and the Emotiv Epoc+
EEG headset) for effective interaction during human-in-the-loop operation of robots.
Indeed, the last decade has seen a massive increase in robots deployed on the
factory floor [380]. This has led to fears of massive loss of jobs for humans in the
manufacturing industry, as well concerns of safety for the jobs that do remain. The
latter is not an emerging concern, though. Automation of the manufacturing industry
has gone hand in hand with incidents of misaligned intentions between the robots
and their humans co-workers, leading to at least four instances of fatality [482]. This
dates back to as early as 1979 when a robot arm crushed a worker to death while
gathering supplies in the Michigan Ford Motor Factory, to as recent as 2015 in a very
similar and much publicized accident in the Volkswagen factory in Baunatal, Germany.
With 1.3 million new robots predicted to enter the workspace by next year [351], such
concerns are only expected to escalate.
A closer look at the dynamics of employment in the manufacturing industry also
reveals that the introduction of automation has in fact increased productivity [320]
as well as, surprisingly, contributed to a steady increase in the number of jobs for
human workers [274] in Germany (which so far dominates in terms of deployed robots
in the industry). We posit then either a semi-autonomous workspace in future with
increased hazards due to misaligned interests of robots in the shared environment, or
a future where the interests of the human workers will be compromised in favor of
automation. In light of this, it is essential that the next-generation factory floor is
able to cope with the needs of these new technologies. Indeed, recent reports [1] have
hinted at significant gains to be had from bridging this gap.
At the core of this problem is the impedance mismatch between humans and
robots in how they represent and communicate information, as illustrated in Figure
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Figure 108: Alternative forms of communication to combat impedance mismatch in
human robot interactions in settings where wearables can be integrated for closed
loop feedback from EEG signals and Augmented Reality.
108. Despite the progress made in natural language processing, natural language
understanding is still a largely unsolved problem, and as such robots find it difficult
to (1) express their own goals and intentions effectively; as well as (2) understand
human expressions and emotions. Thus there exists a significant communication
barrier to be overcome from either side, and robots are essentially still “autistic"
[226] in many aspects. While this may not always be a serious concern for deploying
completely autonomous agents in isolated environments such as for space or underwater
exploration, the priorities change considerably when humans and robots are involved
in collaborative tasks, especially for concerns of safety, if not to just improve the
effectiveness of collaboration. This is emphasized in the 2016 Roadmap for U.S.
Robotics [99] which outlines that “humans must be able to read and recognize robot
activities in order to interpret the robot’s understanding”. To this end, recent works
have focused on generation of legible motion plans [122] and explicable task plans
[507], and verbalization of intentions in natural language [446, 345].
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G.1.1 System Overview
Our primary focus here is on structured settings like the collaborative assembly
environment where wearables can be a viable solution for improving the workspace.
Indeed, a reboot of the safety helmet and goggles as illustrated in Figure 108 only
requires retro-fitting existing wearables with sensors that can enable these new tech-
nologies. Imagine, then, a human and robot engaged in an assembly task, where they
are constructing a structure collaboratively. Further suppose that the human now
needs a tool from the shared workspace. At this time, neither agent is sure what
tools and objects the other is going to access in the immediate future - this calls for
seamless transfer of relevant information without loss of workflow. Existing (general
purpose) solutions will suggest intention recognition [180] or natural language [446]
communication as a means to respond to this situation. With regards to naturalistic
modes of interaction among agents, while natural language and intent or gesture
recognition techniques remain the ideal choice in most cases, and perhaps the only
choice in some (such as robots that would interact with people in their daily lives), we
note that these are inherently noisy and ambiguous, and not necessary in controlled
environments such as on the factory floor or by the assembly line where the workspace
can be engineered to enforce protocols in the interests of safety and productivity, in
the form of safety helmets integrated with wearable technology [384].
Instead, in our system, the robot projects its intentions as holograms thus making
it directly accessible to the human in the loop, e.g. by projecting a pickup symbol on
a tool it might use in future. Further, unlike in traditional mixed reality projection
systems, the human can directly interact with these holograms to make his own
intentions known to the robot, e.g. by gazing at and selecting the desired tool thus
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forcing the robot to replan. To this end, we develop, with the power of the HoloLens26,
an alternative communication paradigm that is based on the projection of explicit
visual cues pertaining to the plan under execution via holograms such that they can
be intuitively understood and directly read by the human partner. The “real" shared
human-robot workspace is now thus augmented with the virtual space where the
physical environment is used as a medium to convey information about the intended
actions of the robot, the safety of the work space, or task-related instructions. We call
this the Augmented Workspace. Recent development of augmented reality techniques
[398] has opened up endless possibilities in such modes of communication.
This, by itself, however, provides little indication of the mental state of the
human, i.e. how he is actually responding to the interactions - something that human
teammates naturally keep track of during a collaborative exercise. In our system,
we propose to use real-time EEG feedback using the Emotiv EPOC+ headset27 this
purpose. This has several advantages - specific signals in the brain are understood
to have known semantics (more on this later), and are detected immediately and
with high accuracy, thus short circuiting the need for the relatively highly inaccurate
and slower signal processing stage in rivaling techniques such as emotion and gesture
recognition. Going back to our previous use case, if the robot now makes an attempt
to pick up the same tool again, the error can fire an event related EEG response -
which may readily be used as in a closed loop feedback to control or stop the robot.
Further, if the robot is making the same mistake again and again, causing the human
to be stressed and/or irritated, it can listen to the human’s affective states to learn
better, and more human-aware, policies over time. We demonstrate these capabilities
26https://www.microsoft.com/microsoft-hololens/en-us
27https://www.emotiv.com/epoc/
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as part of the Consciousness Cloud which provides the robots real-time shared access
to the mental state of all the humans in the workspace. These signals can either be
used as a control signal for immediate monitoring of the plan execution process (e.g.
abort action on detecting surprise) or for long term feedback on the human’s attitude
towards the robot (e.g. to learn human-aware policies). The Consciousness Cloud logs
the mental state of all the humans in the shared workspace and makes it available to
the robots in the form of a real-time accessible representation of the mental model of
the humans. The agents are thus able to query the cloud about particulars (e.g. stress
levels) of the current mental state, or receive specific alerts related to the human’s
response to events (e.g. oddball incidents like safety hazards and corresponding ERP
spikes) in the environment.
Finally, instead of the single human and robot collaborating over an assembly
task, imagine now an entire workspace shared by many such agents, as is the case
of most manufacturing environments. Traditional notions of communication become
intractable in such settings. With this in mind, we make the entire system cloud based
- all the agents log their respective states on to a central serve, and can also access the
state of their co-workers from it. As opposed to peer-to-peer information sharing, this
approach provides a distinct advantage towards making the system scalable to multiple
agents, both humans and robots, sharing and collaborating in the same workspace, as
envisioned in Figure 109. Thus the system conceptualizes a centralized Dashboard (as
seen in Figure 110) that provides a real-time snapshot of the entire workspace. The
Dashboard allows the humans to communicate or visualize the collaborative planning
process between themselves. It can be especially useful in factory settings to the floor
manager who can use it to effectively monitor the shared workspace. It shows the
real-time stream from the robots’ points of view, the AR streams from the humans’
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Figure 109: A conceptual impression of the next generation workshop floor involving
multiple humans and robots sharing the workspace and collaborating either singly or
in groups across different tasks. The humans are wearing safety helmets integrated
with electrodes to capture EEG feedback, as well as safety goggles that provide access
to augmented reality based communication through a shared cloud platform. The
robots thus have access to a real-time mental model of their human co-workers on the
cloud which they can use to inform or modulate their behavior. The robots can also
project their intentions into the environment thereby improving situational awareness
of their human teammates. These two components – the Consciousness Cloud and the
Augmented Workspace – form a sophisticated plan execution and monitoring system
that can adapt with real-time feedback from the humans.
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points of view and information about the current status of plan execution and the
affective states of the human(s) in the loop.
Thus, in this chapter, we tear down this communication barrier between human
and robot team members (1) by means of holograms/projections as part of a shared
alternative vocabulary for communication in the Augmented Workspace, and (2)
by using direct feedback from physiological signals to model the human mental state in
the shared Consciousness Cloud. The former allows for real-time interactive plan
monitoring and execution of the robot with a human-in-the-loop, while the latter, in
addition to passive plan monitoring, also allows a planning agent to learn preferences
of its human co-worker and update its policies accordingly. We will show how this can
be achieved on an end-to-end cloud-based platform built to scale up to the demands
of the next-generation semi-autonomous workspace envisioned in Figure 109.
Remark – A short presentation on the system can be viewed at https://youtu.be/
5EJPc8YaIuE. An even shorter video demonstrating its capabilities can be viewed at
https://youtu.be/6c4OlcnaZAQ. This research has appeared in the 2017 Microsoft
Imagine Cup, where I led team ÆRobotics to the US Finals. Details can be found at
http://www.ae-robots.com/.
G.1.2 Chapter Highlights
In Chapter 4 I have already covered the Augmented Workspace in great detail.
Here, I explore how real-time feedback can be acquired using electroencephalographic
(EEG) signals during the plan execution process in order to be used by a learning
agent to adapt to specific user preferences.
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Figure 110: The Dashboard - displaying elements of the Consciousness Cloud and the
Augmented Workspace - monitors the state of the shared workspace including the
status of plan execution, the point of views of different agents in both real and the
augmented workspace, and the affective states of the human(s) in the loop.
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G.2 The Consciousness Cloud
Electroencephalography (EEG) is an electrophysiological monitoring method to
measure voltage fluctuations resulting from ionic currents within the brain. The use
of EEG signals in the design of BCI has been of considerable interest in recent times.
The aim of our project is to integrate EEG-based feedback in human-robot interaction
or HRI. Of particular interest to us are Event Related Potentials or ERPs which
are measured due the response to specific sensory, cognitive, or motor events, and
may be especially useful in gauging the human reaction to specific actions during
the execution of a robot’s plan [192, 3, 171, 363]. Recently, researchers have tried to
improve performance in robotics tasks by applying error-related potentials or ErrPs
[367, 145] to a reinforcement learning process [210, 209]. These are error signals
produced due to undesired or unexpected effects after performing an action. The
existence of ErrPs and the possibility of classifying them in online settings has been
studied in driving tasks [500], as well as to change the robot’s immediate behavior
[389]. However, almost all of the focus has remained on the control of robots rather
than as a means of learning behavior [34], and very little has been made of the effect
of such signals on the task level interactions between agents. This remains the primary
focus of our system.
Figure 111 demonstrates different ways in which EEG signals can be used to
provide closed loop feedback to control the behavior of robots. This can be useful in
two ways - either as a means of plan monitoring, i.e. controlling the plan execution
process using immediate feedback, or as a reward signal for shaping and refining the
policies of a learning agent. A preliminary video demonstrating these capabilities is
available at https://goo.gl/6LhKNZ.
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G.2.1 Discrete Events
Discrete events refer to close to instantaneous events, producing certain typical
(easy to classify) signals. We identify three modalities of EEG-based feedback - (1)
Event Related Potentials or ERPs (e.g. p300) that can provide insight into the
human’s responses like surprise; (2) Affective States like stress, valence, anger, etc.
that can provide longer term feedback on how the human evaluates interactions with
the robot; and finally (3) Alpha Rhythm that can relate to factors such as task
engagement and focus of the human teammate. This type of feedback is useful in the
online monitoring of the plan execution process by providing immediate feedback on
errors or mistakes made by the robot. The video demonstration shows a particular
example when the human avoids coming into the harm’s way by stops the robot’s
arm by blinking. Figure 111 shows another such use case where the robot is building
words (chosen by the human) out of lettered blocks and makes a wrong choice of
a letter at some stage - the mistake may be measured as a presence of ERP signal
here. The latter has so far gotten mixed results leading us to shift to different EEG
helmets (Emotiv Epoc+ lacks electrodes in the central area of the brain where p300s
are known to be elicited) for better accuracy.
G.2.2 Affective States
Here, our aim is to train a learning agent to model the preferences of its human
teammate by listening to his/her emotions or affective states. We refer to this as
affective robotics (analogous to the field of affective computing). As we mentioned
before, the Emotiv SDK currently provides five performance metrics, namely va-
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Figure 111: Different modes of EEG feedback - the robot can observe response to
discrete events (left - listening for p300s) and listen to longer term affective states of
the human (right - a reinforcement learner using stress values as negative feedback),
and use this information to refine its policies. A video demonstration is available at
https://goo.gl/6LhKNZ.
lence/excitement, stress/frustration, engagement, attention, and meditation. At this
time, we have limited ourselves to excitement and stress as our positive (RH+) and
negative reward signals (RH−). We use a linear combination of these two metrics to
create a feedback signal that captures the human’s emotional response to a robot’s
action. It is important to note that these signals do not capture the entire reward
signal but only capture soft goals or preferences that the robot should satisfy, which
means the total reward for the agent is given by R = RT + RH , where RT is the
reward for the original task. However, learning this from scratch becomes a hard (as
well as somewhat unnecessary if the domain physics is already known) problem given
the number of episodes this will require. Keeping this in mind, we adopt a two staged
approach where the learning agent is first trained on the task in isolation without
the human in the loop (i.e Q-learning with only RT ) so that it can learn a policy
that solves the problem (piT ). Then we use this plan as the initial policy for a new
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Q-learning agent that considers the full rewards (R) with the human in the loop. This
“bootstrapping" approach should reduce the training time as the policy piT should be
much closer to pi∗ than a random policy pi′.
The scenario, as seen in Figure 111, involves a workspace that is shared by a robot
and a human. The workspace consists of a table with six multicolored blocks. The
robot is expected to form a three-block tower from these blocks. As far as the robot
is concerned all the blocks are identical and thus the tower can be formed from any of
the blocks. The human has a goal of using one of those specific blocks for his/her own
purpose. This means whenever the robot uses that specific block it would produce
high levels of frustration within the human. The goal of the robot is thus to use this
negative reward to update its policy to make sure that it does not use one of the
blocks that the human implicitly requires.
For the first phase of training, we trained the agent using a simulated model of the
task. For the state representation, we used a modified form of the IPC BlocksWorld
pddl domain. We used a factored representation of the state with 36 predicates and
one additional predicate tower3_formed to detect task completion. At every step,
the agent has access to 50 actions to manipulate the blocks on the table and 80
additional actions form3tower to check for the goal. As for the task rewards, each
action is associated with a small negative reward and if the agent achieves the goal it
receives a large positive reward. We also introduced an additional reward for every
time the number of ontable predicates reduces (which means the agent is forming
larger towers) to improve the convergence rate. We found that the agent converged to
the optimal policy (the agent achieves the goal in 5 steps) at around 800 iterations.
Figure 111 shows the length of the episodes produced after each iteration and the
distribution of Q values across the table. Once the initial bootstrapping process was
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completed, we used the resultant Q-value table as our input for the second phase of
the learning, as seen in the video demonstration. While there are some issues with
convergence that are yet to be resolved, initial results showing the robot exploring
new policies using the stress signals are quite exciting.
G.2.3 System Architecture
The Consciousness Cloud has two components - the affective state monitor and
the discrete event monitor (as shown in Figure 112). In the affective state monitoring
system, metrics corresponding to affective signals recorded by the Emotiv EPOC+
headset are directly fed into a rabbitMQ queue, as before, called “Raw Affective Queue”
to be used for visualization, and a reward signal (calculated from the metrics) is fed
into the “Reward Queue”. The robot directly consumes the “Reward Queue” and the
signals that appear during an action execution is considered as the action reward
or environment feedback for the AI agent (implementing a reinforcement learning
agent). For the discrete event monitoring system, the raw EEG signals from the
brain are sampled and written to a rabbitMQ queue called “EEG queue”. This queue
is being consumed by our Machine learning or classifier module, which is a python
daemon running on a azure server. When this python daemon is spawned it trains an
SVM classifier using a set of previously labelled EEG signals. The signals consumed
from the queue are first passed through a feature extractor and then the extracted
features are used by the SVM to detect specific events (e.g. blinks). For each event a
corresponding command is sent to the “Robot Command” queue, which is consumed
by the robot. For example, if a STOP command is sent for the blink event, it would
cause the robot to halt its current operation.
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Figure 112: Architecture diagram of the Consciousness Cloud.
449
Appendix H
RELAYING V2V COMMUNICATION TO SMART HUDS FOR IMPROVING
SITUATIONAL AWARENESS OF DRIVERS
450
RELAYING V2V COMMUNICATION TO SMART HUDS FOR IMPROVING
SITUATIONAL AWARENESS OF DRIVERS
“Brrr brrr brr-brr brr-brr brrr brrr.”
In Chapter 4 and Appendices B and G, we looked at how mixed-reality interfaces
can enabled smoother interactions between humans and AI planning systems. In
this chapter, we will demonstrate yet another example of this in the context of
vehicle-to-vehicle communication.
Inter-car communication has emerged in recent times as a viable solution towards
reducing traffic hazards, with the recent US government mandate in favor of vehicle-
to-vehicle communication highlighting the movement towards this direction in the
automobile industry. However, questions remain as to how information from other
cars can be effectively relayed to a driver, especially so as to not overload the driver
with too much information. Meanwhile, a parallel thread of development in the
space of Smart HUDs has shown the applicability of augmented reality to increase
the situational awareness of drivers on the road. In this paper, we build on these
threads of work and show how Smart HUDs can be an effective platform for projecting
relevant information from surrounding vehicles in real time, and how an onboard AI
component can avoid increased cognitive burden on the driver by determining when
and what information to project based on its models of the driver and the surrounding
environment. This is a report on our work in progress on the same.
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H.1 Introduction
Vehicle-to-vehicle (v2v) communication technology has seen significant interest
[243] over the last decade in a bid to make the roads safer both from the perspective of
(fleets of) autonomous cars [257] on a shared network or for improving the situational
awareness of individual human drivers [280]. This interest has also been reflected in the
US government’s recent mandate [405] for making v2v communication a mandatory
feature of automobiles. Although the previous mandate for v2v communication has
seen some setbacks [135] of late, the general outlook towards this area remains positive
with the Department of Transportation (DoT) [437] continuing to be one of the major
players in the field.
However, v2v communication poses different interfacing challenges depending on
the whether the receiving vehicle is autonomous or not. The former is likely to be able
to process larger amounts of data in byte form while the latter can be easily overloaded
with information and become distracted [432, 24] thus rendering the whole point of v2v
communication moot. There has indeed been significant work [311] aimed at different
forms of driver-to-vehicle interfaces (DVIs) and driver-to-infrastructure interfaces
(DIIs), such as with the help of vibrating seats or audio-visual cues [437] to alert the
driver of impending danger. As [311] acknowledges, with the continued progress of
augmented or mixed reality (AR / MR) technology [489], heads-up displays (HUDs)
might become the interface of choice for drivers. Recent trends [458, 115, 148, 250]
certainly point towards this eventuality.
However, such visual cues are also likely to increase the cognitive burden on drivers
if not designed effectively. Further, most of the existing works on v2v communication
are aimed at specific kinds of alerts such as while navigating an intersection [28, 175] or
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when detecting possibility of collisions [148]. As such, the design of a general purpose
DVI with v2v information sharing must account for the possibility of cognitive overload
of the driver. We posit then that solutions for visual DVIs cannot be purely an exercise
in interface design but also a matter of designing higher order reasoning capabilities
of the software that drives the DVIs to be able to differentiate between information
that is relevant to the driver and those that are not. This problem is exacerbated
when all the data for the DVI is not generated in situ (as is the state-of-the-art), but
is rather accumulated from information sent over from surrounding vehicles.
The scope of this project is thus not to develop efficient or secure protocols for
v2v communication or design user-friendly interfaces for smart windshields. Instead,
we focus on how the on-board software for the DVI can leverage AI techniques to
reason over the information at its disposal and decide on what to make available to the
driver, based on its model of the driver and its understanding of the current situation
or context. Our starting point is then that v2v communication technologies already
exist or are, in most cases, an eventuality as are smart HUDs or visual DVIs. We
will build on this to show how such DVIs can benefit significantly from incorporating
v2v communication in the most unrestricted sense (we make no assumptions on
what information is feasible for real-time transmission with today’s technology) and
show how the on-board AI engine can reason with this information to realize a
smart HUD that is truly smart. To this end, we will discuss the design of a general-
purpose architecture for the reasoning or AI engine that drives the DVI, and show
demonstrations of the technology on some typical use cases covered in the literature.
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H.1.1 Typical Use Cases
We will now envision some scenarios that illustrate the usefulness of combining
v2v communication technology with DVI design.
Intention Projection – Vehicles currently use a very limited collection of signals to
inform surrounding vehicles of their intended actions. Human drivers often augment
these signals by using hand gestures to communicate, but even these are not sufficient
for many scenarios, and furthermore, are not available for autonomous cars. For
instance, there is no unique signal for making a U-turn at an intersection, even
though this information would be very relevant to a car in the adjacent street making
a right turn, as well as to a car heading the opposite direction on the other side
of the intersection making a right turn. Or consider driving down a narrow road
when suddenly a car pulls out of parking, and similar issues with maneuvering in
blind-sighted corners – this information can be relayed beforehand, even more so
if the parked car is autonomous and has thus already decided on its intention to
pull out. Perhaps the most well-studied scenario for v2v communication is that of
collision avoidance at intersections [259] – while usually this is a simpler problem since
it is a matter of following the turn-taking rules as outlined in the driver’s manual,
the problem is complicated often by errors in human judgment, or for autonomous
vehicles, the absence of social cues or even mistakes by the automation. Thus, in
navigating an intersection, the DVI might have to reason about what is wrong with
the current situation than what is right, in order to alert the driver, thus complicating
the problem further. Providing drivers with visual projections of the information (e.g.
intentions [82] of nearby cars) that is relevant to their intended path could enable
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them to make better informed decisions, decreasing the risk of a collision without
increasing their cognitive load.
Information Sharing – Human drivers make decisions based on what they are
able to perceive, yet there are several scenarios we encounter while driving where
impending dangers are obstructed from view – e.g. a car slamming on its breaks two
vehicles ahead, a yellow light hidden behind a semi-truck, a cyclist approaching from a
blind spot, etc. With access to information from nearby vehicles, Smart HUDS could
augment the vision of the driver with pertinent details of their occluded surroundings.
During the project we explored these scenarios from the perspective of the reasoning
capabilities of the AI-enabled DVIs. Of course, these scenarios become more nuanced
as we delve into the details of whether the participating cars are autonomous or the
details of the driver model itself, as well as the modes of interaction enabled by the
environment and supported by the reasoning engine, but are also necessary issues that
must be addressed so as to mitigate the additional cognitive burden on the human
driver while also improving the safety of driving, which makes this a significant and
challenging problem going forward.
H.2 The cARs System
In the following, we describe briefly describe the components of the proposed system
cARs (illustrated in Figure 113). Every car, irrespective of whether it is autonomous
or not, or whether it has on-board cARs, broadcasts their “state” information (e.g.
velocity, location, intended route, etc.) and is received by all the cars within a certain
range either via direct peer-to-peer communication or mediated by traffic infrastructure
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Figure 113: An overview of the cARs – every car broadcasts their intentions which is
processed by the car with the help of its model of the driver and the driving context
to determine the relevant content for its DVI.
such as smart intersections [30]. This (broadcast followed by processing at the receiving
end) is a more practical way of sharing information than, say, determining upfront
what information to share with whom. In the case of the latter, a car will need to
estimate the state of its surrounding cars to determine relevance of information, which
is a much harder task.
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Figure 114: The flow of control in the current implementation of cARs. Each car
runs two parallel threads - one where they compute a limited rollout of their future
actions and broadcast it to surrounding cars; the other where they compile incoming
intentions from surrounding cars and filter out the ones that are not relevant before
forwarding them for display in the heads up display.
The on-board DVI has a context switch which it uses based on the current situation
the car is in (e.g. maneuvering at an intersection versus a roundabout, or driving
in a parking lot). With its current model of the driver (e.g. where they are headed,
attention model, etc.) and the incoming information from surrounding vehicles, the
DVI spawns an instance of one of the interaction modules inside its context switch
and solves this instance to get the optimal course of action (CoA) of its parent car as
well as the cars around it. This enables the smart filter to process the computed CoA
to determine information that is relevant to its parent car. It forwards this filtered
content to the DVI (in this case, a smart HUD). This process repeats during the entire
driving period or as long as the DVI is enabled.
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H.2.1 Implementation / Assumptions
We will now describe our implementation of cARs (c.f. Figure 115) and assumptions
made in that process.
- Context Switch – We assume the context switch can correctly identify the
current environment and spawn the correct problem instance. This is not a
strong assumption given the state of the art in vehicular perception and v2v
communication technology. Thus, in this project, we only concentrate on the
smart filter (c.f. Section H.2.2) as introduced in Figure 113.
- Discrete / Shared World – We also discretized the environment in order to run
the reasoning engine in reasonable time. This is inspired by similar discretization
approaches in previous literature [257] to make inter-vehicular information
sharing tractable. We also assume that the vehicles have a shared understanding
of this map [257] in order to reason over each others’ intentions.
- We also assume that the high-level intentions of the cars are known to the car –
e.g. if the car is going to take a left turn at an intersection or if the car is going
to come out of a parking space, etc. This is, in fact, an interesting assumption
(and becomes more nuanced depending on whether a car is autonomous or not)
and worthy of further explication –
- For human-drive car, the intention information is not readily available.
However, this can be derived from the status of the car either explicitly
(e.g. driver turns on left-turn signal or starts up engine in a parked car) or
even implicitly (e.g. driver turns into a left-turn only lane).
- For an autonomous car, the future intentions are easily derivable. Thus,
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arguably, the cARs framework could become more and more useful (i.e. it
can be wary of more higher level intentions further down the line) as more
and more cars become autonomous with respect to the parent car.
In either case, we assume that the higher-level intent is provided to the DVI.
H.2.2 The Smart Filter
Given the above information, the smart filter proposed in Figure 113 is realized
using the following communication protocol.
• On every car (broadcast, publisher node) –
[1] Compile the current feedback from the environment (location of the car,
surrounding area, desire/intent) into a planning problem [183].
[2] Solve this, and repeat.
[3] The solution, i.e. plan or aggregated course of action in the next few time
steps, is now broadcasted to all surrounding cars within the communication range.
• On every car (in situ, receiver node) –
[1] Upon receiving a ping from a nearby car (this contains the intent and relative
position on the shared map of the surroundings as computed above on board the
car sending the ping) every car compiles these as observations to be included in
its own planning problem in the framework of [357, 360].
[2] This compilation produces a new planning problem the solution to which must
enforce the provided observations. This new planning problem is now solved and
the solution is compared (for equality or cost, or specific features as required
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by the designer) to the one from the previous step where the self-plan was
computed without considering the intentions of the cars around the parent car.
If they do not match, then these intentions must have been conflicting, and
hence may be useful information to the driver, if they are the same then the
intentions of the other cars do not matter to the parent car. This is following
Theorem 7 in [357].
[3] The step is asynchronous and runs every time a ping is received from a nearby
car, whereas the broadcast step repeats continuously. The output of the check
about determines if the intent send over from a car needs to be forwarded by
the DVI to be displayed on the SmartHUD.
H.2.3 Discussion
It is worth having a discussion at this point about the trade-offs made in the above
communication scheme, i.e. what did we gain out of casting the interaction modules
in Figure 113 as planning problems? And what do we lose?
Gains. The representation allows us a slick way to not only formulate different forms
of interactions encountered on the road (note: given these are already well
established rules, a declarative rule based system provides an ideal approach
towards this) but also allows us to call upon off-the-shelf techniques to provide
a variety of support functionalities.
- Consider the following domain – https://goo.gl/bUxLQy which fleshes out
the full scope of the intersection domain in much more detail, including
rules for turn taking, queuing, etc. We can use the exact same framework,
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and keep adding such newer modules, to enable newer and newer forms of
interaction in the cARs framework.
- Further, imagine now that the parent car itself is trying to enter the
intersection out out turn. The on-board planner that is computing the
intentions of the self, can easily catch this immediately using plan validation
[198] techniques. This opens up a whole set of possibilities on projecting
intentions that are not only conflicting in the future but are also, for
example, against the law – e.g. in the above case, the SmartHUD will
display back the driver of the parent car that they should stop. We plan to
expand to these scenarios (by integration of the interaction modules with
VAL [198]) in the project going forward.
Thus, the planning representation allows us a rich language to reason over the
driving domain.
- However, planning (of the form used here) itself is known to be PSPACE-
complete and thus we are in danger of taking a computational hit. Luckily,
since these interaction modules are small sub-domains (such as roundabout,
intersection, lane change, etc.) spawned repeatedly, we avoid getting into the
weeds of minimizing computational burden. Indeed, the domains talked about in
the paper solve in 1 sec and can thus the planning instances on the self can be
re-spawned almost every second. The compiled domains also operate similarly,
but are asynchronous. Note here that the compiled domains have to be run
for observations from each car, but these can be run parallel on independent
threads since they do not affect each other, giving us the same amortized runtime.
Loss. The classical planning formulation, while allowing for an expressive vocabulary
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for representing complex interaction constraints, in discrete space, also suffers
from the nature of that discretization. In the current form, we have essentially
turned the environment into a dynamic grid world shared among the cars.
Further, we have assumed communication at the symbolic level which may not
always be possible - e.g. intent as a general high level goal is derivable from the
left-turn or backing signals switched on in a car, but general trajectories are not.
It is, of course, not necessary to account for all sorts of interactions in the same
framework, and the proposed solution does account for a wide variety of them.
Lesson. One of the lessons learned in dealing with the hardware issues (latency and
localization in the real-time / real-world implementation of cARs) is that it may
well be more useful to isolate the visualization challenge with the reasoning
challenge in so much as the information required for them is concerned. Note
that the SmartHUD can only display with respect to what is viewable through
the windshield and thus the localization information from the broadcasted pings
are not necessarily useful there (might be easier to do this with vision, if the
pings can be tokenized to match objects in the scene). This can allow for more
flexible representations going forward. Especially, issues with the GPS accuracy
and the HoloLens map (which, though to be fair, is not built to work outdoors
and is not an issue for the scope of the problem in general since the HoloLens is
just a proxy for the SmartHUD) proved to be troublesome during the project.
H.2.4 Implementation
GPS and location discretization – The DVI for each vehicle in our experiment
was simulated in part by utilizing real-time GPS information from an Android cell
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Figure 115: A demonstration of a simple intersection scene in the ASU parking lot –
the car in the green spot has the first person view and is intending to take a right
turn. The car in the red spot can have three possible intents – go straight, take a
right as well, or make a left turn. Note that only the last intent conflicts with the
parent car. Our cARs framework filters out this information and presents the future
intent of the other car to the in the parent car only if the former is going to take a
left turn. This is seen here in terms of the projected arrow around Andy pretending
to be the other car (a HoloLens simulates the SmartHUD on the parent car). A video
of the demonstration can be seen at https://goo.gl/pAzuzn.
phone. We developed an Android application which receives the latitude and longitude
coordinates of the device and then publishes them - along with the Cartesian-discretized
coordinates - to a centralized RabbitMQ messaging server. The discretization can
be performed manually by marking the centroid of each location, or by reading in
pre-computed mappings created with Google Maps.
Communication – RabbitMQ messaging brokers were configured for each vehicle
to enable vehicle-to-vehicle communication. Each broker builds a queue of messages
from the surrounding vehicles, and then initializes the planning and compilation
procedures discussed above. In our final implementation, instead of using separate
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messaging servers for each vehicle, we decided to use a single centralized server, which
receives the locations of - and handles the planning for - all vehicles in each scenario.
This was done for convenience, as it enabled us to add more cars to each scenario by
only adding more cell phones, without the need of additional laptops. Without the
use of ad-hoc communication, we were also limited by the port security configured
on the Local Area Network at the scenario site, so using a centralized server greatly
simplified the networking requirements. Note that this design in effect converts our
vehicle-to-vehicle solution into a vehicle-to-infrastructure solution.
Intention Projection – Simulation of a Smart HUD was accomplished using a
Microsoft HoloLens, which enabled us to augment the driver’s view with the relevant
intentions of nearby vehicles using a virtual arrow. The information required by the
HoloLens to generate each projection is accessed via a RESTful API, which provides
a JSON object that encodes each intention of the scenario.
The HoloLens uses a mapping of the environment that corresponds to the same
discretized space defined previously in order to properly draw the arrow relative to the
driver’s position and orientation. This mapping is done separately, and is more typical
of how the HoloLens works in practice, more than how a SmartHUD is implemented
[114] (where the projection is done in situ relative to the view from the windscreen).
H.3 Demonstration
In this section, we will provide a demonstration of cARs in action in a mock
intersection domain. The files for the interaction module are provided at https:
//goo.gl/zNYVqj – this is a simplified version of the one described in Section H.2.3,
without the queuing rules and turn taking. The target situation, illustrated in
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Figure 115, plays out in the ASU parking lot next to BYAC, as a mock setting for an
intersection without traffic lights. Here, the parent car is equipped with the AR-enable
SmartHUD (i.e. the HoloLens) and is trying to take a right turn at the bottom right
corner of the image. The car in the opposite corner in the intersection can, of course,
go either of three ways – i.e. go straight, take a right or take a left. These paths are
shown with arrow in Figure 115. Note that only one of these intentions are conflicting.
In the cARs framework, both the cars internally solve their immediate planning
problems, compute their intentions, and broadcast them. In the image, these intents
are shown with the red and green arrows (the other possible ones from the other car
are shown in green). This is the outcome of the first step of the protocol explained
in Section H.2.2. The on-board DVI, here the server, upon receiving intentions from
other cars, compiles these observations into a new planning problem and solves it
asynchronously. As explained in Section H.2.2 (second asynchronous step), if at any
time, the solution from the compiled problem requires the parent car to change its
future course of action, that means the intention of the other car is conflicting with
its own, and thus must be forwarded to the driver. In the current situation, this is
done by placing an arrow next to the car with the conflicting intent, thus illustrating
its immediate planned motion, so as to alert the driver of a possible collision.
The insets in Figure 115 provide snapshots of this interaction in progress (with
us pretending to be the cars, for now). A video of the same can be viewed at
https://goo.gl/pAzuzn. The arrow of course does not show up if the other car was
taking a right turn or just moving forward on the same road.
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Appendix I
APPROXIMATE OPERATOR COUNTS FOR COORDINATION
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APPROXIMATE OPERATOR COUNTS FOR COORDINATION
“The camouflaged parrot, he flutters from fear,
When something he doesn’t know about suddenly appears.”
In this work [85], we develop a computationally simpler version of the operator
count heuristic for a particular class of domains. The contribution of this abstract
is threefold, we (1) propose an efficient closed form approximation to the operator
count heuristic using the Lagrangian dual; (2) leverage compressed sensing techniques
to obtain an integer approximation for operator counts in polynomial time; and
(3) discuss the relationship of the proposed formulation to existing heuristics and
investigate properties of domains where such approaches appear to be useful.
– In particular, from the perspective of human-aware planning, we recognize that
that, in predicting human intentions, often times the entire plan need not be
computed – for example, in Section ??, we were only interested in what resources
the human would be interested in. In this context, being able to have faster
algorithms that can deliver that information accurately is of great value.
Domain Model – The domain is described by a set of variables f ∈ F which can
assume values from a (finite) domain D(f) ⊆ N. A state is given by the particular
assignment of values to these variables: S = {f = v | v ∈ D(f) ∀f ∈ F}. The value of
variable f in state S is referred to as S(f). The action model A consists of operators
a = 〈Ca, Ea〉 where Ca is the cost of the action, and Ea = {〈f, vo, vn〉 | f ∈ F ; vo, vn ∈
{−1} ∪D(f)} is the set of effects. The transition function δ(·) determines the next
state after the application of action a to state S as -
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δ(a,S) = ⊥ if ∃〈f, vo, vn〉 ∈ Ea s.t. vo 6= −1 ∧ vo 6= S(f);
= {f = vn∀〈f, vo, vn〉 ∈ Ea; else f = S(f)} otherwise.
Operator Counts – A planning problem is a tuple Π = 〈F ,A, I,G〉, where I,G are
the initial and (partial) goal states respectively. The solution to the planning problem
is a plan pi = 〈a1, a2, . . .〉, pi(i) = ai ∈ A such that δ(pi, I) |= G, where the cumulative
transition function is given by δ(pi,S) = δ(〈a2, a3, . . .〉, δ(a1, S)). The cost of the plan
is given by C(pi) =
∑
a∈pi Ca and an optimal plan pi
∗ is such that C(pi∗) ≤ C(pi) ∀pi.
The operator count for an action a given a plan pi is given by λ(a, pi) = |{i | a = pi(i)}|
and the total operator count of the plan is given by λ(pi) = |pi|.
Compliant Variables – We define compliant variables as those that whenever they
occur as a precondition of an action, they must also be an effect, and vice versa. Thus,
f ∈ F is compliant iff ∀a ∈ A, 〈f, vo, vn〉 ∈ Ea =⇒ vo 6= −1 ∧ vn 6= −1; f is referred
to as rogue otherwise. Let Φ ⊆ F be the set of all compliant variables, and the set
of compliant variables whose values are specified in the goal be φ ⊆ Φ, henceforth
referred to as goal compliant conditions.
The State Transformation Equation – Let |φ| = m and |A| = n. Consider an
m × n matrix M whose ijth element Mij ∈ Z is the numerical change in fi ∈ φ
produced by action aj ∈ A, i.e. Mij = vn − vo; 〈fi, vo, vn〉 ∈ Eaj . Also, let D be a
vector of size m whose ith entry di is the change in a goal compliant f ∈ φ from the
current state to the final state, i.e. di = vg − vc; vg = fi ∈ G, vc = fi ∈ S; and let x be
a vector of size n, whose ith element is xi ∈ N. Then the following equality holds:
Mx = D (I.1)
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The integer solution x∗ to this system of linear equations with the least |x∗| gives
a lower bound on the operator counts required to solve the planning problem, i.e.
|x∗| ≤ |pi∗|. We can compute a real-valued approximation in closed-form, by
min ||Qx||22 (I.2)
s.t. Mx = D (I.3)
using the Lagrangian multiplier method for this optimization problem as follows –
L(x) =
1
2
||Qx||2 + λT (D−Mx)
∇L(x) = Q2x−MTλ = 0
MTλ = Q2x
MQ−2MTλ = Mx = D
λ = (MQ−2MT )−1D
=⇒ x∗ = Q−2MT (MQ−2MT )−1D (I.4)
Here Q is a n × n matrix of action costs whose ijth entry Qij = Cai if i =
j; 0 otherwise (for unit cost domains) Q is an identity matrix and x∗ =
MT (MMT )−1D. The most costly operation here is the calculation of the pseudo
inverse, which can be done in ≈ O(n2.3) time. Further, M is problem independent,
and hence the factor Z = Q−2MT (MQ−2MT )−1 can be precomputed given an action
model. Thus it follows that we can readily call upon ||QZD|| as a heuristic during
state-space search. Note that this formulation can also determine infeasibility of goal
reachability immediately (in domains where actions are not reversible this is extremely
useful) when the system is unsolvable, as shown in Algorithm 6. Unfortunately, the
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Algorithm 6 Using OP-COUNT Heuristic for State-Space Search
procedure Pre-compute(Π)
Compute M,Q
Convert M to row echelon form → T is the transformation matrix, r is the rank
Y ←M[1 : r, :], Z← Q−2YT (YQ−2YT )−1
procedure h(S) = OP-COUNT(S,G)
Compute D = G− S
Compute T d = T×D and τ = Td[1 : r]
if tdi 6= 0 ∀i ≥ r + 1 then No solution!
else return dQ× Z× τe
use of the l2-norm, that helps us in obtaining the closed-form polynomial bound
heuristic, also makes the heuristic inadmissible.
Sparse coding – Since operator counts are integers, we would ideally want an
integer solution to Eqn I.4. On one hand this makes the problem computationally
intractable, but on the other hand, the polynomial bound Lagrangian method really
suffers from this, giving rise to bad heuristic values for certain section of problems.
To describe this problem geometrically, we consider a planning domain with two
compliant operators (of unit cost), such that x =< x1, x2 >. If the plane inscribed
by Mx = D in the two dimensional space is close two either of the axis, the l2 norm
calculated above results in small fractional values, and hence a less informed heuristic.
As can be seen in the figure 116, the actual operator counts for the given example
(with M =
(
15 4
)
and D =
(
12
)
) should have been x1 = 0 and x2 = 3. But the l2
minimization results in small fractional values with x1 = 0.77 and x2 = 0.77, and the
heuristic values of hl2 = 1.54 instead of |pi∗| = 3.
Thus, we propose a different approximation method to obtain integer values for
individual operator counts, remaining within the polynomial time bound. We notice
that in most cases n m and also n |x∗| due to the combinatorial explosion during
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Figure 116: Eucledian norm minimization produces small fractional values for x1 and
x2
grounding of domains. Thus, we propose an operator count heuristic that exploits
this knowledge about the sparsity of x∗. Since minimizing the l0 norm results in the
sparsest solution, we would ideally want to solve the following –
min |x|l0
s.t. Mx = D
x  0
But, we encounter two problems. Firstly, the optimal operator counts (x∗),
although sparse, might not be the sparsest solution. Secondly, minimizing the l0 norm
is NP -hard [156]. Thus, we draw upon compressed sensing techniques to enforce a
level of sparsity when computing the vector x by minimizing of l1-norm (l1-LP) or
weighted l1-norm (ω-l1-LP) [63] to enforce positive integer solutions.
Geometrically, as can be seen in figure 117 these norms produce a more informed
heuristic (hl1 = 1.60 and hω−l1 = 3.4) for the aforementioned problem. This method
tries to compress (minimize) the norm ball (or box for that matter) as much as possible
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Figure 117: Eucledian norm minimization produces small fractional values for x1 and
x2
till it fits in the plane Mx = D. The operator (dimension) that induces a tighter
constraint (x1 in our case), limits the expansion of the norm ball, producing a less
informed heuristic (hl1 = 1.60). The weighted l1-norm method addresses this problem
by minimizing the l1-norm and iteratively penalizing the increase along the tightest
dimension till convergence is reached or maximum number of iterations are achieved,
resulting in a more informed heuristic (hω−l1 = 3.4). For ω-l1-LP, we empirically
observe that rounding up the individual operator counts produce a more informed
heuristic. Thus, we arrive at a polynomial time proxy for integer solutions.
Evaluations – Table 18 shows the evaluation of the proposed heuristics across a
total of 83 problems from five well-known unit cost planning domains. Each entry in
the table represents the percentage difference in the initial state heuristic value and the
optimal plan length averaged across the problems in each domain. The %-compliance
column shows the average number of goal compliant predicates in the problems. Rows
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Table 18: Analysis of heuristic estimates using OP-COUNT .
Domains %-compliance l1-MILP l1-LP ω − l1-LP OP-COUNT
GED 34.29% 55.48% 55.48% 75.76% 55.48%
Blocks-3ops 31.25% 47.80% 47.80% 23.60% 52.60%
Blocks-4ops 19.64% 67.71% 67.71% 35.42% 67.71%
Visitall - - - - -
GED 25.49% 37.61% 34.02% 53.36% 48.32%
Blocks-3ops 31.25% 47.80% 47.80% 23.60% 52.60%
Blocks-4ops 19.64% 67.71% 67.71% 35.42% 67.71%
Visitall 21.75% 28.41% 28.41% 44.37% 100.00%
Blocks-3ops 48.13% 28.68% 28.68% 44.38% 32.32%
Blocks-4ops 42.86% 56.25% 56.25% 12.50% 64.58%
8-puzzle 88.89% 33.33% 40.00% 46.67% 40.00%
1-3 show the performance of our heuristic on the original domains (‘-’ indicates that
the heuristics could not be computed due to absence of any goal complaint variables).
Rows 3-6 show the performance in domains where the %-compliance was increased
(this was done by identifying instances in the action model where variables assume a
don’t care condition, i.e. a value of -1, and replacing it with appropriate values as
entailed by domain axioms). Finally, rows 6-9 show the performance of our heuristics
in problems with more completely specified goals (which results in higher percentage
compliance). As expected, our heuristic performs better as %-compliance increases
across a particular domain. The performance of l1 LP and ω-l1 LP highlights the
usefulness of compressed sensing in obtaining integer approximations to the MILP.
Remark – The proposed heuristic has close associations with both heuristics on state
change equations and operator counts [348, 43, 465]. Specifically, compliant conditions
capture the net change criteria very succinctly and are thus extremely useful where
such properties are relevant. Another interesting connection to existing work is with
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respect to graph-plan based heuristics [38], except here we are relaxing preconditions
instead of delete effects.
Remark – Our approach works better in domains that have many goal compliant
conditions, e.g. in manufacturing domains [328] or in puzzles like Sudoku [20]. Thus
goal completion strategies and semantic preserving actions have a direct effect on the
quality of the heuristic. The type of representation also determines a part of this
information, e.g. for multivalued variables the same net change may correspond to
different transitions and this information is lost in the compilation, while in many
cases this change may not have any semantics. Intermediate representations such as
transition normal form (TNF) [347] should be investigated in this context.
Remark – Our purpose here was not to compete with the most sophisticated heuristics
of today but to motivate a special case that can be computed extremely efficiently.
We discussed the simplest version of this formulation here, but it can be easily
extended to incorporate more informative features like landmarks [350]. A landmark
constraint is added by simply subtracting the corresponding net change from D:
di ← di − ka × (xn − xo) if 〈di, xo, xn〉 ∈ Ea and a ∈ A is an action landmark with
cardinality ka; and the closed form solution remains valid. In fact in terms of plan
recognition with operator counts, observations are landmarks and the same approach
may apply. This demonstrates the flexibility of our approach.
Resource Constrained Interaction. Finally, as motivated at the start, the approach
described here is especially relevant in the context of multi-agent interactions [94, 505]
constrained by usage piα(η) of a shared resource η by a plan piα of an agent α. For
example, in an adversarial setting, if an agent α2 wanted to stop α1 from executing
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its plan, all it needs to do is to ensure that ∃η s.t. piα1(η) + piα2(η) > |η|. Similarly, in
a cooperative setting, if agent α2 wanted to ensure that α1’s plan succeeds, it would
need to make sure that ∀η piα1(η) + piα2(η) ≤ |η|. In fact, as resource variables are
compliant, our approach may provide quick estimates of an agent’s intent without
computing the entire plan.
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Figure 118: The Model Reconciliation Adventure
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